拆分風(fēng)潮乍起,石油巨頭末路
????上月,康菲石油公司(ConocoPhillips)宣布公司將拆分成兩家獨(dú)立的上市公司,著實(shí)讓華爾街震驚,也讓人們開始質(zhì)疑大型石油公司存在的理由。如果康菲石油公司分離開采及生產(chǎn)部門與冶煉和營(yíng)銷部門的舉動(dòng)能帶來公司市值的增加,其他公司,如英國(guó)石油(BP)和埃克森美孚石油公司(ExxonMobil)等可能很快將迫于股東壓力而紛紛效仿,繼而徹底改寫能源行業(yè)的格局。 ????到目前為止,人們普遍認(rèn)為“大”才是石油公司制勝的法寶。這個(gè)理念在90年代末達(dá)到了鼎盛時(shí)期,市場(chǎng)上也因此出現(xiàn)了“特大型”石油公司。在美國(guó),康納和石油(Conoco)牽手菲利普斯石油(Phillips),雪佛蘭石油(Chevron)與德士古(Texaco)合并,??松停‥xxon)與美孚石油(Mobil)聯(lián)姻。在歐洲,英國(guó)石油將美國(guó)石油公司阿莫科(Amoco)和大西洋里奇菲爾德(Arco)攬入懷中,法國(guó)道達(dá)爾石油(Total)收購了比利時(shí)石油財(cái)務(wù)公司(Petrofina)和本國(guó)的埃爾夫-阿奎坦公司(Elf Aquitaine)。只有皇家荷蘭殼牌石油(Royal Dutch Shell)沒有受合并潮影響。 ????合并的原因很明確——原油價(jià)格崩盤。上世紀(jì)90年代后期,原油貿(mào)易價(jià)格一度降至10美元一桶。背后的原因很多,既有環(huán)境因素,例如98年的亞洲金融危機(jī),也有結(jié)構(gòu)性因素,例如西方國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)與原油消費(fèi)的脫鉤。除此之外,可供開采的商業(yè)油田的數(shù)量逐年減少,而且由于產(chǎn)油國(guó)要求從石油開采中分得更多的利益,因此現(xiàn)有油田管理費(fèi)也是越來越少。 ????大多數(shù)合并都是成功的,因?yàn)檫@些大公司都藉此建立了有效的商業(yè)模型并精簡(jiǎn)了運(yùn)營(yíng)?!按蟆币馕吨驹谂c石油服務(wù)承包商打交道時(shí)定價(jià)權(quán)也就越大,在與外國(guó)政府協(xié)商時(shí)的優(yōu)勢(shì)也就越大。然而規(guī)模擴(kuò)大所帶來的優(yōu)勢(shì)僅惠及各個(gè)獨(dú)立的業(yè)務(wù)部門:合并提高了冶煉部門的效率,但原因并不在于公司開采和生產(chǎn)部門的壯大,反之亦然。 ????這是因?yàn)殚_采部門與冶煉部門的業(yè)務(wù)沒有太多的關(guān)聯(lián)。與普遍認(rèn)識(shí)相反的是,大型石油公司近來幾乎沒有石油定價(jià)權(quán)。定價(jià)權(quán)掌握在擁有豐富石油儲(chǔ)備的國(guó)家和制定石油市場(chǎng)交易規(guī)則的華爾街銀行和對(duì)沖基金的手中。所以,盡管??松梨谀軌蜷_采出石油,但卻不能保證公司的冶煉部門將原油冶煉成汽油或燃料油后就能賺錢。 單一業(yè)務(wù)公司的復(fù)興 ????希望在石油及天然氣行業(yè)大展拳腳的投資者們注意到了這一厲害關(guān)系。隨著投資者將資金注入小型、單一業(yè)務(wù)公司(專注于單一行業(yè)),大型石油公司的股票交易就開始折價(jià)。事實(shí)上,據(jù)花旗投資研究分析公司(Citi Investment Research and Analysis)最近的一項(xiàng)調(diào)查顯示,自從2000年出現(xiàn)合并潮以來,與小型單一業(yè)務(wù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手相比,大型石油公司的股票平均折價(jià)一直保持在11%-12%。 ????這種折價(jià)對(duì)于大型公司來說就是幾十億美元市值的損失。拿美國(guó)馬拉松石油公司(Marathon Oil)來說,這個(gè)小型整合石油及天然氣公司1月份宣布,公司將一分為二——一家從事開采和生產(chǎn),另一家專注于冶煉和銷售,這與康菲公司的拆分如出一轍。宣布之日的前一天,馬拉松公司的市值約為289億美元。如今,這兩家獨(dú)立的公司,馬拉松石油公司(Marathon Oil Corporation)和馬拉松原油公司(Marathon Petroleum Corporation)的聯(lián)合市值為374億美元,較拆分前增長(zhǎng)了30%,這也意味著拆分釋放了85億美元的潛在市值。 ????根據(jù)拆分決定宣布前日公司的市值計(jì)算,如果拆分能為康菲公司帶來30%的增長(zhǎng)率,那么將有可觀的330億美元的額外市值入賬。但是與馬拉松公司截然相反,自從拆分決定宣布后,康菲公司的股價(jià)一直在下跌——再加上公司的收益乏善可陳,股價(jià)反而下跌了3%。 ????當(dāng)然,在宣布拆分決定時(shí),馬拉松與康菲公司的交易領(lǐng)域截然不同。與其他整合石油公司相比,馬拉松(MRO)折價(jià)20%,而康菲與其同行交易的水平持平。似乎市場(chǎng)根據(jù)馬拉松公司同行的情況對(duì)馬拉松進(jìn)行了重新估價(jià),然后為公司提供了額外10%的市值用于彌補(bǔ)整合公司與單一業(yè)務(wù)公司之間的平均折價(jià)差額。如果這一理論再次驗(yàn)證,康菲公司也將拿到10%的增長(zhǎng)率,這樣公司的市值將增加180億美元——也算是體面。 ????現(xiàn)有的石油巨頭——??松梨冢╔OM),道達(dá)爾,雪佛蘭(CVX),殼牌(RDSA)以及英國(guó)石油(BP)——以及規(guī)模略遜一籌的整合石油公司,例如阿美拉達(dá)赫斯公司(Hess),必將會(huì)密切關(guān)注康菲石油(COP)的拆分舉動(dòng)。分析人士已經(jīng)開始撥弄算盤。大多數(shù)認(rèn)為英國(guó)石油拆分的時(shí)機(jī)已經(jīng)成熟。去年墨西哥灣所發(fā)生的大面積漏油事故使英國(guó)石油元?dú)獯髠@位原油巨頭目前的股價(jià)僅為其凈資產(chǎn)值的零頭。德意志銀行(Deutsche Bank)預(yù)計(jì)如果英國(guó)石油公司剝離其冶煉及營(yíng)銷部門,交易水平與同業(yè)公司看齊,公司將拿下150億——200億的額外市值。 ????但是德意志銀行的分析師們稱,鑒于公司可能還需花費(fèi)十億美元來為去年的原油泄漏善后,因此這種重大戰(zhàn)略拆分對(duì)于公司來說無異于“蠻干”。消化原油泄漏的影響還需幾年的時(shí)間,在此期間,英國(guó)石油公司也將繼續(xù)保持其完整性。然而,英國(guó)石油已開始采取措施,在不拆分公司的情況下通過出售其最大的煉油廠來壓縮其冶煉業(yè)務(wù),并藉此賠付泄漏所造成的損失。 ????英國(guó)石油并不是唯一一家出售煉油廠的公司。例如,殼牌(Shell)在過去的12年中通過變賣資產(chǎn)剝離了40%的煉油業(yè)務(wù)。因此殼牌的拆分在收益上可能無法與康菲石油相提并論。 ????再者,就算拆分可能會(huì)帶來幾十億美元的額外市值,對(duì)于向來保守的石油公司來說,這種大刀闊斧的拆分談何容易。以埃克森美孚石油公司為例,如果拆分能帶來10%的市值增長(zhǎng),那么股東們將新進(jìn)賬430億美元,相當(dāng)于突尼斯一年的GDP。但是??松梨谑谴笮褪凸颈J嘏傻牡湫痛恚鸱謱?duì)于該公司來說無異于天方夜譚。 ????“雖然??松梨跁?huì)是拆分增值的最佳候選人,但是該公司這樣做的可能性幾乎為零。該公司的管理層深信沿用至今的整合經(jīng)營(yíng)模式將在未來繼續(xù)發(fā)揮作用?!泵绹?guó)投行Oppenheimer公司能源分析師費(fèi)德?哥特說。 ????然而??松梨谝膊荒軣o視股東的壓力。好在康菲的拆分預(yù)計(jì)要到明年第一季度才能完成,埃克森美孚仍然有時(shí)間實(shí)現(xiàn)股價(jià)的上揚(yáng)。 ????如果康菲的成功一旦為股東們所接受,相信拆分大型石油公司將成為來年春天年會(huì)當(dāng)中頗為應(yīng)景的提議。所以明年這個(gè)時(shí)候,大型石油公司可能會(huì)重蹈洛克菲勒標(biāo)準(zhǔn)石油公司(Standard Oil)這一往日巨頭的覆轍——迫于市場(chǎng)而不是政府的壓力,被迫分崩離析。 |
