2015年底，錢德勒·尤林考意識到有人正在窺探他的啤酒龍頭。

尤林考是悠航啤酒坊的兩位業(yè)主之一。這家位于北京的精釀啤酒廠在中國十幾座城市分銷啤酒，還在著名的夜生活區(qū)三里屯經(jīng)營一家擁有3個樓層的全新旗艦店。（尤林考介紹說，悠航啤酒坊的名稱源于弗蘭克·羅瑟在上世紀(jì)40年代創(chuàng)作的愛情歌曲《一艘駛往中國的慢船》。）向各大高檔餐廳和酒吧銷售桶裝啤酒，是悠航啤酒坊的重要收入來源。在中國首都，好啤酒不像在西雅圖或堪薩斯城那樣容易找到。

本壘美式燒烤就是它的客戶之一。這家極具人氣的餐廳曾經(jīng)利用它的9個啤酒龍頭銷售5款悠航鮮啤。悠航啤酒坊每周派遣一名技術(shù)員來照看這些啤酒管線。尤林考說，“我們購買啤酒管線，還負(fù)責(zé)安裝和維護(hù)。”但有一天，這位技術(shù)人員驚奇地發(fā)現(xiàn)，一種被稱為流量計的設(shè)備正在檢測每條管線。流量計測量經(jīng)過龍頭的啤酒數(shù)量，這是餐廳追蹤銷量的一種方式。

In late 2015, Chandler Jurinka realized someone was spying on his beer taps.

Jurinka and a partner own Slow Boat Brewery, a Beijing craft-beer maker that distributes its beers across a dozen cities in China and runs a new three-level brewpub in Beijing’s nightlife district. (Jurinka named the brewery after the 1940s Frank Loesser love song “On a Slow Boat to China.”) The business is driven in part by sales of kegs to restaurants and bars in China’s capital, where good beer isn’t as easy to find as it is in, say, Seattle or Kansas City.

One of those restaurants, a popular spot called Home Plate BBQ, once sold five Slow Boat drafts on its nine taps. Slow Boat sent a technician weekly to take care of the tap lines: “We bought them, installed them, and maintained them,” says Jurinka. But one day the tech was startled to find a device called a flow meter monitoring every line. Flow meters measure the beer passing through the taps, as a way for restaurants to track sales.

這個流量計并非本壘美式燒烤自己安裝的，而是全球啤酒巨頭百威英博集團(tuán)的杰作。餐廳老板告訴尤林考，它是這家擁有百威(Budweiser)、科羅娜(Corona)和時代(Stella Artois)等著名品牌的啤酒釀造商提供的一項免費福利。就憑這樣一個小小的舉動，百威英博就贏得了這家餐廳的好感，并獲得了一個窺視競爭對手的情報源——因為這個流量計可以實時監(jiān)測悠航鮮啤的銷量。尤林考極其憤怒?！?strong>但除了從龍頭拿下我們的啤酒，我?guī)缀鯖]有辦法?！边@位強(qiáng)壯的前美國陸軍軍士無奈地說道。

然后，在去年夏天，本壘美式燒烤為百威英博主辦了一場為期四天，旨在向北京消費者推介精釀品牌鵝島啤酒(Goose Island)的活動。參與者不僅有免費啤酒喝，還有機(jī)會與該品牌吉祥物自拍留念。中國新聞網(wǎng)站像追蹤時裝秀那樣，報道了這場活動。到了秋天，這家餐廳僅有一個出酒閥在銷售悠航鮮啤?，F(xiàn)如今，位列本壘美式燒烤啤酒推薦清單之首的，是三款鵝島啤酒。

啤酒流量計僅僅是一場新營銷戰(zhàn)爭的序曲之一。百威英博正在進(jìn)軍中國新興的精釀啤酒市場：自2016年初以來，這家比利時-巴西啤酒集團(tuán)在北京和上海鋪天蓋地地投放了大量鵝島啤酒——百威英博于2011年收購了這個來自芝加哥的精釀品牌。鵝島借助法國葡萄酒桶和波旁威士忌橡木桶，釀造充滿異國情調(diào)的啤酒。伸著細(xì)長脖子的呆萌鵝Logo有望贏得中國消費者的追捧，并改變其口味。百威英博正在致力于向中國不斷增長的年輕消費者推銷高檔啤酒，而這場宣傳攻勢恰恰是該戰(zhàn)略的核心所在。盡管包括喜力啤酒(Heineken)和督威啤酒(Duvel)在內(nèi)的競爭對手也從海外進(jìn)口精釀啤酒，投放在中國市場，但沒有一家擁有像百威英博這樣高漲的熱情。

Home Plate itself hadn’t installed the meter: The global beer giant AB InBev (bud, -0.33%) had. The restaurant owners told Jurinka it was a free perk from the brewer of Budweiser, Corona, and Stella Artois. With one move, AB InBev had earned goodwill with the restaurant and got a source of intel on its competition—since the meter could monitor Slow Boat’s sales in real time. Jurinka, a broad-shouldered former U.S. Army sergeant, was incensed, he says, “but other than take our beer off tap, there was little I could do about it.”

