????如果你認(rèn)為，金融和政府高層人士都無所不知，無所不能，你應(yīng)當(dāng)讀一讀蒂姆?蓋特納的新書《壓力測試》(Stress Test)。你將看到，他和他接觸的其他高層人士天資聰明，工作勤奮，但他們都是肉眼凡胎。他們做出了最大的努力，但很多情況下都搞得一團(tuán)糟。

????這本書就像蓋特納本人一樣（至少與我相處時(shí)）讓人不設(shè)防，務(wù)實(shí)聰慧且待人非常謙遜。實(shí)際上，《壓力測試》可能被稱為《致命的弱點(diǎn)》（Feet of Clay）更合適。正如書名所講, 即便是神也有致命的弱點(diǎn)。”你知道，他們一點(diǎn)都不完美。

????蓋特納在擔(dān)任4年財(cái)政部長前曾擔(dān)任過5年的紐約聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行（New York Fed）行長。權(quán)力很大，對(duì)吧？ 但他依然記得那些2008年他努力避免金融災(zāi)難的那些不那么風(fēng)光的時(shí)刻：

????我當(dāng)時(shí)得了非常嚴(yán)重的毒葛皮炎。因此，有好幾周，我工作的時(shí)候還得在腿上涂抹很多爐甘石液，還要用繃帶包扎。有一次，我從辦公室走到會(huì)議室時(shí)，我褲腿后拖著長長一條涂抹爐甘石液的繃帶。”一長條浸滿爐甘石液的繃帶，而不是光彩照人的形象。

????蓋特納在書中一再描述自己因?yàn)榛丶彝砹?，或者因?yàn)槿硇耐度牍ぷ?，或者因?yàn)殄e(cuò)過了家里的大事，以及因?yàn)樽冯S自己的雄心、導(dǎo)致全家人反反復(fù)復(fù)地跟著他東奔西走，結(jié)果一再惹惱妻子卡羅爾，讓她失望、憤怒。這些都是現(xiàn)實(shí)生活，而不像科幻世界里那樣，像蓋特納這樣的人，（如果我們贊賞他們的所作所為），他們通常就會(huì)被看成神；（如我們不贊成他們）他們就會(huì)被當(dāng)成魔鬼。

????我很高興看到這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)，這本書索引中他妻子卡羅爾?蓋特納出現(xiàn)的次數(shù)（31次）超過本?伯南克的次數(shù)（29次）。我認(rèn)為，這表明蓋特納操心那些他真正應(yīng)該關(guān)心的事，也就是他的妻子和孩子。（沒錯(cuò)，拉里?薩默斯出現(xiàn)了37次，這位蓋特納的前老板兼導(dǎo)師后來成為了他的對(duì)手和競爭者。）但要注意，沒有人是完美無缺的。）

????出現(xiàn)次數(shù)最多的是42次，是“雷曼兄弟（Lehman Brothers）倒閉”。而且，的確如此。因?yàn)椋?008年9月雷曼的倒閉觸發(fā)了一系列活動(dòng)，幾乎葬送了全球整個(gè)金融體系，需要世界各國政府和央行進(jìn)行大規(guī)模干預(yù)。

????雷曼為什么被批準(zhǔn)倒閉？

????下面是蓋特納的說法：

????我們但是無能為力，而不是無所畏懼。我們?cè)?jīng)努力過，但還是沒能阻止災(zāi)難性的錯(cuò)誤。這一點(diǎn)至今仍舊很難理解，部分原因是因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)漢克（當(dāng)時(shí)任財(cái)政部長的保爾森） 和本（伯南克）承擔(dān)著吃力不討好的任務(wù)，要向人們解釋我們的行動(dòng)。他們決定不向公眾承認(rèn)失敗。那時(shí)候，他們認(rèn)為承認(rèn)我們沒有力量拯救雷曼會(huì)加劇災(zāi)難，這么想或許是正確的。

????我們把他的說法與尼爾?埃爾文在他2013年出版的書《The Alchemists》中所描述的情形進(jìn)行一下對(duì)比。當(dāng)時(shí)在《華盛頓郵報(bào)》（Washington Post）、現(xiàn)在《紐約時(shí)報(bào)》（New York Times）任職的埃爾文寫到，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)（Fed）有意誤導(dǎo)民眾：

????If you think that people in the upper echelons of finance and government are all-knowing and all-powerful, you ought to read Tim Geithner's new book, Stress Test. You'll see that he and the other high-level types he deal with are smart and hardworking, but are distinctly mortal. They do the best they can, but screw up plenty of times.

????The book, like Geithner himself (at least in his dealings with me) is disarming, down to earth, witty, and self-effacing. In fact, Stress Test might more accurately be called Feet of Clay. As in, "Even the gods have feet of clay." You know, they aren't remotely perfect.

????Geithner was head of the New York Fed for five years before spending four years as Treasury secretary. A lot of power, right? But he remembers some less-than-godlike moments as he tried to avert financial calamity in 2008:

????I got a nasty case of poison ivy, so I worked for weeks with my legs slathered in Calamine lotion and wrapped in gauze. I once walked from my office to a conference room with a long train of Calamine-covered gauze trailing from my pant leg." Trailing gauze rather than glory, a hilarious image.

????There are repeated descriptions of how Geithner angered and disappointed his wife, Carole, when he would come home late, be preoccupied with work, miss important family events, and repeatedly uproot the family to follow his ambitions. That's real-world stuff, not the fantasy world in which people like Geithner are generally portrayed as either gods (if we approve of what they're doing) or devils (if we don't).

????I love the fact that the book's index has more entries for Carole Geithner (31) than for Ben Bernanke (29). To me, that's a sign that Geithner worries an awful lot about the right things: his wife and kids. (Okay, there are 37 entries for Larry Summers, formerly Geithner's boss and mentor, later his rival and competitor. But hey, no one's perfect.)

????The most entries of all -- 42 -- are for "Lehman Brothers, collapse of." And rightly so. Because Lehman's bankruptcy, in September of 2008, set off a series of events that almost capsized the world financial system and required massive intervention by the world's government's and central banks.

????Why was Lehman allowed to fail?

????Here's Geithner's version:

????We had been powerless, not fearless. We had tried but failed to prevent a catastrophic default. That's still poorly understood, in part because Hank [Paulson, then Secretary of the Treasury] and Ben [Bernanke], who had the thankless job of explaining our actions, decided not to admit defeat in public. They thought at the time that confessing we didn't have the firepower to save Lehman would intensify the panic, which may have been right.

????Compare that with the account by Neil Irwin in his 2013 book, The Alchemists. Irwin, then at theWashington Post, currently at the New York Times, wrote that the Fed misled people intentionally: