當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普在就職典禮籌委會(huì)主席全球晚宴上發(fā)表講話，2017年1月17日（周二），華盛頓。

當(dāng)選總統(tǒng)唐納德·特朗普就行使權(quán)力表達(dá)了近乎獨(dú)裁的觀點(diǎn)，這讓許多人擔(dān)心他會(huì)玩弄保護(hù)美國(guó)人自由的法律。9.11之后，美國(guó)就領(lǐng)教過(guò)這樣的行為方式——小布什總統(tǒng)宣稱(chēng)自己在保衛(wèi)國(guó)家時(shí)不受法規(guī)和條約約束。貝拉克·奧巴馬總統(tǒng)反對(duì)這種觀點(diǎn)，他說(shuō)和所有人一樣，總統(tǒng)也得遵守法律。

但奧巴馬這份值得稱(chēng)道的遺產(chǎn)也有另外一面。除了刑訊逼供這個(gè)顯而易見(jiàn)的例外，奧巴馬在恢復(fù)法制的過(guò)程中其實(shí)并沒(méi)有和小布什格外寬廣的權(quán)力視野劃清界限。相反，奧巴馬想鞏固其法律根基，有時(shí)是在國(guó)會(huì)或法院的幫助下，有時(shí)則僅僅闡明了政府行為的法律依據(jù)。

實(shí)際情況或許會(huì)證明，這樣的選擇有著決定性的影響。奧巴馬用法律認(rèn)可了一些小布什主張的最令人窒息的權(quán)力，矛盾的是，這可能降低了特朗普濫用這些權(quán)力的難度。這種風(fēng)險(xiǎn)在以下四個(gè)方面尤其突出：

監(jiān)聽(tīng)

美國(guó)國(guó)家安全局未經(jīng)授權(quán)的監(jiān)聽(tīng)活動(dòng)是小布什政府最大的丑聞之一。但美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)非但沒(méi)有反對(duì)這項(xiàng)違法活動(dòng)，甚至還從根本上使之合法化。《外國(guó)情報(bào)監(jiān)視法》（FISA）2008年修正案允許國(guó)安局在未經(jīng)授權(quán)的情況下收集美國(guó)人和外國(guó)人之間的通信資料，前提是國(guó)安局證明監(jiān)聽(tīng)目標(biāo)是外國(guó)人（不需要證明其存在不當(dāng)行為），而不是美國(guó)人。

任參議員時(shí)，奧巴馬對(duì)這項(xiàng)法案投了贊成票；當(dāng)了總統(tǒng)后，他支持讓該法案再次生效。2011年，奧巴馬政府極大的擴(kuò)展了此項(xiàng)法案的覆蓋范圍——經(jīng)秘密的FISA法院批準(zhǔn)，美國(guó)聯(lián)邦調(diào)查局（FBI）探員可以在國(guó)安局收集的通信資料中搜索美國(guó)人的信息。

這次“后門(mén)搜索”授權(quán)可能讓特朗普掌握監(jiān)聽(tīng)無(wú)辜美國(guó)人的工具。他會(huì)怎樣使用這樣的工具呢？特朗普曾明確呼吁加強(qiáng)對(duì)穆斯林社區(qū)的監(jiān)視。此外，他從不隱藏自己對(duì)政治對(duì)手的不滿，他的代理人還質(zhì)疑過(guò)和平政治抗議的合法性。人們或許很容易就能想象出特朗普治下的FBI在國(guó)安局的大量數(shù)據(jù)中挖掘信息的情景，而這些信息會(huì)被用于對(duì)付少數(shù)族裔、持不同政見(jiàn)者以及他自己的仇家。

無(wú)限期扣留

小布什政府率先在關(guān)塔那摩采取了未經(jīng)審訊就無(wú)限期扣留恐怖嫌疑分子的做法。小布什宣稱(chēng)憲法本來(lái)就授權(quán)了這樣的扣留，奧巴馬沒(méi)有采納他的說(shuō)法，而且承諾要關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄。但奧巴馬沒(méi)有否認(rèn)基于極寬松標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來(lái)無(wú)限期扣留“敵方戰(zhàn)斗人員”的權(quán)力。對(duì)于被扣留者要求獲釋的案件，奧巴馬持反對(duì)態(tài)度，他說(shuō)2001年《軍事力量使用授權(quán)》（AUMF）是關(guān)押這些人員的法律依據(jù)。

由于未能關(guān)閉關(guān)塔那摩監(jiān)獄，奧巴馬為無(wú)限期扣留所找的法律依據(jù)現(xiàn)在有可能為特朗普再次把人送進(jìn)關(guān)塔那摩的計(jì)劃開(kāi)綠燈。雖然AUMF只針對(duì)參與9.11的人員和團(tuán)體，但“敵方戰(zhàn)斗人員”的寬泛定義得到了奧巴馬治下司法部的支持，也得到了法院認(rèn)可，這給了特朗普巨大的自由空間。被他關(guān)起來(lái)的可能不光是外國(guó)的基地組織或塔利班武裝人員，還可能包括被指“支持”各色國(guó)際恐怖組織的美國(guó)人。

