????布拉德?欣茨是自由市場的忠實信徒，他曾擔(dān)任摩根士丹利（Morgan Stanley）首席財務(wù)官，目前在伯恩斯坦研究（Bernstein Research）做證券分析師，主要關(guān)注經(jīng)紀(jì)商、交易所和信托銀行。與羅奇代爾證券公司分析師迪克?波維一樣，欣茨竭力為金融服務(wù)業(yè)辯護(hù)，希望它盡量少受限制。因此，布拉德?欣茨痛恨沃爾克規(guī)則，認(rèn)為它將葬送華爾街所珍視的一切，他的反應(yīng)倒也不算出乎意料。

????如果你覺得金融危機(jī)的故事聽起來痛苦不堪，那你真該來見識下欣茨對沃爾克規(guī)則的看法。由于該規(guī)則的繁瑣程度可能超過業(yè)界先前的預(yù)期，欣茨眼中的未來暗無天日?！拔覀冊竟烙?，沃爾克規(guī)則將會使交易收入下降10%，”欣茨稱，“即使非為客戶操作的純高風(fēng)險業(yè)務(wù)遭到禁止，這個數(shù)字還是相對較小的?！彼@里指的是自營交易部門，過去兩年中，多數(shù)銀行紛紛將該部門關(guān)閉或分拆?！靖呤ⅲ℅oldman Sachs）、摩根士丹利和摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）都采取了類似措施?！?/p>

????可是，本月初浮出水面供業(yè)內(nèi)人士探討的新規(guī)則限制非常嚴(yán)格，遠(yuǎn)超此前預(yù)期。就連該規(guī)則的首倡者、前美聯(lián)儲主席沃爾克本人也有些擔(dān)憂起來，覺得其復(fù)雜性與日俱增。在原版的《多德-弗蘭克法案》（Dodd-Frank legislation）中，沃爾克規(guī)則只有10頁，可美國貨幣監(jiān)理署（OCC）公布的最新版本有298頁，涵蓋了400個主題的1,300多個問題。從現(xiàn)在直到明年1月13日，該版本將接受公眾評議。根本性的問題在于，哪些行為構(gòu)成銀行的“自營交易”，特別是因為這涉及到為客戶利益而進(jìn)行證券交易的行為。沃爾克希望實現(xiàn)的目標(biāo)很簡單：確保接受存款的銀行無法用這些存款來進(jìn)行賭博式的自營交易。但是，如何界定自營交易卻是個相當(dāng)棘手的問題。

????欣茨認(rèn)為，這些規(guī)則恰恰瞄準(zhǔn)了投資銀行履行其關(guān)鍵職責(zé)——做市商——的能力?！八鼈儗淖児潭ㄊ找媸袌龅恼麄€商業(yè)模式，”他說，“風(fēng)險交易的定義非常寬泛，而受到的限制相當(dāng)嚴(yán)格，幾乎所有固定收益業(yè)務(wù)都屬于風(fēng)險性業(yè)務(wù)。如果各銀行被迫轉(zhuǎn)型，改為按客戶指令而作交易的模式，那收入將會下降25%，而利潤會減少三分之一。”

????但是，這樣一個事實也不容忽視：提案中包含了豁免“善意”為客戶做市的條款。如果銀行們無法說明，他們不是在進(jìn)行自營交易，而是在為客戶的利益行事（換句話說，“按客戶指令進(jìn)行交易”），那么，他們從事的或許正是那種使我們陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退的高風(fēng)險交易。沒錯，考慮到沃爾克規(guī)則提案極為細(xì)致且法律語言艱深難懂，請求公眾評議只是表面文章，可它的復(fù)雜程度也沒有批評人士宣稱的那么夸張。

