????私募基金瑟伯勒斯資本管理公司（Cerberus Capital Management）斥資94億美元收購(gòu)美國(guó)食雜店經(jīng)營(yíng)商Safeway之后，人們圍繞這筆交易計(jì)算出了各種各樣的數(shù)字，其中一個(gè)數(shù)字最引人注意：市場(chǎng)份額。鑒于瑟伯勒斯資本管理公司同時(shí)還擁有Safeway的對(duì)手企業(yè)Albertson's，雙方合并后，新公司在美國(guó)食雜市場(chǎng)中的份額將上升42%。

????2013年，Safeway旗下1335家門店實(shí)現(xiàn)銷售額360億美元。加上Albertson's旗下的店鋪，新公司的規(guī)模幾乎可以達(dá)到傳統(tǒng)超市領(lǐng)軍企業(yè)克羅格（Kroger）的水平。不過(guò)，合并后公司的市場(chǎng)份額只有5.4%（甚至可能更少，原因是有可能剝離部分門店，以免遭到反壟斷調(diào)查）。歐睿信息咨詢公司（Euromonitor International）的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，沃爾瑪（Wal-Mart）在食雜市場(chǎng)中的份額接近30%?？肆_格的市場(chǎng)份額為9.6%，2013年的銷售額為980億美元。

????不過(guò)，克羅格和Safeway都面臨著同樣的挑戰(zhàn)。這些挑戰(zhàn)一方面來(lái)自沃爾瑪、好市多（Costco）和其他大型折扣零售商及倉(cāng)儲(chǔ)式超市，另一方面則來(lái)自專門銷售天然食品的零售商，比如全食超市（Whole Foods）和Trader Joe's。問(wèn)題還不止于此，不斷變化的購(gòu)物習(xí)慣讓越來(lái)越多的人開始到主營(yíng)藥品的雜貨店、一元店和網(wǎng)店購(gòu)買食雜商品，而且網(wǎng)購(gòu)這類產(chǎn)品的人數(shù)還在不斷增多。我們記憶中的傳統(tǒng)連鎖食雜店已經(jīng)不復(fù)存在，剩下來(lái)的食雜零售商要么必須適應(yīng)環(huán)境，要么就會(huì)消亡。

????經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退及其余波讓人們徹底相信需要進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)型，這就是促成本次合并的原因。Safeway一直表現(xiàn)低迷，它在適應(yīng)環(huán)境方面付出的努力不足以改變?nèi)藗兊馁?gòu)物習(xí)慣，也不足以改變它自上而下的管理方式。2012年利潤(rùn)下跌17%以上和2013年利潤(rùn)持平就體現(xiàn)了這一點(diǎn)。彭博新聞（Bloomberg News）一位分析師估算，本次合并對(duì)Safeway的估值是這家公司2013年息稅折舊攤銷前利潤(rùn)的5.5倍左右，只是同類并購(gòu)交易中估值水平的一半多一點(diǎn)兒。

????Albertson's首席執(zhí)行官鮑勃?米勒接受《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》（Wall Street Journal）采訪時(shí)表示，他們并沒(méi)有在合并后關(guān)閉任何門店的計(jì)劃，“我們打算把兩家公司的現(xiàn)有零售業(yè)務(wù)都保留下來(lái)”。然而，要成功合并，這些零售業(yè)務(wù)就必須改變行進(jìn)的步伐——Safeway得剝離那些敏感的“不作為”店鋪。但問(wèn)題是用什么來(lái)取代它們。

????去年，消費(fèi)市場(chǎng)研究機(jī)構(gòu)Packaged Facts在一篇報(bào)告中指出：“雖然超市仍是食品零售的主要力量，但它們已經(jīng)不再繼續(xù)發(fā)揮主導(dǎo)作用?！毕M(fèi)者的決定權(quán)越來(lái)越大，他們要么尋求更低的價(jià)格，要么尋求更健康的產(chǎn)品，無(wú)論出于哪種目的，他們都會(huì)尋求更為多樣化的渠道。

????Safeway這樣的中等市場(chǎng)規(guī)模的公司必須抵御來(lái)自天然食品店和專賣店的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)，同樣的，沃爾瑪對(duì)食品零售業(yè)的沖擊也不可低估。16年前，沃爾瑪在食雜市場(chǎng)的份額還只有4%，但現(xiàn)在已經(jīng)增長(zhǎng)到接近30%。食雜產(chǎn)品目前占沃爾瑪收入的一半。2011年，美國(guó)財(cái)政部社區(qū)發(fā)展金融機(jī)構(gòu)基金（Community Development Financial Institutions Fund）在一份報(bào)告中這樣介紹食雜行業(yè)的情況：美國(guó)最大的10家食雜連鎖經(jīng)營(yíng)商擁有整個(gè)行業(yè)35%的店鋪，在行業(yè)總收入中所占的份額則為68%左右。這兩個(gè)數(shù)字之間的差距幾乎完全由沃爾瑪造成，它所有的店面都很大，其中容納的商品數(shù)量遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)大多數(shù)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手（好市多也是造成這個(gè)差距的因素之一）。

