????正如此前傳聞的一樣，F(xiàn)acebook于上周三上午正式推出一個名叫“Instant Articles”（意為“即時文章”）的試驗項目。該項目是Facebook聯(lián)合《紐約時報》、《衛(wèi)報》、BuzzFeed網(wǎng)站和《國家地理雜志》等媒體共同推出的。根據(jù)協(xié)議，這些合作媒體的文章將全文出現(xiàn)在Facebook的移動應(yīng)用內(nèi)，也就是說，用戶可以在Facebook上直接閱讀全文，而不是像以往一樣只能閱讀摘要，或通過一個鏈接轉(zhuǎn)到原網(wǎng)頁。

????乍一看，這個項目顯然是一次直白的價值交換。Facebook為它的14億用戶爭取到了高質(zhì)量的內(nèi)容，出版商們也通過Facebook獲得了大量受眾——另外他們還能從Facebook基于相關(guān)內(nèi)容獲得的廣告收入分成。（據(jù)報道，如果Facebook圍繞相關(guān)內(nèi)容銷售廣告的話，出版商可以獲得70%的廣告收入。）所以這是一次皆大歡喜的合作，對吧？

????這顯然就是Facebook用來吸引合作伙伴的套路——Facebook高風亮節(jié)地為出版商提供了更多的讀者，同時雙方開開心心地交換了利益。但如果一個企業(yè)達到了Facebook這樣的規(guī)模和實力，哪怕是最簡單的安排也可能充滿潛在的危險，沒有例外。為什么呢？因為在這場特殊的牌局中，所有的好牌都握在一個玩家的手里。

????正如哥倫比亞大學(xué)艾米利?貝爾在Twitter上指出的，這個“開掛”了的玩家就是Facebook。

????“出版商+Facebook”模式的主要問題是理論上的：你能否一邊做新聞，一邊成為一個商業(yè)權(quán)力架構(gòu)的組成部分？

????— emily bell (@emilybell)，2015年5月13日。

????像《紐約時報》這樣的出版商之所以要進行這樣的合作，首要原因是它們在移動領(lǐng)域大大滯后?？萍挤治鰩煴?湯普森指出，F(xiàn)acebook有一句話說得很對：大多數(shù)新聞網(wǎng)站的載入速度過慢，網(wǎng)站本身也設(shè)計得一塌糊涂，這使得這些網(wǎng)頁上的大多數(shù)廣告百無一用。而Facebook對移動的理解是無人能比的，它的載入速度更快，界面看起來更舒服，也更吸引廣告商，這在某種程度上也是由于Facebook擁有報刊媒體普遍都不具備的市場定位能力。

????這就是為什么Facebook拋出的橄欖枝如此吸引人。另外，出版商們不僅能保持部分乃至全部的廣告收入，還能從Facebook那里獲得用戶對內(nèi)容的反饋數(shù)據(jù)，這對出版商來說無疑也是非常有用的。

????此次合作之所以有那么一絲浮士德式交易的味道，也是因為Facebook從中撈取的好處要大于出版商。或許有人會問，既然Facebook把廣告收入都拱手讓人了，它還能獲得什么好處？其實Facebook并不在乎圍繞這些新聞內(nèi)容的廣告收入（不過我認為大多數(shù)合作媒體只能獲得70%的廣告收入，因為Facebook比它們更擅長銷售廣告）。Facebook的真正目標是深化和鞏固它對用戶群的吸引力。

????就這個意義而言，新聞內(nèi)容只是Facebook為達成目標而采用的一個手段。蘊含的風險是，如果這種合作達不到預(yù)期效果，F(xiàn)acebook就會對它失去興趣，不愿意再花大力氣推廣它。但與此同時，F(xiàn)acebook作為幾百萬甚至幾十億網(wǎng)民看新聞的“默認客戶端”這一地位早已深入人心。換句話說，一旦Facebook成了“地主”，誰是給它耕地的“長工”已經(jīng)不重要了。

????As has been rumored for some time, Facebook launched a trial project called “Instant Articles” on Wednesday morning—a partnership with nine news organizations, including The New York Times, The Guardian, BuzzFeed,and National Geographic. Under the terms of the deal, entire news stories from those partners will appear insideFacebook’s mobile app and be able to be read there, as opposed to the traditional practice of news publishers posting an excerpt and a link to their website.

????At first blush, this sounds like a pretty straightforward exchange of value. Facebook gets what will hopefully be engaging content for its 1.4 billion or so users, and publishers get the reach that the social network provides—plus keep any revenue from advertising that they sell around that content. (if Facebook sells the ads, then publishers reportedly get to keep 70% of the proceeds.) So everybody wins, right?

????That’s certainly the way Facebook is trying to sell the partnership: as a mutual exchange of goods, driven by the company’s desire to help publishers make their articles look as good as possible and reach more readers. But whenever you have an entity with the size and power of Facebook, even the simplest of arrangements becomes fraught with peril, and this is no exception. Why? Because a single player holds all of the cards in this particular game.

????And that player is Facebook, as Columbia University’s Emily Bell noted on Twitter:

????Main problem for publishers + FB remains theoretical: can you both be journalistic + be part of a commercial power structure?

????— emily bell (@emilybell) May 13, 2015

????The main reason why publishers like the Times have entered into this partnership in the first place is that they are falling behind when it comes to mobile. As technology analyst Ben Thompson points out, Facebook is quite right when it says that most news sites load too slowly and look terrible, rendering the ads on those pages largely useless. Facebook, however, understands mobile like no one else: everything loads faster, looks nicer and is more appealing to advertisers, in part because Facebook can do the kind of targeting that newspapers aren’t equipped to do.

????This is what makes the social behemoth’s offer so appealing. Plus, publishers get to keep some or all of the ad revenue, and they also get data about what users are doing with their content, which is always useful.

????The part of this deal that makes it a classic Faustian bargain is that Facebook arguably gets more from the arrangement than publishers do. How could that be, when it is giving away all the revenue? Because Facebook doesn’t really care about the revenue from ads around news content (although I expect most partners will take the 70% deal, if not now then later, because Facebook is better at selling ads). What Facebook wants is to deepen and strengthen its hold on users.

????In that sense, news content is just a means to an end. And the risk is that if it stops being an effective means to that end, then Facebook will lose interest in promoting it. But in the meantime, Facebook will have solidified its status as the default place where millions or possibly even billions of people go to get their news. In other words, it will still own the land, and who farms which specific patch of that land is irrelevant.