????要消除毒石膏板的危害，就必須徹底拆除這些房屋的內(nèi)墻進行重建，由此產(chǎn)生的成本往往達到六位數(shù)。而這還是建立在正確實施翻修工作的基礎(chǔ)之上：有些營建商和投資人不講誠信，他們在草草翻修之后就會設(shè)法把問題房屋賣給那些沒有戒心的買家。目前沒有什么披露方面的規(guī)定能防止這種做法。

????以美國消費品安全委員會（Consumer Product Safety Commission）為首的聯(lián)邦政府機構(gòu)對毒石膏板進行了調(diào)查，但這些部門一直沒有動用它們原本可以掌握的權(quán)力來幫助受害者，同時打擊應為此負責的企業(yè)。它們也沒有解答最基本的問題，比如造成石膏板釋放含硫氣體的原因或者含硫氣體對人體健康有多大影響。同時，該委員會發(fā)現(xiàn)自己力量不足，而且也無權(quán)起訴隔海相望的中方企業(yè)，也無法迫使它們召回產(chǎn)品。

????實際上，如果毒石膏板受害者希望訴諸法律，由于牽涉到外國公司，特別是中國公司，情況就會變得復雜起來。新奧爾良聯(lián)邦法院已經(jīng)受理了數(shù)千起相關(guān)訴訟。但起訴至今已過去近四年時間，中方企業(yè)幾乎沒有顯露出一點兒配合的意向，甚至裁定它們敗訴的判決書都沒人接收?！疚ㄒ坏睦馐?，德國綜合型企業(yè)可耐福集團（Knauf Group）的中國子公司同意為受影響房屋的翻修提供資金。】

????中國公司規(guī)避美國司法體系的能力并不是沒有引起《石膏板安全法案》起草者的注意。他們在法案中提出，“國會感覺”美國商務部應堅持要求中國政府“指導那些生產(chǎn)和出口問題石膏板的中方企業(yè)接受美國聯(lián)邦法院的管轄，同時遵照美國聯(lián)邦法院的判決行事，即受到問題石膏板影響的業(yè)主勝訴?！?/p>

????但“國會感覺”這樣的措辭沒有任何法律效力。同時，迄今為止石膏板問題并沒有給中國政府帶來沉重的外交壓力，因此也沒什么跡象表明中國政府將改變態(tài)度。

????《石膏板安全法案》的要求一降再降。去年，在弗吉尼亞海灘地區(qū)選民的敦促之下，弗吉尼亞州共和黨眾議員斯科特?里格爾首次提出這項法案，當時的內(nèi)容還比較犀利。弗吉尼亞海灘地區(qū)多數(shù)問題住宅都使用了中國國營企業(yè)——泰山石膏股份有限公司（Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd.）生產(chǎn)的問題石膏板。

????雖然在對中國政府施壓方面，里格爾也采用了“國會感覺”這樣的措辭，但他的提案目的很明確，那就是把購買、銷售和使用中國問題石膏板定性為違法活動。他在提案中要求“按照《聯(lián)邦危險物品管理法》（Federal Hazardous Substances Act）的規(guī)定，將問題石膏板定為禁用危險品”，同時按照《消費品安全法》（Consumer Product Safety Act）的規(guī)定將其定為“緊急危險”品。

????但這些內(nèi)容幾乎立刻遭到削弱。

????通過眾議院能源與商業(yè)委員會（Energy and Commerce Committee）審核后，這項法案的要求已經(jīng)變成石膏板要帶有更容易辨認的標識以及含硫量達到一定標準。它甚至還允許消費品安全委員會采納石膏板行業(yè)自行制定的標準，而不是由該委員會來設(shè)定標準。國會議員們都知道，能源與商業(yè)委員會一向反對出臺新的環(huán)保規(guī)定。

????Fixing a tainted home requires essentially gutting the house down to the studs and rebuilding, frequently at a cost upwards of six figures. And that's assuming a remediation job is done right: builders and investors with less-than-honorable intentions have engaged in dubious and incomplete fixes, then tried to sell off the houses to unsuspecting buyers. No disclosures are currently required to help prevent those practices.

????The federal government's investigation into tainted drywall, headed by the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, never used powers it could have pursued to help victims and crack down on the companies responsible, nor did it answer fundamental questions such as what caused the sulfur emissions in the first place or how extensive the health effects could be. Meanwhile, the CPSC found itself outmatched and without strong statutory authority to pursue companies overseas in China, or attempt to force a recall.

????Indeed, the fact that foreign corporations are involved – particularly Chinese– has complicated any efforts by those harmed by the contaminated drywall to pursue legal action. Thousands of lawsuits have been combined in a New Orleans federal court, but nearly four years after the litigation began, the Chinese manufacturers have shown little interest in cooperating. Even judgments against them have gone uncollected. (The one exception is the Chinese subsidiary of German conglomerate Knauf Group, which has agreed to help fund repairs of its affected homes).

????The ability of Chinese companies to skirt the U.S. court system did not go unnoticed by lawmakers who crafted the new Drywall Safety Act. They included that it was the "sense of Congress" that the Secretary of Commerce should insist the Chinese government "direct the companies that manufactured and exported problematic drywall to submit to jurisdiction in United States Federal Courts and comply with any decisions issued by the Courts for homeowners with problematic drywall."

????However, the "sense of Congress" language carries no legal weight, and there is little to indicate the Chinese government will change its stance absent strong diplomatic pressure, which thus far has never been applied regarding the drywall.

????The Drywall Safety Act always had more limited intentions. It started out with more teeth when first introduced last year by Rep. Scott Rigell (R-Va.), at the urging of his affected constituents in Virginia Beach. Most tainted homes in the region were built with bad drywall from Taishan Gypsum Co. Ltd. – a manufacturer controlled by the Chinese-government itself.

????While Rigell included a similarly symbolic "sense of Congress" about pressuring the Chinese government, his bill aimed to clearly make the buying, selling and using of contaminated Chinese drywall illegal. It called for it to be "treated as a banned hazardous substance under the Federal Hazardous Substances Act" and as "an imminent hazard" under the Consumer Product Safety Act.

????However, almost immediately the bill found itself being weakened.

????By the time it got through the House Energy and Commerce Committee – a panel known on Capitol Hill for opposing new environmental regulations – the legislation had been reduced to only calling for better identifying marks on drywall, and for a standard on "sulfur content." It further allowed the CPSC to simply defer to an industry-developed voluntary standard, rather than instituting its own rules.