????那么，為什么這兩起訴訟中的原、被告各方在決定向慈善機構(gòu)支付近似罰金時，都不約而同地忽略了電子隱私信息中心呢？同時，這兩起訴訟最后的確選擇了不少非營利組織作為受益人，比如位于大長灘的基督教青年會（YCMA）、位于奧克蘭的青年電臺（Youth Radio）、布魯金斯學(xué)會（Brookings Institute，經(jīng)常獲得谷歌的捐贈）和麥克阿瑟基金（MacArthur Foundation，經(jīng)常獲得Facebook的捐贈）等。但為什么大家很難把這些機構(gòu)當(dāng)成忠心守護老百姓數(shù)碼隱私的守夜人呢？

????是不是因為電子隱私信息中心在抗擊侵權(quán)行為時表現(xiàn)得太激進，導(dǎo)致這兩起訴訟的被告反對向它支付罰金呢？Google Buzz一案的原告律師蓋里?梅森表示，原、被告之間的調(diào)解談判是保密的，因此拒絕對此發(fā)表評論。而Facebook一案中的兩位原告律師則沒有回電話。

????2011年3月的Google Buzz一案中，電子隱私信息中心和其他7個關(guān)注網(wǎng)絡(luò)隱私問題的非營利機構(gòu)共同發(fā)起抗議，反對原告律師和被告將他們排除在罰金受益人之外。同時聲稱，原、被告實際上將大部分罰金給了“收了谷歌的錢，幫谷歌搞游說或給谷歌做咨詢”的機構(gòu)。（EFF、CDT和CIS都否認他們與谷歌是這種關(guān)系。他們表示自己完全獨立自主，并表示他們收到的任何企業(yè)捐贈都是“不受限制”的，也就是說沒有任何附加條件。）

????2011年5月，圣荷塞聯(lián)邦地方法院審判長詹姆斯?威爾同意了電子隱私信息中心的要求，將50萬美元的罰金劃撥給了它?！九c此同時他自行決定，另撥出50萬美元罰金，捐給圣克拉拉大學(xué)（Santa Clara University）的一個倫理中心，而威爾審判長本人恰好也是這所大學(xué)法學(xué)院的教師。】

????近似罰金并不是由科技公司發(fā)明的。這個原則非常古老，經(jīng)常用來解決信托法領(lǐng)域某個反復(fù)出現(xiàn)的問題。比如富蘭克林?羅斯?？偨y(tǒng)1938年創(chuàng)立了畸型兒基金會（March of Dimes Foundation）。當(dāng)時羅斯福明確表示，這個基金會要與小兒麻痹癥做斗爭。后來美國的小兒麻痹癥得到了控制，該基金會希望征得公眾的同意，轉(zhuǎn)而與其它疾病進行抗?fàn)?。法庭認為，畸型兒基金會的這種做法非常近似羅斯?？偨y(tǒng)的初衷，因而引用了近似罰金原則，同意了該基金會的請求，

????到了上世紀(jì)80年代，近似罰金原則（或者是像理查德?蒲士納法官在2004年的一次裁定中所說的那樣——“其它什么東西借其之名”）逐漸進入了集體訴訟案的調(diào)解操作中。有些批評人士認為，近似罰金可能變成合法的“行賄基金”，因為無論是法官、原告律師，甚至連被告人都可以利用這筆錢進一步做有利于自己的事。過去的10個月里，有三家聯(lián)邦上訴法院都駁回了“近以罰金”調(diào)解申請，因為他們在研究后都認為，這些接收罰金的慈善機構(gòu)幾乎與案件中的利益受侵害方?jīng)]有任何關(guān)系。

????在集體訴訟案的調(diào)解過程中，原告律師最關(guān)心的是如何拿到最多的律師費，而被告企業(yè)最關(guān)心的是如何掏最少的錢平息事態(tài)。因此原告律師與被告為了達成目標(biāo)，可能會犧牲受侵害方的利益。集體訴訟公平中心（Center for Class Action Fairness）的西奧多?弗蘭克律師寫道，近似罰金“為了使原告律師實際上獲得最大份額的代理費，而掩飾了被告真正的和解成本”，因而可能導(dǎo)致濫用。