????The announcement last month that ConocoPhillips plans to break up into two separately traded companies took Wall Street by surprise, raising uncomfortable questions as to Big Oil's raison d'etre. If COP proves that it can indeed unlock value from separating its exploration and production unit from its refining and marketing units, then other companies, namely BP and ExxonMobil, could soon find themselves under pressure from their shareholders to follow suit, forever changing the energy landscape. ????Up until now, it was widely accepted that being bigger was the key to being a better oil company. That view was taken to its logical extreme in the late 1990s when the "Super Major" oil company was born. In the United States, Conoco merged with Phillips, Chevron merged with Texaco and Exxon merged with Mobil. In Europe, BP snapped up U.S. oil companies Amoco and Arco while France's Total acquired Belgium's Petrofina and fellow French oil company Elf Aquitaine. Only Royal Dutch Shell avoided the merger mania. ????The reason for the mergers was clear -- oil prices had collapsed. In the late 1990s, oil traded down as low as $10 a barrel due to a myriad of events -- some situational, like the Asian economic crisis of 1998, and some structural, like the decreasing link between oil consumption and economic growth in Western nations. In addition, the number of oil fields that were open to commercial development had diminished, while royalties from existing fields were on the wane as oil-producing countries demanded a larger piece of the revenue pie. ????The mergers were seen as a success for most of the majors as they were able to rationalize their business models and streamline operations. Being bigger gave them more pricing power when dealing with oil service contractors and greater leverage when negotiating with foreign governments. But the benefits of being bigger seemed confined to separate business units: While a refining unit got more efficient through the merger, it wasn't because the company had a strong exploration and production unit, and vice versa. ????That's because the exploration side and the refining side of the oil business have little to do with one another. Contrary to popular belief, Big Oil has almost no control over the price of oil these days. That power squarely rests with oil-rich nations that hold most of the world's oil reserves and the Wall Street banks and hedge funds that speculate and make markets in the oil trading game. So even though ExxonMobil pumps oil, it can't guarantee that its refining unit will be able to profitably process a barrel into gasoline or heating oil. Pure-play revival ????Investors who wanted exposure to the oil and gas sector noticed this disconnect. As they put more money in the smaller, pure-play companies that focused on one industry vertical, Big Oil began to trade at a discount. In fact, since the merger mania of 2000, Big Oil has traded at an average discount of between 11% and 12% compared to their smaller pure play competitors, according to a recent study by Citi Investment Research and Analysis. ????That discount translates into billions of dollars in lost value in companies this big. Take the case of Marathon Oil. The small integrated oil and gas firm announced in January that it was splitting up into two companies – one that concentrated on exploration and production and one that concentrated on refining and marketing, similar to the COP split. The day before the announcement, Marathon had a market value of around $28.9 billion. Today, the two independent companies, Marathon Oil Corporation and Marathon Petroleum