2016年11月10日，北京，一名報亭老板在印有特朗普照片的報紙上接過一張百元人民幣鈔票。

特朗普今天就要宣誓就職了，在特朗普團(tuán)隊可能出臺的許多顛覆性政策中，與中國的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)也是一種可能。有些人仍然希望特朗普政府中的實用主義者能平息那些反對中國的聲音，然而特朗普指定的下一任國務(wù)卿候選人、前?？松綜EO雷克斯·蒂勒森日前的一番言論，可能要打消這些人的幻想了。

在上周的新任國務(wù)卿提名聽證會上，蒂勒森雖然在對俄羅斯的政策上閃爍其辭，卻強(qiáng)硬抨擊了中國的貿(mào)易政策。一旦蒂納爾森的提名獲得通過，他將在新一屆美國政府的對華政策中扮演舉足輕重的角色，因此他的態(tài)度也表明，如果特朗普真的要不惜代價對華發(fā)動貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，他是不會出力阻攔的。

特朗普深知，如果中美之間真的爆發(fā)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)，美國將是相對強(qiáng)勢的一方。因為美國對對外貿(mào)易的依存度要低于中國。2015年，美國的對外貿(mào)易約占GDP的28%，而中國的這一比例則達(dá)到了41%。另外，中國對美國的出口額也遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)高于美國對中國的出口。2015年，美國對華的出口總額約為1160億美元，而中國對美國的出口額則要高出三倍，達(dá)到4830億美元。最重要的是，美國目前基本實現(xiàn)了充分就業(yè)和低通脹，且金融系統(tǒng)處于比較健康的水平，美國經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)恢復(fù)到2008年金融危機(jī)以來最強(qiáng)勢的水平。而中國經(jīng)濟(jì)則受到大量不良債務(wù)和產(chǎn)能過剩、資本外流等問題的影響。

首先要強(qiáng)調(diào)的是，我們并不知道特朗普究竟只是說說還是要來真的。但如果他以為中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人不會展開反制，或者是即便展開了反制也不會令美國傷筋動骨，那他就打錯如意算盤了。從政治上看，中國國家主席領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人也向特朗普一樣，一貫展示出一位強(qiáng)勢領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人的形象，并表示其使命是帶領(lǐng)中國實現(xiàn)中華民族的偉大復(fù)興，所以他不可能接受在國際沖突中示弱的后果。從經(jīng)濟(jì)上看，雖然中國可能會在中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中受到很大損害，但作為全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體，它依然有能力向美國打出強(qiáng)有力的反擊。

在可能發(fā)生的中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)中，如果特朗普搶先發(fā)難，中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人十有八九會果斷接招，向那些比較脆弱的美國企業(yè)和部門采取行動，同時出臺反制戰(zhàn)略，將對中國的影響降至最低，而把對美國的痛苦放到最大。

中國政府打出的第一套組合拳將是一些能夠打擊到美國卻不會傷及自身的策略。比如取消與波音簽訂的飛機(jī)訂單（2015年，中國一國就占據(jù)了波音全球銷量的12%），這不會給中國造成任何不好的影響，因為波音在中國幾乎沒有雇傭任何工人，而且中國也可以轉(zhuǎn)向空客公司購買飛機(jī)。另外，砍掉從美國進(jìn)口的小麥、大豆和其它農(nóng)產(chǎn)品也不會給中國造成多大的問題，因為中國總是可以向其他產(chǎn)糧大國（如加拿大、巴西和阿根廷等國）購買。

限制中國的對美投資也是中國可以采取的一個反制戰(zhàn)略。據(jù)美國咨詢機(jī)構(gòu)榮鼎集團(tuán)統(tǒng)計，2015年，中資企業(yè)在美投資總額已達(dá)456億美元。削減這些投資不僅會傷害美國經(jīng)濟(jì)，也有益于中國減緩資本外流的速度。

美國在服務(wù)貿(mào)易領(lǐng)域?qū)χ袊拇罅宽槻睿?015年為333億美元）也很可能成為中國的反制目標(biāo)。在美國對華出口的服務(wù)貿(mào)易中，中國游客的消費貢獻(xiàn)了其中的大頭（2014年，有180萬名中國游客赴美觀光，為美國GDP貢獻(xiàn)了210億美元的產(chǎn)值）。只要減少中國游客赴美旅游，就能給特朗普傳達(dá)一個膽確的信號，同時也有助于縮小外匯的流失。

當(dāng)然，中國也有很多其他措施可以采用。只不過這些措施的吸引力不像前面幾種那么多，因為它們所鎖定的美國目標(biāo)雖然在面臨中國的反擊手段時非常脆弱，但它們卻在中國雇傭了大量員工，比如說蘋果公司（中國市場占蘋果全球市場的四分之一，同時蘋果也間接地通過富士康在中國境內(nèi)雇傭了幾十萬名工人）、通用汽車和沃爾瑪?shù)鹊?。它們也可能會登上中國政府的反制名單，但中國領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人不太可能把它們列入第一輪制裁名單，除非中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)升級到了更激烈的程度。

