春節(jié)到來(lái)一周前，中國(guó)央行突然宣布，首次購(gòu)買普通性住房的商業(yè)性個(gè)人住房貸款首付比例由25%降至20%，以提振房產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)。這項(xiàng)新規(guī)面向所有不實(shí)施“限購(gòu)”措施的城市，即北京、深圳和廣州等住房需求強(qiáng)勁的少數(shù)城市不適用。政策出臺(tái)的背景是中國(guó)一線城市和非一線城市之間房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)冷熱不均，但新政可能不會(huì)產(chǎn)生巨大影響。

與此同時(shí)，中國(guó)各地的大興土木仍在持續(xù)。據(jù)《華盛頓郵報(bào)》報(bào)道，2011-2013年，中國(guó)消耗水泥約64億噸，比美國(guó)整個(gè)20世紀(jì)的消耗量還多。如果說(shuō)日本讓世人見(jiàn)識(shí)到了怎樣可以盡量減少庫(kù)存，造完剛好能用上，那么，中國(guó)則掌握了先造了再說(shuō)，造完再想怎么辦的絕技。改革開(kāi)放三十年來(lái)，中國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)在保持兩位數(shù)的高增長(zhǎng)的同時(shí)，也在大力興修房產(chǎn)，每年新增房屋面積是香港總面積的兩倍多，如今，這臺(tái)高速發(fā)展的機(jī)器上裂痕隱現(xiàn)。

路透社報(bào)道稱，中國(guó)已有1300萬(wàn)套空置房。在人稱“鬼城”的城市里，大量新建的購(gòu)物中心、中央廣場(chǎng)、體育館、風(fēng)格前衛(wèi)的行政大樓、豪華公寓、別墅一應(yīng)俱全，可就是空無(wú)一人。去年，西安一棟占地3.7萬(wàn)平米的27層高樓被爆破拆除然后清理干凈，因?yàn)樵摻ㄖL(zhǎng)期空置，已無(wú)法修繕。

鑒于中國(guó)五分之一的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)都與房產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)息息相關(guān)，現(xiàn)狀讓人更加擔(dān)憂。樓市下滑的影響面極廣。2015年，中國(guó)制造工程機(jī)械與環(huán)衛(wèi)設(shè)備的龍頭企業(yè)中聯(lián)重科凈利潤(rùn)銳減90%。同年，由于市場(chǎng)下滑，15家中國(guó)房地產(chǎn)企業(yè)均報(bào)虧損。據(jù)《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》報(bào)道，就在春節(jié)前，標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾將中國(guó)首富王健林旗下的大連萬(wàn)達(dá)商業(yè)地產(chǎn)的信用評(píng)級(jí)降為垃圾級(jí)，惠譽(yù)則將該司的評(píng)級(jí)降至BBB級(jí)，僅比垃圾級(jí)高兩級(jí)。

對(duì)中國(guó)房產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)而言，減少供應(yīng)至關(guān)重要，但政策上并不明確。一線城市的房?jī)r(jià)已經(jīng)反彈，非一線城市的房?jī)r(jià)集體下跌。中國(guó)消費(fèi)者在痛苦中明白了房屋所在地的重要性。一座有活力的城市需要活躍的經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)和足夠規(guī)模的人口才能維系。要素具備時(shí)，房?jī)r(jià)才會(huì)上漲，但在中國(guó)必要要素只集中在極少數(shù)城市里。

中國(guó)政府長(zhǎng)期管控利率、首付比例和稅率，并實(shí)行限購(gòu)政策，以便或抑制或刺激房產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)。2014年下半年以來(lái)，中國(guó)房地產(chǎn)領(lǐng)域沒(méi)有受到任何束縛，包括六次降息在內(nèi)的所有舉措都在刺激樓市。大家都在猜測(cè)，在吸引潛在買家進(jìn)入小城市購(gòu)房方面，最近這輪刺激能起多大作用?？蓻Q策者面臨的真正問(wèn)題是，房地產(chǎn)市場(chǎng)的“病根”未除，而且越發(fā)深入。

早在2005-2010年，地方政府就在定期向開(kāi)發(fā)商出售地皮，開(kāi)發(fā)商從銀行得到貸款開(kāi)發(fā)地塊后，以相對(duì)較高的價(jià)格賣給個(gè)人投資者。在這一過(guò)程中，地方政府獲取了亟需的收入，地方GDP從而增長(zhǎng)，官員獲得了政績(jī)，為當(dāng)?shù)貏?chuàng)造了就業(yè)，人人都得到物質(zhì)回報(bào)。然后，大家不斷重復(fù)這一過(guò)程?？墒聦?shí)證明，整個(gè)體系在實(shí)現(xiàn)“居者有其屋”的政策目標(biāo)以及投資回報(bào)方面，效率極低。

