出售風(fēng)云：我們?nèi)绾伟压举u給惠普
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????只要鼓起全部勇氣，我們就決不會失敗。 ????— 威廉?莎士比亞，《麥克白》 ????這是探討戰(zhàn)略性業(yè)務(wù)開發(fā)之重要性的系列文章的結(jié)局篇（前四部分參見 I, II ，III and IV）。 ????在前一部分中，我描述了在自動化軟件供應(yīng)商Opsware每年我們都會拋開瑣事，與董事會一起對公司的現(xiàn)狀進行戰(zhàn)略評估。2005年11月，我們的結(jié)論是繼續(xù)獨立運營，但到了2007年初，我們的評估結(jié)論卻大相徑庭。公司業(yè)務(wù)強勁，然而達到每季度的預(yù)期絕非易事，公司的成長和所達到的市場領(lǐng)先地位也并沒有在股票市場上給我們帶來回報。我們走到了這樣一個決策的時間節(jié)點：投入更多資金進行研發(fā)和銷售拓展，還是嘗試出售公司。我們決定走后一條路，但必須為股東贏得足夠高的售價。 ????大戲上演：2007年5月 ????二月份，我們照常與主要企業(yè)信息技術(shù)公司舉行業(yè)務(wù)更新會晤，他們的收購興趣導(dǎo)致了數(shù)次后續(xù)會談。關(guān)鍵是找到某家公司，讓它開價。5月22日，我們向董事會匯報進展。代號為“1號公司”的某個企業(yè)剛剛提出每股11美元的收購價。那是38%的溢價——不錯，但還不夠好。我們再一次討論：如果繼續(xù)運營我們面臨什么樣機會、風(fēng)險，而股東價值如何體現(xiàn)。反復(fù)討論的焦點就是：我們該還價多少？ ????最終的決定向所有有意競購公司的人發(fā)出了強烈信號：我們告訴1號公司，董事會拒絕了每股11美元的報價，而且不會認真考慮任何14美元以下的報價。這樣我們也等于告訴其它和我們進行后續(xù)會談的公司【普惠（HP）和其它幾家公司】，我們已經(jīng)收到收購要約，但不會賤賣公司，正可謂是一箭雙雕。但14美元的價格有高達75%的溢價，1號公司、普惠和其它所有人都選擇了退出。我們則發(fā)出信函要求所有公司退回或銷毀我們與之共享的公司材料。退出的黃粱美夢看來就是美夢而已了。我們將繼續(xù)又一個季度的艱苦跋涉。 ????然而差不多一個月之后，1號公司率先服軟，將收購價增加到每股13.25美元。太棒了！接近我們的心理價位了！我們重新召集董事會，實事求是地嚴肅討論，是繼續(xù)運營還是在這個價格附近出售公司。我們的分析表明，只有收入年增長75%以上，才能實現(xiàn)15美元的股價。這個目標很難實現(xiàn)：當(dāng)時華爾街的一致預(yù)測也不過28%。 ????除了考慮上行空間，我們還討論了獨立運營的風(fēng)險。（請注意第6條，宏觀經(jīng)濟放緩：我們完全沒有想到幾個月之后這個風(fēng)險就會如此巨大而真實。） |
????But screw your courage to the sticking-place, and we'll not fail. ????— William Shakespeare, Macbeth ????This is the final post in a series dealing with the importance of strategic business development (Here are Parts I, II, III and IV). ????In my last post, I described how, at Opsware, we would step back from the fray about once a year to go through a strategic review of our situation with the board. In November 2005, our conclusion was to keep on building an independent company, but in early 2007 another review led us to a different conclusion. Our business was strong, but meeting quarterly expectations was difficult and the market wasn't rewarding us for the growth and leading market position we had achieved. We were at a decision point: Plow even more money into R&D and sales expansion or explore a sale. We decided to explore a sale, but only if we could achieve a top-dollar price for our shareholders. ????The dance begins: May 2007 ????Our February update meetings with the major enterprise IT players had piqued their interest and led to several follow-ups. The key was to get someone to set an initial price. On May 22, we went back to the Opsware board with an update. A company we'll call Company 1 had just offered to buy the company for $11/share. That was a 38% premium—good, but not exceptional. Once again, we discussed the opportunities, risks and shareholder value implications of continuing in the business. We debated long and hard: What was our number? ????We decided to send a strong message to anyone considering us as a target: We told Company 1 that the Board had rejected its $11/share offer and would not give serious consideration to any new offer below $14/share. For good measure, we took the opportunity to notify the other companies who'd followed up with us (HP and several others) that we'd received an offer but were not interested in discussing any deal below $14. Since that was a 75% premium over our current price, Company 1, HP and everyone else told us they were out. We sent all of them letters requesting the return or destruction of any information we had shared. Those brief dreams of exit seemed to be just that—dreams. We went back to the slog of making yet another quarter. ????Then, almost a month later, the CEO of Company 1 came back offering $13.25/share. Yes! We were getting close to our magic number! We reconvened the board for a serious, fact-based discussion of staying the course versus selling in this price range. Our analysis suggested we would have to grow revenues at least 75% annually to exceed $15/share. That seemed impossible—Wall Street consensus was 28%. ????In addition to upside opportunities, we discussed the risks of staying standalone. (Note #6, macroeconomic slowdown: We had no idea how real a risk that would turn out to be just months later.) |
