摩根大通CEO真的值2000萬美元年薪嗎?
????大多數(shù)研究都表明,CEO薪酬的基礎(chǔ)是投資者對他們所在公司的估值,或者說市場價值,而不是實際的利潤,也不是股價的走勢。2011年底,摩根大通的市值為1360億美元,而現(xiàn)在的市值為2120億美元。按照2011年的市值-酬勞比例,戴蒙的2013年年薪應(yīng)該達(dá)到3500萬美元。也許就是出于這個原因,董事會才認(rèn)為他們的CEO只應(yīng)該得到2000萬美元。欣然接受吧,戴蒙。 ????但在我看來,更聰明的做法應(yīng)該是效仿瑞信銀行(Blackrock's),后者遵從的是歐洲銀行監(jiān)管部門的建議。據(jù)報道,2013年瑞信的獎金是所謂的有條件紓困債券(bail-in-able bonds)。這種債券的有趣之處在于,今后三年內(nèi),一旦瑞信的一級資本充足率下降到7%以下,這些債券就會變得一文不值。 ????摩根大通董事會本可以采取同樣的方式來支付戴蒙的酬勞。用這樣的模式,戴蒙的年薪會上升,但董事會可以說,他們懲罰了戴蒙,方法是把他的獎金,或者部分獎金,和他能否滿足監(jiān)管機構(gòu)的要求掛鉤。在面對這么多監(jiān)管問題的情況下,還能想出比這更好的懲罰措施嗎? ????當(dāng)然,這樣做確實有點兒公關(guān)色彩。瑞信的一級資本充足率已經(jīng)達(dá)到10%左右。因此,那些有條件紓困債券在到期時不太可能變得毫無價值。摩根大通同樣可以把標(biāo)準(zhǔn)定得低一點。同時,這些債券的持有人會獲得利息,而具有諷刺意味的是,利息水平取決于倫敦銀行同業(yè)拆借利率(Libor,這會給他們更多的理由來操縱這項利率)。因此,和只拿現(xiàn)金相比,債券持有人最后得到的酬勞可能多一些。同時,這確實比股權(quán)報酬的風(fēng)險低。此外,這些債券還能以應(yīng)急資本的形式出現(xiàn)。這樣,它們自身還能提高公司的資本充足率。 ????不利的一面是,把資本金要求作為CEO的酬勞基礎(chǔ)基本上就意味著他們要為監(jiān)管機構(gòu)工作。當(dāng)然,2013年摩根大通向監(jiān)管部門支付了約220億美元罰款,而這家銀行的股東只獲得了180億美元的利潤。從這個角度來說,戴蒙其實已經(jīng)在為監(jiān)管機構(gòu)打工了。(財富中文網(wǎng)) ????譯者:Charlie |
????Most studies show that CEOs are paid based on what investors think their company is worth, or market capitalization, not actual earnings or stock price movement. Back in the end of 2011, JPMorgan had a market cap of $136 billion. The company now has a market cap of $212 billion. Based on the 2011 ratio (market cap to salary), Dimon should get paid $35 million this year. Perhaps that's why the board felt he should only get $20 million. Take that, Dimon. ????But I think it would have been smart if JPMorgan had followed the lead of Credit Suisse (CS), which was following a recommendation from European bank regulators. Credit Suisse is reportedly paying bonuses this year in so-called bail-inable bonds. What's interesting about the bonds is that they become worthless if Credit Suisse's common capital ratio falls below 7% at any time in the next three years. ????JPMorgan's board could have done the same with Dimon's pay. In that way, they could have upped Dimon's pay, but still still say they were penalizing him by paying him a bonus, or a portion of his bonus, tied to whether he was able to keep regulators happy. Can you think of a better punishment for getting in so much trouble with regulators? ????Of course, it's all a bit of a PR move. Credit Suisse already has a common capital ratio of around 10%. So it's unlikely that the bonds would expire worthless. JPMorgan could set a similarly low threshold. In the meantime, the bonds pay the bankers interest, which ironically is based on Libor (more reason to manipulate). So bankers would end up making a bit more than if they were just paid in cash. And it's actually less risky than getting paid in stock. What's more, you can structure the bonds as a form of contingency capital, so they actually end up boosting the company's capital ratios all on their own. ????The downside is that by paying bankers based on levels of regulatory capital, you are basically saying that bankers are working for the regulators. Of course, last year, JPMorgan paid regulators fines of about $22 billion. Shareholders got $18 billion in earnings. So, in a way, Dimon is already working for the regulators. |