新一輪金融危機(jī)潛在導(dǎo)火索不完全名單
????歐洲、日本和中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩或衰退風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也在美國(guó)金融穩(wěn)定監(jiān)管委員會(huì)的列表中,雖然美國(guó)監(jiān)管部門(mén)對(duì)此幾乎做不了什么。Libor等借貸利率可能不夠準(zhǔn)確,也在列表之中。造成利率操縱的原因可能多少讓人們對(duì)銀行和經(jīng)濟(jì)有些過(guò)度擔(dān)心。但這里我們擔(dān)心的是銀行業(yè)。Libor被操縱的事實(shí)似乎是華爾街公開(kāi)的秘密,因此很難說(shuō)有哪家銀行中招了。 ????列表中的其他事情,比如洗錢(qián),似乎都是壞事,但不是會(huì)真正導(dǎo)致一家大銀行倒閉的事情,除非出現(xiàn)大規(guī)模欺詐。但大規(guī)模欺詐并沒(méi)有出現(xiàn)在列表中。 ????列出這樣一個(gè)可能導(dǎo)致金融危機(jī)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素名單最大的問(wèn)題在于我們必定會(huì)出錯(cuò)。導(dǎo)致金融危機(jī)的因素是我們沒(méi)有看到的黑天鵝。雖然美國(guó)金融穩(wěn)定監(jiān)管委員會(huì)沒(méi)有詳細(xì)說(shuō)明哪里可能出錯(cuò),他們花了很多時(shí)間說(shuō)為什么不會(huì)?;蛟S,我們最好能跳上時(shí)光機(jī),回到2007年初(金融危機(jī)前),讓監(jiān)管部門(mén)給出一份可能導(dǎo)致銀行業(yè)崩潰的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)因素列表。我估計(jì)這份列表可能根本不值一提。 ????上周,美國(guó)參議員謝羅德?布朗和戴維?維特發(fā)起了一項(xiàng)議案,要求顯著增加銀行業(yè)手頭用于覆蓋投資損失和不良貸款的資金。目前,這個(gè)比率是9%。兩位參議員希望能增加到比如15%。我不能說(shuō)我非常贊成這一議案。有些成本增加可能并不是出于本意,目前在這方面似乎沒(méi)有上限。(為什么不弄成200%?那樣就真的安全了。) ????上述兩位參議員以及支持這個(gè)議案的人們出發(fā)點(diǎn)是好的。我們不知道風(fēng)險(xiǎn)會(huì)來(lái)自哪里。唯一的答案是持有比我們認(rèn)為必要的水平更高的資本金。不過(guò),列表還是反映了監(jiān)管部門(mén)以及銀行對(duì)當(dāng)前行業(yè)狀況的總體看法。提高銀行業(yè)安全性的第一步是承認(rèn),它是一項(xiàng)不可能完成的任務(wù)。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) |
????The risk of slowdowns or recession in Europe, Japan, and China are on the FSOC's list as well, even though there is little U.S. regulators can do about that. The fact that Libor and other lending rates may be inaccurate is also on the list. The reason being that manipulation may make people more-or-less worried about the banks and the economy than they should be. But what we are worried about here is banks. The fact that Libor was being manipulated seems to be one of Wall Street's worst-kept secrets, so is any banks were tricked by it. ????Other things that show up on the list like money laundering seem like bad things, but not really things that would cause a major bank to fail, unless there was a massive fraud. Widespread fraud, however, is not on the list. ????But the biggest problem with listing the things that will result in our financial doom is that inevitably we get it wrong. The things that result in our financial doom are the ones we didn't see coming -- black swans. And while the FSOC does detail what could go wrong, they spend much of their time saying why it won't. Perhaps the best thing we could do is hop a time machine back to early 2007 (the pre-financial-crisis era) and ask regulators to produce a list of things that could cause the banking sector to blow up. My guess is the list would be just as dismissive. ????This week Sherrod Brown and David Vitter proposed a bill that significantly ups the amount of money banks have to have on hand to cover bad bets and soured loans. Currently, we are at 9%. The senators would like more like 15%. I can't say I am a huge fan of this. There are unintended costs, and there seems to be no limit to the thinking. (Why not make it 200%? That's really safe.) ????The senators' point and ones who support the measure is a good one. We don't know where the risks are going to come from. The only answer is holding more capital than we think necessary. Lists, however, give the impression that regulators and banks know what's out there. The first step in making our banking sector safer is acknowledging that this is impossible. |