2014年12月，美國第二巡回上訴法院裁定，原對沖基金交易員托德·紐曼的有罪判決無效。此次裁定震動了美國的法律界，同時它也再次說明了美國法律對內(nèi)幕交易的界定有多么不直觀。

對于此次裁決，曼哈頓最高檢察官普里特·巴拉拉已經(jīng)遞交了法律文書表示抗議，稱第二巡回上訴法院的此次裁決將“極大限制政府對一些最常見、最應(yīng)受譴責(zé)以及對市場危害最大的內(nèi)幕交易的檢舉能力?！薄目棺h目前仍然是徒勞的。

由于去年美國最高法院已經(jīng)駁回了政府的申訴申請，因此目前紐曼脫罪已成定局，但圍繞此案引發(fā)的爭議卻仍在發(fā)酵。

今年10月，美國最高法院將審理加利福尼亞州的一起案件，此案又被稱為“巴薩姆·薩爾曼vs美國”案，該案涉及的情節(jié)也和紐曼案差不多。另外，目前還有幾個法案也被引入國會進行討論，它們或?qū)⒂型品诙不胤ㄔ旱呐欣＃ê芏嗯c內(nèi)幕交易有關(guān)的法案已歷經(jīng)多年仍無定論，但如果薩爾曼案的裁決也引用了紐曼案的判例，那么或許某個與內(nèi)幕交易有關(guān)的法案這次可能會獲得國會通過。）

從某些方面來看，紐曼案所引起的爭議并不是什么新鮮事。幾十年來，美國法學(xué)界一直在就內(nèi)幕交易立法的適當(dāng)政策目標(biāo)進行爭論。紐曼案只不過是讓這場爭論再起波瀾而已。

這場爭論歸根結(jié)底，是由于美國對于內(nèi)幕交易尚無一個明確的法律定義。司法部門在審理內(nèi)幕交易案件時只能援引一個關(guān)于禁止證券詐騙的法律，而法官則認為，并非所有泄露重要的非公開信息的行為都能被上升到“詐騙”的層面。

從歷史角度看，美國的自由派（以及美國證券交易委員會）歷來傾向于為所有投資者創(chuàng)造一個公平競爭的環(huán)境，也就是沒人能享有信息優(yōu)勢。而保守派人士則認為，如果分析師們由于努力攫取信息優(yōu)勢而獲得了回報，那么這實際上將有益于市場的發(fā)展，美國最高法院實際上也持此立場。因此，只有當(dāng)交易者依靠竊取的信息或是具有保守義務(wù)者故意泄露的信息進行交易時，才會構(gòu)成內(nèi)幕交易。

如果以這個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來衡量，紐曼的交易行為就處于一個灰色地帶上。他實際上是一個信息的“遠程受領(lǐng)者”。要想明白這個術(shù)語的含義，我們首先需要后退一步，舉個例子進行說明。

如果一名交易員送給一名企業(yè)高管一包現(xiàn)金，以換取對方向其泄露重要的非公開信息，那么這兩位高管（泄密者）和交易員（受領(lǐng)者）都犯有內(nèi)幕交易罪。泄密者違反了他對公司股東的保守義務(wù)，而受領(lǐng)者的罪名則是在泄密者的罪名的基礎(chǔ)上衍生的。

再舉一個更有難度的例子：泄密者沒有接受任何明顯的賄賂。在1983年美國最高法院審理的美國證監(jiān)會vs德克斯一案中，最高法院認為，如果泄密者個人沒有通過泄密獲得任何利益，那么他就沒有犯下詐騙罪，因此也就不能以內(nèi)幕交易罪對其進行處罰。事實上德克斯案也是一樁非常另類的案子：一家保險公司高管將內(nèi)幕信息泄露給了分析師雷蒙德·德克斯，但卻沒有接受任何好處。因為這位高管所透露的信息就是保險公司內(nèi)部存在欺詐行為，他之所以要把信息透出去，目的就是為了揭發(fā)不法行為。

就連審理德克斯一案的法庭也認為，掌握內(nèi)幕信息者如果將信息“贈予”了“一名從事交易相關(guān)工作者或一個朋友”，那么他仍然有可能構(gòu)成內(nèi)幕交易罪，因為在這些情形下，泄密者本人很可能會獲得一些無形的利益。

在紐曼一案中，企業(yè)的內(nèi)幕消息人士將內(nèi)幕消息透露給了一個互相利用的對沖基金分析師的小圈子，這些分析師相互透露了該內(nèi)幕消息，并且將內(nèi)幕消息透露給了包括紐曼在內(nèi)的產(chǎn)品經(jīng)理。該內(nèi)幕消息的最初泄露者并沒有因為透露消息而獲得任何經(jīng)濟利益，不過檢方還是認為，如果援引德克斯案的判例，那么他們依然是有罪的，因為他們通過把消息有意贈予“交易員朋友”而獲得了無形的利益。

第二巡回法院基于兩個理由駁回了檢方的上述觀點：第一，它對德克斯一案的“贈予”二字的語義解釋是非常狹義的——政府甚至宣稱“贈予”內(nèi)幕信息這種說法是“不存在”的。

