????日本大地震及之后的一系列海嘯所引發(fā)的核泄露，是自1986年切爾諾貝利事件后全球最大的核災難。現(xiàn)在時間已經(jīng)過去一年多了，但福島核事故仍然是全日本上下爭議的焦點。日本核電的發(fā)展到了一個歷史性的關(guān)口，作為全球第三經(jīng)濟大國，日本全國30%的電力都出自核電。目前爭議的基本問題是：核電在日本到底應不應該繼續(xù)發(fā)展下去？

????4月13日，野田佳彥政府就此表明了態(tài)度。隨著夏天臨近，日本的用電需求即將達到高峰，日本政府批準了重啟兩座核反應堆的計劃。這兩座反應堆位于日本西海岸的一個名叫大飯的小漁港，隸屬福井縣。

????只要獲得政府批準，日本的九大電力公司都有權(quán)重啟自己的核電站。但問題是野田政府必須首先征得核電站所在的各縣和各地政府的同意。目前日本各地還有48座停機的反應堆。要想避免今年夏天出現(xiàn)大面積停電，野田政府還得一一說服這些核電站所在地的政府才行。

????但要說服他們并不容易。自核泄露發(fā)生后，日本民間的棄核聲浪一直高漲，今年不但沒有消退的跡象，而且大多數(shù)日本人民現(xiàn)在都站在了棄核的一邊。這將野田政府和急需用電的日本企業(yè)界逼到了一個非常困難的境地。導火線當然還是去年3月11日東京電力公司福島第一核電站的核泄露?，F(xiàn)在圍繞著這場災難的問題還有很多。

????去年一年里，我們試圖通過采訪東電員工（有些接受采訪的員工獲得了公司的官方許可，有些沒有）、政府官員以及日本和國際上的核電專家來解答日核危機帶來的兩個最基本的問題：福島核災難究竟為什么會發(fā)生？尤其是它為什么會發(fā)生在日本這樣一個以工藝出色、管理嚴格而聞名的國家？

????答案令人心頭發(fā)涼。福島核電站的災難宣告了這個核電項目幾乎在每個層次上都是失敗的，從日本政府對核電的監(jiān)管，到東京電力公司（TEPCO）在災難環(huán)境下對危機關(guān)鍵細節(jié)的管理都乏善可陳。

????管理的失職幾乎與天災本身一樣可怕。日本政府自己也承認，核危機的種子早在40年前福島第一核電站剛修建的時候就埋下了。在日本這個小地震如家常便飯、大地震史不絕書的國家，這座規(guī)模居世界前列的核電站居然被建在了大洋邊緣。這不僅導致日本國民在震后過著提心吊膽的日子，而且一開始就使東電公司和整個日本處在了一個非常脆弱的位置。

????More than a year has passed since a massive earthquake and a series of tsunamis triggered the worst accident at a nuclear power plant since Chernobyl in 1986, but the epic debacle at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station remains front and center in Japan, at the very core of a historic debate over the future of nuclear energy—one that comes down to a fundamental question: Should nuclear power, which prior to the accident last year generated 30% of the electricity for the world's third-largest economy, have any future at all in Japan?

????On April 13, the government of Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda tipped its hand. With summer approaching, and with it peak demand for electricity, the Japanese government approved the restart of two nuclear reactors in the small fishing town Oi, in Fukui prefecture on Japan's west coast.

????The nine power companies in Japan have the legal authority to fire up the nuclear plants once they have received regulatory approval from Tokyo, in practice. But the Noda administration now must seek the assent of the local and prefectural governments affected by a restart--as it will have to do for each of the other 48 reactors across the country should it seek to bring them back online in order to avoid crippling brown outs this summer.

????That assent won't come easily. Public opposition to nuclear power now runs hot in Japan. Far from fading over the last year, opposition seems to have expanded to a solid majority of citizens nationwide, putting both Noda's government and Japan's big business community (which needs the electricity) in a very difficult spot. The reason for that is the debacle of Fukushima Daiichi—the six-reactor power station owned and operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) —and the many questions that still surround the terrifying events that began on March 11, 2011.

????For the past year, through interviews with employees of TEPCO (some officially sanctioned by the company, some without its knowledge), government officials and nuclear industry experts in Japan and abroad, we've attempted to answer two of the most fundamental issues at the heart of nuclear debate now roiling Japan: how could the accident at Fukushima Daiichi have happened—and how, in particular, could it have happened in Japan, a country once known, not so long ago, for its sheer management and engineering competence?

????The answers are bracing. The epic disaster at Fukushima Daiichi represents failure at almost every level, from how the Japanese government regulates nuclear power, to how TEPCO managed critical details of the crisis under desperate circumstances.

????As horrific as the natural disasters that occurred on March 11, 2011 were, the Japanese government itself has concluded that the nuclear crisis effectively began more than four decades before that, when one of the world's largest electric generating stations was located at the ocean's edge, in a country in which earthquakes—huge ones— are facts of life, and have been for centuries. This story recounts not only the fearful days that followed the Great Tohoku quake, but what led TEPCO, and Japan, to be in such a position of vulnerability to begin with.