????商業(yè)戰(zhàn)略其實(shí)也是一種潮流，但人們似乎很少留意到這一點(diǎn)。汽車鰭狀穩(wěn)定板曾風(fēng)行一時(shí)，如今商界人士的著裝活脫脫就是現(xiàn)實(shí)版的《廣告狂人》（Mad Men），手機(jī)行業(yè)也在效仿喬尼?艾夫的iPhone手機(jī)設(shè)計(jì)理念，紛紛采用大觸摸屏和圖標(biāo)。同樣的道理，涉及企業(yè)應(yīng)該如何創(chuàng)造價(jià)值，我們也有一些約定俗成的觀點(diǎn)。而且，為了便于使用，這些觀點(diǎn)甚至擁有屬于自己專門的名稱，比如：關(guān)注點(diǎn)、成本領(lǐng)先、差異化、核心競爭力、供應(yīng)鏈整合等等。

????最近幾天，處于死亡邊緣的柯達(dá)公司（Kodak）讓我產(chǎn)生了上面這樣的想法。有關(guān)柯達(dá)的大多數(shù)描述都是標(biāo)準(zhǔn)版的《四眼天雞》（Chicken Little）：天要蹋了；美國夢破滅了；又一家優(yōu)秀公司遭遇滑鐵盧。我們就要玩完了，而對此我們卻束手無策。畢竟，曾經(jīng)的柯達(dá)是美好時(shí)代的標(biāo)志。當(dāng)時(shí)的美國，創(chuàng)新和發(fā)明無處不在?？逻_(dá)創(chuàng)始人喬治?伊士曼當(dāng)初的目標(biāo)是讓攝影“像使用鉛筆一樣方便”。雖然現(xiàn)在這已經(jīng)成為現(xiàn)實(shí)，甚至有所超越，但柯達(dá)公司卻并未從這一新興趨勢中獲益。

????因此，周一上午，當(dāng)柯達(dá)公司的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)解釋公司面臨的問題、以及一家前途如此光明的公司為何功敗垂成時(shí)，我們的心情非常復(fù)雜，幸災(zāi)樂禍中也夾雜著一絲恐懼。外界的基本觀點(diǎn)是，柯達(dá)錯(cuò)過了這個(gè)時(shí)代。由于它過分固守膠片攝影，因此，柯達(dá)從未真正（借用另一個(gè)商業(yè)戰(zhàn)略流行術(shù)語）“跨越鴻溝”，無法抓住新興數(shù)碼攝影領(lǐng)域的發(fā)展潮流。

????如果說這個(gè)簡單的分析過于膚淺，那么實(shí)際情況又是怎么樣的呢？柯達(dá)公司的倒閉并非像那些令人唏噓不已的經(jīng)典破產(chǎn)案例那么簡單。公司衰敗的原因也不僅僅是由于公司高管近期的一系列錯(cuò)誤決策或管理不善。其中的問題更加微妙，證明了即便是一家滿懷良好的愿景、竭盡全力做到最好的公司也非常容易出現(xiàn)問題。它告誡我們，創(chuàng)新與某個(gè)具體的商品、設(shè)備，或者某一項(xiàng)技術(shù)無關(guān)。我們必須謹(jǐn)慎思考創(chuàng)新的真正意義，以及創(chuàng)新的極端重要性——事實(shí)上，它比人們想象的更加重要。

????其實(shí)，柯達(dá)非常清楚，數(shù)碼技術(shù)終將會(huì)瓦解傳統(tǒng)膠片產(chǎn)業(yè)。眾所周知，柯達(dá)擁有關(guān)于數(shù)碼攝影的主要專利，并且在1975年生產(chǎn)了世界上第一批數(shù)碼相機(jī)?！督?jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)人》（The Economist）近期載文稱，1979年，柯達(dá)高管之間流傳過一份報(bào)告，其中詳細(xì)描述了到2010年，攝影市場將如何從膠片時(shí)代永久地轉(zhuǎn)變?yōu)閿?shù)碼時(shí)代。所以，數(shù)碼技術(shù)帶來的沖擊完全在意料之中。但是柯達(dá)公司高層卻遵循了當(dāng)時(shí)流行的管理思潮，仍然從公司在化學(xué)、光學(xué)和膠片領(lǐng)域的絕對優(yōu)勢這個(gè)角度出發(fā)來看待整個(gè)行業(yè)的轉(zhuǎn)變。他們試圖沿用自己熟悉的本領(lǐng)來嘗試新生事物，但實(shí)際上，他們應(yīng)該更積極地探索新興的陌生事物。

