????德魯和該信用衍生產(chǎn)品首席交易員、人稱倫敦鯨的布魯諾?伊科西爾似乎鮮有聯(lián)絡(luò)。相反，她賴以了解情況的渠道似乎一直是伊科西爾的上司——阿基里斯?麥克瑞斯和哈維爾?馬丁-阿塔霍以及那些現(xiàn)在看來存在缺陷的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型。4月初德魯曾表示，麥克瑞斯和馬丁-阿塔霍告訴她，2012年第二季度摩根大通的信用衍生產(chǎn)品投資可能出現(xiàn)2.5億美元（15.525億元人民幣）的虧損。但他們也說，這項(xiàng)投資還可能帶來3.5億美元（21.735億元人民幣）利潤(rùn)。而實(shí)際上，這項(xiàng)投資當(dāng)季虧損超過了40億美元（248.4億元人民幣）。

????德魯稱，調(diào)整風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型是導(dǎo)致摩根大通巨虧的原因之一，但她并沒有參與這件事。不過她承認(rèn)，2012年初自己知道上述信用衍生產(chǎn)品投資所具有的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)經(jīng)常超過摩根大通設(shè)定的上限。參議院的報(bào)告指出，這種情況連續(xù)出現(xiàn)了71天。德魯還表示，本來有一項(xiàng)措施可以防止這筆投資在2012年初急劇擴(kuò)張，但摩根大通高管層決定暫緩采取這項(xiàng)措施。

????萊文牢牢抓住了這一點(diǎn)。他據(jù)此指出，真正的問題在于摩根大通管理層，而不是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)模型。他說：“出現(xiàn)問題的不是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上限，而是風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理人員并沒有針對(duì)已知風(fēng)險(xiǎn)采取控制措施?！?/p>

????從德魯?shù)淖C詞中還能看出摩根大通首席投資辦公室的業(yè)務(wù)規(guī)模之大和盈利水平之高。德魯說，從2007年到2011年，她的部門為摩根大通貢獻(xiàn)了230億美元（1,428.3億元人民幣）利潤(rùn)，占同期總利潤(rùn)的近三分之一。信用衍生產(chǎn)品投資出現(xiàn)虧損時(shí)，該部門對(duì)沖掉了7,000億美元（4.347萬億元人民幣）的潛在借貸損失。

????由于摩根大通完全有能力在不靠政府幫助的情況下消化這些損失，有人認(rèn)為這次調(diào)查是參議院在羅織罪名。和倫敦鯨事件及其損失公告發(fā)布前相比，摩根大通的股價(jià)已經(jīng)開始反彈。但萊文表示，本次調(diào)查是一項(xiàng)關(guān)鍵措施，它能發(fā)現(xiàn)美國(guó)金融業(yè)承擔(dān)了多少風(fēng)險(xiǎn)以及摩根大通和其他金融機(jī)構(gòu)在如何使用由政府提供擔(dān)保的存款資金。

????他說：“顯然，摩根大通對(duì)衍生產(chǎn)品交易過于投入，以至于無暇通過發(fā)放貸款來促進(jìn)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇?！?/p>

????譯者：Charlie

????She seems to have had little contact with Bruno Iksil, the chief trader of the portfolio who has been nicknamed the London Whale. Instead, she appears to have relied on the trader's bosses, Achilles Macris and Javier Martin-Artajo, and risk models that now appear to have been flawed. In early April, Drew said Macris and Martin-Artajo told her the most the bank's credit portfolio could lose in the second quarter of 2012 was $250 million. They also said there was a possibility it could produce a $350 million profit. Instead, the portfolio lost more than $4 billion.

????Drew said she played no role in revising the risk model that, in part, led to JPMorgan's (JPM) huge loss. Nonetheless, she admitting knowing the portfolio was regularly in "breach" of the firm's risk limits - on 71 straight days according to the Senate's report's findings - in early 2012. She also said that "senior management" at JPMorgan signed off on delaying a move that would have stopped the portfolio from growing significantly in early 2012.

????Levin seized on that fact to say the real problems were with JPMorgan's management and not its risk models. "It wasn't that the risk limits were wrong," said Levin. "It was that risk managers didn't manage the risks they knew they had."

????Drew's testimony also shed light on how large and profitable the bank's chief investment office had become. From 2007 to 2011, Drew said her division contributed $23 billion to the bank's bottom line, or nearly a third of JPMorgan's total profit during the period. At the time of the credit losses, Drew said her division was responsible for hedging $700 billion in potential lending losses.

????Some have called the Senate investigation of JPMorgan a witch hunt, considering the bank was more than able to swallow the losses without any help from the government. JPMorgan's stock is now higher than it was before the announcement of the London Whale losses. But Levin said the investigation was key to uncovering the riskiness of the nation's banks and how JPMorgan and others use deposit money that is insured by the government.

????"Apparently, JPMorgan was too busy betting on derivatives to make loans that would have sped the U.S. recovery," he said.