優(yōu)秀的中國公司跟隨消費者的口味調(diào)整速度之快，經(jīng)常讓西方同行驚訝。

在中國人看來，即使美國百年老店梅西百貨關(guān)閉約占總數(shù)15%的百家門店，也沒什么大不了。

梅西百貨關(guān)店的現(xiàn)實意義在于，面對亞馬遜的崛起，以及紐約布魯克林區(qū)無數(shù)初創(chuàng)公司在網(wǎng)上出售奢侈內(nèi)衣和全套服裝的熱潮，縱然是老牌百貨公司也難以應(yīng)付。

中國也有一家類似的連鎖百貨公司，過去幾年的困境跟梅西差不多。逛街的購物者越來越少，網(wǎng)店造成的競爭又越發(fā)激烈，實體店的客流和利潤銳減。中國品牌的對策是大量關(guān)閉實體店，比例較梅西百貨的15%高得多。

據(jù)中國媒體報道，中國內(nèi)地首富王健林旗下購物中心開發(fā)商大連萬達(dá)集團(tuán)去年決定，關(guān)閉90家百貨商店中的40家，幾乎占店面總數(shù)的一半。內(nèi)部人士告訴內(nèi)地媒體，萬達(dá)2007年以后開張的百貨商店都沒盈利。

盡管萬達(dá)開拓網(wǎng)上銷售看來一團(tuán)亂，但其關(guān)閉過氣百貨商店的決策，以及短短幾年內(nèi)將450億美元年銷售額的業(yè)務(wù)重心從房地產(chǎn)轉(zhuǎn)向服務(wù)業(yè)，都可能成為哈佛商學(xué)院的案例。不過，美國企業(yè)的最高領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者似乎不可能如此行事。

中國的初創(chuàng)公司還提供了更多的實例。

中國最大的出行共享平臺滴滴出行起家時只有出租車叫車服務(wù)，但后來滴滴緊隨美國競爭對手優(yōu)步，在中國提供多項類似服務(wù)。后來即便優(yōu)步的人氣越來越高，滴滴出行的市場份額也居高不下。如今滴滴還提供拼車和私人巴士服務(wù)，周五晚上車主飲酒過多無法開車時，也可以通過平臺找到代駕的司機(jī)。滴滴出行之所以能擊敗更強(qiáng)大的美國對手，主要原因是其能及時調(diào)整業(yè)務(wù)，滿足用戶的需求。

另一個例子來自騰訊。騰訊即時通訊應(yīng)用微信面世后，蠶食了其他服務(wù)的市場份額。如今微信目前用戶突破7億。

在許多方面，中國像印度一樣超越了美國。比如，中國的固網(wǎng)電信網(wǎng)絡(luò)并不完善，運營商也不用從固話轉(zhuǎn)向手機(jī)，中國全是手機(jī)生產(chǎn)企業(yè)。萬達(dá)上紀(jì)80年代末才成立，而梅西百貨早在1851年就開了第一家店。

不僅有這些后發(fā)優(yōu)勢，許多中國企業(yè)還克服了所謂創(chuàng)新者的困境。消費者當(dāng)下的需求未來的需求二選一時，很多企業(yè)都清醒地傾向于未來需求。

或許梅西百貨關(guān)店后，能真正放下包袱，斷臂求生。

如果做不到，梅西百貨的衰敗只能怪自己戰(zhàn)略轉(zhuǎn)型過于緩慢。而與此同時，很多中國企業(yè)正在積極應(yīng)變。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

翻譯：Pessy

審校：夏林

Westerners often underestimate how good China’s private businesses are at swiftly adapting to consumer tastes.

That’s why the news of?Macy’s?closing 100 stores, or about 15% of its total, seems tame from a Chinese perspective.

Macy’s relevance, even if it is a most storied department store brand, is fading amid the rise of Amazon.com?and countless Brooklyn-inspired startups peddling online luxury underwear and entire outfits.

A similarly popular Chinese department store chain has faced the dynamics as Macy’s over the past few years. Fewer shoppers and harsh online competition cut into traffic and profits. The Chinese brand responded by slashing a lot more than 15% of its stores

Last year Dalian Wanda Group, the mall developer owned by China’s richest man Wang Jianlin, decided to close almost half of the department stores it ran inside its larger malls, shuttering 40 of 90 locations, according to Chinese?media reports. Insiders told the Chinese press that Wanda’s department stores opened after 2007 had never made a profit.

Although its push into online shopping?looks like a mess, Wanda’s decision to close outdated department stores—along with?flipping its $45-billion-annual-sales business?from a real estate focus to services over a few short years—is the kind of decisive act that might be praised in the halls of Harvard Business School but seems near impossible for a U.S. CEO to make.

China’s startups offer more examples.

Didi Chuxing, the ridesharing leader in China, quickly came up with multiples of the services Uber offered in China after starting as a simple taxi-hailing service. These new offerings kept Didi’s market share elevated despite Uber’s rising popularity. Now Didi’s platform offers ridesharing, private buses, and even Friday night chauffeurs who drive your own car if you’ve had too much to drink. Didi’s transformation to keep up with user demands is a chief reason the startup beat its more powerful American rival.

In another example, Tencent?cannibalized its other services when it released its messaging app WeChat. WeChat now has 700-million-plus users.

In many ways, China, like India, has simply leapfrogged the U.S. It never had a network of fixed-line telephones, for instance, nor phone operators who needed to adapt to cellphones; it just had cellphone companies. Wanda’s history traces back to the late 1980s, while Macy’s first store dates to 1851.

Even with those advantages, many Chinese companies have still overcome the so-called Innovator’s Dilemma. When faced with meeting its consumers needs now or their needs in the future, many have been able to choose the future.

Maybe Macy’s pulls itself out of a spiral of growing irrelevance.

If it doesn’t, its downfall will almost certainly be blamed on moving too slowly in a new direction—something many of China’s private companies don’t fear.