????因此，在傳統(tǒng)食雜連鎖領(lǐng)域出現(xiàn)了整合以及資產(chǎn)剝離。把Safeway和Albertson's（以及二者旗下多個(gè)連鎖店品牌）加在一起，再把它們的采購(gòu)和經(jīng)銷系統(tǒng)合并起來(lái)，也無(wú)法和沃爾瑪?shù)牟少?gòu)能力抗衡，價(jià)格方面也無(wú)法和后者相匹敵，但這至少能幫助它們?cè)谥械纫?guī)模市場(chǎng)和克羅格展開競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。擁有2600多家門店的克羅格仍將是這個(gè)領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)軍者之一。瑟伯勒斯資本管理公司則擁有2400多家店鋪和16個(gè)品牌，包括Albertson's、Von's、Randall's和Jewel-Osco。

????近年來(lái)，克羅格在做出必要的調(diào)整方面一直比Safeway更積極。它的策略一直是用多元化抵御來(lái)自高端和低端領(lǐng)域的挑戰(zhàn)。1月份，克羅格完成了對(duì)食雜連鎖經(jīng)營(yíng)商Harris Teeter的收購(gòu)，進(jìn)而獲得了約200家高檔店鋪，同時(shí)還擴(kuò)大了在美國(guó)東南部的經(jīng)營(yíng)范圍。同時(shí)，這家公司巧妙地度過(guò)了經(jīng)濟(jì)滑坡時(shí)期，途徑是讓現(xiàn)有門店進(jìn)一步以價(jià)值為導(dǎo)向，以及通過(guò)返現(xiàn)來(lái)吸引對(duì)價(jià)格比較敏感的購(gòu)物者。

????10年來(lái)，克羅格的同店銷售額增速一直不減，2013年第四季度的增長(zhǎng)率達(dá)到了4.3%；而Safeway的同店銷售額只增長(zhǎng)了1.6%。

????Of all the numbers that have been thrown around regarding the $9.4 billion acquisition of Safeway (SWY) by Cerberus Capital Management, the private-equity company that owns rival grocery chain Albertson's, one metric stands out: market share. After the merger, the combined companies' share of the American grocery market will rise by 42%.

????Safeway's 1,335 stores racked up $36 billion in sales in 2013. Adding Albertson's stores will create a company that's almost on a level with the larger Kroger (KR), the leader among conventional supermarkets. But the combined companies' market share post-merger will be just 5.4% (likely less since some stores will likely be divested to forestall antitrust action), and Wal-Mart's share of the grocery business is nearly 30%, according to Euromonitor International. Kroger has 9.6% of the total market and $98 billion in 2013 sales.

????Kroger and Safeway, though, are both facing the same set of challenges, not only, on one side, from Wal-Mart (WMT), Costco (COST), and other large discounters and warehouse stores, but also, on the other side, from natural grocers and specialty stores like Whole Foods (WFM) andTrader Joe's. And it doesn't end there: Changing shopping habits are sending more people to drugstores, dollar stores, and, increasingly, websites to buy their groceries. The traditional chain grocery store as we know it is over, and the remaining players must either adapt or die.

????The need for transformation, which was brought into stark relief by the recession and its aftermath, is what spurred this merger. Safeway has been a poor performer, not doing enough to adapt to changing shopping habits or to alter its top-down management approach. This is reflected in its flat earnings in 2013, after a drop of more than 17% in 2012. The deal is valued at about 5.5 times the past year's earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization -- just a little over half what similar deals command, according an analysis by Bloomberg News.

????Albertson's CEO Bob Miller told the Wall Street Journal that there are no plans to close any stores after the merger: "We intend on keeping the existing retail footprint of both companies," he said. But to succeed, those feet will have to be shod in different shoes -- Safeway needs to kick off its sensible loafers. The question is what to replace them with.

????"Although supermarkets remain the majority force in food shopping, they are no longer calling the shots," concluded a report last year by Packaged Facts. The shots are increasingly being called by consumers, who are looking for either lower prices or healthier choices -- and, in either case, more variety.

????As much as mid-market grocers like Safeway have to fend off competition from natural and specialty stores, the impact of Wal-Mart on the retail food industry should not be underestimated. Its share of the grocery market has risen from 4% just 16 years ago to nearly 30% today. Groceries now represent half of Wal-Mart's revenues. A 2011 report on the grocery industryby the Treasury Department's Community Development Financial Institutions Fund paints the picture: The top 10 grocery chains in the United States accounted for about 35% of the total number of stores, but about 68% of total industry revenues. The disparity there is almost entirely because of Wal-Mart, which is able to stock many more products in each of its huge stores than most of its competitors. (Costco is also a factor.)

????Hence, there is consolidation and asset-shedding among traditional grocery chains. Putting Safeway and Albertson's (and their many branded chains) together -- and combining their procurement and distribution systems -- won't result in parity with Wal-Mart's purchasing power, or allow the company to match Wal-Mart's prices, but it will at least help it compete with Kroger for the middle market. Kroger will still be tops in that category, with more than 2,600 stores to Cerberus's more than 2,400 under 16 different names, including Albertson's, Von's, Randall's, and Jewel-Osco.

????Kroger has moved more aggressively than Safeway in recent years to make needed changes. Its strategy has been to diversify as a way to fend off challenges from both the high and low ends. In January it completed its purchase of the Harris Teeter chain, giving it about 200 upscale stores and enlarging its presence in the southeast. At the same time, it deftly navigated the economic downturn by making its existing stores more value-oriented and by launching a rewards program to appeal to price-conscious shoppers.

????Kroger's decade's worth of same-store sales growth continues unabated. That number grew by 4.3% in the fourth quarter of 2013, while Safeway's same-store sales grew by just 1.6%.