定點(diǎn)清除

小布什政府用無(wú)人機(jī)消滅海外敵對(duì)勢(shì)力嫌疑成員時(shí)沒(méi)有公布相關(guān)法律程序或依據(jù)。奧巴馬政府雖然極大地?cái)U(kuò)展了無(wú)人機(jī)的使用范圍，但也建立了錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的內(nèi)部審查體系，并且起草了支持此類(lèi)行動(dòng)的法律備忘錄。然而，特朗普有可能徹底拋棄這個(gè)審核程序。至于奧巴馬政府的法律解析，有學(xué)者批評(píng)說(shuō)這樣做扭曲了國(guó)內(nèi)和國(guó)際法律。

按照奧巴馬政府的法律解釋?zhuān)乩势諏?duì)無(wú)人機(jī)的使用就不會(huì)限于仍在交戰(zhàn)的地區(qū)，而且目標(biāo)或許會(huì)包括美國(guó)公民——奧巴馬時(shí)期已經(jīng)有了先例。雖然只有帶來(lái)“迫切威脅”而且逮捕方案“不可行”的美國(guó)人才有可能成為目標(biāo)，但或許基于目標(biāo)參與恐怖活動(dòng)的程度就可以將其視為迫切威脅，而且如果逮捕具有“過(guò)大”安全風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，就可能認(rèn)為逮捕方案不可行。

這些解釋可能讓特朗普拿到對(duì)美國(guó)人使用致命武力的特別許可證。奧巴馬顯然沒(méi)有大量使用這張?jiān)S可證，但特朗普會(huì)不會(huì)像他一樣自律還非常不明朗。

《反間諜法》指控

小布什政府用過(guò)《反間諜法》，后者旨在懲罰間諜和叛徒，同時(shí)威懾并在某些情況下起訴向媒體泄露國(guó)家安全事務(wù)的政府雇員。讓許多人感到意外的是，奧巴馬政府在這方面變本加厲——它提起的泄密訴訟超過(guò)了此前歷屆政府的總和，而且在其中的幾起案件中，被告是為了曝光濫用權(quán)力的行為；同時(shí)，奧巴馬政府還讓這種不尋常的法律手段常態(tài)化。

此外，在獲取?？怂剐侣?dòng)浾哒材匪埂ち_森的電子郵件以確定泄密源頭的過(guò)程中，奧巴馬治下的司法部采取了前所未有的行動(dòng)，那就是指控羅森密謀違反《反間諜法》。雖然司法部后來(lái)表示絕沒(méi)有打算用法律來(lái)對(duì)付新聞?dòng)浾?，但它的做法為指控那些曝光政府不?dāng)行為的記者打開(kāi)了大門(mén)。

特朗普對(duì)媒體的敵意眾所周知，人們有充足的理由擔(dān)心他可能會(huì)闖進(jìn)這扇大門(mén)，小布什和奧巴馬為《反間諜法》配備的寬廣視角以及法院對(duì)此的認(rèn)可則會(huì)為特朗普鋪平道路。

有風(fēng)險(xiǎn)的賭博

上述事例的教訓(xùn)顯而易見(jiàn)。小布什政府對(duì)行使權(quán)力的看法很危險(xiǎn)，這不光是因?yàn)樗麄冊(cè)噲D為明顯違法的行為辯護(hù)，還因?yàn)樗麄冑澇砂研惺勾髾?quán)置于公民的生命和自由之上。從法律上認(rèn)可這些權(quán)力時(shí)，奧巴馬政府、國(guó)會(huì)和法院都相信總統(tǒng)可以明智地予以使用。這樣的賭博存在風(fēng)險(xiǎn)。

今后，只問(wèn)特朗普是否守法還不夠，我們還得問(wèn)問(wèn)他對(duì)自己繼承的這些無(wú)上權(quán)力的使用是否符合我們的權(quán)力、自由和價(jià)值。在后9.11時(shí)代占據(jù)上風(fēng)的權(quán)力使用觀點(diǎn)影響深遠(yuǎn)，我們則必須啟動(dòng)一項(xiàng)早就應(yīng)該開(kāi)始的審查，看一看在特朗普政府及其后繼者治下，這種觀點(diǎn)能否竭誠(chéng)服務(wù)于我們的憲政民主。

作者伊麗莎白·戈伊坦是紐約大學(xué)法學(xué)院布倫南司法研究中心自由和國(guó)家安全項(xiàng)目聯(lián)合負(fù)責(zé)人。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Charlie

President-elect Donald Trump speaks during the presidential inaugural Chairman's Global Dinner, Tuesday, Jan. 17, 2017, in Washington.

President-elect Donald Trump has expressed a near-autocratic view of executive authority, leading many to worry that he will play fast and loose with the laws that protect Americans’ freedoms. After 9/11, USA had a taste of this approach, as President George W. Bush claimed he was not bound by statutes or treaties when acting to protect the nation. President Barack Obama rejected that view, maintaining that the president, like everyone else, must obey the law.

