????（時年66歲的清水正孝還不習(xí)慣被政府官員訓(xùn)斥。他是日本商界保守派的中流砥柱，一輩子都在東京電力公司任職。他在全球核電行業(yè)也有著良好的聲譽，不到一年前，他還被選為世界核電運營商協(xié)會< World Association of Nuclear Operators >的理事，這個協(xié)會的宗旨是確保“最高可能性的安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)”。）

????菅直人自己也想聽取清水正孝的想法，不過在清水正孝到來之前，菅直人已經(jīng)與他的核事故緊急小組討論過了，他已經(jīng)做出了決定：“我不會讓它（大規(guī)模疏散）發(fā)生的。它不在考慮之列?！?/p>

視而不見，養(yǎng)虎為患

????襲擊福島第一核電站的地震和海嘯破壞力之大，是史無前例的。但這種災(zāi)難并非難以想象。事實上，東電公司的工人也經(jīng)常私下討論福島第一核電站的選址。有一名工人說道：“我經(jīng)常在想，為什么有人會在大洋邊上，在這樣一個地震帶里建造一個規(guī)模這么大的核電站?！庇捎跂|電公司沒有給他接受媒體采訪的權(quán)利，因此這名工人要求匿名。他在福島附近的南相馬市的一家卡拉OK廳里接受了我們的采訪。2011年3月11日災(zāi)難發(fā)生時，這名工人就在福島第一核電站，而且整個春天、夏天和秋天幾乎都連續(xù)地堅守在那里。

????這名工人表示，東京電力公司的高管層和日本的核電監(jiān)管機構(gòu)也對核危機感到疑惑。當(dāng)1966年和1972年福島第一核電站獲得核電許可證時，東電高層和核電監(jiān)管機構(gòu)要求福島第一核電站必須能夠抵御3.1米高的大浪——這個數(shù)據(jù)是參考智利1960年的一次海嘯得來的。

????根據(jù)日本政府去年年底發(fā)布的一份報告，就在離大海嘯發(fā)生只有三年的2008年，東電公司還曾重新評估過福島第一核電站的海嘯風(fēng)險。東電公司最新的技術(shù)模擬顯示，一旦發(fā)生海嘯，該地區(qū)最高可能會遭受15米的巨浪——令人心寒的是，這差不多正好就是3月11日下午襲擊福島海岸線的最大浪高。

????不過東京電力公司當(dāng)時并不相信這個模擬結(jié)果的可靠性。

????就像日本政府對核事故的一份調(diào)查報告所總結(jié)的那樣：由于東電不相信該模擬結(jié)果所采用的新模型，所以“東京電力公司仍未針對海嘯的可能性采取具體措施。”

????該報告對日本的核電監(jiān)管機構(gòu)也同樣表示了不滿。報告寫道，在確定福島第一核電站是否采取了適當(dāng)?shù)目购[措施的問題上，“調(diào)查委員會沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)監(jiān)管機構(gòu)做出相關(guān)努力”。日本注定要為此付出巨大代價。3月11日，七波海嘯向福島第一核電站輪番襲來，兩名正在檢查四號機組的東電員工在最大的一波海嘯襲擊中當(dāng)場殞命。備用發(fā)電機發(fā)生故障后，反應(yīng)堆的冷卻系統(tǒng)和乏燃料池隨即陷入癱瘓。

????(Shimizu, then 66, was not accustomed to being called on the carpet by government officials. He was a pillar of the conservative Japanese industrial establishment, and a TEPCO lifer. He had also been a member in good standing of the global nuclear power industry; less than a year earlier he had been elected to the board of the World Association of Nuclear Operators, a trade group ostensibly devoted to ensuring the "highest possible standards of safety.")

????Kan himself wanted to hear what Shimizu was thinking, but he had already decided, after talking to his nuclear emergency team before the TEPCO president arrived, that "I could not let it [an evacuation] happen. It just wasn't an option."

Turning a Blind Eye

????There was no precedent for the magnitude of the quake and tsunami that wreaked havoc at Fukushima Daiichi. But the disaster wasn't unimaginable. In fact, workers periodically discussed among themselves the risks of the facility's location. "I always wondered why you would build a nuclear site this size in an earthquake zone right on the ocean," said one worker, who requested anonymity because TEPCO had not granted him permission to speak to the press. Sitting in a small karaoke bar in the nearby city of Minami-soma, the worker was at the plant on March 11, 2011 and worked almost continuously through the spring, summer and autumn to try to contain the crisis.

????TEPCO's senior management and Japan's nuclear regulators wondered about the risks, too, this worker noted. When the licenses for the Fukushima Daiichi generating stations were granted in 1966 and 1972, they called for the plant to be able to withstand a wave cresting at 3.1 meters in height—a figure based on the size of a tsunami in Chile in 1960.

????As recently as 2008, according to the Japanese government's interim report into the accident released at the end of last year, TEPCO reevaluated the tsunami risks at the plant. New simulations the company ran showed waves could reach as high as 15 meters—chillingly, almost the exact height of the biggest wave that smashed into the coastline on the afternoon of March 11.

????TEPCO didn't believe the simulation was reliable.

????As a Japanese government investigation into the nuclear accident concludes, in understated but withering prose: "TEPCO still did not take concrete measures against the possibility of tsunami," because it didn't trust the new model that had generated that result.

????The report is equally critical of the nuclear regulatory agencies in Japan. "The investigation committee is unable to find efforts of the regulatory organizations concerned" to determine whether adequate defenses against possible tsunamis were in place.

????Japan would pay dearly for that. Two TEPCO workers, in the process of inspecting unit number four, were killed instantly when the largest of the seven waves struck the plant site. The cooling systems for the reactors that were operating and the plant's spent fuel pools were disabled when backup generators failed.