????例如在Google Buzz一案中，從表面上來看，原告的代理律師獲得了總罰金的四分之一作為代理費，也就是810萬美元中的210萬。這聽起來還好，屬于正常水平。不過批評人士們可能會抗議道，這筆錢里沒有一分錢花到了實際受侵害者的身上，而接收了近似罰金的慈善機構(gòu)可能以前已經(jīng)或多或少地受到過被告的資助。如果真是這樣，那么律師們的律師費可能的確過高了，因為他們?yōu)槭芮趾θ后w爭得的利益實在太少了。

????在Facebook一案中，律師費過高的可能性更為明顯。如果調(diào)解方案獲批，那么原告律師會得到1,000萬美元，非營利機構(gòu)也能拿到1,000萬美元，實際受侵害者一分錢也拿不到。光是在表面上看起來就很不公平。而且Facebook本來就是某些受益機構(gòu)背后的金主，即便沒有這起官司，F(xiàn)acebook也可能通過其他渠道對他們進行捐贈。因此原告律師們實際上有可能獲得這筆調(diào)解費的一半以上，看起來更是不公平。

????在本案的訴訟文件上，原告律師強調(diào)，調(diào)解內(nèi)容還包括一些禁制令，利益受到侵害的用戶未來可能會從這些禁制令中獲得好處。理由是Facebook已經(jīng)同意修改服務(wù)協(xié)議的部分條款，讓用戶有機會選擇“不參與”贊助廣告。然后原告律師表示，對于受侵害的用戶來說，這些條款更改的有效程度居然價值整整1.03億美元，因為用戶們“現(xiàn)在有機會控制相當(dāng)于X個月的廣告資產(chǎn)的使用權(quán)。（X所表示的數(shù)據(jù)仍然處于保密狀態(tài)）。

????剛剛過去的7月，電子隱私信息中心以及代表反對調(diào)解結(jié)果的受侵害群體的代理律師分別質(zhì)疑了Facebook一案調(diào)解結(jié)果的正當(dāng)性。電子隱私信息中心和其他三家關(guān)注網(wǎng)絡(luò)隱私的組織要求法院采取透明的、公開審請的程序，來確定近似罰金的受益人。不過法庭尚未受理這些投訴。部分原因是由于這些要求剛剛提交到法庭，負責(zé)此案的露西?科荷法官就自動調(diào)離了此案。雖然她沒有透露具體原因，但根據(jù)公開報道顯示，她和她丈夫與即將獲得調(diào)解費的一些慈善組織存在某些聯(lián)系。

????有些其它調(diào)解案的近似罰金也獲得了法院的批準(zhǔn)，盡管其中可能不乏類似、甚至更嚴重的利益沖突。科荷法官在這個當(dāng)口上選擇避嫌，也不失為一種進步。

????譯者：樸成奎

????How, then, could the parties -- again and again -- have overlooked EPIC when doling out the cash? How, indeed, when so many of the groups that the parties did select—like the YMCA of Greater Long Beach, Youth Radio of Oakland, the Brookings Institute (a regular Google beneficiary), and the MacArthur Foundation (a regular Facebook beneficiary) -- are hardly thought of as digital privacy watchdogs?

????Could it be that the defendants in each case blackballed EPIC precisely because it was too aggressively devoted to combatting the wrongs that allegedly harmed the class? Lead Google Buzz plaintiffs attorney Gary Mason declined to comment, explaining that settlement negotiations are confidential. Two lead plaintiffs attorneys in the Sponsored Stories case did not return calls.

