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Airbnb與Uber,誰(shuí)更強(qiáng)?

Airbnb與Uber,誰(shuí)更強(qiáng)?

Deepak Ravichandran、Jeff Lu、Roger Lee 2017-03-20
Uber將面臨持續(xù)的全球性競(jìng)爭(zhēng),Airbnb則有可能以相對(duì)壟斷的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)。

2017年年初以來(lái),公關(guān)問(wèn)題一直讓叫車服務(wù)提供商Uber頭疼不已,而這只是一種溫和的說(shuō)法。從網(wǎng)上的卸載Uber運(yùn)動(dòng),到數(shù)量猛增的性騷擾索賠,再到該公司躲避執(zhí)法調(diào)查的Greyball軟件遭曝光,Uber發(fā)現(xiàn)自己一反常態(tài)地不穩(wěn)定。同時(shí),受到批評(píng)的不光是Uber的文化。泄露的財(cái)務(wù)信息顯示,該公司2016年虧損高達(dá)30億美元,這體現(xiàn)出了Uber在美國(guó)以及海外叫車服務(wù)市場(chǎng)遇到的困難。

盡管如此,Uber仍是互聯(lián)網(wǎng)上最大的交易場(chǎng)所之一,而且就其規(guī)模和成熟度將要觸及的拐點(diǎn)而言,大多數(shù)處于這種狀態(tài)的公司都會(huì)在2018年上市。

有意思的是,Airbnb有可能沿著類似路徑前進(jìn),但這兩家在按需經(jīng)濟(jì)中取得了驚人進(jìn)展的年輕公司可能有著天壤之別。

2008年成立以來(lái),Airbnb的成長(zhǎng)一直都沒(méi)遇上什么真正的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。隨著一間間新的房屋加入Airbnb平臺(tái),對(duì)初來(lái)乍到的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手來(lái)說(shuō),成長(zhǎng)和從前者手中奪取市場(chǎng)份額的難度已經(jīng)顯著增大。2011年至今,Airbnb的地位一直沒(méi)有受到過(guò)真正的挑戰(zhàn)。在這一年,Airbnb完成了B輪融資,最接近它的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手HomeAway則首發(fā)上市。

與之相反,雖然Uber在叫車軟件領(lǐng)域處于主導(dǎo)位置,但在它進(jìn)入的所有主要市場(chǎng)中,Uber實(shí)際上都面臨著激烈競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。在美國(guó),Lyft仍和Uber齊頭并進(jìn)。同時(shí),Uber已經(jīng)牢牢把握的主導(dǎo)性市場(chǎng)份額仍不足遏制新生力量的出現(xiàn),比如紐約市的叫車服務(wù)軟件Juno。在國(guó)外,Uber的仗更難打,特別是在中國(guó)——Uber和滴滴出行那場(chǎng)頗為公開(kāi)的爭(zhēng)奪以Uber敗北告終。

雖然不再和滴滴開(kāi)戰(zhàn),但Uber仍在和其他主要競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手抗衡,比如印度的Ola Cabs、東南亞的Grab和拉美的Easy Taxi。此外,旨在征服全球市場(chǎng)的Uber預(yù)計(jì)還會(huì)出現(xiàn)巨額虧損。

Airbnb和Uber的差異對(duì)今天的創(chuàng)業(yè)者來(lái)說(shuō)是重要的一課。投資者也可以從中窺見(jiàn)兩家公司今后幾年的表現(xiàn)。Airbnb面臨的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)比Uber少,主要原因在于所提供產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)的獨(dú)特性。就Airbnb來(lái)說(shuō),這個(gè)平臺(tái)上的公寓或住宅基本上各不相同,比如所在位置、家具、裝飾、價(jià)格和服務(wù)質(zhì)量等。換句話說(shuō),Airbnb提供的是差異化的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)。

Uber則相反,和大多數(shù)叫車軟件一樣,它提供的是大體類似的,或者說(shuō)同質(zhì)化服務(wù),因此不像Airbnb那樣在市場(chǎng)上有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力。比如,就怎樣把顧客從A點(diǎn)送到B點(diǎn)來(lái)說(shuō),Uber的車輛和司機(jī)較為相似。雖然一些細(xì)微差別偶爾會(huì)變得很重要,比如車子是否夠大,可以坐下五名乘客而不是一、兩名,或者它是否方便坐輪椅的乘客上下,但Uber的單位產(chǎn)品/服務(wù)基本上如出一轍。

