大眾正竭盡全力在自定期限前就“排放門(mén)”做出解釋，此事的源頭可能比意料中更為久遠(yuǎn)。

德國(guó)《商報(bào)》本周二報(bào)道，早在1999年環(huán)保標(biāo)準(zhǔn)收緊之際，大眾旗下奧迪部門(mén)的工程師們就開(kāi)始考慮利用非法軟件來(lái)掩蓋實(shí)際排放水平，比起大眾真正決定使用這款軟件要早得多。

大眾一直堅(jiān)持說(shuō)“排放門(mén)”最早發(fā)生在位于德國(guó)沃爾夫斯堡的大眾核心品牌，從報(bào)道來(lái)看該公司的說(shuō)法很有問(wèn)題。這條消息也讓外界更加懷疑已經(jīng)下課的大眾首席執(zhí)行官馬丁?文德恩有共謀嫌疑，因?yàn)楫?dāng)時(shí)他正擔(dān)任奧迪部門(mén)的負(fù)責(zé)人。文德恩稱自己對(duì)非法軟件一無(wú)所知；對(duì)于2014年內(nèi)部調(diào)查員提出的相關(guān)警示信息，他也視而不見(jiàn)，亦或未曾察覺(jué)。

這條消息也是發(fā)酵了七個(gè)月的“排放門(mén)”事件中兩次轉(zhuǎn)折之一。另?yè)?jù)彭博報(bào)道，4月28日大眾將披露去年第四季度以及全年業(yè)績(jī)，屆時(shí)該公司可能還是沒(méi)法把丑聞解釋清楚。去年9月，大眾聘請(qǐng)律師事務(wù)所Jones Day對(duì)“排放門(mén)”展開(kāi)內(nèi)部調(diào)查，目前事務(wù)所的調(diào)查人員仍在努力整理去年收集的大量信息。

部分問(wèn)題似乎在于，20名接受調(diào)查的大眾發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)開(kāi)發(fā)部門(mén)人員里，至少有好幾個(gè)人都在用暗語(yǔ)掩飾行為（要知道，新任CEO馬提亞斯?穆勒今年初曾表示，大眾認(rèn)為自己并沒(méi)有犯任何錯(cuò)誤）。暗語(yǔ)中最重要的一個(gè)是“音響軟件”，代指大眾在自家汽車上安裝的一套軟件，用途是辨別車輛是在監(jiān)管部門(mén)的實(shí)驗(yàn)室里測(cè)試，還是在普通道路上行駛。如果在實(shí)驗(yàn)室里，車輛的發(fā)動(dòng)機(jī)功率就會(huì)保持在美國(guó)環(huán)保局和加州空氣資源委員會(huì)設(shè)定的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)以下；但如果在路上，車輛就會(huì)進(jìn)入性能更強(qiáng)且更耗油的模式，當(dāng)然最關(guān)鍵的是，空氣污染更嚴(yán)重。

大眾正面臨多個(gè)最終期限。該公司第二大股東，下薩克森州政府已經(jīng)表示，希望大眾在4月底前做出合理解釋。只是如果大眾未能做到這一點(diǎn)，還不清楚州政府會(huì)怎樣懲罰本州最大的納稅人和用人單位。更重要的是，大眾與美國(guó)環(huán)保局以及加州空氣資源委員會(huì)的談判將于本周五結(jié)束，三方的目標(biāo)是想辦法維修美國(guó)的涉事車輛。如若不然，大眾就得全額賠償相關(guān)買(mǎi)家和經(jīng)銷商因失去轉(zhuǎn)售價(jià)值而蒙受的損失。

同樣是在本周五，大眾監(jiān)事會(huì)必須就高管的2015年獎(jiǎng)金做一些決定。這應(yīng)該是一場(chǎng)有意思的討論，原因是一半監(jiān)事都是工會(huì)代表，他們?cè)絹?lái)越擔(dān)心“排放門(mén)”會(huì)引發(fā)裁員。另外，大眾靠作假提高柴油車在美國(guó)市場(chǎng)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力時(shí)，擔(dān)任首席財(cái)務(wù)官的正是如今的監(jiān)事會(huì)主席漢斯?迪特?珀奇。

下薩克森州政府以及大眾普通股東聯(lián)合會(huì)正在向公司高層施壓，希望他們徹底放棄去年的獎(jiǎng)金，畢竟去年大眾損失了數(shù)十億美元，股東手中的股票市值也縮水了幾十億美元。但大眾擔(dān)心不發(fā)獎(jiǎng)金會(huì)導(dǎo)致個(gè)別管理層成員起訴，特別是能理直氣壯宣稱跟“排放門(mén)”事件沒(méi)關(guān)系的高管。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

Volkswagen is struggling to meet its own self-imposed deadline for explaining its emissions scandal—which may have roots that go farther back than previously thought.

The newspaper Handelsblatt reported Tuesday that engineers at VW’s Audi division had considered using illegal software to mask emissions levels in the event of environmental standards being tightened as early as 1999—well before VW actually decided to use it.

The report contradicts the company’s long-held line that the problem originated at its core VW brand in Wolfsburg. It also increases suspicions about the complicity of the now-departed CEO Martin Winterkorn, who was head of Audi at the time. Winterkorn, who denies having any knowledge of the illegal software, either ignored or failed to spot warning messages about the scale of the problem from internal investigators in 2014.

That revelation is one of two fresh twists in a scandal that’s already in its seventh month. According to a report by Bloomberg, VW may not be able to give a full account of the scandal when it publishes its fourth-quarter and full-year accounts on April 28. Investigators at law firm Jones Day, which VW asked to perform an internal investigation into the affair back in September, are struggling to wade through the wealth of data they gathered last year.

Part of the problem, it seems, is that at least some of the 20 engine development employees on whom the investigation is focusing used code words to cover their tracks. (Remember: CEO Matthias Müller suggested earlier this year that the company didn’t think it had done anything wrong). Chief among these was the term “acoustic software” to refer to the package of code that VW installed in the cars to detect whether the car was being tested by regulators in the lab, or being run on the open road. In the former case, the engines ran just within the limits prescribed by the Environmental Protection Agency and California Air Resource Board, but in the latter, they switched into a higher-performance, more fuel-hungry and—crucially—dirtier mode of operation.

The deadlines are coming thick and fast at VW now. Its second-largest shareholder, the state of Lower Saxony, has said it wants proper answers by the end of April, although it isn’t clear quite how it intends to sanction the largest taxpayer and employer in the state if it fails. More importantly, it has until Friday to negotiate a solution for fixing its U.S. cars with the EPA and CARB, or else face having to compensate buyers and dealers in full for their complete loss of resale value.

Also on Friday, the supervisory board has to come to some kind of decision on bonuses for the management for 2015, which should be an interesting discussion, given that half of the board is made up representatives of labor unions who are increasingly afraid of job cuts in the wake of the scandal, and that the body is chaired by Hans Dieter P?tsch, the man who was chief financial officer during the period when VW was cutting corners to make its diesels competitive in the U.S.

Both Lower Saxony and the association of VW’s free shareholders are pressing for management to accept no bonus at all for last year, reflecting the multi-billion loss it will take and the billions of dollars of shareholder value destroyed. Yet the company fears lawsuits from individual management board members if they aren’t given a bonus, especially those who can claim that they weren’t directly involved in the conspiracy.