許多備受吹捧的高估值私人公司，即所謂的獨角獸公司，很可能將重演15年前的“.com”泡沫大崩盤。一個重要的觸發(fā)因素就是它們的燒錢率。

2000年3月，《巴倫周刊》曾發(fā)表了一篇名為《當錢燒盡》的著名研究文章，其研究重點是許多不盈利的互聯(lián)網公司，并著重分析了它們的“燒錢率”——現金耗盡前的燒錢速度。該文當時還頗具先見之明地預言稱，一旦資本難以為繼，這些公司將面臨非常慘淡的結局。

這篇文章點名指出了一些在當時聲名顯赫，但現在已經被人遺忘的公司，其中包括Intraware、drkoop.com和CDNow.com等。該文章還清晰地預見道，“.com”泡沫一旦破裂，即便是許多知名企業(yè)也將受到重創(chuàng)。被《巴倫周刊》點名的思科系統(tǒng)公司當月市值高達5500億美元?，F在，雖然仍有1500億美元的市值，但思科系統(tǒng)甚至不是“美國最有價值的10家上市公司”之一。

在上市科技公司圈，類似的腥風血雨這次不可能重現，原因很簡單：已上市的科技創(chuàng)業(yè)公司非常少。但是，許多備受吹捧的高估值私人公司，即所謂的獨角獸公司，很可能將重演15年前的大崩盤。罪魁禍首和15年前并無兩樣，即它們的“燒錢率”。

我們已經知道，給獨角獸公司估值無異于一場惡作劇，我在《財富》雜志中撰文詳述了其中的貓膩（http://www.zgfxmdz.com/business/c/2015-04/10/content_239004.htm）?？萍脊镜腃EO們喜歡追求各種噱頭，比如有保證的IPO價格（如果沒有達到，就會激發(fā)他們發(fā)行股票）、現金紅利和其他優(yōu)先權利，從而換來自我滿足感，以及有助于招募和留住人才的10億美元大公司標簽。

這次的一個重大區(qū)別在于，目前還沒有一份權威研究顯示這些私人公司還剩下多少時間。其現金消耗數據很難得到。但毫無疑問，這些公司，包括它們身后的金主，都清楚錢什么時候會燒完?？萍脊镜娜谫Y難度現在已經變大?！敦敻弧返ぁて绽R克撰文報道了這種趨勢，并分析了它將給資金短缺的獨角獸們帶來的真實影響。普利馬克指出，面臨這種局面的獨角獸公司有91家，其雇傭的員工總數達5.7萬人。大批渴望成為獨角獸的公司雇傭了更多人。

不妨再看看這樣一個事實：許多企業(yè)的成功取決于它們面向初創(chuàng)公司的銷售業(yè)績，比如華爾街最近的新寵——亞馬遜的云軟件和服務Amazon Web Services。一旦獨角獸的燒錢率泡沫破裂，由此產生的層疊效應也會傷及這些企業(yè)。那時的局面一定不會好看。（財富中文網）

譯者：樸成奎

審校：任文科

In March 2000, the financial weekly Barron’s published an infamous study under the headline “Burning Up.” It focused on scores of unprofitable Internet companies, specifically analyzing their “burn rates”—their pace of cash consumption until there’s nothing left–and presciently predicted the ugly result when capital raising turned difficult.

The screen turned up then-prominent and now-forgotten gems, including Intraware, drkoop.com, and CDNow.com. The Barron’s article also saw clearly that the dot-com bust would smack established companies because they sold to the soon-to-be ailing group. Barron’s specifically fingered Cisco Systems, whose market value peaked that month at more than $550 billion. Today, at $150 billion, Cisco isn’t even one of the 10 most valuable publicly traded companies in the U.S.

There won’t be a similar bloodbath among public tech companies this time around for a simple reason: Too few startups have gone public. But the much ballyhooed cohort of highly valued private companies, the so-called unicorns, are heading for a fall every bit as dramatic as their hapless dot-com brethren 15 years ago. The culprit will be exactly the same, their burn rates.

Already we know that there’s a fair amount of monkey business in unicorn valuations, as I detail in the current issue of Fortune. Tech CEOs pursue a variety of gimmicks, including guaranteed IPO prices (which trigger share issuance if they aren’t met), cash dividends, and other preferential rights in return for ego-gratifying, recruitment-and-retention-stimulating billion-dollar labels.

There will be a critical difference this time in that there won’t be an authoritative study of how much time private companies have left. (Their cash-burn data are hard to come by.) But make no mistake. The companies and their backers know precisely when the money will run out, and fundraising already is becoming more difficult. Fortune’s Dan Primack has documented this trend as well as the real impact that a collapse among poorly funded unicorns will have. He noted that 91 such companies employ 57,000 people. The vast crop of unicorn wannabes employs many more.

Consider as well that businesses like Amazon’s CSCO -1.36% “cloud” software and services provider Amazon Web Services—a darling of Wall Street today—base their success on selling to startups. Even they will be stung by the cascading effect of a unicorn burn-rate bust. It won’t be pretty.