????可以肯定的是，大型銀行絕不會(huì)束手就擒，毫不抗?fàn)幍亟邮苄碌谋O(jiān)管規(guī)定。

????幾周前，有報(bào)道稱，摩根大通（JPMorgan）首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙)在與加拿大銀行（Bank of Canada）的一位行長的見面會(huì)上情緒非常激動(dòng)，以至于高盛（Goldman Sachs）首席執(zhí)行官勞埃德?布蘭克費(fèi)恩覺得有必要在小組會(huì)議后向出席會(huì)見的官員發(fā)送一份電子郵件致歉。(戴蒙后來承認(rèn)他在表述自己的觀點(diǎn)時(shí)有些過激)。

????大型銀行的高管們或許以為向監(jiān)管部門施壓，就能阻止針對大型銀行的新資本金規(guī)定出臺——但這種做法這次可能不會(huì)奏效了。

????原因或許是因?yàn)閼n心忡忡的并不只是監(jiān)管部門。公眾輿論同樣不會(huì)放過這些大型銀行。業(yè)界很多人（包括其他行業(yè)的高管們）都擔(dān)心如果放任不管，依賴美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（Fed）窗口指導(dǎo)和救助的大銀行可能會(huì)無法避免金融危機(jī)的再次爆發(fā)。上周六，二十國集團(tuán)（G20）的財(cái)長們對一項(xiàng)針對大銀行的附加資本金提議表達(dá)了支持，該提議要求大型銀行在執(zhí)行適用于所有國際銀行的資本金要求之外，還需計(jì)提附加資本金。

????銀行業(yè)高管們的有些說法還不失公允【例如，花旗集團(tuán)（Citigroup）首席執(zhí)行官潘偉迪稱新的資本金提議是一把鈍刀】，但其他言論反而只能更加凸顯加強(qiáng)銀行業(yè)監(jiān)管的必要性。

????例如，潘偉迪稱，新的資本金要求會(huì)導(dǎo)致銀行體系中無監(jiān)管領(lǐng)域的泛濫。但如果銀行家們負(fù)責(zé)任的話，他們應(yīng)該指出具體是哪些領(lǐng)域可能會(huì)出現(xiàn)問題，從而幫助監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)堵塞漏洞，《大西洋》月刊（The Atlantic）的丹尼爾?英迪維格里奧稱監(jiān)管部門很容易做到這一點(diǎn)。

????戴蒙在駁斥新規(guī)時(shí)稱，要滿足超大型企業(yè)的需求，必須依靠大型銀行：意即銀行必須具備一定規(guī)模要。如果是這樣，銀行家們應(yīng)向超大型企業(yè)收取額外費(fèi)用，因?yàn)檫@些企業(yè)享受了大型銀行的規(guī)模效應(yīng)帶來的好處，但這種規(guī)模卻給其他客戶和利益相關(guān)者帶來了更多風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

????雖然關(guān)于特定資產(chǎn)類別的資本金構(gòu)成有些建議可能是合理的，但這些問題自1988年訂立首份《巴塞爾協(xié)議》以來就一直存在。如果對他們有利，銀行家們對這些問題的模糊性毫無意見。過去二十年里，太多銀行家們并沒有強(qiáng)化自身的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理，而是將低標(biāo)準(zhǔn)的監(jiān)管資本金條例作為衡量風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的尺度。監(jiān)管體制最終總是存在妥協(xié)的——銀行家們對這一點(diǎn)心知肚明。

????不過，提議對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)高度集中的大型金融機(jī)構(gòu)實(shí)施附加資本金和新的聯(lián)邦存款保險(xiǎn)公司（FDIC）費(fèi)用評估卻是另一回事。它們是對基于市場之經(jīng)濟(jì)價(jià)值的基本認(rèn)可。

????憑借超大規(guī)模贏得超大客戶（其他中小型銀行無法染指這個(gè)領(lǐng)域）的這些大銀行一旦倒閉，也會(huì)給金融系統(tǒng)帶來很大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。大型銀行業(yè)務(wù)涉獵廣泛，情況復(fù)雜，格外需要監(jiān)管部門的關(guān)注。大型銀行吸引了監(jiān)管部門過多的注意力，金融體系中的其他薄弱環(huán)節(jié)就容易遭到忽視，但體系中的每個(gè)人最終都要為此付出代價(jià)。因此，大銀行應(yīng)支付一定的經(jīng)濟(jì)費(fèi)用，為其自身考慮也不能規(guī)模過大，并縮減需要很多監(jiān)管力量的經(jīng)營活動(dòng)。

????這是對納稅人將要承擔(dān)之清理成本的經(jīng)濟(jì)補(bǔ)償，不管這些金融機(jī)構(gòu)是否獲準(zhǔn)倒閉。從這個(gè)意義上說，“大到不能倒”并不是問題。

????需要大型銀行提供服務(wù)的大客戶們應(yīng)該為他們享受的特權(quán)付出代價(jià)。這純粹是個(gè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)問題。沒錯(cuò)，銀行家們也許需要重新考慮商業(yè)模式，但這是一件好事。

