????今天的歐元危機(jī)迫使成員國(guó)必須找到復(fù)蘇之路，但這絕對(duì)不是第一次出現(xiàn)這種情況。這些國(guó)家近年來(lái)一直受累于嚴(yán)重高估的貨幣，經(jīng)濟(jì)嚴(yán)重下滑。

????眼下來(lái)回顧一下上個(gè)十年阿根廷和拉脫維亞的經(jīng)歷非常具有指導(dǎo)意義：它們?cè)?jīng)面臨的問(wèn)題和如今意大利、希臘等歐元區(qū)成員國(guó)一模一樣，但兩個(gè)國(guó)家選擇了兩條截然不同的道路。

????阿根廷選擇了我們稱之為“退出路徑”（Exit route）的道路，接受了殘酷的休克療法，立即施行了貨幣大幅貶值。而拉脫維亞則選擇了國(guó)際貨幣組織（IMF）、歐盟（EU）和外國(guó)投資者一致要求的方式，這也是當(dāng)今深陷危機(jī)的歐盟成員國(guó)信誓旦旦宣稱將采取的方式。這就是我們稱之作“堅(jiān)持到底”（Toughing-it-out）的道路：留在歐元區(qū)內(nèi)，選擇一條痛苦的道路——減薪，削減政府開(kāi)支，如果有可能的話，放松本國(guó)僵化的、抑制生產(chǎn)率的勞動(dòng)法規(guī)。

????當(dāng)年的結(jié)果讓人意外，特別是鑒于人們普遍認(rèn)為必須保留歐元。阿根廷迅速恢復(fù)了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力，成為全球最富活力的經(jīng)濟(jì)體之一。而拉脫維亞雖然實(shí)施了悲壯的改革，但還需要一些年，才能恢復(fù)到上世紀(jì)末的產(chǎn)值。

????阿根廷和拉脫維亞的經(jīng)驗(yàn)教訓(xùn)可能嚴(yán)重動(dòng)搖歐元區(qū)弱國(guó)的歐元信念。如果意大利、希臘或西班牙只考慮自己的利益，不考慮對(duì)持有它們債券的歐洲銀行或投資者帶來(lái)的損害，不考慮歐元區(qū)強(qiáng)國(guó)的責(zé)難，它們顯然會(huì)選擇“退出路徑”。隨著這些國(guó)家的經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退加深，救助資金用盡，“某個(gè)國(guó)家宣布退出歐元，然后經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)始復(fù)蘇，吸引其他國(guó)家效仿”，出現(xiàn)這種情形的可能性越來(lái)越高。

????卡內(nèi)基研究院（Carnegie Endowment）經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家烏利?達(dá)杜什和本內(nèi)特?斯坦薩在最近的研究報(bào)告《來(lái)自拉脫維亞和阿根廷的災(zāi)難警告》（A Dire Warning from Latvia and Argentina）中闡述了兩個(gè)國(guó)家選擇的不同道路和結(jié)果。兩國(guó)都曾將本幣與全球最堅(jiān)挺的兩種貨幣掛鉤：阿根廷于20世紀(jì)90年代初將比索與美元掛鉤，而拉脫維亞在2004年加入歐盟時(shí)將拉特與歐元進(jìn)行了掛鉤。阿根廷的經(jīng)濟(jì)危機(jī)出現(xiàn)在2001年和2002年，而拉脫維亞是在2008年。

????但這兩個(gè)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)興衰的原因都一樣。通過(guò)將本幣與低通脹國(guó)家的貨幣掛鉤，阿根廷和拉脫維亞都得以按照極低的利率借貸。兩個(gè)國(guó)家的信貸都出現(xiàn)了爆炸式的增長(zhǎng)。阿根廷的年增長(zhǎng)率在經(jīng)濟(jì)崩潰前的三年接近6%，而拉脫維亞增長(zhǎng)則接近11%。

