寶萬大戰(zhàn)正酣,影子銀行風(fēng)險(xiǎn)凸顯
圍繞中國頂尖房地產(chǎn)公司萬科的收購爭奪揭示了影子貸款產(chǎn)品怎樣讓地方銀行面臨越來越大的國內(nèi)股市高波動(dòng)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。這些影子貸款產(chǎn)品并不安全,而且掩蓋了自身資產(chǎn)質(zhì)量的不斷下降。 為了在經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩之際追逐較高的投資回報(bào),同時(shí)抵消壞賬不斷增多的影響,中國國內(nèi)銀行正在把儲戶存款投入所謂的資產(chǎn)管理計(jì)劃。這種產(chǎn)品以股票為抵押,目的是讓企業(yè)獲得貸款。 打算敵意收購萬科的寶能集團(tuán)買下了前者25%的股份,所用資金中有260億元即是通過資管計(jì)劃從五、六家銀行籌集而來,其中包括一直都較為謹(jǐn)慎的中國建設(shè)銀行。 建設(shè)銀行拒絕發(fā)表評論。 雖然銀行通過影子貸款渠道持有多少股票并無官方數(shù)據(jù),但摩根大通估算,截至今年3月底,資管計(jì)劃總額為32萬億元,和一年前相比翻了一番。 盡管并不違法,但銀行越來越多地使用這些影子貸款技術(shù)可能會讓它們在追逐利潤的過程中失去對風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的恰當(dāng)把握。在中國,影子貸款經(jīng)常借助一些不透明的金融工具,后者就是人們所知的理財(cái)產(chǎn)品。 惠譽(yù)評級聯(lián)席董事袁牧指出:“資管計(jì)劃和理財(cái)產(chǎn)品本質(zhì)上處于模糊區(qū)域,存在一定程度的監(jiān)管套利,而且顯然是(銀行)避開審慎經(jīng)營規(guī)則的途徑?!? “這種活動(dòng)的規(guī)模不斷擴(kuò)大令人擔(dān)心,而且對此缺乏有效的監(jiān)管?!? 在幾乎所有情況下,影子貸款都不會進(jìn)入銀行的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表,因而很難估算這種形式的融資或貸款占銀行業(yè)務(wù)的確切比重。由于中國商業(yè)銀行的貸款違約率處于2009年全球金融危機(jī)以來的最高點(diǎn),這種情況特別讓人憂慮。 更廣泛地來說,中國的債務(wù)水平正在節(jié)節(jié)攀升。去年,個(gè)人、企業(yè)和政府債務(wù)總額已經(jīng)達(dá)到中國經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出的2.5倍。 了解情況的人士透露,參與寶能資管計(jì)劃的銀行承諾的回報(bào)率高達(dá)7.5%,而中國10年期國債的收益率為2.8%。 傳染風(fēng)險(xiǎn) 行業(yè)分析師指出,大多數(shù)投資股票的資管計(jì)劃合同都包含一些風(fēng)險(xiǎn)控制條款,具體內(nèi)容是如果資管計(jì)劃單位凈值跌破預(yù)先設(shè)定的水平,就會強(qiáng)行平倉。 但對銀行來說,風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在于大多數(shù)情況下銀行都不清楚資管計(jì)劃背后的借款公司財(cái)務(wù)情況如何,或者杠桿有多高。 《財(cái)富》雜志曾請中國銀監(jiān)會發(fā)表意見,但后者沒有立即做出回應(yīng)。本月初,銀監(jiān)會督促銀行把風(fēng)險(xiǎn)管理提升到“更重要”的位置,并采取措施來控制不良貸款的快速上升。 分析師稱,一些銀行還推出了自己的資管計(jì)劃,用潛在高收益吸引個(gè)人投資者,進(jìn)而籌集資金,然后再將這些資金投入股票、房地產(chǎn)以及其他資產(chǎn)。 他們指出,銀行還向顧客銷售理財(cái)產(chǎn)品,這是影子銀行活動(dòng)的最主要源泉之一,而且在某些情況下,這些資金也會直接投入股市,或者通過資管計(jì)劃進(jìn)行股票投資。 資管計(jì)劃和理財(cái)產(chǎn)品等金融產(chǎn)品幾乎不受監(jiān)管,其運(yùn)作方式也幾乎沒有透明度。由于缺乏二級市場,進(jìn)而可能使用高杠桿,如果它們進(jìn)入下行通道,就很難變現(xiàn)。 分析師表示,因此,如果投資失誤,這些產(chǎn)品不僅會成為投資銀行的壞賬,還會給出資銀行帶來感染風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。 一位不愿被提及姓名的行業(yè)追蹤者指出:“隨著這些產(chǎn)品的規(guī)模變得越來越大,銀行要管理它們可能引發(fā)的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)也會變得越來越難?!?(財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)) 譯者:Charlie 審校:詹妮 |
The takeover tussle embroiling top Chinese developer China Vanke has unveiled how local banks are increasingly exposed to highly volatile domestic stock markets through risky shadow lending products that mask their worsening asset quality. In their hunt for higher investment returns in a slowing economy and to offset the impact of rising bad loans, Chinese banks are putting their depositors’ money into so-called asset management plans (AMPs), products set up for the purpose of lending to companies and backed by shares as collateral. Baoneng Group, which is attempting a hostile takeover of Vanke, used 26 billion yuan ($3.9 billion) of such instruments from about half a dozen banks – including traditionally cautious China Construction Bank Corp to partly finance buying 25% of the property developer. CCB declined to comment. While there is no official data on banks’ overall exposure to shares through shadow lending channels, JPMorgan estimated that AMP funds stood at 32 trillion yuan at the end of March, double a year earlier. Although not illegal, banks’ growing use of such shadow-lending techniques, which often make use of opaque instruments known in China as wealth management products (WMPs), could be sacrificing proper risk management in the pursuit of profit. “The whole nature of WMPs and AMPs is that it’s a murky area. There is a degree of regulatory arbitrage there and it’s clearly a way for (the banks) to get around the prudential rules,” said Jack Yuan, associate director at Fitch Ratings. “It’s concerning that the scale of this sort of activity is widening, and there is no effective regulation around this.” In almost all cases, shadow lending is kept off the banks’ balance sheets, making it difficult to gauge the true extent of the banks’ exposure to this form of fund raising or lending – which is of particular concern as Chinese commercial banks’ loan defaults are at their highest since the global financial crisis in 2009. More broadly, debt levels in the country are mounting, with the overall level of private, corporate and government debt reaching 250% of the country’s economic output last year. People familiar with the matter said the banks involved in the Baoneng AMPs have been promised a return of as high as 7.5%, compared with China’s 10-year treasury bond yield of 2.8%. CONTAGION RISKS Most of the AMPs that invest in shares have some risk-control provisions in the contract that triggers liquidation of the stocks if they fall below a pre-agreed threshold, industry analysts said. However, what makes it risky for the banks is that in most cases they don’t have a clear understanding of the financial health and existing leverage of the borrower company behind the AMPs. The China Banking Regulatory Commission did not immediately respond to a request for comment. Earlier this month, the regulator urged banks to elevate risk management to a “more prominent” place and take measures to rein in the rapid rise of non-performing loans. Some banks also float their own AMPs, raising money from retail investors lured by the prospects of high yields. The funds generated through these AMPs are then used to invest in shares, real estate and other assets, analysts said. Chinese banks also sell WMPs to clients, one of the biggest sources of shadow banking activities, and in some cases those funds are also used to invest in shares directly or through AMPs, they said. Schemes such as the AMPs and WMPs, with little regulatory oversight or transparency in the way they operate, are difficult to turn into cash in a downturn since they lack a secondary market and can in turn be highly leveraged. So if investment bets through these schemes go bad, it would not only add to the investing banks’ bad loans but also create contagion risks for banks that finance that investment, analysts said. “As the scale of these entire products becomes larger and larger, it would be harder and harder for the banks to manage the risks it can trigger,” said an industry tracker, who declined to be named. |