????薩博汽車（Saab Automobiles）申請破產(chǎn)的消息一如既往地引發(fā)震動，人們先是捶胸頓足，隨后開始相互攻擊、指責(zé)。

????薩博這個擁有悠久歷史的傳奇品牌居然也因?yàn)樨?cái)務(wù)問題被送上斷頭臺，這讓許多汽車業(yè)的傳統(tǒng)主義者深感沮喪。一個精品汽車品牌的消失就好比一個物種的滅絕，我們再也見不到它們的身影了。薩博也將一去不回還。

????許多人把薩博失敗的主要責(zé)任歸咎于通用汽車（General Motors）。通用1990年收購了薩博的半數(shù)股權(quán)，10年前又吃進(jìn)了剩下的50%。

????有評論人士指出，通用根本就不了解薩博。他們沒有準(zhǔn)確地理解薩博的歷史和遺產(chǎn)，強(qiáng)行將它并入通用的生產(chǎn)體系，導(dǎo)致品牌完整性遭到弱化，同時在財(cái)務(wù)和管理上也沒能給予足夠的支持。

????事實(shí)上，我認(rèn)為要不是通用汽車20年前將薩博收入旗下，薩博可能早就淡出人們的視野了。原因很簡單：薩博這個品牌太小了，在當(dāng)前的模式下沒法生存。像梅賽德斯奔馳（Mercedes-Benz）和寶馬（BMW）等德系車，年產(chǎn)量可達(dá)百萬輛，但薩博的年銷量卻從來沒有超過14萬輛。就連沃爾沃（Volvo）的產(chǎn)量都能達(dá)到它的兩三倍。低產(chǎn)量是十分致命的，因?yàn)槠囆袠I(yè)是一個靠規(guī)模經(jīng)濟(jì)稱王的產(chǎn)業(yè)。薩博一要分?jǐn)傂萝囆脱邪l(fā)的成本，二要面臨越來越嚴(yán)格的安全性和排放技術(shù)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這就對公司財(cái)力提出了巨大的要求。除非它的年銷量能達(dá)到幾十萬輛，否則這兩個目標(biāo)都是不可能實(shí)現(xiàn)的。

????薩博的未來同樣很黯淡。由于它的吸引力非常狹隘，因此這個品牌注定做不大。雖說薩博的車主可能并不介意別人叫他們“怪人”，說不定還甘之如飴。但只要說起開薩博的人，人們腦海中總會出現(xiàn)一群穿燈心絨夾克和地球牌旅游鞋的英倫教授范兒的大叔——可見它的客戶群并不廣泛。其它的歐洲品牌則在擴(kuò)展品牌吸引力上表現(xiàn)得更出色，尤其是奧迪（Audi）。

????除此之外，薩博還背負(fù)著另一個“不可承受之重”——它得養(yǎng)活一大幫高薪低能的瑞典工人。據(jù)《汽車新聞》（Automotive News）報(bào)道，在上世紀(jì)90年代執(zhí)掌過薩博的戴夫?赫爾曼曾經(jīng)說道：“健康漂亮的小伙子們都可以從醫(yī)生那里弄來一份證明，然后騎著摩托，載著女朋友去湖邊或什么地方。日常曠工率高達(dá)18%?！绷硗夤镜纳a(chǎn)率也十分低下，質(zhì)量也慘不忍睹。在咨詢公司J.D. Power歷年發(fā)布的汽車初始質(zhì)量排名中，薩博歷來排名接近墊底。

????這些因素結(jié)合起來，使得薩博在很快難以繼續(xù)生存，只能求助于通用。為了解決這些問題，通用向薩博安插了美國管理人員，將一些產(chǎn)能轉(zhuǎn)移到了德國，零部件則采取了向歐寶（Opel）采購或共同生產(chǎn)等方法。后來薩博打了幾個漂亮的翻身仗，推出了可能是該品牌有史以來最好的9-3轎車。

????The news that Saab Automobiles filed for bankruptcy has spurred the usual round of breast-beating, finger-pointing, and name calling.

????Automotive traditionalists are understandably upset that a brand with a long and storied history like Saab has wound up on the financial chopping block. The disappearance of a boutique automaker is like the extinction of a species -- its like will never be seen again. Saab will be as dead as the dodo.

????Most of the blame for Saab's failure is being laid at the feet of General Motors, which bought a half-interest in Saab in 1990 and then the rest of it a decade ago.

????GM, the critics say, didn't understand Saab. They weren't properly appreciative of its history and heritage, diluted its brand integrity by merging it into GM's production system, and failed to support it financially or managerially.

????In fact, I would argue that Saab would have expired years ago had not GM taken it under its wing two decades ago. The reason is simple: Saab was simply too small to survive in its current configuration. At a time when German luxury makers like Mercedes-Benz and BMW make more than one million cars a year, Saab never sold more than 140,000 cars a year. Even Volvo made two or three times that many cars. Low production is fatal, because the auto industry is all about economies of scale. Trying to amortize the expenses of new model engineering, not to mention increasingly stringent safety and emissions technology, requires accounting gymnastics that are all but impossible unless volumes reach the hundreds of thousands.

????The future was bleak. Saab was destined to remain small because its appeal was so narrow. While its owners may have reveled in being described as "quirky," their image never extended much beyond that of the corduroy jacket, Earth shoe wearing English professor -- not a broad base from which to build. Other European brands -- notably Audi -- did a better job of expanding their appeal.

????Saab bore another burden that was unbearably heavy: its base in high-wage, low output Sweden. As Dave Herman, who ran Saab in the 1990s, was quoted as saying, most recently in Automotive News: "Beautiful, healthy young people could get a doctor's certificate and then hop on their motorcycle with their gal and go off to a lake somewhere. The daily absenteeism rate was 18%." On days when Saab employees came to work, productivity was poor and quality abysmal. Saabs historically ranked near the bottom of J.D. Power's initial quality ratings.

????The combination of factors would have soon made it difficult for Saab to remain a viable proposition without GM's help. GM tried to ameliorate its problems by installing American managers, moving some production to Germany, and integrating its parts buying and engineering with Opel. It had some notable successes. It developed what was probably the best 9-3 ever.