那種認(rèn)為西方國家繼續(xù)對伊斯蘭國(ISIS)開戰(zhàn)不會招致后院起火的看法，實(shí)在是異想天開。像法國一樣，美國城市也遲早有可能被ISIS襲擊。

作為一位任教于美國軍校的國家安全學(xué)教授，我的本職工作就是思考未來的戰(zhàn)爭形態(tài)，并培養(yǎng)軍事領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者。我發(fā)現(xiàn)巴黎恐怖襲擊對美國公眾和軍人的蘊(yùn)意令人不安。

大多數(shù)美國公眾都為在敘利亞和伊拉克陣亡的海陸空三軍將士感到惋惜，不過也承認(rèn)這是無可避免的，但是，很少有人能充分明白，美國本土仍然有可能遭到恐怖襲擊。巴黎遭受的恐怖襲擊，想必會給這種虛幻的自我安慰劃上句號了。

追蹤恐怖分子：僅是誘人的目標(biāo)

法國正在重新認(rèn)識到，法國在過去幾個月針對ISIS發(fā)動的數(shù)百次空襲，以及長期信奉的世俗化理想，終于釀下惡果。

雖然法國禁止公民蒙面紗的政策得到歐盟支持，但這道禁令卻招致穆斯林和伊斯蘭主義者的滿腔怒火。法國變成了一個誘人的脆弱目標(biāo)。盡管《查理周刊》遇襲后，法國加強(qiáng)了安保措施和情報(bào)工作，但仍然不足以拯救巴塔克蘭劇院的眾多遇難者。襲擊發(fā)生后，街頭上出現(xiàn)了更多全副武裝的軍警，但這也只能帶來表面上的安心，并不足以保障安全。

150年前，西方國家可以對世界任何地方進(jìn)行武裝干涉，基本上不用擔(dān)心倫敦或柏林遭到炸彈襲擊，或是有人在本國的大街上掃射平民。在那個年代，如果類似于19世紀(jì)無政府主義者那樣的恐怖分子真敢襲擊無辜平民或國家領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人，他們的武器也僅限于槍支或偷來的爆炸物。

當(dāng)今世界則充斥著大量軍事級武器。巴黎恐怖襲擊事件中恐怖分子使用的AK-47這種“大殺器”，就算在法國這種嚴(yán)格控槍的國家也不難獲得?；ヂ?lián)網(wǎng)上還有現(xiàn)成的教材，教人怎樣用基本的化學(xué)原料和簡單的電器件制作簡易爆炸物。更嚴(yán)重的是，正如9?11事件所示，只要有足夠的策劃、狡詐和意志力，就連民航客機(jī)這種與人無害的技術(shù)也可以被當(dāng)成武器使用。數(shù)不勝數(shù)的平民死于恐怖襲擊，未來也將是如此。

Political leaders should not peddle military solutions that offer little hope for resolving the direct military threat of ISIS quickly, much less the underlying political, religious, and ethnic sources of the conflict.

It is magical thinking to assume that Western states can continue to wage war against the Islamic State (ISIS) without incurring casualties at home. Like France, the United States faces the possibility that the ISIS will attack an American city sooner or later.

As a professor of national security employed by an American war college, I am charged with thinking about the future of war and teaching military leaders. I find the implications of the Paris attack for our public and our services members disturbing.

Most members of the American public regret, but recognize, that soldiers, sailors, and airmen might be killed in action in Syria or Iraq. But until the past week, few seemed to understand fully that the home front remains vulnerable.The Paris attacks should put an end to this comforting fiction.

An inviting target

France is now relearning that its several hundred air strikes against ISIS over the past months and long-term commitment to secular ideals in the face of Islamism at home have consequences.

While the EU may have upheld France’s right to ban veils, the ban raised the ire of Muslims and Islamists alike. France became an inviting soft target. Even the heightened security measures and intensified intelligence activities imposed in the aftermath of Charlie Hebdo were insufficient to save the Bataclan concertgoers. Increased numbers of armed police officers and military personnel on the streets provided superficial reassurance but insufficient safety.

One hundred and fifty years ago, Western states could intervene militarily anywhere the world with little fear that London or Berlin would be bombed or civilians would be shot on the street.If terrorists like the 19th-century Anarchists attacked innocent civilians or state leaders, their weapons were limited to guns or perhaps stolen explosives.

