????Uber的成功鼓舞了成百上千家初創(chuàng)公司，它們打出旗號(hào)，自稱為“XX業(yè)的Uber”。如今，幫助你訂購(gòu)生活用品、洗車、尋找法律顧問(wèn)等的應(yīng)用紛紛涌現(xiàn)。Uber是按需移動(dòng)服務(wù)這一大類產(chǎn)品的代表。拜智能手機(jī)和云計(jì)算所賜，需要辦事的人現(xiàn)在可以更容易找到那些希望利用閑暇時(shí)間兼職掙錢的人士。

????企業(yè)家和投資者為其中蘊(yùn)含的巨大機(jī)遇和潛力感到興奮，不過(guò)也有其他人擔(dān)心經(jīng)濟(jì)“Uber化”會(huì)讓一切優(yōu)秀的全職工作變成彈性制的臨時(shí)活計(jì)。不過(guò)無(wú)論是恐懼還是熱切期盼，有一點(diǎn)我們得明白：按需服務(wù)并不適用于所有行業(yè)。

????有許多潛在因素導(dǎo)致按需服務(wù)市場(chǎng)顛覆出租車行業(yè)的時(shí)機(jī)已經(jīng)成熟：這是一項(xiàng)商品化服務(wù)，消費(fèi)頻率高，時(shí)效性強(qiáng)。盡管這些特質(zhì)絕不是出租車行業(yè)獨(dú)有的，但也不是所有行業(yè)和領(lǐng)域都有類似情況。因此，找一個(gè)尚未開發(fā)的市場(chǎng)，宣布你要做一款“XX行業(yè)的Uber”，并不能保證你取得成功。

????潛在的商品化服務(wù)

????當(dāng)我們需要打車時(shí)，只要能有一位司機(jī)開著干凈整潔的汽車，把我們從A地帶到B地而不會(huì)有迷路的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，就能讓我們感到滿意。因此，我們對(duì)誰(shuí)來(lái)提供這項(xiàng)服務(wù)并不是十分在意。不過(guò)服務(wù)越復(fù)雜，消費(fèi)者就越難接受這種服務(wù)人員的隨機(jī)性。在選擇誰(shuí)來(lái)給我們理發(fā)，幫我們照看小孩，修理家具，提供法律或醫(yī)療服務(wù)上，我們都會(huì)有所偏好。

????為了克服這種信任障礙，市場(chǎng)可以利用用戶評(píng)論和Facebook上的檔案。比如說(shuō)，房屋租賃服務(wù)商Airbnb利用Facebook Connect，設(shè)法讓人們?cè)陂_放自己的家庭或留宿在陌生人家中時(shí)感到安全可靠。其他的方式還包括證明自己的服務(wù)提供商資質(zhì)，與已有的評(píng)論網(wǎng)站合作以獲得客戶評(píng)價(jià)，并提供退款保障。

????如今，尚未商品化的服務(wù)網(wǎng)站已經(jīng)存在。不過(guò)它們的運(yùn)作更像是營(yíng)銷拓展的手段，而不是利用Uber這樣通過(guò)簡(jiǎn)單幾次點(diǎn)擊的應(yīng)用，促進(jìn)整體業(yè)務(wù)發(fā)展的實(shí)際市場(chǎng)。

????想要在市場(chǎng)中開展復(fù)雜的業(yè)務(wù)，需要把服務(wù)產(chǎn)品化，也就是提前設(shè)定服務(wù)的范圍、價(jià)格、持續(xù)時(shí)間、可交付成果等一系列內(nèi)容。只有去掉了服務(wù)中的可選因素和定制化部分，顧客通過(guò)移動(dòng)應(yīng)用來(lái)使用一項(xiàng)復(fù)雜服務(wù)才會(huì)變得比較現(xiàn)實(shí)。

????高消費(fèi)頻率

????最好的市場(chǎng)中，服務(wù)的消費(fèi)頻率和使用率很高。對(duì)城市居民和經(jīng)常旅行的人來(lái)說(shuō)，出租車是每日或至少是每周都得使用的工具。此外，隨著旅客從一個(gè)地方去到另一個(gè)地方，Uber還有了顯著的溢出效應(yīng)。

????在高頻率的使用下，消費(fèi)者一旦滿意某項(xiàng)服務(wù)，就會(huì)習(xí)慣于一直使用它。因此，一家初創(chuàng)公司在這樣的況下成為“手機(jī)必備應(yīng)用”也就輕而易舉了。相比之下，如果消費(fèi)者的購(gòu)買頻率不高，想要讓他們保持對(duì)品牌的關(guān)注就難得多。比如，如果消費(fèi)者每年只需要清掃幾次院子，他們更可能每次都重新研究一下哪家的服務(wù)更好。

????真正的按需服務(wù)

????許多想要做成按需移動(dòng)服務(wù)的服務(wù)類型，實(shí)際上并不是“按需”的。大多數(shù)情況下，你不需要清潔工或房屋油漆工在幾分鐘，甚至是在當(dāng)天內(nèi)就上門服務(wù)。但出租車的情況則完全不同。

????真正的按需服務(wù)市場(chǎng)需要供應(yīng)方擁有足夠的流動(dòng)性。如果出租車服務(wù)市場(chǎng)沒有足夠的司機(jī)，消費(fèi)者就只能在路邊干等著。這種流動(dòng)性使得其他公司很難進(jìn)入這個(gè)市場(chǎng)，因?yàn)樾聛?lái)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者也得擁有數(shù)百個(gè)司機(jī)，而不是幾個(gè)就夠了。

