最近，國(guó)際貨幣基金組織（IMF）主席拉加德明確宣布支持工作人員將人民幣納入特別提款權(quán)（SDR）籃子的建議之后，市場(chǎng)一致認(rèn)為人民幣成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣已指日可待。作為一種記賬單位，特別提款權(quán)的作用是穩(wěn)定貨幣匯率。雖然它只是高深莫測(cè)的國(guó)際貨幣交易體系的一部分，但這可是一條重大新聞。

要成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣既不像看上去那么簡(jiǎn)單，也不像表面上那么復(fù)雜。說(shuō)它復(fù)雜是因?yàn)檫@是一場(chǎng)政治較力，一方是在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)領(lǐng)域處于優(yōu)勢(shì)地位的中國(guó)，另一方則是主導(dǎo)各個(gè)國(guó)際組織的美國(guó)。說(shuō)它簡(jiǎn)單的原因是成為IMF儲(chǔ)備貨幣后，人民幣在世界經(jīng)濟(jì)中發(fā)揮的作用可能較小。

表面上看，IMF未采取任何行動(dòng)是為了“確保特別提款權(quán)相關(guān)業(yè)務(wù)的順利進(jìn)行”，并在何時(shí)調(diào)整的問(wèn)題上考慮到了特別提款權(quán)使用國(guó)的反饋。這種說(shuō)辭有些言不由衷，因?yàn)槔^續(xù)使用目前的四種儲(chǔ)備貨幣，也就是美元、日元、歐元和英鎊，并不會(huì)帶來(lái)任何干擾。顯然，所有這一切都和人民幣有關(guān)。鑒于人民幣的價(jià)值和流動(dòng)性尚不明朗，在塵埃落定前使用“拖字訣”是謹(jǐn)慎的做法。

IMF表面上有一套選擇儲(chǔ)備貨幣的客觀程序。第一條評(píng)判標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是用某種貨幣結(jié)算的國(guó)際貿(mào)易額。IMF規(guī)定，合格貨幣“由成員國(guó)或貨幣聯(lián)盟發(fā)行，并在全球經(jīng)濟(jì)中發(fā)揮核心作用?！庇萌嗣駧沤Y(jié)算的國(guó)際貿(mào)易額占全球貿(mào)易總額的2.8%（2015年8月），在所有貨幣中排名第四。因此，在這方面人民幣無(wú)疑是合格的。

第二條標(biāo)準(zhǔn)是這種貨幣必須“可以自由使用”。雖然IMF章程就此進(jìn)行了說(shuō)明，但在這一點(diǎn)上仍可做出多種解釋，而這就是爭(zhēng)議所在。要進(jìn)入儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子，某種貨幣必須在特別提款權(quán)使用國(guó)穩(wěn)定自身貨幣的過(guò)程中發(fā)揮作用。采用固定匯率制、有管理的浮動(dòng)匯率制或者自由浮動(dòng)匯率制的國(guó)家都可能符合這條標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，實(shí)施有限資本管制的國(guó)家也是如此。顯然，有些貨幣未達(dá)到這項(xiàng)要求，但“自由使用”和非自由使用貨幣之間的界限最多也只能說(shuō)是模糊不清。

客觀上講，這個(gè)問(wèn)題很難解決，原因是成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣會(huì)改變對(duì)某種貨幣的需求。同樣的，非儲(chǔ)備貨幣身份也許會(huì)影響持有某種貨幣的意愿。對(duì)于當(dāng)前和今后IMF成員國(guó)為調(diào)整外匯儲(chǔ)備而產(chǎn)生的人民幣需求量，人們可以探討這項(xiàng)數(shù)據(jù)是否支持人民幣進(jìn)入儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子；但說(shuō)到底，這樣的討論既依賴于經(jīng)濟(jì)證據(jù)，也取決于政治風(fēng)向，二者的影響不相上下。

如果把人民幣納入儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子，但事后發(fā)現(xiàn)它并不符合“自由使用”標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，就會(huì)出現(xiàn)“請(qǐng)神容易送神難”的局面。如果一些國(guó)家由于擔(dān)心流動(dòng)性或者今后的匯率而不愿持有人民幣，發(fā)生匯兌危機(jī)時(shí)，儲(chǔ)備貨幣中含有人民幣（使用國(guó)必須接受整個(gè)貨幣籃子）就會(huì)降低特別提款權(quán)在提供流動(dòng)性方面的效率。不過(guò)，人民幣在這個(gè)貨幣籃子中的百分比將較小，它對(duì)特別提款權(quán)效率的影響也許可以忽略不計(jì)。

今年12月份，IMF將作出重大決定，那就是基于中國(guó)和大多數(shù)國(guó)家的貿(mào)易關(guān)系、中國(guó)巨大的經(jīng)濟(jì)體量以及主要貿(mào)易國(guó)地位來(lái)判斷讓人民幣在儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子中獲得一席之地是件好事，還是說(shuō)人民幣成為儲(chǔ)備貨幣的條件尚未成熟。目前來(lái)看，這兩種選擇在政治層面上都會(huì)有影響。就像中國(guó)發(fā)起設(shè)立的亞洲基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施投資銀行表明的那樣，這樣的選擇將影響到國(guó)際匯兌制度框架。