But there is another side to this admirable aspect of Obama’s legacy. With the notable exception of torture, in restoring the rule of law, he did not actually renounce Bush’s extraordinarily broad vision of executive power. Instead, Obama sought to put it on firmer legal footing—sometimes with help from Congress or the courts, sometimes simply by articulating a legal justification for government actions.

This choice may prove to have fateful consequences. By buttressing with legal authority some of the most breathtaking powers asserted under Bush, Obama paradoxically may have made it easier for Trump to abuse them. This risk will be particularly acute in the following four areas:

Surveillance

The National Security Agency’s (NSA) warrantless wiretapping program was one of the Bush administration’s greatest scandals. Yet instead of decrying this lawless conduct, Congress essentially legalized it. The FISA (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act) Amendments Act of 2008 allows the NSA to collect communications between Americans and foreigners without a warrant, as long as the agency certifies that the foreigner—not the American—is the “target” of the surveillance (a designation requiring no showing of wrongdoing).

As a senator, Obama voted for the law, and as president, he supported its reauthorization. In 2011, his administration greatly expanded its reach by obtaining permission from the secret FISA Court for FBI agents to search the communications collected by the NSA for information about Americans.

This “backdoor search” authority gives Trump a potent tool for surveillance of innocent Americans. How might he use it? Trump has expressly called for more surveillance of Muslim communities. Moreover, he makes no secret of his grudges against political opponents, and his surrogates have questioned the legitimacy of peaceful political protests. One could easily imagine a Trump FBI mining the NSA’s massive data haul for information to use against vulnerable minorities, political dissidents, and personal enemies.

Indefinite detention

The Bush administration initiated the indefinite detention without trial of terrorist suspects at Guantánamo Bay. Obama abandoned Bush’s claim that the Constitution inherently authorized such detention, and he pledged to close the facility. But he did not disclaim the authority to hold people indefinitely as “enemy combatants” based on extremely loose criteria. He opposed lawsuits by detainees seeking release, citing the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) as legal justification for their imprisonment.

Having failed to close Guantánamo, Obama’s legal defense of indefinite detention could now serve as a green light for Trump’s plan to repopulate the prison. The broad definition of “enemy combatant” espoused by Obama’s Justice Department and endorsed by the courts—notwithstanding the AUMF’s narrow focus on people and groups involved in the 9/11 attacks— gives Trump enormous leeway. He could potentially imprison not merely foreign Al Qaeda or Taliban fighters, but Americans who are deemed to “support” a wide array of international terrorist groups.

Targeted killings

The Bush administration employed drones to kill suspected members of enemy forces overseas without disclosing its legal process or justification. The Obama administration, while vastly expanding the use of drones, created an intricate system of internal review and crafted legal memoranda to support the practice. But Trump could abandon this review process altogether. As for the Obama administration’s legal analysis, scholars have criticized it for distorting domestic and international law.

Under the Obama administration’s legal interpretation, Trump’s use of drones will not be constrained to active theaters of war. His targets may include American citizens—a precedent set under Obama. Although Americans may be targeted only if they pose an “imminent” threat and capture is “infeasible,” an imminent threat may be assumed based on the target’s level of involvement with terrorism, and capture may be deemed infeasible if it would pose “undue” safety risks.

These interpretations could give Trump extraordinary license to use lethal force against Americans. Obama appears not to have made extensive use of that license. It is far from clear that Trump will exercise the same self-restraint.

Espionage Act prosecutions

The Bush administration used the Espionage Act, a law intended to punish spies and traitors, to intimidate and occasionally prosecute government employees who leaked information about national security matters to the media. To the surprise of many, the Obama administration doubled down on this practice, prosecuting more media leak cases than all former administrations combined—including several cases in which the defendants had sought to blow the whistle on executive abuses of power—and normalizing this unorthodox use of the law.

Moreover, in seeking access to Fox News reporter James Rosen’s e-mails to determine the source of leaks, Obama’s Justice Department did something unprecedented: It accused Rosen of conspiring to violate the Espionage Act. Although the department later renounced any intent to use the law against journalists, its actions opened the door to the prosecution of reporters who disclose leaked information about government misconduct.

There is ample reason to fear that Trump, who is openly hostile toward the media, will charge through that door. The expansive view of the Espionage Act put forward by Bush and Obama and endorsed by the courts will smooth his path.

A risky gamble

A clear lesson emerges from these examples. The Bush administration’s views of executive authority were dangerous, not only because they purported to justify conduct that was plainly illegal, but because they countenanced the exercise of enormous powers over the lives and freedoms of citizens. In giving these powers legal sanction, the Obama administration, Congress, and the courts were trusting that presidents would exercise them wisely. That was a risky gamble.

Going forward, it is not enough to ask whether Trump is obeying the law. We must also ask whether he is exercising the formidable authorities he will inherit in a manner that is consistent with our rights, liberties, and values. And we must begin a long overdue examination of whether the far-reaching view of executive power that has triumphed in the post-9/11 era will best serve our constitutional democracy under the Trump administration and administrations to come.

Elizabeth Goitein is the co-director of the Liberty and National Security program at the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law.