????為什么在這個(gè)市場很難重復(fù)成功？讓我們回想一下，過去行得通的是哪些游戲模式。像《憤怒的小鳥》（Angry Birds）、《開心農(nóng)場》和《糖果傳奇》這樣的成功手游吸引了廣泛的用戶群體：這些游戲足夠簡單，兒童都可以玩，但又足夠有趣，能夠吸引青少年和成人。這些游戲都不是非常復(fù)雜，每一關(guān)的時(shí)間在5至15分鐘之間，而且沒有一個(gè)游戲“圖像浩大”，可以在盡可能多的智能手機(jī)上運(yùn)行。

????所有這些游戲都非常簡單。真的不存在任何重大的技術(shù)壁壘，這意味著幾乎任何中級(jí)水平的程序員都有機(jī)會(huì)一舉成名。這給像Zynga這樣功成名就的手游公司帶來了重大挑戰(zhàn)。比如，《糖果傳奇》到2012年下半年才上市。幾乎不知是從哪里冒出來的，令行業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者Zynga大吃一驚。一夜之間，這家擁有數(shù)十億美元投資的公司突然被一家初創(chuàng)企業(yè)奪走了市場份額。這樣的市場沖擊是顛覆性的，導(dǎo)致高預(yù)期和公司破產(chǎn)。

????更加糟糕的是，這些手游公司無一能掌控產(chǎn)品分銷渠道，都依賴Facebook、谷歌（Google）、蘋果（Apple）或微軟（Microsoft）的應(yīng)用商店。這些公司非常容易在分銷渠道受到擠壓。假設(shè)說，如果谷歌要求Zynga交出一半的利潤來換取其最新游戲的分銷，Zynga真的不能拒絕。這是因?yàn)?，約80%的手機(jī)用戶使用谷歌的安卓（Android）操作系統(tǒng)來運(yùn)行他們的智能手機(jī)。數(shù)字分銷市場的集中化可能是所有應(yīng)用軟件公司的軟肋，特別是像King Digital和Zynga這樣依賴眾多應(yīng)用軟件內(nèi)購買的公司。

????King Digital很可能盡快發(fā)布下一款轟動(dòng)性游戲，但它也可能被證明是一大失敗。看起來，手游公司的運(yùn)營類似于風(fēng)險(xiǎn)投資公司：它們僅僅期望每8個(gè)或更多的游戲中有1個(gè)能熱銷。對(duì)于一家擁有高速增長預(yù)期的公司，這是個(gè)問題，因?yàn)檫@可能意味著收入不穩(wěn)定。

????如果一家公司的產(chǎn)品屬于一個(gè)成熟市場，投資者群體擁有長期增長預(yù)期，這樣的不穩(wěn)定在預(yù)料之內(nèi)，但手游行業(yè)顯然不是這樣。收益不穩(wěn)定是災(zāi)難性的，這最終會(huì)疏遠(yuǎn)公司與投資者之間的關(guān)系，無論其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)偏好高低。因此，在游戲公司找到出路之前，最好的辦法或許是讓它們重歸私有化，到硅谷再修煉一番。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：早稻米

Why is it so hard to repeat success in this market? Let’s think about what has worked in the past. Successful mobile games like Angry Birds, Farmville, and Candy Crush have appealed to a wide audience: they are simple enough for children to play but interesting enough to draw in teens and adults. The games weren’t overly complex, lasting between five and 15 minutes per round and none were “graphic hogs,” allowing them to be used on as many smartphones as possible.

These games are all very simple. There are really no major skill barriers here, meaning that just about any mid-level programmer has a shot at making it big. This presents major competition issues for established mobile gaming companies like Zynga. Candy Crush, for instance, only hit the scene in late 2012. It basically came out of nowhere, taking Zynga, the leader in the space, totally by surprise. Overnight, the company, with its billions of dollars of investor capital, was suddenly losing market share to some startup. This level of market disruption is chaotic, leading to lofty expectations and broken companies.

To make matters worse, none of these mobile gaming companies control the distribution of their product, relying on Facebook or app stores owned by Google, Apple, or Microsoft to do it for them. These companies are highly vulnerable to being squeezed at the distribution end. If Google wants, say, half of Zynga’s profits in exchange for distributing its latest game, Zynga really can’t say no. That’s because around 80% of mobile phone users have Google’s Android operating system running on their smartphones. The concentration of the digital distribution market could be a major impediment for all “app”-based companies, especially those that rely on multiple in-app purchases, like King Digital and Zynga.

King Digital could very well come out with the next blockbuster game tomorrow, but it’s just as likely to come out with a flop. It seems that mobile gaming companies operate like venture capital firms in that they expect only one out of eight or more games they launch to take off. This is a problem for a company with high growth expectations as it could mean major lumpiness in the revenue stream.

Such lumpiness is expected if a product belongs to a mature market with an investor base with long-term growth expectations, but that’s hardly the case with mobile gaming. Erratic earnings is a recipe for disaster as it ultimately alienates investors across the entire risk spectrum. So until these gaming companies can figure out what works, it may be best for them to go private again and tinker around in Silicon Valley until they get it right.