????那么，在阿根廷和拉脫維亞在“退出”和“堅(jiān)持到底”兩者間做出抉擇后，兩個(gè)國(guó)家的情況又如何呢？2002年1月，阿根廷施行本幣貶值后，GDP 直線下降，失業(yè)率升至20%，比索跌至4比索兌1美元。但令人驚奇的是，到2002年第四季度，阿根廷經(jīng)濟(jì)已重現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)活力。到2004年（距陷入大蕭條僅10個(gè)季度），GDP已重新回到了此前的峰值。從2002年至2011年，阿根廷產(chǎn)值躍升了94%，經(jīng)通膨調(diào)整的增幅也超過(guò)了40%，成為西半球增長(zhǎng)最快的國(guó)家，增速是巴西的兩倍。

????當(dāng)然，阿根廷絕非什么經(jīng)濟(jì)奇跡。它的通膨率已再度飆升，1,000億美元的外債違約至今仍然讓該國(guó)遭到國(guó)際投資者的唾棄。實(shí)際上，它是將巨大的痛苦轉(zhuǎn)嫁到了其他國(guó)家和債權(quán)人身上。如果能獲得像阿根廷這樣的復(fù)蘇，很難保證希臘或意大利不會(huì)采取同樣的做法。

????拉脫維亞的GDP在2008年和2009年下降了22%以上，但它依然選擇將貨幣與歐元掛鉤，特別是在國(guó)際貨幣基金組織和歐盟向它提供了75億歐元（相當(dāng)于拉脫維亞當(dāng)前GDP的約40%）的救助資金之后。通過(guò)引導(dǎo)投資進(jìn)入計(jì)算機(jī)、制藥等領(lǐng)域，拉脫維亞在提高生產(chǎn)率方面也做得不錯(cuò)。2011年拉脫維亞經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)了約5%，雖然今年預(yù)計(jì)將下滑至1%甚至更低。

????但是，拉脫維亞仍堅(jiān)持歐元聯(lián)系匯率，雖然歐元匯率太高，無(wú)法給拉脫維亞帶來(lái)阿根廷式的出口增長(zhǎng)。拉脫維亞還需要一些年頭，才能獲得阿根廷迅速恢復(fù)的那種經(jīng)濟(jì)繁榮狀態(tài)。拉脫維亞的失業(yè)率現(xiàn)在高居12%，而且國(guó)際貨幣基金組織預(yù)計(jì)，至少在2016年之前，拉脫維亞經(jīng)通膨調(diào)整的總產(chǎn)值將無(wú)法恢復(fù)到2008年的峰值。

????問題是歐洲弱國(guó)是否愿意像拉脫維亞一樣選擇漫長(zhǎng)而痛苦的道路，慢慢恢復(fù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。迄今為止，它們的改革還遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)不夠。

????“這就是希臘和其他國(guó)家目前面臨的兩難選擇，”斯坦薩說(shuō)?！拔C(jī)國(guó)家開始思考（阿根廷）另一條道路，而且這非常有誘惑力。這條道路是痛苦的，但也只能從矬子里拔將軍?！?/p>

????如果這些國(guó)家不顧外界的壓力，執(zhí)意采取對(duì)自己最有利的行動(dòng)，“退出路線”就會(huì)成為首選。歐債危機(jī)多拖一個(gè)月，退出的吸引力就會(huì)增加一分。

????So how have Argentina and Latvia performed since choosing between the "Exit" and "Tough it out" approaches? After its devaluation in January of 2002, Argentina's GDP went into freefall, unemployment reached 20%, and the peso dropped to four to the dollar. But amazingly, Argentina was growing briskly again by the fourth quarter of 2002. And by 2004 -- a mere ten quarters from the onset of its recession-turned-depression -- its GDP had climbed back to its previous peak. From 2002 to 2011, its output jumped 94%, or over 40% adjusted for inflation, the fastest number in the Western Hemisphere, and twice the pace of Brazil.

????Argentina is far from a miracle. Its inflation is surging again, and it's despised by international investors since defaulting on $100 billion in foreign debt. Indeed, it put plenty of pain on other nations and creditors. Don't bet that a Greece or Italy will refrain from doing the same if it can stage an Argentinian-scale comeback.

????In Latvia, GDP fell over 22% in 2008 and 2009. But it still chose to remain tied to the euro, especially since the IMF and EU granted it 7.5 billion euros in bailout funds, almost 40% of current GDP. It's done a good job increasing its productivity by guiding investment into such areas as computers and pharmaceuticals. It also grew about 5% in 2011, though the rate is projected to fall to 1% or less this year.

????Still, Latvia is stuck with a currency that's far too expensive to allow the kind of export explosion that rescued Argentina. It faces years of slogging to get back to the kind of prosperity Argentina regained so fast. Unemployment stands at 12%, and the IMF projects that Latvia won't see a return to total output it posted at the peak in 2008, adjusted for inflation, until at least 2016.

????The question is whether Europe's weaklings are willing to suffer through the kind of long, grueling process Latvia adopted to slowly restore its competitiveness. So far, their reforms are scant.

????"It's the dilemma that Greece and the others are now facing," says Stancil. "The ailing nations are starting to figure out what the other path is, and that it's extremely tempting. It's painful, but it may be the best of only bad options."

????If those countries decide to do what's best for them, not what they're being told, the "Exit route" will prevail. For every month the crisis lingers, the more alluring the exit looks.