????巴克萊（Barclays）被控操縱倫敦銀行同業(yè)拆借利率（Libor），最后達(dá)成4.50億美元和解并披露了大量電子郵件，但在這些郵件中找不到任何信貸員或商業(yè)銀行家要求抬高利率的內(nèi)容。為什么沒有這樣的郵件？巴克萊可是全球最大的銀行之一。而Libor眾所周知是從企業(yè)授信額度到汽車貸款的數(shù)萬億美元貸款的基準(zhǔn)利率。那么，既然巴克萊有龐大的放貸規(guī)模，還能操縱Libor，為什么沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)信貸員寫郵件來要求抬高利率，增加季度貸款利潤？

????事實(shí)上，這些郵件來自交易員，而且通常都是要求負(fù)責(zé)提交巴克萊貸款利率的銀行官員壓低（而不是抬高）Libor，以幫助該行或個(gè)別交易員的頭寸獲利。很多時(shí)候，提交利率者都照辦了。有些銀行看上去還有協(xié)調(diào)利率提交和交易業(yè)務(wù)的安排。據(jù)稱，部分銀行干脆就把利率提交部門安排在了交易部門的旁邊，希望藉此增加銀行利潤。但是，好像沒有什么協(xié)調(diào)銀行貸款利率和實(shí)際貸款業(yè)務(wù)的安排。而且他們對于壓低Libor將損及貸款利潤似乎也不怎么擔(dān)心。

????摩根大通（JPMorgan Chase）倫敦鯨丑聞敗露后暴露出來的一點(diǎn)是，該行的交易業(yè)務(wù)，也就是杰米?戴蒙所稱的“對沖”，已經(jīng)變得有多大多重要。摩根大通將大約1/3的存款（約3.5億美元）都進(jìn)行了投資，而不是放貸。正如路透社（Reuters）的菲利克斯?賽蒙和其他人所指，該行將這么多的資源用于交易（而非放貸），這是真正問題所在，絕非一家資本金充足的大銀行搞砸了一筆交易這么簡單。

????Libor丑聞看來也一樣。真正的問題或者說讓監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)長期擔(dān)憂的并非利率操縱，而是大銀行有多少業(yè)務(wù)是交易驅(qū)動(dòng)，而非借貸驅(qū)動(dòng)。顯然，巴克萊和其他銀行當(dāng)時(shí)認(rèn)為，通過操縱利率，他們可以在交易業(yè)務(wù)中賺更多的錢，彌補(bǔ)借貸業(yè)務(wù)的損失。正如佛洛依德?諾瑞斯周末在《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》（NY Times）上的文章中所寫的：“有意思的是，即便是在金融危機(jī)之前，這類操縱也不是總是朝著抬高利率（常理看來，貸出方總是利率越高越好）一個(gè)方向。巴克萊的交易部門炮制報(bào)告，有時(shí)根據(jù)交易頭寸要求降低利率，即便這樣可能會減少該行獲得的利息收入。”

????所有這些看來都進(jìn)一步證明了一點(diǎn)，那就是，為什么我們需要嚴(yán)厲的《沃克爾法則》（Volcker rule），以便將借貸業(yè)務(wù)與交易業(yè)務(wù)分離。它不光是為了防止這些大銀行遭受巨額交易損失。我們需要《沃克爾法則》的原因是在經(jīng)濟(jì)增長乏力之時(shí)，我們需要銀行家專注于借貸業(yè)務(wù)。Libor丑聞再次表明借貸業(yè)務(wù)在當(dāng)代國際金融界只是個(gè)配角。這才是真正的問題所在。

????譯者：早稻米

????Here's one thing you won't find among the trove of e-mails released as part of Barclays' $450 million settlement for its part in the scheme to fix Libor: Loan officers or commercial bankers asking for higher rates. The question is why not. Barclays is one of the biggest banks in the world. And Libor, as the world now knows, is the basis for trillions of dollars in loans including everything from corporate lines of credit to auto loans. So if Barclays is a huge lender, and the Libor fix was on, why wasn't there any e-mails from loan officers asking the bank to jack up the rates in order to boost lending profits in the quarter?

????Instead, the e-mails are from traders. And often they are asking for the bank officials responsible for reporting Barclays' lending rates to the London group that set official Libor to push the rate down, not up, in order to benefit the bank's, or an individual trader's, positions. And in many instances the submitters complied. At some banks there appeared to be a concerted effort to coordinate their rate reporting and their trading operations. Allegedly, some banks sat their Libor traders right next to the submitters in order to boost profits. Yet, there appears to be very little effort to coordinate bank lending rates with actual lending. And very little concern for how pushing the rate lower would hurt lending profits.

????One of the revelations after the JPMorgan Chase (JPM) London Whale blow-up was just how big and important trading activities, which Jamie Dimon calls hedging, had become at the bank. Roughly, one-third of all the money JPMorgan has taken in from depositors, or around $350 billion, is invested, rather than lent out. The fact that the bank diverted so much of its resources to trading, and away from lending, Reuters' Felix Salmon and others pointed out, was the real problem for the economy, and not the fact that a large well-capitalized bank had messed up a trade.

????The same appears to be true for the Libor scandal. The real story, and the long-term concern for regulators, is not that lending rates were fixed, but how much of the business of big banks these days is driven by trading, not lending. Clearly, Barclays and other banks believed they could make more money on their trading desk manipulating the rate, then they would lose in their lending operations. As Floyd Norris wrote in the NY Times over the weekend, "It is interesting to note that even before the financial crisis, the manipulation was not, as one might expect from a lender, always in the direction of higher rates. The trading department at Barclays was rigging the report, and sometimes its trading positions called for lower rates, even though that might reduce the interest income received by the bank."

????All this appears to be more evidence for why we need a strong Volcker rule that separates lending from trading. It's not just to insure against large trading losses at the big banks. The reason we need the Volcker rule is that at time when the economy is struggling to grow what we really need is bankers who are focused on lending. The Libor scandal shows once again that lending is a sideshow in the world of modern global finance. And that's the real problem.