澳大利亞聯(lián)邦銀行一位分析師向美國(guó)財(cái)經(jīng)科技新聞網(wǎng)站Business Insider表示，近年來(lái)，中國(guó)的三四線城市的新建住宅占全國(guó)新增總量的80%-90%。國(guó)有銀行對(duì)房產(chǎn)開(kāi)發(fā)商大開(kāi)綠燈慷慨融資，卻對(duì)其他領(lǐng)域的私人企業(yè)和地方實(shí)業(yè)的融資需求視而不見(jiàn)，導(dǎo)致資金幾近斷流。中國(guó)早已決意改變投資拉動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的模式，轉(zhuǎn)而向消費(fèi)驅(qū)動(dòng)、科技帶動(dòng)的知識(shí)型經(jīng)濟(jì)，可現(xiàn)行系統(tǒng)卻在起反作用。

對(duì)中國(guó)的中產(chǎn)階級(jí)而言，經(jīng)濟(jì)疲弱只會(huì)造成生活不便。可對(duì)7000萬(wàn)在貧困線上掙扎的人口來(lái)說(shuō)，生活水平哪怕只有小幅下降，也可能是一場(chǎng)不折不扣的災(zāi)難——足以引發(fā)社會(huì)動(dòng)亂。GDP增速跌至創(chuàng)最低記錄的6.9%之際，中國(guó)已別無(wú)選擇，只能增加刺激力度。若要避免經(jīng)濟(jì)受到進(jìn)一步?jīng)_擊，微調(diào)不可避免，但全面深化經(jīng)濟(jì)改革才是更緊迫的。(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng))

作者Howard Yu是瑞士IMD商學(xué)院戰(zhàn)略管理與創(chuàng)新領(lǐng)域教授。

譯者：Pessy

Just a week before the Chinese New Year, China’s central bank cut the minimum mortgage down payment for first-time buyers from 25% to 20%, as it sought to shore up the property market. The new rules apply to all but a handful of cities—such as Beijing, Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou—where demand remains strong. It’s a tale of two tiers of cities, and one that likely won’t have a huge impact.

Construction is everywhere in China. Between 2011 and 2013, China consumed around 6.4 gigatons of cement, according to The Washington Post—more than what the United States used during the course of the 20th century. If Japan taught the world just-in-time production, where inventory should be minimized, China has mastered just-in-case construction—build now and figure out what to do with it later. In its ferocious race to modernity, with three decades of double-digit growth, China has built enough floor space to cover Hong Kong twice over every year. And now, cracks are beginning to show.

There are 13 million vacant homes in China, according to Reuters. Known as “China’s ghost cities,” there is an abundance of newly built urban areas complete with shopping malls, central squares, stadiums, avant-garde administrative buildings, luxurious condos, and villas—everything except people. In the city of Xi’an last year, a never-used 27-floor high-rise that covered 37,000 square meters was blown up and cleared away because it had been left vacant for too long and deteriorated beyond repair.

This is all the more disturbing, given that one-fifth of China’s economic activities are related to the property market. The consequences are many. Zoomlion, the country’s leading construction machinery and sanitation equipment maker, announced a 90% net profit drop in 2015. Fifteen Chinese real estate companies projected a loss for 2015 due to the recent market slowdown. Wanda Commercial Properties, whose founder was until recently China’s richest man, was downgraded last week by Standard and Poor’s to junk bond status, and by Fitch Ratings to “BBB,” hovering two notches above junk bond status, according to The Wall Street Journal.

While reducing China’s housing supply is crucial, it is anything but straightforward. Prices havebounced back in top-tier cities, while dropping in all of those below. Buyers have learned the importance of location the hard way. A viable city needs vibrant economic activity and a sizable population to sustain itself. Price increases, when they occur, tend to be concentrated in a small segment of Chinese markets.

Chinese authorities have long manipulated interest rates and down payment requirements, played with tax rates, and imposed purchase restrictions to either curb or spur the property market. From the second half of 2014 onward, there’s been no hampering of the real estate sector—all moves have been stimulus-oriented, including a six-fold reduction of interest rates. How successful this latest round will be to lure potential buyers into rural cities is anyone’s guess. But the real problem for policymakers is that the root causes of China’s real estate disease run much deeper.

As early as the second half of the 2000s, municipal governments have routinely handed over land to developers. Developers would then receive loans from banks to develop the land. Individual investors bought housing units at inflated prices. In the process, local government pocketed much-needed revenue, local GDP grew, politicians got patted on the back, jobs were created, and everyone made money so the wheels kept turning. But the system has proved to be extremely inefficient at building what is actually needed and yielding return on investment.

In recent years, tier 3 and 4 cities accounted for 80% to 90% of total new construction, an analyst at the Commonwealth Bank of Australia tells Business Insider. With state-owned banks indiscriminately channeling financial resources to property developers, other types of private enterprises and local businesses have been starved of capital. The Chinese government has long been adamant about transforming the nation from an investment-focused to a consumption-driven, technologically-advanced, knowledge-based economy. The current system encourages exactly the opposite.

For China’s middle class, a weakening economy is a mere inconvenience. For the 70 million people who live in abject poverty, a small contraction in living standards could be an utter disaster—enough to trigger social unrest. With overall GDP growth grinding to a record low of 6.9%, the Chinese government has had no choice but to inject more stimulus.This temporary tweak to avoid deeper shocks is needed without a doubt. But the urgency for broader economic reforms is needed even more.

Howard Yu is a professor of strategic management and innovation at IMD, a business school based in Lausanne, Switzerland.