????這樣的大幅增長(zhǎng)并不是來(lái)自出口增長(zhǎng)，而是來(lái)自房地產(chǎn)和國(guó)內(nèi)服務(wù)業(yè)的迅猛發(fā)展。國(guó)內(nèi)物價(jià)和工資的上漲打擊了它們的出口，也使得進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品遠(yuǎn)比本國(guó)制造產(chǎn)品便宜得多。兩個(gè)國(guó)家都無(wú)法進(jìn)行貨幣貶值以降低出口商品價(jià)格，提高國(guó)際市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。

????2001年巴西貨幣貶值后，美元持續(xù)升值，比索也緊隨其后，導(dǎo)致阿根廷出口完全喪失了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。而拉脫維亞的問(wèn)題則是全球金融危機(jī)阻斷了寬松的信貸資金流，此前正是這些資金才使得拉脫維亞成為了00年代中晚期歐洲增長(zhǎng)最快的發(fā)展中經(jīng)濟(jì)體。

????阿根廷和拉脫維亞經(jīng)歷的經(jīng)濟(jì)興衰與希臘、意大利、西班牙、葡萄牙和愛(ài)爾蘭因貨幣高估而受到的沖擊何其相似。

????The eurozone crisis is far from the first time that nations in steep decline, saddled with a vastly overvalued currency, have been forced to choose a path to recovery.

????It's extremely instructive to study the cases of two countries that in the past decade, confronted with many of the same problems that now haunt euro zone members like Italy and Greece, followed two radically different courses.

????Argentina took what we'll called the "Exit route," embracing the brutal shock therapy of suddenly and radically devaluing its currency. Latvia picked the approach that the IMF, EU, and foreign investors universally demand, and that even the stricken EU members themselves swear they'll follow. It's what we'll call the "Toughing-it-out" option: staying in the euro, and taking the painful, grinding road of lowering salaries, slashing government spending, and hopefully, freeing their markets of rigid, productivity-killing work rules.

????The results are surprising, especially given the broad consensus that the euro must survive. Argentina rapidly restored its competitiveness, becoming one of the world's most vibrant economies. Latvia, despite enacting heroic reforms, will struggle for years before clawing back to the levels of output it posted in the late 2000s.

????The lessons from Argentina and Latvia pose a substantial risk to the euro. If Italy, Greece or Spain considers only its own self-interest, not the damage to Europe's banks or investors that hold its debt or the condemnation of powerful nations, they would clearly choose the "Exit route." As their recessions deepen, and the bailout money is spent, the chances that one nation bolts the euro and then thrives, attracting followers, becomes not just thinkable, but increasingly probable.

????In a recent paper, "A Dire Warning from Latvia and Argentina," economists Uri Dadush and Bennett Stancil of the Carnegie Endowment outline the courses the two countries chose, and the results. Both nations effectively pegged their own money to the world's two strongest currencies: Argentina tied the peso to the dollar in the early 1990s, and Latvia yoked its lat to the euro when it joined the EU in 2004. Argentina's collapse came in 2001 and 2002, while Latvia imploded in 2008.

????But their rise and busts came for the same reasons. By harnessing their economies to currencies used in countries with low inflation, Argentina and Latvia were able to borrow at extremely favorable rates of interest. Credit exploded in both nations. In the three years before their economies crashed, Argentina grew at nearly 6% a year, and Latvia expanded at almost 11%.

????That big growth came not from selling more goods to other nations, but from a boom in real estate and domestic services. The rise in prices and wages pounded their exports, and made imports far cheaper than goods they produced at home. Neither country could devalue to lower the prices of its exports so it could compete on global markets.

????In fact, for Argentina, the dollar -- and hence the peso -- kept rising after Brazil devalued in 2001, rendering Argentina hopelessly uncompetitive. For Latvia, it was the global financial crisis that ended the flow of easy money that had made it the fastest-growing developing nation in Europe in the mid-to-late 2000s.

????The cycles both countries experienced are extremely similar to the damage wrought by an overvalued currency in Greece, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland.