上周，照片分享軟件Snapchat曝出一款嚴(yán)重歧視亞洲人的濾鏡（濾鏡效果是黃皮膚，又小又斜的眼睛），引發(fā)網(wǎng)絡(luò)抵制熱潮，最后以Snapchat撤下濾鏡告終。這一事件讓人不禁聯(lián)想，會(huì)不會(huì)出現(xiàn)同樣聲勢(shì)浩大的抵制中國(guó)海外投資熱潮。

這里有三起與美國(guó)利益不相關(guān)的案例，可能更方便解釋清楚問(wèn)題。第一起就是，出于國(guó)家安全考慮，澳大利亞明確拒絕中國(guó)政府與企業(yè)組成的銀團(tuán)收購(gòu)該國(guó)最大的供電網(wǎng)絡(luò)。

上周，英國(guó)新任首相叫停40年來(lái)第一個(gè)核電站項(xiàng)目，只因?yàn)橹袊?guó)在其中有小部分股份（不過(guò)也有人說(shuō)英國(guó)更擔(dān)心的是如何擺脫之前跟合作方法國(guó)電力公司簽訂的天價(jià)能源購(gòu)買(mǎi)合同）。

越來(lái)越多證據(jù)表明，中國(guó)在網(wǎng)絡(luò)戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)方面的實(shí)力不容小覷且還在增強(qiáng)，所以考慮國(guó)家安全無(wú)可厚非。打算投資英國(guó)欣克利角核電站的中廣核集團(tuán)此前就身陷美國(guó)一起間諜丑聞。不過(guò)這一方面體現(xiàn)中國(guó)在低利率環(huán)境里渴望通過(guò)正當(dāng)手段尋求可靠回報(bào)，另一點(diǎn)也被反復(fù)強(qiáng)調(diào)（也有可能是誤導(dǎo)），即中國(guó)在積攢長(zhǎng)期低碳能源領(lǐng)域的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。

不管真相如何，中國(guó)利用類似投資圖謀不軌的可能性到底有多大呢？中國(guó)可是靠著向全世界出口維護(hù)國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)穩(wěn)定的。一旦貿(mào)易伙伴的信任不再，反作用會(huì)非常明顯。俄羅斯總統(tǒng)普京用天然氣當(dāng)武器對(duì)抗歐洲的前車(chē)之鑒歷歷在目。

即便無(wú)關(guān)國(guó)家利益，而且與中國(guó)政界沒(méi)什么關(guān)系，中國(guó)美的集團(tuán)收購(gòu)德國(guó)工業(yè)機(jī)器人制造商Kuka AG還是遭遇抵抗，西方政客對(duì)中國(guó)的態(tài)度就是比別國(guó)嚴(yán)苛許多。安全方面的考慮當(dāng)然很重要。但如果德國(guó)政府和央行五年來(lái)一直苦求行業(yè)加大投資卻毫無(wú)效果，外國(guó)資金要進(jìn)入?yún)s無(wú)腦抵制，到底有多大意義？（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

Snapchat succumbed yesterday to a wave of online outrage about?a filter that smacked of anti-Asian racism?(a yellow face with closed, slanted eyes). It seems a good moment to wonder if the same outrage will ever be directed at those who are blocking Chinese investment overseas.

It may be easier to illustrate the problem in three cases where U.S. interests aren’t directly affected. Today, Australia moved to block a Chinese consortium of state and private interests taking a controlling stake in the country’s largest electricity network over national security concerns.

Last week, the U.K.’s new Prime Minister slammed the brakes on a project to build the country’s first new nuclear power station in 40 years due to China having a minority stake in it (although one suspects that London is more concerned about wriggling out of a ludicrously high power-purchase contract it has already signed with the lead partner, France’s EDF).

The national security risk may be clear, given widespread evidence of Beijing’s?formidable and growing cyberwarfare capabilities. China General Nuclear Power, the company investing in the Hinkley Point power station, is already mired in an industrial espionage scandal in the U.S.. But one reflects a legitimate desire for a reliable yield in a world of low returns, and the other an important (if arguably misguided) learning experience in the country’s search for a long-term low-carbon energy future.

But, either way, how credible is the threat of China abusing the leverage it gets through such investments? It is a country that guarantees its internal stability by exporting to the rest of the world. Breaching the trust of its trading partners would quickly prove counterproductive. The example of Vladimir Putin and his use of the gas weapon in Europe makes this only too clear.

Even where there is no national security interest and no direct line back to politicians back in Beijing, as in the acquisition of German robot maker Kuka AG?by China’s Midea Group, western politicians continue to resist Chinese investment much more stiffly than that of other countries. Security concerns matter, obviously. But when domestic business isn’t investing despite five years of pleading from governments and central banks, you’re allowed to wonder whether it makes sense to be so sniffy about foreigners who are.