在今天的投資者和消費(fèi)者眼中,Airbnb和Uber在市場(chǎng)地位和未來(lái)增長(zhǎng)潛力上的主要差距正是源于二者在供應(yīng)層面的這個(gè)基本區(qū)別。

更廣義地說(shuō),如果市場(chǎng)上的產(chǎn)品和服務(wù)存在明顯差異,起步就極為困難,因?yàn)橄M(fèi)者提出的要求可能相當(dāng)多樣。舉例來(lái)說(shuō),如果Airbnb想讓一位消費(fèi)者實(shí)施交易,就需要在后者的預(yù)算范圍內(nèi)于恰當(dāng)?shù)臅r(shí)間,在恰當(dāng)?shù)某鞘泻蜕鐓^(qū)提供帶有恰當(dāng)家具而且可供住宿的場(chǎng)所。

匹配供需是個(gè)棘手問(wèn)題,但Airbnb拿出了很好的解決方案。理論上,一個(gè)市場(chǎng)可進(jìn)行匹配的水平被稱為流動(dòng)性,如果房東和租客所在的城市不同,情況就會(huì)變得更復(fù)雜。最初,Airbnb面臨的困難在于讓合適的房東(打算出租房屋的人)找到合適的租客,原因是雙方經(jīng)常住在不同的城市。為做到這一點(diǎn),Airbnb必須在一個(gè)城市取得供應(yīng),同時(shí)預(yù)測(cè)另一個(gè)城市的需求。剛剛成立時(shí),Airbnb得以完成這項(xiàng)任務(wù)的途徑是關(guān)注住宿需求高度集中的事件,比如2008年在丹佛召開(kāi)的民主黨全國(guó)代表大會(huì)(DNC)。當(dāng)時(shí),丹佛大多數(shù)酒店都預(yù)定一空,而且消費(fèi)者的住宿意愿很強(qiáng)烈,具體表現(xiàn)就是他們?cè)贏irbnb搜索和DNC、住宿以及丹佛有關(guān)的出租信息。Airbnb提供的解決辦法很完美。

隨著Airbnb吸納的供應(yīng)(住宅)不斷增多,匹配房東和租客的可能性緩慢上升,從而加大了競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的追趕難度。從下圖可以看出,隨著Airbnb供應(yīng)的增長(zhǎng),每一單位新增供應(yīng)都會(huì)提高流動(dòng)性,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手追趕起來(lái)就會(huì)難得多。因此,對(duì)于Airbnb這樣的供應(yīng)異質(zhì)化交易場(chǎng)所來(lái)說(shuō)起步也許很難,但隨著供應(yīng)增多,回報(bào)將不斷上升,達(dá)到一定規(guī)模后就會(huì)具有難以想象的防御性。

So far, 2017 has been a non-stop PR headache for Uber, and that’s putting it mildly. From the online #DeleteUber campaign to explosive sexual harassment claims against the ride hailing company to the public discovery of Uber’s Greyball program, the company finds itself on uncharacteristically shaky grounds. And it’s not just Uber’s culture that’s under attack. Leaked financial information that Uber lost as much as $3 billion in 2016 reflects the difficulties Uber has faced in the ride-hailing market in the U.S. and abroad.

Nonetheless, Uber is one of the largest Internet marketplaces ever created — and it’s hitting a scale and maturity inflection point that would, for most companies, point toward a public offering in 2018.

Interestingly, Airbnb could head toward a similar trajectory, but these two young companies that have made incredible headway across the on-demand economy couldn’t be more different.

Since its creation in 2008, Airbnb has been able to grow without much real competition. With every new property or unit entering the Airbnb platform, it becomes that much harder for an ankle-biter competitor to grow and take share from the company. Airbnb hasn’t experienced a real challenge to its position since 2011, when it raised its Series B and its closest competitor, HomeAway, went public.

By contrast, while Uber dominates the market for ride-hailing apps, it has actually experienced fierce competition in just about every major market it has entered. In the U.S., Lyft continues to give it a run for its money. And Uber’s established, dominant market share still hasn’t been enough to prevent newer entrants, like Juno in New York City, from popping up. Internationally, the battle has been even harder-fought, particularly in China, where Uber lost a much publicized battle with Didi Chuxing.

While Uber is no longer battling Didi, it is still butting up against major competitors like Ola Cabs in India, Grab in Southeast Asia, and Easy Taxi in Latin America — and major financial losses are expected to continue in its quest to conquer global markets.