不知道特朗普和他的貿(mào)易顧問們是否認(rèn)真考慮過中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)的后果和目標(biāo)。不過有一點是清楚的——中美貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)并不能改善特朗普的核心支持者（即沒有受過大學(xué)教育的制造業(yè)工人）的生活處境，因為那些被特朗普征收了懲罰性關(guān)稅的企業(yè)，只會將生產(chǎn)線轉(zhuǎn)移至亞洲的其他國家。而更嚴(yán)重的惡果是，中美兩國將面臨雙輸?shù)木置?。如果這樣一場毫無意義的、自殘式的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)真的打響了，誰輸?shù)酶鼞K對于工作和生活都遭受了巨大影響的美國人民來說，真的沒有什么意義。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

本文作者裴敏欣是克萊蒙特麥肯納學(xué)院的政府學(xué)教授。

譯者：樸成奎

A vendor picks up a 100 yuan note above a newspaper featuring a photo of US president-elect Donald Trump, at a newsstand in Beijing on November 10, 2016.

As Donald Trump is sworn into office today, among many of the possible disruptive initiatives his administration may launch is a trade war with China. Some may still harbor hopes that pragmatists in his administration could counterbalance the anti-trade China hawks, but former Exxon CEO Rex Tillerson, Trump’s pick for the Secretary of State, should dispel such illusions.

During his confirmation hearings last week, Tillerson took a hardline on China over its trade practices, even as he prevaricated on Russia. Since Tillerson would play a key role in determining policy toward Beijing if he is confirmed, his remarks suggest that he would not stand in the way if Trump wants to launch a costly trade war with China.

Trump knows that the U.S. is in a stronger position than China, since America is much less dependent on trade than China (total foreign trade is equivalent of 28% of GDP for the U.S. in 2015 while it is 41% of GDP for China). In addition, China sells far more to the U.S. than the other way around. In 2015, U.S. exports to China totaled $116 billion while Chinese exports to the U.S. were more than triple that at $483 billion. Most importantly, with full employment, low inflation, and a healthy financial system, the U.S. economy is at its strongest since the financial crisis of 2008. The Chinese economy, by comparison, is weighed down by a mountain of bad debt, overcapacity, and capital flight.

To be sure, we have no idea what Trump might actually do. But he would be wrong to assume that Chinese leaders will not push back or that their actions would not amount to much. Politically, China’s President Xi Jinping, has portrayed himself, just like Trump, as a strong leader whose mission is to make China great again. He cannot afford to appear to be a weakling. Economically, China may be highly vulnerable and will suffer worse consequences than the U.S. in a trade war, but as the world’s second-largest economy, it can still deliver a powerful counter punch.

In all likelihood, Chinese leaders will respond to the actions taken by Trump by targeting vulnerable American firms and sectors and following a strategy that minimizes costs to China while maximizing pain to the U.S.

The first set of actions would be those that would hurt the U.S. without harming China. For example, canceling orders of Boeing aircraft (China accounts for nearly 12 percent of Boeing’s sales in 2015) will have no adverse impact since Boeing employs few workers in China and Beijing can buy from Airbus. Cutting the imports of American wheat, soybeans, and other agricultural products will not cause starvation in China because there are alternative producers (Canada, Brazil, and Argentina).

Restricting Chinese investments in the U.S. is another retaliatory measure attractive to Beijing. According to the Rhodium Group, an American consulting firm, Chinese companies invested $45.6 billion in the U.S. in 2015. Curtailing such investments would not only hurt the American economy, but also help Beijing slow down capital outflows.

Since the U.S. runs a large surplus in its exports of services to China, $33.3 billion in 2015, Beijing would be highly tempted to single out this sector for retaliation as well. In terms of U.S. services exported to China, the bulk consists of Chinese tourists dollars (1.8 million Chinese tourists visited the U.S. in 2014 and spent $21 billion). Cutting down America-bound Chinese tourists can both send Trump a message and help plug the leakage of precious foreign currency.

There are, of course, other options available to Beijing. But these measures are less attractive because these American targets, vulnerable as they are, all employ large numbers of workers in China. They include Apple (which relies on China for a quarter of its iPhone sales but also indirectly employs hundreds of thousands of workers in China through its contract manufacturer, Foxxcon). GM and Wal-Mart also belong in the same category. They may be on Beijing’s target list, but Chinese leaders are less likely to go after them first unless their trade war with Trump escalates to a more vicious level.

It is unclear whether Trump and his trade advisers have thought through the consequences and objectives of a trade war with China. What is clear is that such a war will do little to help Trump’s core supporters (manufacturing workers without college education) because companies hit with Trump’s punitive tariffs will simply move their production facilities to other countries in Asia. Worse still, both China and the U.S. will lose – the idea that China will lose more than the U.S. is no consolation for those whose lives and jobs are upended in a totally needless and self-destructive trade war.

Minxin Pei is a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College.