Today the world is awash in military-grade weapons. High-volume killing machines like the AK-47s that were used in the Paris attack are available even in countries like France with strict gun control measures. Knowledge of how to combine basic chemicals and simple electronics to build makeshift improvised explosive devices is readily available on the internet. Worse, as 9/11 showed, even peaceful technologies like civilian airliners can be used as weapons with enough planning, willpower, and cleverness. Casualties have been and will be high.

另外，由于移民的涌入，許多國家已經(jīng)變成了多民族多宗教的社會。即便法國的絕大多數(shù)北非和阿拉伯裔移民是愛好和平、遵紀(jì)守法、憎恨暴力的良好公民，只要有少數(shù)人包庇或藏匿恐怖分子，就會讓偵查工作極難開展。

到現(xiàn)在為止，據(jù)說已經(jīng)有約1800名法國人前往中東，與ISIS并肩作戰(zhàn)。匿名情報(bào)顯示，其中一部分人已經(jīng)回國，隱匿在大約470萬名法國穆斯林之中。法國在這方面并非是孤例，美國和其他歐盟國家也有大量的伊斯蘭人口，而且數(shù)量還在不斷攀升，其中不少人的文化理念還未被當(dāng)?shù)赝?。這些移民群體往往成為藏匿和孕育極端主義者的溫床，因此這些國家也仍然有被襲擊的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。尤其是如果ISIS變得更加瘋狂，本地的ISIS同情者更加激進(jìn)，更多經(jīng)過戰(zhàn)爭洗禮的西方雇傭軍返回本國，那么，這些國家遭襲的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)就會更大。

在追蹤這些威脅時(shí)，無論是法國、比利時(shí)，還是美國政府都會受到技術(shù)、分析能力和法律等方面的限制。

至少到目前為止，在民主社會的法律規(guī)范和價(jià)值觀之下，以往那些針對非法移民的最嚴(yán)厲懲治措施已經(jīng)緩和了不少。以往在這種嚴(yán)峻的時(shí)刻和地方，載著難民的船只可能會被毫不客氣地直接驅(qū)逐走，少數(shù)漏網(wǎng)之魚被抓到后也會被直接遣返，很少有什么正當(dāng)程序可言。在應(yīng)對內(nèi)部威脅上，一些國家以前在面臨重大危機(jī)時(shí)，慣常使用的手段就是圈禁和驅(qū)逐，那時(shí)距今只有僅僅幾代人的時(shí)間。就連美國歷史上也有過在二戰(zhàn)時(shí)期圈禁美籍日裔公民的污點(diǎn)。

Moreover, migration has left many countries multiethnic, multireligious mélanges. Even if the vast majority of immigrants of North African and Arab origin in France are peaceable, law-abiding citizens who abhor violence, it takes only a few family members or disaffected outcasts to shelter terrorists and make surveillance extremely difficult.

Reportedly 1,800 or so French residents have traveled to the Middle East to fight alongside ISIS. Anonymous intelligence reports suggest that some number have returned to live amid the roughly 4.7 million Muslims living in France. With large, growing, and sometimes unassimilated Islamic populations where Jihadis might hide and perhaps find comfort, the United States and many other European nations will remain vulnerable. This is especially true if ISIS grows desperate, local sympathizers are radicalized, and more now-battle-hardened Western recruits return home.

The capability of governments like France, Belgium, and the U.S. to track such threats face technical, analytic, and legal limitations.

Democratic norms and values, at least to date, have moderated some of the harshest measures that might be taken against those illegally crossing international borders. In a more brutal time and place, boats carrying refugees might have been turned away without ceremony, while those captured later could be sent home with little if any due process. As for internal threats, only a few generations have passed since internment and deportation were normal in times of crisis. Even the United States has the stain of interning Japanese-American citizens in its recent history.

關(guān)閉邊界？還是忘了這件事吧

在全球化的時(shí)代，關(guān)閉邊界是不切實(shí)際的?，F(xiàn)代商業(yè)依賴于商品、服務(wù)和人力的自由流動，現(xiàn)代化的交通系統(tǒng)也能夠提供大批量的人員和物資運(yùn)輸。關(guān)閉邊界完全是缺乏現(xiàn)實(shí)政治和商業(yè)利益考量的嘗試，注定會以失敗告終。當(dāng)然，這并不能阻擋法國和美國的右翼政客呼吁采取這種措施。

