中國(guó)股市再次下跌，熊態(tài)漸顯。這些天來(lái)，多位經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家都指出中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)存在深層次問(wèn)題。但在2010年，中國(guó)曾是左派經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家的最愛(ài)。

2008年底到2009年，中美兩國(guó)都推出了刺激措施。但一年過(guò)后，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)似乎回到了正軌，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)則依然停滯不前。保羅?克魯格曼等具有左派傾向的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家認(rèn)為，原因在于規(guī)模。美國(guó)的刺激規(guī)模一直太小。2010年克魯格曼曾撰文指出：“韓國(guó)和中國(guó)的刺激力度均遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)所有西方國(guó)家，而且成效明顯。”

就在2014年，圣路易斯聯(lián)儲(chǔ)銀行還公布了一份研究報(bào)告，探討了中國(guó)和西方發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家在經(jīng)濟(jì)上的迥異表現(xiàn)。該行經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家Yi Wen和Jing Wu稱，中國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)走勢(shì)要好得多，原因是：

中國(guó)實(shí)施了大膽而果斷的財(cái)政刺激措施，而其他主要國(guó)家都不敢這樣做。特別要指出的是，中國(guó)政府聰明地把國(guó)企作為2009年積極對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)予以刺激的財(cái)政工具，這完全符合凱恩斯主義的觀點(diǎn)，即通過(guò)增加政府支出來(lái)對(duì)總需求進(jìn)行管理。

然而，考慮到近來(lái)的情況，或許已經(jīng)到了重新考量此類分析的時(shí)候。2015年12月以來(lái)，上證指數(shù)已下跌近20%；和2015年6月的高點(diǎn)相比，該指數(shù)的跌幅還要深得多。分析師和中國(guó)政府也已大幅調(diào)整他們的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)預(yù)期。

這種局面說(shuō)明，十年來(lái)一直表現(xiàn)出色的中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)存在缺陷，它的基礎(chǔ)一直是不可持續(xù)的資本積累和出口增長(zhǎng)。我們?cè)?jīng)看到過(guò)這樣的場(chǎng)面，比如20世紀(jì)50年代的蘇聯(lián)、70年代的巴西以及80年代的日本。這些政府都采取了鼓勵(lì)投資的政策，他們?yōu)槔试O(shè)定上限，這樣企業(yè)就可以利用低成本貸款；他們還刻意壓低本幣匯率，目的是促進(jìn)出口。這樣的政策使得公司可以通過(guò)投資獲利，甚至是在這些投資不符合經(jīng)濟(jì)原理的情況下。

在上述事例中，經(jīng)濟(jì)長(zhǎng)期繁榮過(guò)后就是痛苦的泡沫破裂過(guò)程。20世紀(jì)80年代初發(fā)生經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退后，巴西多年來(lái)一直受到通脹、低增長(zhǎng)和政局不穩(wěn)的困擾。90年代初日本受到了金融危機(jī)的沖擊，從此再未真正實(shí)現(xiàn)過(guò)復(fù)蘇。

2009年稱贊中國(guó)刺激措施規(guī)模較大的那些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家可能沒(méi)有考慮到，這樣做的基礎(chǔ)是有缺陷的增長(zhǎng)模式，是鼓勵(lì)國(guó)企增加投資。實(shí)施刺激后，投資對(duì)中國(guó)GDP的貢獻(xiàn)率飆升至50%以上，這樣的水平在現(xiàn)代經(jīng)濟(jì)史上聞所未聞，而且很大一部分投資的背后推手都是政府。

從這個(gè)角度來(lái)看，中國(guó)的刺激措施并不那么注重為經(jīng)濟(jì)創(chuàng)造需求，它更多的是鼓勵(lì)公司來(lái)創(chuàng)造供給，無(wú)論最終產(chǎn)品是否有市場(chǎng)。如今我們看到了這種做法的影響，那就是大宗商品價(jià)格暴跌以及全球制造業(yè)出現(xiàn)滑坡，原因是產(chǎn)出遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超過(guò)滿足需求所需的水平。

考慮到衰退最終達(dá)到的水平，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦政府本可以采取時(shí)間更長(zhǎng)，也更有可持續(xù)性的經(jīng)濟(jì)刺激措施。但這并不是說(shuō)，中國(guó)的刺激措施就是明智之舉。由于中國(guó)存在失衡問(wèn)題，一味地大舉刺激而不致力于通過(guò)改革來(lái)扭轉(zhuǎn)失衡，這只會(huì)讓情況變得更糟?，F(xiàn)在，中國(guó)乃至整個(gè)世界都在應(yīng)付刺激措施帶來(lái)的影響。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

校對(duì)：詹妮

China’s stock market fell yet again, pushing it into bear market territory.More than a few economists these days are starting to say there are deep problems in China’s economy, but back in 2010, China was the darling of the economic left.

Both China and the U.S. had embarked on stimulus efforts in late 2008 and 2009. A year later, though, China’s economy seemed to be back on track, while the U.S. was still stuck. Left leaning economists, like Paul Krugman, said the reason was size. The U.S.’s stimulus effort had been too small. As Krugman wrote back in 2010, “Korea and China both engaged in much more aggressive stimulus than any Western nation—and it has worked out well.”

As recently as last year, the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis published a research paper that contemplated the divergent performances of the Chinese economy with those in the developed west. The economists Yi Wen and Jing Wu argued that that China performed so much better because:

China implemented bold, decisive fiscal stimulus programs that no other major nations dared to adopt. In particular, the Chinese government cleverly used its state-owned enterprises (SOEs) as a fiscal instrument to implement its aggressive stimulus programs in 2009, consistent with the very Keynesian notion of aggregate demand management through increased government spending.

In the light of recent events, however, it might be time to rethink this analysis. The Shanghai stock market is down roughly 20% since December, and much more since its peak last June, while analysts and the Chinese government have been sharply revising their estimates for economic growth.

This dynamic puts into sharp relief the flaw of China’s outstanding economic performance over the past decade: It’s been been based on an unsustainable build up of capital and growth in exports. We’ve seen this story before, be it the Soviet Union in the 1950s, Brazil in the 1970s, or Japan in the 1980s. In each of these cases the governments pursued policies that encouraged investment—like capping interest rates so that businesses could take advantage of cheap loans, and artificially cheapening the currency to promote exports. Such policies make it profitable for businesses to invest, even when these investments don’t make economic sense.

And in each of these cases, the long economic boom was followed by a painful bust. Brazil was plagued for years by inflation, slow growth, and political instability following the collapse of their economy in the early 1980s. The Japanese suffered from a financial crisis in the early 1990s from which they’ve never really recovered.

The economists who praised China’s stimulus package for its relative size in 2009 were likely not considering that it doubled down on this flawed growth model, encouraging more investment by state-owned enterprises. After China’s stimulus package, the share of GDP that came from investment, much of it spurred by the government, soared to above 50%—an unheard of level in recent economic history.

Taken in this light, China’s stimulus was less about making up for the lack of demand in the economy, and more about encouraging businesses to create supply regardless of whether there was demand for the end product. We’re seeing the effects of this approach today, with collapsing commodity prices and a global downturn in the manufacturing industry, as the world produces far too much than is needed to meet global demand.

The United States likely could have used a longer and more sustained stimulus effort from the federal government, taking into account how large the recession ended up being. But that doesn’t mean that China’s stimulus was wise. Given the imbalances in the Chinese system, a large stimulus without a commitment to reforms to reverse those imbalances amounted to just kicking the can down the road. Now China, and the world, is dealing with the consequences.