????緊接著，在東電總部和福島第一核電站發(fā)生的混亂與騷動(dòng)又導(dǎo)致了一連串不該發(fā)生的錯(cuò)誤，最終導(dǎo)致三座反應(yīng)堆出現(xiàn)氫氣爆炸，爆炸向大氣和海水中釋放了破壞性水平的放射性物質(zhì)。福島第一核電站站長吉田雅夫回憶道：“我以為我們完了。我以為我們會(huì)徹底失去對(duì)反應(yīng)堆的控制。”

駝鳥心態(tài)，逃避現(xiàn)實(shí)

????日本的核安全標(biāo)準(zhǔn)歷來是旨在確保核電廠能夠抵御“設(shè)計(jì)基準(zhǔn)事故”，也就是核電廠在設(shè)計(jì)上能夠自動(dòng)抵御的事故。而一年前的事故的破壞性遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過了這個(gè)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)。核電行業(yè)把福島第一核電站的事故稱為“全廠失電”（SBO）。

????在上世紀(jì)八九十年代，美國的核電監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)和核電運(yùn)營商就開始計(jì)劃出現(xiàn)“全廠失電”時(shí)的對(duì)策——也就是核電廠失去所有電力，就像去年福島第一核電站發(fā)生的那樣。當(dāng)時(shí)美國核電站就開始安裝一套被東京的核電顧問佐藤智（音譯）稱為“深度防御”的系統(tǒng)，也就是一些冗余、多樣的機(jī)制，來確保核電站能夠應(yīng)對(duì)包括全廠失電在內(nèi)的各種事故。

????東京電力公司和日本核電監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)表示，福島第一核電站的確配備了多余的電力設(shè)施——也就是核電站里的柴油發(fā)電機(jī)，不過它們也在海嘯襲擊中癱瘓了。（盡管柴油發(fā)電機(jī)所在的位置離太平洋還有好幾百碼，但它們的設(shè)計(jì)卻抵御不了水淹。）

????不過日本卻從來沒有為全廠失電的情況做過準(zhǔn)備。佐藤表示，盡管全世界都在向前看，但日本核電業(yè)的感覺卻是：“全廠失電是不可能的事，想都不要想。”

????日本的核電批評(píng)人士表示，這種現(xiàn)象有一個(gè)基本的原因。長期以來，日本政府和電力公司把更多的時(shí)間和精力用來向公眾兜售“核電安全論”，而不是用來做些實(shí)事提高核電站的安全。佐藤說道：“我們花在公關(guān)上的錢，比花在實(shí)際安全措施上的錢多10倍。這是個(gè)可怕的事情?！?/p>

“艱難的時(shí)刻”

????去年3月15號(hào)凌晨，當(dāng)東電總裁清水正孝走進(jìn)菅直人的辦公室時(shí)，內(nèi)閣主要官員以及參與危機(jī)處理的各部門負(fù)責(zé)人都已經(jīng)到了。

????菅直人告訴清水正孝，從福島第一核電站撤離的計(jì)劃是不可接受的。“你們決不能離開核電站。”據(jù)菅直人說，清水正孝并沒有反對(duì)，只是說：“我明白了?！睎|京電力公司通過其新聞發(fā)言人否認(rèn)了當(dāng)初曾打算從福島第一核電站全部撤離的計(jì)劃，清水正孝本人也拒絕接受媒體采訪。不過菅直人在接受《財(cái)富》采訪時(shí)堅(jiān)稱，清水正孝當(dāng)時(shí)的打算就是“撤離”。

????The ensuing chaos and confusion—at TEPCO headquarters and at the plant site—would lead to a series of early missteps that would eventually cause hydrogen explosions at three of the reactor units, blasts that released damaging levels of radioactive material in the atmosphere and seawater. "I thought we were done," recalls Masao Yoshida, the plant manager. "I thought we would lose control over the reactors completely."

Heads in the sand

????Nuclear safety in Japan historically has been predicated on making sure plants could withstand "design basis accidents."??Translation: an accident that the plant has been designed to deal with automatically. What happened a year ago went far beyond that. The industry calls the accident at Fukushima Daiichi a station blackout, or an SBO.

????In the United States, in the 1980s and 90s, regulatory authorities and nuclear operators began planning for the possibility of station blackouts, in which a nuclear plant loses all sources of power, just as Fukushima Daiichi did last year. They began installing what Satoshi Sato, a nuclear industry consultant in Tokyo, calls "defense in depth," which means there are both redundant and diverse mechanisms in place intended to cope with accidents, up to and including SBOs.

????TEPCO and Japan's nuclear regulators say they did have redundant power sources in place—the on site diesel generators that also eventually failed after the tsunami struck. (Despite sitting within a few hundred yards of the Pacific ocean, the generators were not designed to withstand flooding.)

????But Japan never even tried to prepare for station blackouts. Even as the rest of the world moved on, says Sato, the feeling in Tokyo was, "SBOs are not conceivable; don't even think about it."

????Critics of the industry in Japan say there is a basic reason for that. Historically, the government and the power companies spent more time and energy trying to convince the public that nuclear energy was safe than it did actually trying to make nuclear energy safe. Says Sato: "we spent ten times more money for PR campaigns than we did for real safety measures. It's a terrible thing."

"A Tough Moment"

????When Shimizu walked into Kan's office in the early hours of March 15 of last year, the Prime Minister was surrounded by the key officials from his office and various ministries trying to cope with the ongoing crisis.

????Kan told the TEPCO executive that his plan to withdraw from Fukushima Daiichi was unacceptable. "There's no way you can leave the site." Shimizu, according to Kan, didn't protest. "I understand," he replied. TEPCO has denied through its press spokesmen that it ever intended to pull out entirely from the plant and Shimizu has declined to talk to the press. Kan, in his interview with Fortune, was adamant in his language about what Shimizu said he wanted to do: "Tettai," he said in Japanese. Withdraw.