更重要的是，有人覺得，將巴黎恐襲事件稱為戰(zhàn)爭行為，出臺以軍事主導(dǎo)的新戰(zhàn)略，進(jìn)一步加大對敘利亞和伊拉克境內(nèi)ISIS目標(biāo)的打擊力度，就能保護(hù)普通民眾了——這種想法也是一廂情愿。宣揚(yáng)這種豪言壯語的政客，如法國總統(tǒng)奧朗德等，只會鼓勵選民們產(chǎn)生更多不切實(shí)際的想法。

必須明確，這在政治上是不健康的，在戰(zhàn)略上也是不健康的！

Forget closing borders

Closing borders is impractical in an era of globalization. Modern commerce depends on the free flow of goods, services, and people. Modern transportation systems provide bulk transport for people and materials. Attempts to close borders more tightly will inevitably run afoul of both practical politics and commercial considerations. This, of course, has not stopped the right from calling for such measures in both France and the U.S.

More important, it is also magical thinking to assume that calling the Paris attacks an act of war, devising new military-dominated strategies, and reinvigorating efforts to strike ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq will protect ordinary citizens. Politicians like French President Francois Hollande who engage in such rhetoric are encouraging still more magical thinking among their constituents.

This is unhealthy politically.It is also unhealthy strategically.

不要假裝恐怖襲擊發(fā)生“在別處”

過去幾天，美國總統(tǒng)奧巴馬幾乎成了眾矢之的。巴黎恐襲事件之后，他的態(tài)度近乎袖手旁觀，為此，他必須激烈地為自己辯護(hù)。他的反駁令人信服，而且也不太可能讓美軍卷入代價(jià)高昂又沒有效果的以牙還牙式的軍事升級中。

要想在戰(zhàn)場上打敗ISIS，進(jìn)而避免羅馬或紐約遭到恐怖襲擊，終歸是妄想。不管法國、美國、俄羅斯或目前尚未形成的“國際反ISIS同盟”能派出多少軍隊(duì)，要想保護(hù)平民免遭恐怖主義的襲擊，難度依然很大。只要“獨(dú)狼”式的恐怖分子和一小搓極端主義者仍然愿意為信仰獻(xiàn)身，他們就很難被發(fā)現(xiàn)和制止。何況，要打敗盤踞在敘利亞和伊拉克的ISIS，需要大量資源和時(shí)間，當(dāng)然也包括大量部隊(duì)。這也就說明了，恐怖襲擊的威脅在未來相當(dāng)長的一段時(shí)間內(nèi)仍將存在。

指出這些令人不安的現(xiàn)實(shí)一點(diǎn)兒也不好玩，但公眾必須明白，與ISIS這樣的敵人開戰(zhàn)意味著什么。對于美法等國的政治領(lǐng)袖來說，要想更好地為選民服務(wù)，就不要繼續(xù)假裝這場戰(zhàn)爭將一直“在別處”發(fā)生。他們不應(yīng)該急匆匆地兜售軍事解決方案，因?yàn)檫@些方案幾乎沒有希望解決ISIS構(gòu)成的直接軍事威脅，也更不要指望它們能從根本上解決政治、宗教和民族矛盾。

Peter Dombrowski是美國海軍戰(zhàn)爭學(xué)院戰(zhàn)略教授。原文首發(fā)于《The Conversation》。（財(cái)富中文版）

譯者：樸成奎

審校：任文科

Obama has it right

Despite the intense criticism leveled at President Obama these past few days, his strong defense of a more hands-off approach is both compelling and less likely to embroil American troops in costly and ineffective tit-for-tat military escalation.

Defeating ISIS on the battlefield to prevent attacks in Rome or New York may be futile. No matter how much military force France, the United States, Russia, or some yet-to-be-formed coalition apply, it will be incredibly difficult to protect citizens from terror, the ultimate weapon of the weak. As long as lone wolves or small dedicated cells are willing to die in the name of their beliefs, they will be hard to find and difficult to deter. The amount of time and resources—including potentially large numbers of the proverbial “boots on the ground”—that will be required to defeat ISIS in Syria and Iraq ensures that the threat of future terrorist attacks will remain for a long time to come.

There is no pleasure in pointing out these uncomfortable realities. But the public must understand what war against an enemy such as ISIS means. Political leaders in France, the United States, and elsewhere will better serve their constituents by not pretending that the fight will always remain somewhere “over there.” And they should not peddle military solutions that offer little hope for resolving the direct military threat of ISIS quickly, much less the underlying political, religious, and ethnic sources of the conflict.

Peter Dombrowski is a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College. This piece was originally published on The Conversation