????當(dāng)時(shí)，這種思維方式頗為流行。比如，1979年，索尼公司（Sony）利用微型化技術(shù)創(chuàng)造了風(fēng)靡一時(shí)的產(chǎn)品——隨身聽(tīng)。豐田汽車(chē)（Toyota）充分利用其在汽車(chē)噴漆和密封方面的優(yōu)勢(shì)，生產(chǎn)出的汽車(chē)質(zhì)量遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于底特律的產(chǎn)品。十年后，另一位英雄式人物CK?普哈拉在《哈佛商業(yè)評(píng)論》（Harvard Business Review）企業(yè)核心能力版塊發(fā)表了一篇開(kāi)創(chuàng)性的論文，闡述了這種趨勢(shì)。事實(shí)上，戰(zhàn)略性的問(wèn)題在于：如果我們?cè)诂F(xiàn)有領(lǐng)域已經(jīng)做得很好，還有什么新領(lǐng)域可以進(jìn)一步促進(jìn)我們的發(fā)展？

????對(duì)于柯達(dá)公司而言，繼續(xù)關(guān)注化學(xué)、光學(xué)和膠片成像也是順理成章的事。在二十世紀(jì)九十年代中期之前，這種策略使柯達(dá)始終保持了健康發(fā)展的態(tài)勢(shì)。但如同我們大多數(shù)人一樣，公司的問(wèn)題在于，雖然新業(yè)務(wù)經(jīng)過(guò)了精心推論和設(shè)計(jì)，但與公司的基礎(chǔ)業(yè)務(wù)相比，它仍然顯得薄弱。也正是基于這些原因，輝瑞公司（Pfizer）才會(huì)如此鐘愛(ài)立普妥（及其風(fēng)靡一時(shí)的藥品模式）；思科公司（Cisco）才會(huì)始終堅(jiān)持路由器業(yè)務(wù)；這也是為何IBM很難拋售ThinkPad（不過(guò)，最終IBM還是將ThinkPad出售。而與之形成鮮明對(duì)比的是惠普公司（HP），它本應(yīng)放棄筆記本業(yè)務(wù)）。而蘇打水和薯片大受歡迎，因此，百事可樂(lè)公司（PepsiCo）仍很難決定改售健康食品。所以，我們常常希望創(chuàng)新不必那么大費(fèi)周章——我們只需對(duì)熟悉的事物稍作調(diào)整即可，而無(wú)需嘗試與顧客的生活方式緊密相關(guān)的事情。

? ??對(duì)于柯達(dá)而言，數(shù)碼攝影業(yè)務(wù)不僅增長(zhǎng)緩慢，而且還嚴(yán)重影響了公司最大的利潤(rùn)來(lái)源：照片和電影膠片。數(shù)碼攝影業(yè)務(wù)只是個(gè)微不足道的副業(yè)，它的發(fā)展速度顯然無(wú)法彌補(bǔ)膠片收入的損失，所以核心業(yè)務(wù)部門(mén)的人員沒(méi)有能力也不愿意進(jìn)行大力闊斧地變革。

????其實(shí)，幾乎所有大型企業(yè)的創(chuàng)新都存在同樣的苦惱。每周至少有一名公司高管來(lái)找我抱怨，稱他們公司的新型增長(zhǎng)型業(yè)務(wù)非常有趣，長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)看來(lái)也可能非常重要，但是他們就是“不愿意作出重大改變”。說(shuō)白了，就是“新的業(yè)務(wù)盡管炙手可熱，但在眼下的這個(gè)季度里還無(wú)法產(chǎn)生足夠的收入，所以，我這個(gè)高管也就沒(méi)法指望拿到更高獎(jiǎng)金了?！?/em>所以說(shuō)，新項(xiàng)目缺乏的不是發(fā)展的潛力，而是資金投入。

????This way of thinking was fashionable at that moment. In 1979, Sony (SNE) used its skills in miniaturization to create the craze du jour, the Walkman. Toyota (TM) used its strengths in paints and seals to make better quality cars than Detroit was making. A decade later, one of my heroes, CK Prahalad, published his seminal paper on The Core Competence of the Corporation in Harvard Business Review to explain the fashion. In effect, the strategic question was: given what we are already good at, what new things can we do that will drive growth?

????For Kodak a continued focus on chemistry, optics and depositions on film made perfect sense. And it made it a healthy company through the mid-1990s. But what it missed, what most of us chronically miss, was that the new businesses, however soundly reasoned and engineered, were dinky, especially viewed in comparison to their base business. This is why Pfizer (PFE) loves Lipitor (and the blockbuster drug model); why Cisco (CSCO) loves routers; and why it was hard for IBM (IBM) to sell off the ThinkPad (though it did so, in sharp contrast with HP (HPQ), which should have). And it's why PepsiCo (PEP) has found it so hard to sell healthy snacks, when soda and potato chips are so very popular. So often we want innovation to be easy -- allowing us only to have to tweak the familiar instead of trying to do something more deeply connected to how customers live their lives now.

????In Kodak's case, the digital photography field not only was slow growing but it actively undermined their largest source of profits: photo and motion picture films. The tiny sideline businesses simply could not scale at a rate that might make up for the loss of film revenues, so those inside the core business were unable or unwilling to do what it took to foster drastic transformation.

????This exact phenomenon plagues innovation in nearly every large firm. At least once a week, top executives tell me that new growth businesses in their firms are intriguing and potentially important, but they simply "don't move the needle." Said in plain American: "The hot new thing simply cannot produce enough revenues this quarter to improve my bonus as a senior executive." So those projects are starved of resources instead of nurtured.

????So what should Kodak have done? More to the point, what should you do to avoid this trap? Well, there is a new form of strategic thinking coming into fashion right now, called Convergences. Used well, it gives leaders a deeper sense of the interdependencies that connect firms, products, systems, and services in new ecosystems. It challenges the older notions of supply chains and vertical integration to get at newer ideas such as platforms, which move the cost and risk of innovating off your balance sheet and onto others'. It uses visualization techniques to reveal where new opportunity hotspots are emerging -- typically the confluence of new technological capabilities and new customer behaviors.