????柯達(dá)在膠片之外實(shí)現(xiàn)多元化經(jīng)營的一次重要嘗試發(fā)生在上世紀(jì)70年代末。當(dāng)年，他們瞄準(zhǔn)了靜電復(fù)印，并將競爭對手鎖定為同一地區(qū)的另一家知名企業(yè)——同樣來自紐約羅切斯特的施樂公司（Xerox）。當(dāng)時(shí)，我正擔(dān)任施樂的顧問，對于柯達(dá)公司進(jìn)入復(fù)印行業(yè)的舉措，我們非常重視。事實(shí)上，我們的重視是正確的。要知道，憑借在有機(jī)化學(xué)和光學(xué)方面的優(yōu)勢，他們開發(fā)了大批優(yōu)秀的高端產(chǎn)品。

????People never seem to notice, but strategies have fashions. Just as cars had fins for a while, or business folks try to dress like they just stepped off the set of Mad Men, or phones get big touch screens and icons to chase after Jony Ive's iPhone design choices, there are also conventions in how we think about what firms should do to create value. These ways of thinking even have names so we can refer to them in shorthand: focus, cost leadership, differentiation, core competence leverage, supply chain integration, and the like.

????This came to mind over the last few days in the midst of the Kodak (EK) death vigil. Most of the Kodak conversation has been standard issue Chicken Little: the sky is falling; the American dream is dead; another classic company has bitten the dust. We're all off to hell in a handcart and there's not a thing we can do about it. After all, Kodak was a symbol of better times, an era when American innovation and invention was seemingly ubiquitous. But while George Eastman's goal -- to make photography "as convenient as the pencil" has been realized and even exceeded -- Kodak was not the company that capitalized on this new ubiquity.

????And so, with a mixture of schadenfreude and fear, we hear the Monday morning quarterbacks explain what went wrong and explain how a company with so much promise managed to snatch defeat out of the jaws of victory. The basic buzz is that Kodak missed the moment. Addicted to film photography, they never really could (to borrow a phrase from another brief strategic fashion) "cross the chasm" and drive the growing new digital photography field.

????What if this convenient analysis is just too superficial? The demise of Kodak isn't merely the classic disruption story that everyone loves to tut tut over. Nor is the company's downfall merely a result of recent bad decisions or the mismanagement of senior executives. It is the more nuanced story of how easy it can be to get things wrong, even when trying with the best of intentions to do everything right. It's a cautionary tale of the need for deeper understanding of what innovation really means, and how it is infinitely more vital than most people think it is, even as it isn't about any single product or widget or technology.

????Kodak knew all about the impending disruption of digital technology. As many have noted, they own the primary patents on digital photography and built one of the world's first digital cameras in 1975. As The Economist reported recently, a report circulated among senior executives in 1979 detailed how the market would shift permanently from film to digital by 2010. This disruption was no surprise. But following the fashions of the moment back then, Kodak's leaders looked at the whole shift through the lens of their signature strengths in chemistry, optics, and films. They tried to do new things with familiar capabilities at the exact moment they needed to be hungrier to do truly new, unfamiliar things.

????One of Kodak's significant attempts to diversify away from the world of film came at the end of the 1970s. They targeted xerography, specifically aiming at the other hometown hero in Rochester, New York. I was consulting with Xerox (XRX) at the time, and we took Kodak's threat to enter the world of copying very seriously. We were right to; Kodak's strengths in organic chemistry and optics helped them to create some excellent, high-end products.