上任總統(tǒng)的頭兩周，唐納德·特朗普就與美國的許多貿(mào)易伙伴產(chǎn)生了摩擦——他譴責(zé)日本最大的汽車制造商在墨西哥建廠，恐嚇沒有管住“壞人”的墨西哥總統(tǒng)，欺侮澳大利亞總理，并任由其首席貿(mào)易顧問抨擊德國操作貨幣——全球的權(quán)威人士都把他稱作“瓷器店里的公?！?。不過這個形容也不太恰當(dāng)。迄今為止，還有一個國家沒有成為特朗普的攻擊目標(biāo)，那就是中國。

這樣的克制，無論是巧合還是刻意，看起來都不會持續(xù)太久。特朗普針對中國的冗長演說——維持低價貨幣，瘋狂出口商品，“竊取”美國工作——是他競選時的重要砝碼。然而，他自己或許也知道，中國可不好欺負(fù)。

原因之一在于中國是戰(zhàn)略對手，而不是盟友，因此他們未必愿意原諒特朗普無禮的電話或讓人惱火的推文。而且，中國的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人就像特朗普本身一樣，難以預(yù)測而且敏感，十分要“面子”。不過向中國挑釁的真正難點在于，中國與美國的經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系比其他任何國家都更重要、更復(fù)雜。

中美合作關(guān)系之錯綜復(fù)雜，怎么夸張形容或許都不為過。歷史學(xué)家尼爾·弗格森有過一個著名的說法：兩個國家是如此的相互依存，以至于可以把他們看作一個整體，他將之稱作“中美國”（Chimerica）。中國擁有1.1萬億美元的美國國債，僅次于日本，是美國第二大貸方。中國是美國的最大合作伙伴，每年商品和服務(wù)的貿(mào)易額高達(dá)6,630億美元，也是美國的第三大出口市場。據(jù)估計，如果算上美國公司在中國子公司的銷量，以及美國產(chǎn)品經(jīng)過香港到中國再出口的銷量，美國對中國的出口額將達(dá)到4,000億美元。去年，通用汽車（General Motors）在中國賣出了390萬輛汽車，比在美國本土市場還多25%以上。中國如今擁有超過1,300萬iPhone用戶，也是蘋果（Apple）除美國之外的最大市場。

當(dāng)然，論起軍事實力和經(jīng)濟(jì)總量，美國都遠(yuǎn)超中國。不過貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)一旦打響，就很難控制，如果全球最大的兩個經(jīng)濟(jì)體進(jìn)入了互相傷害的經(jīng)濟(jì)對峙狀態(tài)，那么真正的問題就不再是誰GDP更多，而是誰承受傷害的能力更強(qiáng)。理論上，特朗普可以對中國進(jìn)口的產(chǎn)品征收高關(guān)稅。而中國政府反制的手段可能包括驅(qū)逐波音（Boeing），后者本有望接下來20年內(nèi)在中國規(guī)模1萬億美元的飛機(jī)市場占據(jù)至少一半份額。中國還可以壓榨福特、高通、沃爾瑪和星巴克（Starbucks）等大批美國公司。針對中國的強(qiáng)硬政策或許無法踐行他那《交易的藝術(shù)》（The Art of the Deal），而更可能變成“尖叫的藝術(shù)”（The Art of the Squeal）。

在拭目以待特朗普的中國政策期間，你可以讀讀一篇有趣的文章，從而更好地了解中美經(jīng)濟(jì)關(guān)系的復(fù)雜性。文章作者是駐中國的資深記者布魯克·拉莫爾，他詳細(xì)分析了中國對美國可能最重要的出口品：學(xué)生。美國高校每年招收的大約100萬國際學(xué)生中，有30萬來自中國，這也讓他們成為了最大的外國群體。布魯克的最新文章則試圖搞清楚，為什么被稱作“降落傘一代”的中國高中學(xué)生數(shù)量會迅速增長。相互依存，是這篇文章的核心思想之一。中國學(xué)生因為來到美國，學(xué)習(xí)英語，準(zhǔn)備申請美國大學(xué)而受益。這些地方也因為這些空降的孩子得到好處，中國人的錢讓學(xué)校有了更多資金，還產(chǎn)生了許多涓流效應(yīng)。