其次，上訴法院發(fā)現(xiàn)，即使泄密者獲得了某種個人利益，檢方也并未證明紐曼——也就是這位“遠程受領(lǐng)者”，知道自己獲得了這種利益。

法院提出的第二個理由尤其引起了批評人士的強烈反彈。他們抗議稱，這個理由等于是給那些有權(quán)有勢的大人物提供了一把保護傘。以巴拉拉為首的檢察們在向提交給法院的復(fù)議申請書中寫道，這個標(biāo)準(zhǔn)“實質(zhì)上給那些精明的對沖基金經(jīng)理提供了一張貓膩路線圖，他們可以將自己置身內(nèi)幕信息鏈的一端，并且有意不去了解具體是誰透露了保密信息和不當(dāng)披露的信息，從而使自己免除領(lǐng)受者的義務(wù)?！?/p>

對于第二巡回法院的裁決，紐曼的律師只是簡單地引用了“一條歷史悠久的法律原則，即只有當(dāng)被告人認識到了違法事實，他才可能被判處有罪?！?/p>

紐曼雖然勝訴了，但現(xiàn)在美國司法部卻希望薩爾曼案能有一個不同的結(jié)果。司法部表示，紐曼案的判例根本就是“謬誤的”。由于已故大法官斯卡利亞在最高法院的位子尚未被新人接任，因此今年10月的巴薩姆案在裁決時很可能會出現(xiàn)四比四的僵局。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：樸成奎

The ruling by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in December 2014, that overturned the conviction of hedge fund trader Todd Newman has roiled the legal landscape and demonstrated just how nonintuitive the definition of insider trading is.

In response, the office of Manhattan’s top prosecutor, Preet Bharara, has protested through legal filings—so far in vain—that the decision would “dramatically limit the government’s ability to prosecute some of the most common, culpable, and market-threatening forms of insider trading.”

Though Newman’s exoneration is final—last year the Supreme Court rebuffed the government’s request to hear its appeal—the controversies raised by his case rage on.

In October the U.S. Supreme Court will hear a case from California, known as Bassam Salman v. United States, which presents similar issues. Meanwhile, several bills have been introduced in Congress to overturn the Second Circuit’s precedent. (Many bills concerning insider trading have been floated over the years, but if the Salman ruling endorses the decision in Newman’s case, one may actually pass this time.)

The disputes spawned by Newman’s case are, in some respects, not new. They are, rather, the latest permutation of a debate that has been playing out for decades over the proper policy goals of our insider-trading laws.

The arguments stem from the fact that there is no actual statute defining the offense. Instead, the law that is used to prosecute it is a general one prohibiting securities fraud, and judges have decided that not all leaks of material nonpublic information rise to the level of “fraud.”

Historically, liberals (and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) have favored creating a level playing field for all investors, where no one has an informational advantage. Conservatives, on the other hand, have urged—and the Supreme Court has held—that markets actually benefit when analysts are rewarded for digging for informational advantages. As a consequence, only trading on information obtained via theft or by breach of a fiduciary duty can amount to insider trading.

Against this benchmark, Newman’s trading fell into a gray area. He was what’s known as a “remote tippee.” To understand that term, we need to take a step back.

If a trader gives a corporate officer a briefcase full of cash in exchange for material nonpublic information, both the officer (the “tipper”) and the trader (“the tippee”) are guilty of insider trading. The tipper has violated his fiduciary duty to the corporation’s shareholders, while the guilt of the tippee derives from the tipper’s.

A tougher case arises when the tipper doesn’t receive any obvious payment. In the landmark 1983 Supreme Court case SEC v. Dirks, the Supreme Court held that if the tipper receives no personal benefit in exchange for a tip, he hasn’t committed fraud and thus can’t be guilty of insider trading. In that case—a weird one factually—a former officer of an insurance company tipped off analyst Raymond Dirks, without recompense, to the fact that fraud was taking place within the company, apparently in an effort to blow the whistle.

Yet even the Dirks court acknowledged that some “gifts” of information—for example, those to a “trading relative or friend”—could still amount to illegal insider trading because of the intangible benefits that accrue to the tipper in those situations.

In Newman’s case, corporate insiders passed tips to a circle of back-scratching hedge fund analysts, who then passed the tips to each other and then up the line to their portfolio managers—including Newman. The original tippers had received no payments in exchange for passing the information, but prosecutors argued that they were still culpable under Dirks, because they had received intangible benefits from having given gifts of information to “trading friends.”

The Second Circuit rejected the argument for two reasons. First, it gave a very narrow interpretation to Dirks’s language about gifts—one that the government has since claimed interprets the language “out of existence.”

Second, the appeals court found that even if the tipper had received some personal benefit, the prosecution hadn’t proved that Newman—the remote ?tippee—knew he had.

This second hurdle has particularly incensed the ruling’s critics, who protest that it all but immunizes big shots. This standard “provides a virtual road map for savvy hedge-fund managers,” Bharara’s prosecutors wrote in their unsuccessful petition for reconsideration, “to insulate themselves from tippee liability by knowingly placing themselves at the end of a chain of insider information and avoiding learning details about the sources of obvious confidential and improperly disclosed information.”

Newman’s attorneys responded that the Second Circuit had simply applied the “time-?honored principle that a defendant may be criminally convicted only if he knows the facts that render his conduct unlawful.”

Newman’s argument carried the day then. But now the Justice Department is hoping for a do-over courtesy of the Supreme Court in the Salman case, in which it’s arguing that the Newman precedent was simply “erroneous.” Given that the late Justice Scalia hasn’t yet been replaced on the court, however, there’s a good chance of a 4–4 stalemate ruling.