????金融危機(jī)后大型銀行們并未像人們期待的那樣進(jìn)行大量實(shí)質(zhì)性改革。沒收抵押房產(chǎn)潮仍未減退，說明大型銀行不到萬不得已不會(huì)采取行動(dòng)。另一個(gè)例證則是銀行業(yè)只是一味坐等，直到被迫制定“生前遺囑”（living wills）。

????如果銀行早就自覺定好生前遺囑，盡可能保證遺囑內(nèi)容公開透明，市場本來有望更平穩(wěn)一些，對銀行業(yè)也的信賴感也會(huì)更強(qiáng)一點(diǎn)。第三個(gè)例證是銀行業(yè)并沒有認(rèn)真對待金融危機(jī)所揭示的的薪酬和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)問題。

????大型銀行應(yīng)該成為模范公民，遠(yuǎn)離賭博式交易，而不是反對新的監(jiān)管條例。然后，它們才有可能與監(jiān)管部門進(jìn)行理性的對話。如果大型銀行將來不想招致監(jiān)管部門采取行動(dòng)，最好一開始就向監(jiān)管部門證明，它們根本就不需要監(jiān)管部門的關(guān)注。

????Eleanor Bloxham是董事會(huì)顧問公司The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com)的首席執(zhí)行官。

????Make no mistake, big banks will not be submitting to new regulations without a fight.

????A few weeks ago, JPMorgan (JPM) CEO Jamie Dimon reportedly got so worked up during an exchange with a governor from the Bank of Canada that Goldman Sachs (GS) CEO Lloyd Blankfein felt the need to send an email apology to the regulator after the group meeting. (Dimon later acknowledged the intensity with which he expressed his views).

????Bankers at the largest institutions may think bullying regulators will stop new capital requirements for the largest institutions -- but that tactic just may not work this time.

????Perhaps that's because regulators aren't alone in their concerns. Public opinion is not in favor of letting the largest banks off the hook. Many in the business community (including executives in other industries) are skeptical that, if left to their own devices, the largest banks that relied on the Fed window and bailouts will be able to avoid a repeat of the financial meltdown. And on Saturday, finance ministers from the G20 offered their support for a requirement that big banks be subject to an additional capital surcharge, on top of the capital requirements all international banks will be required to follow.

????While some of the arguments bank executives are making are fair (for example, Citigroup (C) CEO Vikram Pandit called new capital proposals a blunt instrument), other statements just reinforce the need for additional bank oversight.

????For example, Pandit says new capital requirements would simply encourage unregulated parts of the system to flourish. But if bankers behaved responsibly, they'd disclose where those issues would come from and help regulators close the gaps, something Daniel Indiviglio at The Atlantic says regulators could easily do.

????In arguing against new rules, Dimon says large banks are necessary to support the needs of the very largest corporations: scale is essential. If this is true, bankers should be charging the very largest corporations for the luxury that their scale offers and for the increased risk it poses to other customers and stakeholders.

????While it is possible to make rational arguments over the basis of capital for particular asset classes, those issues have existed since the first accord in 1988. Bankers had no problems with inexactitude when it moved in their favor. Rather than step up their own risk management over the past two decades, too many bankers used weak regulatory capital guidelines as the way to measure risk. Regulatory regimes always involve compromise -- and the bankers know this.

????The proposed capital surcharge and new FDIC fee assessments on the largest institutions with high risk concentrations, however, are a different matter. They are simple recognition of the market-based economics that exist for regulators and taxpayers.

????By way of their scale, the same big banks that have access to the largest customers (unavailable to other, smaller banks) are also the banks that pose the greatest risk to the financial system if they fail. Because of their scope and sophistication, they demand extraordinary attention from regulators. By requiring so much attention from regulators, other weaknesses in the financial system go unaddressed, a cost everyone in the system pays for eventually. For these reasons, big banks should incur certain economic charges to discourage size for its own sake and activities that continue to require so many regulatory enforcers on the beat.

????The requirements are economic recognition of the cleanup taxpayers will incur whether or not these institutions are allowed to fail. In this sense, too big to fail doesn't matter.

????Large bank customers who make such scale necessary should pay for the privilege. It's simple economics. Yes, bankers may need to rethink their business models, but this is a good thing.

????Post crisis, the largest banks have done less than one would hope to demonstrate meaningful change. The foreclosure issues that continue unabated are an example of the larger banks' failure to address issues unless they are forced to do so. The fact that banks are just waiting around until they are required to develop living wills is another example.

????Instead of waiting to be told, banks could have promoted calmer markets and greater trust by producing robust living wills on their own and providing transparency to their contents as much as feasible. A third example is the failure to take seriously the compensation and risk issues demonstrated by the crisis.

????Instead of railing at the new rules, the largest banks should become model citizens and step away from casino-like trading. Then, it might be possible for them to have a rational conversation with regulators. If the largest banks want no action from regulators in the future, the best place to start is by showing regulators that they don't require their attention at all.

????Eleanor Bloxham is CEO of The Value Alliance and Corporate Governance Alliance (http://thevaluealliance.com), a board advisory firm.