????In the Google Buzz case in March 2011, EPIC and seven other privacy-focused nonprofits objected to their exclusion from the cy pres funds, protesting that the plaintiffs lawyers and Google had, in effect, arranged to give the majority of those funds "to organizations that are currently paid by Google to lobby for or to consult for the company." (The EFF, CDT, and CIS all reject that characterization of their relationship to Google. They aver, rather, their complete independence, and stress that any corporate donations they accept are "unrestricted" in nature—meaning that they come with no strings attached.)

????In May 2011, Chief Judge James Ware of the federal district court in San Jose granted EPIC's request, carving out a $500,000 tranche for it. (At the same time he spontaneously—without prompting from anyone—sliced off another $500,000 piece for an ethics center at Santa Clara University, a school where Judge Ware serves on the law school faculty.)

????Tech companies did not invent cy pres awards. The doctrine is ancient, having arisen to address a recurring problem in trusts law. For instance, when President Franklin D. Roosevelt set up the March of Dimes Foundation in 1938, he specified that it would fight polio. But once that disease was tamed, the foundation sought permission to fight other diseases. Invoking the cy pres doctrine, courts granted its request, finding that doing so would carry out Roosevelt's original intent as closely as possible.

????In the 1980s the cy pres doctrine—"or rather something parading in its name," as federal appeals court judge Richard Posner archly put it in a 2004 ruling—burrowed its way into the realm of class-action settlements. Critics have referred to cy pres awards as judicial "slush funds," since judges, plaintiffs lawyers, and—as the Google Buzz and Sponsored Stories cases suggest—even defendants can use them to further their own agendas. In the past ten months three federal appeals courts have struck down cy pres awards after concluding that they funded charities that had virtually nothing to do with the class members for whom the cases were ostensibly filed.

????The key recurring concern with any class action settlement is that plaintiffs attorneys, desiring to maximize their fees, and defendant corporations, eager to minimize total payout, will collude to achieve their goals at the expense of class members. Cy pres awards can be enlisted in that abusive process, attorney Theodore H. Frank of the Center for Class Action Fairness, has written, by "disguising the true cost of a settlement to the defendant to maximize the share of the actual recovery received by the plaintiffs attorneys."

????For instance, in the Google Buzz case, on the face of things the plaintiffs attorneys were receiving about one-quarter of the total award -- $2.1 million of an $8.1 million fund -- which sounds well within the normal range. Yet a critic might protest that none of this particular award went to the actual class members, while much of it went to charities the defendant probably would have funded to some degree anyway. If so, then the attorneys fees may have been excessive given how little the lawyers actually won for the class.

????In the Facebook class action, the potential for fee inflation is even more palpable. If the deal is approved, the plaintiffs attorneys get $10 million, the nonprofits get $10 million, and the class members get zilch, which does not look great even on its face. To the extent that some of the nonprofits are also regular beneficiaries of Facebook's largesse, and would likely have gotten at least some of their cy pres money even without any lawsuit, the attorneys would be getting more than half the cash generated by the settlement, which looks even worse.

????In court papers supporting the deal, the plaintiffs stress that the Facebook settlement also includes injunctive relief from which class members may benefit in the future, because Facebook has agreed to fiddle with some of the fine print in its terms-of-service agreements and to give its users opportunities to "opt-out" of the Sponsored Stories program. The plaintiffs then claim that these structural changes are effectively worth --are you sitting down? -- $103 million to the class, because class members will "now have the opportunity to control the use of what is essentially a [redacted]/month advertising asset." (The redacted figure remains under seal.)

????In July, EPIC and attorneys representing other objecting class members each challenged the adequacy of the Facebook settlement. Alternatively, EPIC and three other privacy groups have asked the court to redetermine cy pres recipients using transparent, open-application procedures. These objections have not yet been ruled upon, in part because, as soon as they were lodged, U.S. District Judge Lucy Koh recused herself from the case. Though she did not state her reasons, she and her husband had ties to some of the charities that stood to gain from the settlement, according to published reports

????Since other cy pres awards have been upheld despite similar or worse apparent conflicts, Judge Koh's sensitivity was at least progress of a sort.