????相反，如果某項(xiàng)服務(wù)可以更靈活地安排交付時(shí)間，競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者就能更輕易地進(jìn)入一個(gè)垂直行業(yè)或是新領(lǐng)域，“贏家通吃”的趨勢(shì)也不會(huì)那么明顯。如此一來(lái)，我們預(yù)計(jì)在真正的按需服務(wù)領(lǐng)域只會(huì)看到一到兩家大型供應(yīng)商，而在那些對(duì)時(shí)間不太敏感的市場(chǎng)則會(huì)充滿眾多小公司的身影。

????結(jié)語(yǔ)

????這并不是說(shuō)Uber將成為市場(chǎng)上價(jià)值數(shù)十億美元的最后一家公司。我堅(jiān)信一些經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的公司會(huì)設(shè)法把更加復(fù)雜的業(yè)務(wù)推向網(wǎng)絡(luò)，并顛覆更多的行業(yè)。然而，企業(yè)家和投資者需要深思熟慮地評(píng)估市場(chǎng)和垂直行業(yè)的潛在因素，因?yàn)椤癤X業(yè)的Uber”未必能像原版Uber那樣奏效。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

????本文作者為Version One公司創(chuàng)始合伙人，風(fēng)投公司安德森?霍洛維茨的董事合伙人。文章最初發(fā)表于其博客。

????譯者：嚴(yán)匡正

????審校：任文科

????The success of Uber has inspired hundreds of startups to call themselves the “Uber of X, Y, or Z.” There are now apps to order groceries, to have you car washed, to get legal counsel, and much more. Uber is part of a broad category of on-demand mobile services. Thanks to smartphones and cloud computing, it’s easier than ever to connect people who need a job done with people looking to take on some extra work and monetize their spare time.

????Entrepreneurs and investors are excited by the massive opportunity potential, while others worry that the Uberification of our economy will turn every good full-time job into a flex-time gig. However, amidst all the fear and exuberance, it’s important to realize that the on-demand service model won’t work for every industry.

????Several underlying factors made the taxi industry ripe for disruption by on-demand marketplaces: It’s a commoditized service with a high-purchase frequency that is truly time-sensitive. While these ingredients certainly aren’t unique to hiring a ride, they do not cut across all industries and verticals. Consequently, finding an untapped market and saying you’re going to build the “Uber for X” is hardly a surefire route to success.

????Underlying Commoditized Services

????When it comes to hiring a ride, most of us are happy as long as a driver brings us from Point A to Point B in a clean car without getting lost. This makes us pretty flexible in terms of who delivers the service. Yet the more complex the service, the harder it becomes for consumers to accept the idea that somebody at random will show up each time. We develop preferences for who cuts our hair, babysits our children, performs home repair, and gives out legal/medical advice.

????To overcome the trust-barrier, marketplaces can leverage user reviews and Facebook profiles. For example, through Facebook Connect, Airbnb has managed to make people feel safe and secure when opening up their home or staying in a stranger’s place. Other strategies are to certify the service provider pool, tie into existing review sites/peer testimonials, and offer money-back guarantees.

????Sites do exist for non-commoditized services today. But they operate more like lead generation engines than actual marketplaces capable of facilitating the entire transaction with the couple-of-taps simplicity of Uber.

????Marketplaces for complex transactions will need to productize their services, with boxed offerings that pre-define the scope, pricing, duration, and deliverables of a service. By removing choice and customization from the process, it’s more realistic for customers to arrange a complex service on a mobile app.

????High-purchase frequency

????The best marketplaces have high-purchase frequency and regular usage. For city dwellers and frequent travelers, taxis are used on a daily, or at least weekly, basis. On top of this, Uber also enjoys significant spill-over effects as travelers move from one location to another.

????With high-frequency use cases, customers fall into the habit of using the same service as long as they’re satisfied. It’s easy then for a startup to become the “homescreen app” for that particular use case. In contrast, it’s much harder to retain customer mindshare with lower-purchase frequencies. For example, if customers need a yard cleanup a few times a year, they’re more likely to begin the research process over again each time.

????True on-demand use case

????Many of the services that fall into the on-demand mobile services category aren’t actually “on-demand.” In most cases you don’t need a cleaning service or house painter to show up within minutes, or even the same day. But taxis are a different story.

????A true on-demand marketplace requires sufficient liquidity on the supply side. Without enough available drivers in a car service marketplace, customers will be left waiting on the curb. This creates a large barrier to enter the market, since a new competitor needs to launch with hundreds of providers, not just a handful.

????By contrast when services can be delivered with more flexible timing, it’s easier for competitors to enter a vertical or new location and there’s less of a “winner takes all” dynamic. As such, we can expect just one or two major players for a true on-demand service, while less time-sensitive markets will be crowded with smaller companies.

????Final thoughts

????This is not to say that Uber will be the last multi-billion dollar marketplace unicorn. I have no doubt that some savvy companies will figure out how to move more complex transactions online, shaking up more industries in the process. However, entrepreneurs and investors need to be thoughtful when evaluating the underlying factors of a marketplace and vertical, as the “Uber of X” won’t necessarily work as well as the original.

????Boris Wertz is the founding partner of Version One and a board partner with Andreessen Horowitz. This post originally appeared on his blog.