????上周四，對(duì)沖基金SAC Capital Advisors因電信欺詐和證券欺詐被正式起訴，而就在不久前，這家基金公司的六名員工已經(jīng)向法庭認(rèn)罪。看來(lái)SAC基本無(wú)法否認(rèn)上述指控。

????這并非我個(gè)人針對(duì)SAC及其創(chuàng)始人斯蒂芬?A?科恩的道德標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以及對(duì)兩者的指控力度的主觀看法。我只是觀察到了美國(guó)法律中一個(gè)長(zhǎng)期存在的特殊之處。（SAC在一份聲明中強(qiáng)調(diào)：“少數(shù)人承認(rèn)違法并不能反映過(guò)去21年來(lái)為SAC服務(wù)的數(shù)千位員工不具備誠(chéng)信與正直的品性。我們正在調(diào)查相關(guān)事宜，SAC也將繼續(xù)正常運(yùn)營(yíng)。”）

????2007年，一位知名法律評(píng)論員發(fā)表了一篇長(zhǎng)達(dá)32,000英文單字的司法評(píng)論文章。他對(duì)這個(gè)案例的解釋如下：“理論上，一家大型跨國(guó)公司可能會(huì)因?yàn)槟硞€(gè)小職員的不法行為而被起訴、定罪，甚至破產(chǎn)。這個(gè)員工的級(jí)別可能很低，而且并不具備任何高管經(jīng)驗(yàn)，但違反了一些廣為人知的條款、實(shí)踐和程序?！?/p>

????文章指出：“幾乎每位研究過(guò)美國(guó)法律的評(píng)論家都對(duì)”這項(xiàng)十分不合情理的規(guī)定“多有責(zé)難”。這項(xiàng)規(guī)定源自1909年美國(guó)最高法院的一次審判。法庭當(dāng)時(shí)根據(jù)一位助理貨運(yùn)主管的定罪判決整個(gè)紐約中心鐵路公司違法。文章隨后指出，此次判決堪稱(chēng)一次“司法大地震，影響極其深遠(yuǎn)，到現(xiàn)在還未完全消散。它徹底改變了整個(gè)商業(yè)犯罪的定罪模式，聯(lián)邦檢察官?gòu)拇碎_(kāi)始扮演起商業(yè)、制造和市場(chǎng)監(jiān)管者的角色。”

????時(shí)任查爾斯?舒曼參議員首席法律顧問(wèn)的普瑞特?巴哈納納正是文章的作者。巴哈納納于2009年8月開(kāi)始擔(dān)任紐約南區(qū)法院（包括曼哈頓地區(qū)）檢察官。此次對(duì)SAC的起訴有可能成為他在該法院的最耀眼成績(jī)。【2007年，巴哈納納在《美國(guó)刑法評(píng)論》（the American Criminal Law Review）冬季刊上發(fā)表了一篇意味深長(zhǎng)的文章，“公司已認(rèn)罪，但員工紛紛叫屈”。可點(diǎn)擊此處購(gòu)買(mǎi)該書(shū)。】

????盡管巴哈納納在文中對(duì)適用法律的驚人廣度表達(dá)了疑慮，但他對(duì)SAC提起此次公訴不存在任何偽善之處。他對(duì)SAC的公訴遠(yuǎn)不是根據(jù)某一位“低級(jí)別無(wú)賴員工”的犯罪行為。然而，巴哈納納對(duì)法律，以及法律給予聯(lián)邦檢察官?zèng)Q定是否因?yàn)橐恍〈椴环▎T工的行為懲罰一家大企業(yè)（SAC擁有約1,000名員工）的巨大權(quán)力的疑慮，或許有助于解釋他為何在起訴書(shū)中如此大費(fèi)周章的向公眾解釋這一起訴的必要性。

