????早在2010年，馬克?扎克伯格做出了一個(gè)非常糟糕的決定。他并沒有針對(duì)iPhone、安卓（Android）、黑莓（BlackBerry）、諾基亞（Nokia）設(shè)備，甚至微軟（Microsoft）手機(jī)單獨(dú)開發(fā)應(yīng)用，而是要求工程師們?cè)O(shè)計(jì)了一款能夠在任何智能手機(jī)上運(yùn)行的Facebook應(yīng)用。實(shí)際上，他當(dāng)時(shí)篤信，隨著不同操作系統(tǒng)之間為控制移動(dòng)設(shè)備而展開激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，獨(dú)立應(yīng)用會(huì)逐漸消失，很快我們就會(huì)通過手機(jī)瀏覽網(wǎng)頁(yè)，就像我們?cè)趥€(gè)人電腦上做的那樣。

????事實(shí)證明，扎克伯格錯(cuò)了。谷歌（Google）的安卓系統(tǒng)與蘋果（Apple）的iOS很快就成為占據(jù)主導(dǎo)地位的移動(dòng)操作系統(tǒng)。而按照扎克伯格以網(wǎng)絡(luò)為核心的理念設(shè)計(jì)出來的Facebook應(yīng)用在這兩個(gè)平臺(tái)上的表現(xiàn)都不盡如人意。Facebook應(yīng)用問題多多，運(yùn)行緩慢，而且經(jīng)常崩潰。2011年，F(xiàn)acebook曾經(jīng)推出了一個(gè)更新，第一個(gè)月內(nèi)就在蘋果應(yīng)用商店得到了19,000個(gè)一星評(píng)價(jià)。三月底，扎克伯格在加州門羅帕克市的Facebook總部接收筆者采訪時(shí)表示：“它應(yīng)該是我們犯過的最大錯(cuò)誤?！?/p>

????成立六年以來，F(xiàn)acebook一直是社交網(wǎng)絡(luò)時(shí)代的領(lǐng)頭羊，然而它卻錯(cuò)過了下一次巨大的技術(shù)變革。全球消費(fèi)者都開始放棄臺(tái)式機(jī)，轉(zhuǎn)而選擇移動(dòng)設(shè)備，他們每天沉浸在令人眼花繚亂的應(yīng)用當(dāng)中。這些應(yīng)用都是針對(duì)小型觸摸屏和移動(dòng)人群而專門設(shè)計(jì)的?！灸阋娺^有人在臺(tái)式機(jī)上玩《憤怒的小鳥》（Angry Birds）嗎？】而與此同時(shí)，F(xiàn)acebook卻只有一名專門針對(duì)iPhone的工程師；Facebook移動(dòng)團(tuán)隊(duì)的大部分工作都是針對(duì)移動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)瀏覽器進(jìn)行設(shè)計(jì)。

????硅谷成功的公司并不少見，但是鮮為人知的是，更多的公司因?yàn)槲茨茏プ∠乱徊萍汲绷鞫罱K滅亡。扎克伯格并不想重蹈它們的覆轍。但要想解決公司的移動(dòng)問題，這位在職業(yè)早期便取得巨大成功的天才青年將不得不承認(rèn)失誤，然后對(duì)這家年輕的公司進(jìn)行結(jié)構(gòu)與文化方面的改革——而這種改革和他與生俱來的天性是相互矛盾的。移動(dòng)開發(fā)者不應(yīng)該一味追求更快的發(fā)展速度（這幾乎已經(jīng)成為Facebook的一種信仰），相反，必要的時(shí)候必須暫停發(fā)布新版本。他們應(yīng)該停止加大對(duì)移動(dòng)網(wǎng)絡(luò)的投資，而是應(yīng)該著手開發(fā)應(yīng)用。Facebook應(yīng)該放棄通過一款殺手級(jí)產(chǎn)品吸引盡可能廣泛的用戶群體的嘗試，而是應(yīng)該選擇其中的某一種操作系統(tǒng)，證明自己在移動(dòng)領(lǐng)域的能力。他說：“我認(rèn)為，不論對(duì)公司正規(guī)開發(fā)過程進(jìn)行多大幅度的重組都不為過?！保ㄘ?cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

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????譯者：劉進(jìn)龍/汪皓

????Back in 2010 Mark Zuckerberg made a very bad decision. Instead of building separate apps for iPhones, Androids, BlackBerrys, Nokia devices, and, yes, even Microsoft phones, he put his engineers to work designing a version of Facebook that could operate on any smartphone. In effect, he was betting that as different operating systems jostled for control of mobile devices, standalone apps would go away and soon we would surf websites on our phones, just as we do on PCs.

????Zuckerberg was wrong. Google's Android and Apple's iOS quickly became the dominant mobile operating systems, and Facebook's applications, which were built with its CEO's web-centric worldview in mind, didn't work well on either platform. They were buggy and slow, crashing often. A 2011 update garnered 19,000 one-star reviews in the Apple App Store within the first month. "It's probably one of the biggest mistakes we've ever made," Zuckerberg tells me during an interview at Facebook's Menlo Park, Calif., headquarters in late March.

????Just six years after it had been founded, Facebook (FB) -- the company that had ushered in the social-networking era -- was missing the next big shift in technology. Around the world consumers were abandoning laptops for mobile devices, busying themselves with a dizzying array of downloaded apps designed specifically for small touchscreens and people on the go. (Have you ever seen anyone play Angry Birds on a desktop?) Facebook, meanwhile, had only one engineer dedicated to the iPhone; most of its mobile team was coding for mobile web browsers.

????Hidden among all the Silicon Valley success stories there are hundreds more companies that fail to catch the next wave and die. Zuckerberg was determined not to be among them. But to address his mobile problem, the wunderkind who had tasted enormous success so early in his career had to come to terms with failure, and he had to make sweeping structural and cultural changes at the young company -- moves that often went against his instincts. Instead of going faster (virtually a religion at Facebook), mobile developers had to take a pause on new releases. Instead of doubling down on the mobile web, they had to embrace apps. And instead of trying to reach the broadest possible audience with a killer product, Facebook ultimately would have to pick one operating system to show off what it could really do in mobile. "I can't overstate how much we had to retool the whole company's development processes," he says.