Corporation, have a combined market value that is 30% higher at $37.4 billion, which means the split potentially unlocked $8.5 billion in value. ????If COP were to ultimately gain 30% in its split, it would add a whopping $33 billion in value, based on its market valuation on the day before the deal was announced. But unlike with Marathon, COP has seen its share price fall since its announcement -- down around 3% on lackluster earnings. ????Of course, Marathon and COP were trading at different places when they announced their decisions to split up, with Marathon (MRO) trading at around a 20% discount to other integrated oil companies, while COP was trading more or less on par with its peers. It seems like the market revalued Marathon to trade in line with its peers and then credited it an additional 10% in value to make up for the average discount between integrated oil companies and pure-play companies. If that logic holds and COP pops 10%, it could still stand to unlock $18 billion in value – not too shabby. ????The remaining oil majors -- ExxonMobil (XOM), Total, Chevron (CVX), Shell (RDSA) and BP (BP) -- as well has the smaller integrated oil companies, like Hess, will undoubtedly be watching COP (COP) intently as it begins its dismemberment. Analysts have already started to fiddle with the numbers. Most have pointed at BP as being ripe for a break up. The oil major currently trades at a fraction of its net asset value, thanks mostly to the black eye it took from the massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last year. Deutsche Bank estimates that if BP were to spin off its refining and marketing unit, it could unlock $15 to $20 billion in value if it were to trade in line with its peers. ????But the analysts at Deutsche Bank say it's "foolhardy" to believe that the company would make any major strategic split given the billions of dollars in potential losses it still faces in connection to last year's oil spill. It could take years for that mess to be sorted out, keeping BP together by force. Then again, BP is already taking steps to reduce its refining presence without a split by selling off some of its largest refineries to help pay for damages in connection with the spill. ????BP is not alone in selling off its refineries. For example, Shell has cut 40% of its refining capacity in the last 12 years through asset sales. A split in Shell's case therefore might not yield the same value as it would for COP. ????Furthermore, oil companies are conservative, so convincing them to make a radical split, even if it could potentially unlock billions of dollars in value, won't be easy. Take ExxonMobil. Just a 10% increase in value through a split would be worth $43 billion to shareholders, which is equivalent to the GDP of Tunisia. But ExxonMobil is known as the most conservative member of Big Oil, making any split hard to imagine. ????"Although ExxonMobil would the ideal candidate since a split could unlock the most value, it is the least likely to do so, as management is convinced that the integrated model will serve it in the future as it has in the past," says Fadel Gheit, the energy analyst at Oppenheimer. ????But even ExxonMobil isn't immune to shareholder pressure. COP is slated to complete its split in the first quarter of next year, giving the company's shares some time to turn to the upside. ????If the ConocoPhillips story is a success for shareholders, there will be calls to break up Big Oil just in time for the annual meetings in the spring. So by this time next year, it is possible that Big Oil will go the way of Rockefeller's once gargantuan Standard Oil -- with the markets, not the government, forcing a break up this time. |