或者，IMF也許還可以通過(guò)建立另一種儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子調(diào)整機(jī)制來(lái)解決這個(gè)難題，具體做法是設(shè)立第一特別提款權(quán)（SDR1），并沿用現(xiàn)有儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子，只是可能基于某些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)改變各儲(chǔ)備貨幣所占的比例；同時(shí)設(shè)立第二特別提款權(quán)（SDR2），其中囊括一些新的貨幣。IMF可以把人民幣納入SDR2的首個(gè)貨幣籃子之中。在一定時(shí)間段內(nèi)，這兩個(gè)貨幣籃子可以同時(shí)存在。如果使用國(guó)的偏好表明SDR2優(yōu)于SDR1，前者實(shí)際上就會(huì)取代后者。

在進(jìn)行下一次階段性評(píng)估時(shí)，更受歡迎的那種特別提款權(quán)就會(huì)成為SDR1，而且還可以根據(jù)屆時(shí)的環(huán)境來(lái)決定是否要設(shè)立新的SDR2。這樣的機(jī)制可以把政治屏蔽在儲(chǔ)備貨幣選擇程序之外，并讓市場(chǎng)來(lái)決定儲(chǔ)備貨幣籃子的構(gòu)成。這樣一來(lái)，在這個(gè)問(wèn)題上，就不會(huì)出現(xiàn)目前通過(guò)地緣政治手段來(lái)增強(qiáng)或削弱一國(guó)的威信和經(jīng)濟(jì)實(shí)力，從而使另一國(guó)受益的情況。IMF應(yīng)該盡可能地遠(yuǎn)離政治，而特別提款權(quán)改革顯然正是朝著這個(gè)方向邁出的一步。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

杰瑞?尼克斯伯格是加州大學(xué)洛杉磯分校安德森管理學(xué)院經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)兼職教授。

譯者：Charlie

Earlier this fall, the IMF postponed a scheduled update of the designated basket of reserve currencies, a basket that is used by member countries for Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Though SDR’s, a form of borrowing for purposes of currency stabilization, are part of the arcane mechanism of international currency transactions, this was big news. It was seen as a rebuff of China in the wake of last summer’s intervention in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and devaluation of the Chinese Yuan. However, being a reserve currency is both more and less than meets the eye. The more is the political struggle between Chinese ascendency in the world economy and US dominance in international organizations. The less is the relatively minor role that the yuan as an IMF-designated reserve currency would play in the world economy.

The ostensible reason for the IMF inaction was to “ensure the smooth functioning of SDR-related operations,” and to respond to SDR users feedback on the timing of any changes. This is a bit disingenuous as a continuation of the current four currencies; the US dollar, Japanese Yen, Euro, and UK Pound Sterling, would not have caused disruption. Clearly it is all about the yuan. At a time when the yuan’s value and liquidity were uncertain, a postponement until the dust settled was prudent.

The IMF ostensibly has an objective process for being designated a reserve currency. The first criterion is based on the volume of international transactions cleared in the currency. The IMF specifies that currencies qualifying are those “issued by members or currency unions that play a central role in the global economy.” The yuan is fourth among currencies used in transactions at 2.8% (August 2015). Thus, there is no doubt on this basis it qualifies.

The second is that currencies must be “freely usable.” While there are clarifying statements in the IMF Charter, they are subject to interpretation. Herein is the crux of the debate. To be part of the market basket of currencies, each currency has to be useful to those who borrow SDR’s to stabilize fluctuations in their own currency. A country with a fixed, managed float or freely floating exchange rate may qualify as may one with limited capital controls. It is clear that some currencies do not meet the definition, but the dividing line between those that are “freely usable” and those that are not is fuzzy at best.

This is a difficult nut to crack objectively because the designation of “reserve currency,” changes the demand for that currency. As well, not being a reserve currency might be a disincentive for holding the same currency. One can argue whether the data on the current and future demand for the yuan as a useful currency for members’ foreign exchange portfolios support inclusion or not, but in the end the discussion is based on political perspective as much as economic evidence.

The consequence of designating the yuan as a reserve currency if in fact it does not ex-post meet the criteria of “freely usable” is that once in, removal is difficult. If countries do not want to hold the yuan due to concerns about its liquidity or concerns about its future value, then its presence in the basket of currencies (one has to take the entire basket) will make SDR’s a less efficient mechanism for providing liquidity in the event of an exchange crisis. However, the yuan’s percentage of the basket will be relatively small and this efficiency cost might be negligible.

In December, the IMF will make a leap of faith and decide that either because China has trading relations with most countries, has a large economy, and is a major trading economy, having the Chinese yuan as a small part of the basket would be a good thing, or that the conditions are not yet ripe for the yuan to be in the SDR basket of reserve currencies. Either choice currently has political implications, and as the Chinese-sponsored Asian Insfrastructure Investment Bank demonstrated, implications for the institutional framework for international exchange.

Alternatively, the IMF could cut the Gordian Knot with a mechanism to decide changes in the basket of currencies by having an SDR1, which maintains the old basket, perhaps with changes in the percentages based on some criteria, and an SDR2, which includes some new currency(ies). The first SDR2 basket would contain the yuan. These baskets can run parallel for a set period of time. Based on the preferences of countries using SDR’s, SDR2 would, if better than SDR1, replace SDR1 de facto.

At the next periodic evaluation, the more popular of SDR1 and SDR2 would then become SDR1 and the environment of the day would determine if a new SDR2 be created. Such a mechanism would take the politics out of reserve currency determination and let the market decide the basket. The current geopolitical maneuvering to enhance or diminish the prestige and economic power of one country in favor of another would not enter the equation. The IMF ought to be as apolitical as possible, and a reform of the SDR is an obvious step in that direction.

Jerry Nickelsburg is an adjunct professor of economics at UCLA’s Anderson School of Management.