????巴哈納納干得漂亮。這份訴訟書(shū)列舉了六名已經(jīng)認(rèn)罪的SAC高管（投資組合經(jīng)理和研究分析師），還列舉了兩位正在接受審判的SAC投資組合經(jīng)理（馬修?馬托瑪和邁克爾?斯坦伯格）；引用了不少發(fā)送給首席執(zhí)行官科恩的電子郵件，其中包含至少看似可疑的信息，科恩甚至還回復(fù)了某些郵件，卻沒(méi)有把它們移交給公司合規(guī)部門(mén)；訴訟書(shū)稱(chēng)，SAC傾向于雇傭那些素以獲取來(lái)源可疑的信息聞名的分析師（例如，投資組合經(jīng)理理查德?李上周認(rèn)罪，他承認(rèn)SAC因內(nèi)幕交易而雇傭自己）；SAC本身的制度結(jié)構(gòu)和薪酬體系都在極大地鼓勵(lì)內(nèi)幕交易；SAC的合規(guī)部門(mén)形同虛設(shè)，對(duì)如此規(guī)模的違法交易置若罔顧。法院指出，“SAC的合規(guī)部門(mén)在公司成立以來(lái)只查出了一起微不足道的內(nèi)幕交易?！倍?dāng)事人也只是被處以一筆數(shù)額很小的罰金。根據(jù)已經(jīng)認(rèn)罪的投資組合經(jīng)理供認(rèn)，SAC的員工們?cè)诖似陂g利用內(nèi)幕信息大肆操作股票交易。涉及股票包括Elan、惠氏（Wyeth）、戴爾（Dell）、英偉達(dá)（Nvidia）、英特爾（Intel）、AMD、RIMM、雅虎（Yahoo）、3Com、阿爾特拉（Altera）、臺(tái)積電（Taiwan Semiconductor）、思科（Cisco）、博通（Broadcom）、eBay、賽普拉斯半導(dǎo)體（Cypress Semiconductor）、寶利通（Polycom）、Qlogic、Cirrus Log、美滿電子（Marvell Technology）、Avent、飛兆半導(dǎo)體（Fairchild Semiconductor）。

????Hedge fund powerhouse SAC Capital Advisors, indicted Thursday for wire and securities fraud violations after six of its employees pleaded guilty to those charges, appears to have close to no legal defense to the charges it faces.

????That's not a subjective statement on my part about the ethics of that company or its owner, Stephen A. Cohen, or the strength of the case against either of them. It's a simple observation about an extraordinary and longstanding anomaly in American law. (In a statement, SAC says, "The handful of men who admit they broke the law does not reflect the honesty, integrity and character of the thousands of men and women who have worked at SAC over the past 21 years. SAC will continue to operate as we work through these matters.")

????In a 32,000-word law review article published in 2007, one eminent legal commentator explained the problem: "A multinational corporation may theoretically be indicted, convicted, and perhaps put out of business based on the alleged criminal activity of a single, low-level, rogue employee who was acting without the knowledge of any executive or director, in violation of well-publicized procedures, practices, and instructions of the company."

????This highly non-intuitive state of the law -- one that "has been decried by virtually every commentator who has thought to study it," the article notes -- goes back to a 1909 U.S. Supreme Court case in which the Court affirmed the criminal conviction of the whole New York Central railroad company on the basis of actions committed by one assistant traffic manager. That ruling was "a legal earthquake whose tremors are still being felt today," the article continues. "It forever changed the complexion of business crime prosecution and ushered in an age when government prosecutors would assume the role of regulators of commerce, manufacturing, and markets."

????The article's author was Preet Bharara, who was then chief counsel for Senator Charles Schumer and who, since August 2009, has been the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York (i.e., Manhattan). His office's indictment of SAC may become the crowning achievement of his term in office. (Bharara's thoughtful article, "Corporations Cry Uncle and Their Employees Cry Foul," in the Winter 2007 issue of the American Criminal Law Review, can be purchased here.)

????There is no hypocrisy whatsoever on Bharara's part in bringing this indictment against SAC notwithstanding his qualms, voiced in the article, about the breathtaking breadth of the applicable law. His indictment against SAC is hardly based on the transgressions of a single "rogue, low-level employee." Yet his qualms about the law, and about the enormous power it gives to federal prosecutors in deciding whether to punish a large corporation (SAC has about 1,000 employees) for the acts of a handful, may help explain why Bharara has gone to such lengths in the indictment to explain to the public why this particular indictment is warranted.

????He makes a good case. The indictment lists six guilty pleas already entered by high-level SAC employees (portfolio managers and research analysts); it lists indictments pending against two more SAC portfolio managers (Mathew Martoma and Michael Steinberg); it cites a number of emails alluding to at least prima facie suspect information that was passed along to CEO Cohen himself and, in some cases, responded to by him, without triggering referrals to compliance officials; it alleges that SAC gave hiring preference to individuals with reputations for obtaining information of suspicious origin (portfolio manager Richard Lee, who pleaded guilty this week, was allegedly hired by SAC over its legal department's objections, for instance); it alleges that SAC's institutional structure and compensation incentives effectively encouraged and rewarded insider trading; and it alleges that SAC's compliance program was feeble and ineffective in the face of all the huge enticements to transgress. The government alleges that "SAC's compliance department contemporaneously identified only a single instance of suspected insider trading by its employees in its history," for instance, and that the trader in question was punished with a mere fine. Meanwhile, the firm's employees managed, according to admissions its portfolio managers have made in guilty pleas, to use inside information to trade in the stocks of Elan, Wyeth, Dell, Nvidia, Intel, AMD, RIMM, Yahoo, 3Com, Altera, Taiwan Semiconductor, Cisco, Broadcom, eBay, Cypress Semiconductor, Polycom, QLogic, Cirrus Log, Marvell Technology, Avent, and Fairchild Semiconductor.