The contrasts between Airbnb and Uber serve as important lessons for today’s startup entrepreneurs. It also offer investors a glimpse for how both companies will perform years from now. The main reason Airbnb faces less competition than Uber comes down to the uniqueness of products and services both offer. In Airbnb’s case, each apartment or house on the platform is largely unique based on factors like location, furniture, design, price point, quality of service, etc. In other words, Airbnb offers a heterogenous supply of products and services.

Conversely, Uber, like most ride-hailing apps, offers a largely similar or homoegenous set of services and therefore aren’t as competitive in the marketplace. For instance, Uber’s cars and drivers are relatively similar in terms of how they get the customer from point A to point B. While there are some subtle variances that become important from time to time, like whether the car is large enough to fit five passengers instead of one or two, or whether it has wheelchair access, Uber’s unit of product/service is basically the same.

And it’s this basic difference in supply that accounts for the majority of differences investors and consumers see today with respect to Airbnb and Uber’s market positions, and their future growth potential.

More broadly, a marketplace in which the products and services offered vary widely can be extremely hard to jump-start because the demands from costumers can be quite diverse. For example, if Airbnb wants a customer to transact, they need a space available in the right city and neighborhood, at the right time, with the right furnishings, and within the budget a customer has set.

Matching supply and demand is tricky, but Airbnb has offered a good solution. Conceptually, the degree to which a match can be made in a marketplace is known as liquidity, and this gets more complicated when the host and renter are often located in different cities. Initially, the challenge for Airbnb was matching the right hosts (people looking to rent their properties) with the right renters, since both were often based in different cities. To do that, Airbnb had to acquire supply in one city, while predict demand in another. Airbnb was able to figure this out in its early days by focusing on events with a high degree of concentrated lodging demand, such as the 2008 Democratic National Convention in Denver. Most of the hotels in Denver at the time were booked, and consumers demonstrated high intent by searching on Airbnb for terms related to the DNC, lodging and Denver. Airbnb offered the perfect solution.

As Airbnb continued to onboard more supply (properties), the likelihood of matching hosts with renters grew slowly, making it harder for competitors to catch up. Below, the chart shows that as Airbnb’s supply grew, each new unit of supply provided more liquidity, making it that much more difficult for competitors to catch up. So, while marketplaces with heterogeneous supply like Airbnb may be difficult to jump-start, they yield increasing returns as their supply increases, which make them incredibly defensible at scale.

Airbnb的供應(yīng)規(guī)模(藍(lán)線)和邊際流動(dòng)性。

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相反,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)Uber的同質(zhì)化供應(yīng)產(chǎn)生影響要容易得多。剛起步時(shí),服務(wù)和產(chǎn)品基本相同的交易場(chǎng)所不那么復(fù)雜,建立的難度可能要小得多,資金效率也可能要高的多。就Uber而言,它負(fù)擔(dān)的司機(jī)數(shù)量有可能達(dá)到臨界規(guī)模,從而在供應(yīng)(上路的車輛)上實(shí)現(xiàn)高點(diǎn)起步,需求也在緩慢增長(zhǎng)。由于單位供應(yīng)大致相同,匹配司機(jī)和乘客的可能性就較高。這就意味著流動(dòng)性迅速上升,原因是消費(fèi)者需要的只是一輛來(lái)接他們,然后安全并及時(shí)地將其送到目的地的汽車。

每增加一輛車和一名司機(jī),Uber就可以縮短等待時(shí)間并降低價(jià)格。但在某個(gè)點(diǎn)上,它的流動(dòng)性就不再產(chǎn)生回報(bào),因?yàn)榈却龝r(shí)間不再縮短,價(jià)格也不再下降。出現(xiàn)這種情況后,市場(chǎng)就會(huì)對(duì)所有小型競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手敞開(kāi)大門(mén),前提是它們的服務(wù)有競(jìng)爭(zhēng)力,能為消費(fèi)者提供有吸引力的替代出行方案。下圖就展示了這樣的情況。

By contrast, Uber’s homogeneous supply is much more vulnerable to competition. In the early days, a marketplace that generally offered the same services and products is less complicated and can be much easier and more capital-efficient to build. In the case of Uber, the company could afford to pay a critical mass of drivers to jump-start its supply (cars on the road) and slowly build up demand. Since each unit of supply is largely similar, the likelihood of matching a driver with a passenger is relatively high. This means liquidity improves quickly, since a consumer just needs ANY car to pick them up and safely take them to the final destination in a timely manner.

