LinkedIn的泡沫有多大？
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????如果你打算買入LinkedIn的IPO股票，你一定相信這一點。LinkedIn預計將于本周招股，每股超過40美元，遠高于2009年春季這家職業(yè)社交網(wǎng)站自己評估的2.32美元/股。 ????不過，LinkedIn在招股書中承認，公司的股價估算規(guī)則已至少作過一次調整。這一聰明舉動——你要是知道的話，一定會很震驚——自然是讓LinkedIn的創(chuàng)始人、管理者等內部人士受益，損害的是那些以更高IPO價格購股的投資者。這聽起來有點熟悉嗎？ ????LinkedIn期望本周能將IPO價格定在42-45美元/股。這樣的價格區(qū)間意味著去年賺了1,500萬美元的LinkedIn估值為41億美元。簡單計算，即可知估值已是利潤的267倍。 ????由此不難得出結論，這樣的估值讓LinkedIn和其他社交網(wǎng)站穩(wěn)居于泡沫之中。但同樣有意思的是看到泡沫是如何吹大的，這一點我們可以從LinkedIn最近提交給美國證券交易委員會(Securities and Exchange Commission)的文件中看出。 ????這份文件中有一個章節(jié)談到了在過去兩年半里，這家總部位于舊金山的公司董事會是如何為授予員工的6.11億美元股票期權定價的。 ????2009年2月LinkedIn授予的股票期權執(zhí)行價是2.32美元/股。這一年隨后的三次股票期權授予也維持了該執(zhí)行價。LinkedIn表示，影響估值的因素包括“公司業(yè)務的持續(xù)疲弱”以及“美國和全球經(jīng)濟的不確定性”。 ????但隨著業(yè)務改善、經(jīng)濟復蘇，2009年9月LinkedIn將執(zhí)行價提高到了3.50美元/股，并維持該水平直到2009年底。2010-2011年間公司以營收增長改善、金融市場走強以及IPO可能性上升為由，七次上調股票期權的執(zhí)行價。 ????但即便是在這么多次上調后，據(jù)LinkedIn稱“截至2011年3月17日，我們普通股的最新估值”僅為22.59美元/股——接近本月最新提交文件中所列預期發(fā)行價的一半。 ????在解釋這兩者間巨大差距的過程中，LinkedIn認為至少部分原因是因為確定發(fā)行價區(qū)域時，使用的可比同業(yè)組迥異于公司估值報告中采用的可比同業(yè)組。具體來說，用于確定預期發(fā)行價區(qū)間的可比公司分析更側重于與LinkedIn增速類似的互聯(lián)網(wǎng)公司，而不是不具備這些特征的規(guī)模較小的企業(yè)。 ????換言之，LinkedIn現(xiàn)在要么是在1) 采用實際可比公司，而之前則選擇了不如自己的公司，以使股票期權的低執(zhí)行價顯得合理；要么是2) 采用已然高估的可比公司，讓將被市場接受的泡沫價變得合理。你選擇哪一種？公司發(fā)言人未立即回復尋求置評的電子郵件。 ????無論怎樣，事實上所有IPO公司都有一個特點，LinkedIn也不例外：犧牲IPO投資者的利益，讓內部人得利。在你接受邀請加入LinkedIn投資俱樂部之前，要小心了。 |
????You must if you are planning on buying into its initial public offering. LinkedIn is expected to go public this week at a price above $40 a share. That's a far cry from the $2.32 a share the networking-for-professionals outfit valued itself at as recently as the spring of 2009. ????That said, the company admits in offering documents that it has moved the goalposts at least once in estimating what its shares are worth. That nifty move, you'll be shocked to learn, stands to benefit insiders such as LinkedIn's founders and executives at the expense of those buying in at the inflated IPO price. Does any of this sound familiar? ????LinkedIn is looking to sell shares at between $42 and $45 each this week. An IPO that prices in that range would value the company, which made $15 million last year, at $4.1 billion. That's 267 times earnings if you're keeping score at home. ????It is not too hard to make the case that this valuation puts LinkedIn and its social networking peers firmly in bubble territory. But it's interesting all the same to watch the bubble inflate month by month, which LinkedIn allows us to do in a section of its latest filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission. ????That document contains a section that explains how the San Francisco-based company's board decided to price the $611 million worth of stock options it granted employees in LinkedIn over the past two and a half years. ????When the company granted options in February 2009, for instance, it valued them at $2.32 a share. It maintained that price in three subsequent grants that year. Among the factors in those valuations, LinkedIn said, were "continued weakness in our business" and "uncertainty surrounding the U.S. and global economies." ????But as business picked up and the economy started to recover, the company raised the strike price to $3.50 that September. It maintained that price for the rest of 2009, before citing improving revenue growth, strengthening financial markets and the increasing likelihood of an IPO for seven grant-price increases in 2010 and 2011. ????Even after all those increases, the company said a "contemporaneous valuation of our common stock as of March 17, 2011" put the value at just $22.59 a share -- barely half the expected offering price specified in the latest filing this month. ????The company, eager to explain away that rather large gap, now attributes it at least in part to the use of a substantially different set of comparable companies to determine our price range as compared to the comparable companies utilized in our valuation report. Specifically, the comparable company analysis used to determine our anticipated offering price range focused more on Internet businesses that have similar rates of growth as we do, rather than smaller companies that do not share these characteristics. ????That is to say, LinkedIn is either A) using actual comparable companies now after previously choosing dogs to justify its underpriced stock option grants, or B) using hyped-up comparisons now in order to justify the bubbly market-will-bear price. Which do you prefer? A spokesman didn't immediately return an email seeking comment. ????In any case, there is one characteristic that practically all IPO companies share, and here LinkedIn is no exception: A desire to enrich insiders at the expense of public offering buyers. Be very careful indeed before you accept the invitation to join the LinkedIn investor club. |