????盡管如此，摩根大通掌門人杰米?戴蒙也深感憂慮。10月召開的一次電話會議上，戴蒙向分析師們再開金口，直言不諱地吐露了自己的看法?！懊绹鴵碛腥澜缱詈?、最有深度和廣度且最透明的資本市場，這讓你們這些投資者有能力以極低價格進(jìn)行大宗買賣，這是件好事。我希望保羅?沃爾克能理解這一點。行不行？現(xiàn)在我們理解為何不能做自營交易，這也沒問題……可是，我們必須為自己的客戶去做適當(dāng)?shù)淖鍪泄ぷ鳌覀兊亩鄶?shù)業(yè)務(wù)正是做市……我希望所有收聽這次電話會議的人都能理解其重要性，這不僅關(guān)乎你們自己的生意，更關(guān)乎整個美國的未來?！?/p>

????欣茨評論沃爾克規(guī)則時，還只是稱金融行業(yè)面臨困境。戴蒙一插話，氣氛就不同了，他不僅嚴(yán)辭教訓(xùn)了美國最受尊敬的前美聯(lián)儲主席之一，還提醒我們，整個美國的未來都面臨著風(fēng)險。真的嗎？杰米？我們來分析分析。

????Brad Hintz believes in free markets. The one-time treasurer of Morgan Stanley and current equity analyst covering brokers, exchanges, and trust banks for Bernstein Research is as much a defender of an unshackled financial services industry as Dick Bove. So it should surprise no one that Brad Hintz thinks the Volcker Rule could be the death of all things cherished on Wall Street.

????If you thought the story of the financial crisis was a harrowing one, then you should listen to Hintz trying to figure out a future with a Volcker Rule that's looking like it might be more onerous than previously thought. "We had originally estimated that the Volcker rules would reduce trading revenues by 10%," Hintz says. "Even if non-client pure risk-taking businesses were banned, that number was still relatively small." He's talking about proprietary trading desks, the majority of which have been closed down or spun off in the last two years. (See such actions by: Goldman Sachs (GS), Morgan Stanley (MS), and JPMorgan Chase.)

????But new rules floated for industry consideration earlier this month were far more restrictive than previously expected. Even the ex-Fed chief himself is a little concerned about the growing complexity of the thing. In the original Dodd-Frank legislation, the rule was ten pages long. When the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency released the latest version for public comment between now and January 13, 2012, it was 298 pages, with more than 1,300 questions on 400 topics. At root is the issue of just what constitutes "proprietary trading" by banks, especially as it relates to the issue of making trades in securities on behalf of their customers. The simple goal that Volcker was trying to achieve was making sure that deposit-taking banks are forbidden from making proprietary bets with those deposits. But it gets really thorny when you try to define just what constitutes a proprietary bet.

????Hintz argues the rules are taking dead-aim at the ability of investment banks to act in their vital role as market makers. "They will change the very business model of fixed income," he says."Risk-taking is very broadly defined and severely limited, and virtually all of the fixed income business is a risk-taking business. If banks are forced to shift to an order-taking business, revenue will drop 25% and margins will fall by a third."

????Here's the thing, though: The proposals include an exemption for "bona fide" market-making on behalf of clients. If banks can't demonstrate why they're not making a house bet but instead acting on behalf of customers (i.e., "order-taking"), then they just might be engaging in the kind of risk-taking that got us in this mess in the first place. Sure, the request for comment is paint-peeling in its detail and legalise, but it's not as complicated as critics would have us believe.

????Still, JPMorgan Chase (JPM) chief Jamie Dimon is concerned too. On a conference call with analysts this month, Dimon uttered another one of his unfiltered jewels. "The United States has the best, deepest, widest, and most transparent capital markets in the world which give you, the investor, the ability to buy and sell large amounts at very cheap prices. That is a good thing. I wish Paul Volcker understood that. Okay? Now we understand why there is no proprietary trading. That was fine….[But] we have to be in a position to do proper market-making for our clients…Most of our business is market-making…I hope all of you on this phone understand how important this is, not just for your own business but for future of the United States."

????When Hintz is talking, it's just an industry under siege. When Dimon chimes in, he not only schools one of the country's most respected former chiefs of the Federal Reserve, but he also puts us on notice that nothing short of the future of the country is at risk. Really, Jamie? Come now.