With every car and driver Uber adds to its fleet, it is able to reduce wait times and prices. But at a certain point, its liquidity stops paying off, as wait times and prices stop falling. When this happens, the market opens for any small competitor to offer a competing service and an attractive alternative for consumers. Below, the graph shows how this could look.

Uber的供應(yīng)規(guī)模(藍(lán)線)和邊際流動(dòng)性。

現(xiàn)在把多人拼車服務(wù)Uber Pool考慮進(jìn)來(lái),它讓陌生人一起拼車,也讓流動(dòng)性曲線有所改變。這項(xiàng)服務(wù)在規(guī)模較大時(shí)效果較好,原因是Uber需要比如說(shuō)三個(gè)人,而不是一個(gè)人,而且這三個(gè)人要同時(shí)去差不多同一個(gè)地方才能拼車。在這種情況下,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者更難以讓每輛車的乘客人數(shù)達(dá)到Uber的水平。Uber Pool提高了流動(dòng)性門(mén)檻,競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手需要燒更多的錢才能達(dá)到圖中桔黃色流動(dòng)性曲線變平的那個(gè)點(diǎn)。

Factor in the Uber Pool service, through which strangers carpool together, and it changes the liquidity curve a bit. This service works better at scale, since Uber needs, say, three people—not just one—headed to roughly the same place at the same time to create a carpool. In this scenario, it’s harder for competitors to generate the same amount of riders per vehicle as Uber. The liquidity bar is raised with Uber Pool, requiring competitors to burn more capital to get to the point in the graph where the orange liquidity line flattens out.

Uber Pool的供應(yīng)規(guī)模(藍(lán)線)和邊際流動(dòng)性。

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上述分析表明Airbnb的交易場(chǎng)所比Uber的交易場(chǎng)所更有防御性。如果競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手想推出可以與之抗衡的服務(wù),就必須在全球范圍內(nèi)積累同樣數(shù)量的供應(yīng)(房屋),這樣才能對(duì)租客要去的那個(gè)城市中的待出租房屋進(jìn)行匹配。然而,就Uber來(lái)說(shuō),競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手只需在當(dāng)?shù)厥袌?chǎng)具備與之相當(dāng)?shù)墓?yīng),就可以達(dá)到邊際流動(dòng)性開(kāi)始變平的那個(gè)點(diǎn)。

我們認(rèn)為,Uber將面臨持續(xù)的全球性競(jìng)爭(zhēng),在它進(jìn)入的每一個(gè)大城市都是如此;Airbnb則有可能以相對(duì)壟斷的方式實(shí)現(xiàn)增長(zhǎng)。在競(jìng)爭(zhēng)非常激烈的市場(chǎng)中,Uber仍然可以獲勝,原因是它擁有令人望而卻步的資金和規(guī)模。在一段時(shí)間里,Uber仍然可以保持較高的顧客和供應(yīng)獲取成本以及較低的毛利潤(rùn)率,其競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手則無(wú)法做到這一點(diǎn)。不過(guò),Uber已經(jīng)陷入混戰(zhàn),今后需要使用所有可以調(diào)動(dòng)的武器。

作者:Deepak Ravichandran、Jeff Lu、Roger Lee

譯者:Charlie

審稿:夏林

杰夫·盧是硅谷投資機(jī)構(gòu)Battery Ventures副總裁。迪帕克·拉維奇安德蘭和羅杰·李分別是該公司合伙人和普通合伙人。三位作者及Battery Ventures均未對(duì)Uber、Airbnb以及本文提到的其他公司投資。

What this shows is that Airbnb’s marketplace is more defensible than Uber’s. If a competitor wants to offer a service that is competitive, it would have to accumulate the same amount of supply (properties) on a global scale as Airbnb so that it is able to match host properties located in a city that the renter is looking to visit. With Uber, however, a competitor only needs to have as much supply on a local scale to get to the point where the marginal liquidity starts to flatten.

We think Uber will experience sustained global competition in every major city it enters, while Airbnb could grow relatively monopolistically. Uber can still win in its most competitive markets because of its formidable cash position, and its scale. The company can sustain high customer- and supply- acquisition costs, and low gross margins for a period of time that its competitors will not be able to match. Nonetheless, Uber is in a dog fight and will need to use every weapon it has at its disposal.

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