不過布魯克也發(fā)現(xiàn)了浪潮里的眾生百態(tài)：中國學(xué)生希望逃離國內(nèi)殘酷的考試系統(tǒng)；經(jīng)紀(jì)人發(fā)現(xiàn)了同胞的這種愿望并以此獲取豐厚利益；來到美國后這些學(xué)生產(chǎn)生了疏離感。文章指出，許多學(xué)生并未在美國得到新的認(rèn)可與欣賞，而是返回了中國，他們對美國多了一份警惕，同時對中國人的身份有了更強(qiáng)的認(rèn)同感。對于全球化悖論，以及讓國家和文化緊密結(jié)合在一起的強(qiáng)大力量為何最終反而讓我們漸行漸遠(yuǎn)，這堪稱一份經(jīng)典研究。(財富中文網(wǎng))

作者：Clya Chandler

譯者：嚴(yán)匡正

In first two weeks as president, Donald Trump locked horns with so many U.S. trade partners—denouncing Japan's biggest car maker for building factories in Mexico, hectoring Mexico’s president for failing to stand up to "bad hombres," browbeating Australian prime minister and allowing his top trade advisor to slam Germany as a currency manipulator—that pundits the world over are calling him a "bull in the china shop." But the cliché is inapt. So far, the one country President Trump has avoided charging at is China.

Such forbearance, whether by accident or design, seems unlikely to last. Trump's screeds against China—for cheapening its currency, stoking its export machine and "stealing" American jobs—were a centerpiece of his campaign. And yet, as Trump himself probably knows, China won't be easy to bully.

That is so partly because China is a strategic rival, not an ally, and thus less willing forgive a rude phone call or testy Tweet, and because China's leaders, like Trump himself, are unpredictable, thin-skinned and obsessed with matters of "face." But the real difficulty in taking on China lies in the fact that China’s economic relationship with the U.S. is at once more important and more complicated than that of any other nation.

It's hard to overstate how tangled the U.S.–China partnership has become. Historian Niall Ferguson has famously suggested the two countries are so inter-dependent that they should be thought of as a single creature; he calls it "Chimerica." China owns $1.1 trillion of U.S. government debt, ranking just behind Japan as America's largest foreign creditor. China is America's largest trading partner, with annual trade in goods and services worth $663 billion, and its third-largest export market. By one estimate, if sales by U.S. foreign affiliates in China and re-exports of U.S. products through Hong Kong to China are factored in, U.S. exports to China total $400 billion. Last year General Motors sold 3.9 million vehicles in China, more than 25% more than it sold in the U.S. China now has more than 130 million iPhone users, making it larger market for Apple than the United States.

The U.S. far outweighs China in military firepower and economic output, of course. But trade wars, once begun, aren't easily controlled and if the world's two largest economies get into a mutually destructive economic confrontation, the real question won't be who has the biggest GDP, but which country has the highest threshold for pain. In theory, Trump could slap high taxes on Chinese imports. Beijing's countermoves could include shutting out Boeing, which is hoping to claim at least half of China's estimated $1 trillion market for airplanes over the next 20 years. China could put the squeeze on host of other U.S. companies including Ford, Qualcomm, Walmart, Starbucks. The risk for Trump is that, with China, his get-tough approach could start to look less like The Art of the Deal and more like "The Art of the Squeal."

As we wait for Trump's China policy to take shape, you can get a good idea of the complexities of the U.S.–China economic relationship by reading this fascinating article by veteran China correspondent Brook Larmar, who takes a detailed look at what may be China's most important U.S. export: students. Chinese students now account for about 300,000 of the roughly 1 million foreign students enrolled in American colleges, making them by far the biggest foreign group. Brook's latest piece tries to understand why the number of Chinese high school students, part of what some call the "parachute generation," has also grown so rapidly. Interdependence is one of the article's main themes. The Chinese students benefit from coming to America, learning English and preparing for U.S. universities. But the communities into which these kids parachute benefit too, from Chinese money that funds schools and has many trickle-down benefits.

But Brook captures the many human dynamics of the surge: the yearning of Chinese students to escape the rigors of their own brutal examination system; the Chinese brokers who exploit the desires of their countrymen for hefty profit; and the sense of alienation students feel after coming to America. The piece notes that ultimately, rather than gaining a new understanding and appreciation for the United States, many students who come to America to study return with a new wariness of America, and stronger sense of identity as Chinese. It's a classic study in the paradox in globalization, and how sweeping forces that should be bring us countries and cultures together often wind up just pushing us all apart.