????上周五，摩根大通(JPMorgan Chase)首席投資辦公室前負(fù)責(zé)人、倫敦鯨布魯諾?伊科西爾的大老板伊娜?德魯在參議院負(fù)責(zé)調(diào)查倫敦鯨事件的附屬委員會召開的聽證會上表示，她受到了誤導(dǎo)。此外，盡管這次事件造成了62億美元（385.02億元人民幣）損失，成為華爾街歷史上虧損最嚴(yán)重的投資交易之一，德魯仍認(rèn)為自己的工作“合情合理而且勤勉有加”，甚至連相關(guān)虧損不斷增多的時候也是如此。德魯?shù)霓k公室設(shè)在紐約，她把大多數(shù)責(zé)任都推給了伊科西爾。德魯說，作為下屬，伊科西爾在她不知情的情況下夸大了交易倉位的價值，而且沒有“如實(shí)”計算損失額。參議院公布的調(diào)查報告指出，摩根大通交易員在2011年底或2012年初調(diào)整了計算投資價值的方法。報告發(fā)現(xiàn)，該公司曾將相關(guān)投資的日虧損額計為1,200萬美元（7,452萬元人民幣），而實(shí)際上這個數(shù)字已達(dá)到6億美元（37.26億元人民幣）。

????面對該委員會成員，德魯說：“我相信自己沒有瀆職行為，以前和現(xiàn)在我都這么認(rèn)為?！鄙现芩?，參議院就本次交易損失公布了一份300頁的報告；而周五的聽證會則是去年5月虧損問題公諸于眾后德魯首次公開露面。和她一起在聽證會上接受質(zhì)詢的還有多名摩根大通前任和現(xiàn)任高管。委員會負(fù)責(zé)人、民主黨參議員卡爾?萊文用了三個多小時來盤問這些高管。他提出的問題包括：為什么交易價值記錄有誤？摩根大通的風(fēng)險控制機(jī)制為何不足以限制損失規(guī)模等等。萊文表示，面對倫敦鯨事件可能帶來的損失，摩根大通非但沒有據(jù)實(shí)相告，還在初步報告中誤導(dǎo)了公眾和監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)。

????他說：“摩根大通在風(fēng)險不斷累積的情況下隱瞞損失，無視風(fēng)險限額，操縱計算模型，逃避監(jiān)督并向公眾傳遞了錯誤的信息?！?/p>

????已升任副董事長的前首席財務(wù)官道格?布朗斯坦稱，摩根大通首席執(zhí)行官杰米?戴蒙曾在2011年要求員工不得向監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)提供交易信息。布朗斯坦說，戴蒙這樣做是因?yàn)槟Ω笸〒?dān)心提交給監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)的信息遭到泄露。此事發(fā)生兩周后，摩根大通重新開始向監(jiān)管機(jī)構(gòu)匯報交易情況。

????萊文詢問的要點(diǎn)之一是摩根大通調(diào)整過的一個風(fēng)險模型。實(shí)際上，正是在調(diào)整了這個模型之后，倫敦鯨的交易倉位才得以不斷膨脹，盡管當(dāng)時摩根大通管理層曾表示，他們希望按照新的規(guī)定降低交易風(fēng)險。

????摩根大通投資銀行業(yè)務(wù)負(fù)責(zé)人邁克爾?卡瓦納表示，他們確實(shí)依靠這些模型來了解自身承擔(dān)了多少風(fēng)險。他說，對模型的調(diào)整有時會降低摩根大通所公布的風(fēng)險規(guī)模。但僅僅為了表明自身風(fēng)險已經(jīng)下降而調(diào)整風(fēng)險模型并不符合該公司的政策。首席投資辦公室首席風(fēng)險官彼得?韋蘭表示，2012年1月，他曾將一份警告摩根大通可能因信用投資而損失63億美元（391.23億元人民幣）的報告稱為“垃圾”，對此他感到后悔。韋蘭說，實(shí)際損失和該報告估算的數(shù)字相差不到1億美元(6.21億元人民幣)可能僅僅是個巧合。

????韋蘭稱：“以我當(dāng)時所掌握的情況，這些新數(shù)字看上去似乎一文不值。”

????德魯則表示，直到3月底她才了解到投資中存在的問題，時間和媒體開始披露摩根大通令人驚訝地大規(guī)模投資信用衍生產(chǎn)品相比只早了一個星期左右。德魯說，甚至在她發(fā)現(xiàn)了潛在問題之后，倫敦辦公室的交易員們?nèi)栽谙蛩[瞞信用衍生產(chǎn)品的交易信息。

????On Friday, Ina Drew, the former head of JPMorgan Chase's chief investment office and ultimate boss of the London Whale, told a Senate subcommittee that she was misled. What's more, despite the $6.2 billion loss -- one of the biggest in Wall Street history -- Drew believes she did a "reasonable and diligent" job even as the losses were piling up.

????Drew, who was based in New York, threw much of the blame for the losses onto the firm's former London traders. She said, without her knowledge, the traders who reported to her "inflated" the values of their positions and were not calculating their losses in "good faith."

????A Senate report found that JPMorgan traders shifted the way they were marking the portfolio in either late 2011 or early 2012. In one instance, according to the report, the portfolio's daily loss was recorded as $12 million. It was in fact $600 million.

????"I did not, and do not, believe that I engaged in any misconduct," Drew told senators.

????The hearing came a day after the Senate released a 300-page report on JPMorgan's 2012 trading loss. Drew, in her first public appearance since the losses were revealed last May, was among a number of current and former JPMorgan executives who were questioned on Friday. For more than three hours, Democratic Senator Carl Levin, head of the subcommittee investigating JPMorgan's trading blunder, grilled the executives on why the trades were miss-marked and why JPMorgan's risk controls weren't enough to limit the losses, among other issues. Rather than come clean, Levin said JPMorgan mislead the public and regulators in its initial response to reports about the potential London Whale losses.

????"JPMorgan piled on risk, hid losses, disregarded risk limits,manipulated models, dodged oversight, and misinformed the public," said Levin.

????Former CFO Doug Braunstein, who is now a vice chairman of the bank, said JPMorgan CEO Jamie Dimon in 2011 ordered bank employees to hold back information about the bank's trades from regulators. Braunstein said Dimon did it because the bank was worried that information being related to regulators was not being kept confidential. The bank resumed reporting trading results to regulators after two weeks.

????One of Levin's key points of inquiry was about a risk model that was changed at the bank that effectively let the London Whale trading position continue to grow, even as officials inside the bank stated they wanted to lower the riskiness of their positions to comply with new regulations.

????Michael Cavanagh, who is the head of JPMorgan's investment bank, said the bank does rely on models to tell it how much risk the bank has. He said at times, changes in models have resulted in the bank reducing its stated risk exposure. But he said it was not the policy of the bank to change its risk models just to show that the bank's risk had dropped.

????Peter Weiland, the chief risk officer of JPMorgan's chief investment office, said he regretted calling a report that warned the bank could lose $6.3 billion in January 2012 in its credit portfolio "garbage." Weiland said it was probably less than a coincidence that the actual loss ended up being within $100 million of that original estimate.

????"We got some new numbers, and they looked like garbage from what I could tell," said Weiland.

????For her part, Drew said she only learned of the problems in the portfolio in late March, just a week or so before media reports began to emerge about the surprisingly large bets the bank had made on credit derivatives. Even after she found out about potential problems, Drew said traders in London continued to hide information from her about the credit trades.