????他說(shuō)：“認(rèn)為自己更了解本土市場(chǎng)，這種想法很合理，但不同國(guó)家的人其實(shí)本質(zhì)上是一樣的，他們的想法很類似。每個(gè)人的生活重點(diǎn)不同，但都想在人生中取得進(jìn)步，而這正是網(wǎng)絡(luò)行為背后的驅(qū)動(dòng)力?！彼嘈?，通過(guò)在新興市場(chǎng)扮演“財(cái)富創(chuàng)造者”的角色，OLX可以幫助人們?cè)谌松腥〉眠M(jìn)步。用戶可以利用這一平臺(tái)將自己的物品出售給其他人，從而換取金錢。

????奧克森福德另一項(xiàng)與眾不同的舉動(dòng)是，大筆投資電視廣告。許多成功的初創(chuàng)公司在成立初期會(huì)借助文化營(yíng)銷、增長(zhǎng)造勢(shì)和公共關(guān)系活動(dòng)來(lái)做推廣。在公司的增長(zhǎng)遇到平臺(tái)期之前，它們并不擔(dān)心營(yíng)銷問(wèn)題。那些曾經(jīng)在網(wǎng)絡(luò)熱潮時(shí)期投資電視廣告的初創(chuàng)公司得出的結(jié)論是，電視廣告并不管用，而人們對(duì)電視廣告的認(rèn)識(shí)就停滯于此。奧克森福德稱，這是一個(gè)誤區(qū)，因?yàn)榫W(wǎng)絡(luò)熱潮時(shí)期的因特網(wǎng)用戶其實(shí)太少了。時(shí)至今日，幾乎有30億人上網(wǎng)，其中許多人都不再使用臺(tái)式電腦上網(wǎng)，而是用上了移動(dòng)設(shè)備。他表示，如果用電視廣告引導(dǎo)用戶訪問(wèn)某個(gè)網(wǎng)站或使用某款應(yīng)用，效果實(shí)際上相當(dāng)不錯(cuò)。

????OLX在三年前開始盈利，但每年的利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)率只有70%至80%。援引有可能出現(xiàn)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)壓力，奧克森福德認(rèn)為緩慢的內(nèi)生成長(zhǎng)實(shí)際上比廣告推動(dòng)的快速增長(zhǎng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)更大。他表示：“如果人們更早地弄清楚了我們的做法，我們可能已經(jīng)遭遇了更多競(jìng)爭(zhēng)?！彼設(shè)LX把自己賣給了Naspers，通過(guò)斥資做電視廣告來(lái)推動(dòng)業(yè)務(wù)更快速增長(zhǎng)，盡管這樣做會(huì)導(dǎo)致利潤(rùn)率有所下降。

????如今，公司在許多市場(chǎng)中都占據(jù)了強(qiáng)勢(shì)位置，而其最大的三個(gè)市場(chǎng)——印度、巴西和波蘭——只占公司50%的用戶群。就如分類廣告網(wǎng)站Craigslist和eBay的持續(xù)成功所證明的那樣，一旦網(wǎng)上市場(chǎng)獲得了流動(dòng)性，它就很難被摧垮。這凸顯了奧克森福德另一項(xiàng)逆向決定的英明：他對(duì)美國(guó)和其他發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家不感興趣，因?yàn)橛刑嗟臋C(jī)會(huì)在別處。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????譯者：嚴(yán)匡正

????“It’s rational to believe you know local markets,” he says, “but people are always the same in each country. They think the same way. They have different priorities, but they all want to progress in life and that’s what drives Internet behavior.” He believes OLX helps people progress in life by acting as a “wealth creator” in emerging markets, where users can easily monetize their possessions by selling them to each other.

????Oxenford’s other big contrarian play is to invest heavily in television advertising. Many successful startups don’t worry about marketing until their growth has hit a plateau, relying on cultural relevance, momentum, and public relations outreach in the early days. Startups that poured money into TV ads in the dot-com era concluded they didn’t work. That characterization has stuck. Oxenford says this is a mistake because there were so few Internet users in the dot-com era. Now, almost three billion people are online, many of whom skipped desktop Internet and went straight to mobile. Television ads directing them to a website or app actually work, he says.

????OLX was profitable three years ago, but was only growing by 70% to 80% each year. Citing the potential for competition, Oxenford decided that slow, organic growth was actually more risky than fast-paced, advertising-fueled growth. “If people had understood what we were doing before, we would have had a lot more competition,” he says. So OLX sold itself to Naspers to fund faster, less profitable growth with TV advertising.

????Now, the company is in a position of strength in many of its markets, and its biggest three—India, Brazil and Poland—only make up 50% of user base. As Craigslist and eBay’s EBAY 0.25% lasting success have shown, it’s hard to disrupt a marketplace once it has liquidity. Which highlights another one of Oxenford’s contrarian decisions: he has no desire to compete in the U.S. or other developed countries. There’s too much opportunity elsewhere.