萊恩?彼德森是貨運代理行Flexport的首席執(zhí)行官，每天眼見海運價格時漲時跌，但就在兩周前，一個同行的報價讓他大吃一驚：150美元！

這是從深圳到荷蘭鹿特丹20英尺標準集裝箱的即期運價，報價方是一家未披露名字的中國承運商。即使在外行人看來，150美元可能也偏低了些。彼德森也證實了這點：“真是低得不可思議?！?/p>

這價格還抵不上一頓豐盛的晚餐，也不夠買一個新手機。

彼德森評價：“這可能是全球史上最低的海運價格?！?/p>

國際海運費已經(jīng)較低谷略有回升，但整體來看仍處于歷史低位，這其中部分原因是中國海運公司大打價格戰(zhàn)。事實上，目前的運費已經(jīng)不能簡單用低來形容了，最便宜的報價幾乎肯定抵不上承運商的燃料和人工成本。

“一直以來，馬士基是走低成本路線的貨運商，”彼德森說，“他們在業(yè)內(nèi)規(guī)模最大，因此能享受定價權(quán)?，F(xiàn)在大家突然發(fā)現(xiàn)中國人出價居然比馬士基還優(yōu)惠。如果中國企業(yè)的運費能比馬士基的邊際成本還低，肯定也低于他們自己的邊際成本?！?/p>

中國海運公司在海外動作頻頻也正逢國內(nèi)兩大的海運巨頭合并之際，一旦中國遠洋運輸集團（下稱中遠）與中國海運集團（下稱中海）完成合并，將成為全球第四大集運公司。

兩家公司合并的時機也有一些諷刺意味。彼德森指出，馬士基和其他大型集運班輪公司這些年一直在大幅壓低運費，試圖削弱規(guī)模較小效率相對低下的競爭對手。行業(yè)清理完畢后，照理說馬士基等巨頭就能提升運費了。

但中國企業(yè)橫空殺出，馬士基等大公司的策略有可能就此落空，最主要的原因是合并后的中國集運巨頭和其前身中海與中遠一樣都是國有企業(yè)。假如中國認定值得為刺激出口而投資航運業(yè)，那么即便海運報價虧本或者分文不賺，中國集運企業(yè)也承受得起。如果真是如此，連馬士基這樣的業(yè)內(nèi)巨無霸也可能敗下陣來。

“誰能大過中國政府，誰又能比他們還殺得起價。”彼德森如此感嘆。

受全球需求下滑和行業(yè)進一步產(chǎn)能過剩的負面影響，馬士基已然自身難保。不過，真正痛苦的還是價格靈活性不強的小型海運公司。航空貨運公司也會是很慘，行業(yè)咨詢機構(gòu)Drewry追蹤的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，今年空運與海運費的差距已達到創(chuàng)紀錄水平。

當然，因為低運費都來自一次性的即期合同，并非長期合約，所以情況有可能很快發(fā)生變化。

“從承運商的角度看，誰也不希望現(xiàn)在簽約，都不想讓這么低的報價變成長期合約?！北说律缡钦f。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Pessy

校對：夏林

Ryan Petersen, as CEO of the freight forwarder Flexport, sees a constant flow of shipping prices every day. But two weeks ago, he heard a number that stopped him short:$150.

That’s a spot rate offered by an unnamed Chinese carrier to ship 20-foot containers from Shenzhen to Rotterdam. That may seem low to the layman, and Petersen can confirm:“It’s mind-blowingly cheap.”

Cheaper than a fancy dinner. Cheaper than a new phone.

“It’s probably the lowest shipping has been in the history of planet Earth.”

Though the trough has since ticked back up slightly, the ocean freight market as a whole is still at a historic low, thanks in part to aggressive moves by Chinese shipping companies. In fact, rates are so far beyond cheap that the best bargains are almost certainly below shippers’ fuel and manpower costs.

“Traditionally Maersk has always been the low cost provider,” says Petersen. “They have the most scale and they have the luxury of setting the prices. Now all of a sudden we’re seeing the Chinese come in at a lower price than Maersk. So if they’re going below Maersk’s marginal cost, for sure they’re going below their own marginal cost.”

The aggressive moves come as China’s COSCO and CSCL shippers are merging, set to become the world’s fourth largest container operator.

They also come with a dose of irony. Maersk and the other biggest shippers have been pushing prices down aggressively for years, says Petersen, to weaken smaller, less efficient competitors. Post-consolidation, the big boys theoretically would be able to raise rates.

But to have the Chinese undercut them now could threaten the big shippers’ strategy—especially because the merged Chinese megashipper, like its predecessors, will be state-owned. Loss-inducing or zero-profit rates could be sustainable for them, if the Chinese government decides it’s a worthwhile investment to goose Chinese exports. Even a behemoth like Maersk could end up humbled.

“You’re not bigger than the Chinese government,” says Petersen. “You can’t go deeper than them.”

Maersk in particular is already on its back heel, because of both falling global demand, and self-reinforcing industry trends towards overcapacity. But the real headaches are going to be for smaller shippers, who have less price flexibility. Other big losers in the crunch could be air freight services, as industry tracker Drewry says the gap between air and ocean rates hit record levels this year.

This could all change quickly, of course—especially because the lowest rates on the market are one-time spot deals, not long-term contracts.

“Nobody wants to sign contracts right now, from the carrier side,” says Petersen. “They don’t want to commit to prices this low for the long term.”