Then last summer Home Plate hosted a four-day event for AB InBev—a Beijing unveiling for the craft brand Goose Island that included free beer and selfie opportunities with the goose mascot. China’s news sites covered the event like a fashion show. By autumn the restaurant had replaced all but one of Slow Boat’s taps. Now sitting atop Home Plate’s draft menu: three Goose Island beers.

The flow meter was one of the first salvos in a new marketing war. AB InBev is bulldozing its way into China’s nascent craft-beer market: Since early 2016, the Belgian-Brazilian beer conglomerate has inundated Beijing and Shanghai with Goose Island, the Chicago-based craft brand it acquired in 2011. Goose Island brews exotic beers that it ages in French wine casks and bourbon barrels and has the kind of cute animal logo that can turn heads, and tastes, in China. The campaign is central to AB InBev’s strategy of promoting pricier beer to China’s growing ranks of wealthier young consumers. While competitors—including Heineken and Duvel—are importing their own craft beers, none have moved with the same gusto.

百威英博正在抓住一個額外的優(yōu)勢：由于中國的監(jiān)管環(huán)境薄弱，它可以采用一些在美國根本不能通過審查的方式強(qiáng)勢進(jìn)入市場。該公司對分銷商施壓，要求他們不能營銷其他精釀啤酒，并給予酒吧各種獎勵，以慫恿他們著力推銷鵝島啤酒，并撤下其他精釀品牌——在美國，諸如這樣的交易都是非法的。它還提供優(yōu)渥的薪酬來拉攏當(dāng)?shù)氐尼劸迫瞬?。南京精釀啤酒品牌高大師的老板高巖表示，“百威英博想成為一家精釀啤酒釀造商，但它不想改變作為一家大啤酒商的行事做派。”

這家全球啤酒巨頭對中國寄予厚望，希望在這個世界上最大的啤酒市場彌補它在美國犯下的災(zāi)難性錯誤——錯過精釀啤酒革命。在過去十年中，以銷售額計算，精釀啤酒蠶食了美國市場20%的份額，最大的受害者莫過于工業(yè)啤酒品牌，比如百威英博旗下的百威和Bud Light。2016年，該公司在美國的銷售額下降了2%；百威啤酒的銷售額則遭受2008年以來的最大沖擊，下降35%。去年12月接受行業(yè)網(wǎng)站Just-Drinks采訪時，桑福德伯恩斯坦公司分析師特雷沃·斯特林表示，“要不是百威英博旗下的安海斯-布希公司或多或少地忽視了這個行業(yè)，獨立廠商的精釀啤酒根本就不可能發(fā)展到如此大的規(guī)模?！?/strong>

AB InBev is seizing an additional advantage: Thanks to China’s weak regulatory climate, it can muscle into the market in ways that wouldn’t pass muster in the U.S. AB InBev has leaned on distributors to keep them from carrying other craft beers. It has given bars incentives to promote Goose -Island while shoving other beers off the taps—deals that would be illegal in the States. It’s offering lavish salaries to poach local brewing talent. “AB InBev wants to be a craft-beer brewer,” says Gao Yan, who owns a Nanjing craft brand called Master Gao. “But they want to act like a big brewer.”

The leviathan is turning to China, the world’s biggest beer market, to compensate for a catastrophic mistake it made in the U.S.—missing out on the craft revolution. Over the past decade craft brews grabbed 20% of the U.S. market in dollar terms, largely at the expense of mass-produced lagers like AB InBev’s Budweiser and Bud Light. In 2016 the company’s U.S. sales fell 2%; Budweiser sales have taken the biggest hit, falling 35% since 2008. “Craft beer would never have become as big under independent ownership if [AB InBev’s] Anheuser-Busch had not more or less ignored the sector,” Sanford Bernstein analyst Trevor Stirling told the website Just-Drinks in December.

AB InBev has purchased nine craft breweries in the U.S. over the past six years—Goose Island was among the biggest acquisitions, at -$39 -million—but they haven’t turned around slowing sales. China’s tiny but booming craft market offers a second chance to capitalize on a global trend.

Brewers endlessly haggle over the definition of craft beer. Generally speaking, it’s beer produced by small breweries that is more flavorful and (usually) higher in alcohol content than what you typically find in the grocery store. (Whether brewers remain small enough to hold the label “craft” after being acquired by giants like ABI is a contentious topic.) However it’s defined, the craft market in the Middle Kingdom is booming. A dozen successful breweries have popped up across Beijing and Shanghai, with more appearing in Chengdu, Nanjing, Shenzhen, Wuhan, and other cities. Beer is the most consumed beverage after tea in China, which now gulps a quarter of global beer output. Retail sales have doubled since 2008, according to Euromonitor, and Chinese consumers spend 550 billion yuan (roughly $80 billion) annually on beer.

在這個消費額中，精釀啤酒占據(jù)的份額無疑很小，盡管分析師們只能提供一些粗略的猜測。英敏特市場研究咨詢公司全球飲品分析師喬尼·福賽思說，“現(xiàn)在可能是0.1%。”但他補充道，隨著中國的啤酒市場不斷走向成熟，精釀啤酒必將迎來騰飛。啤酒經(jīng)銷商Top Shelf Asia的業(yè)主加里·布朗表示，百威英博現(xiàn)身中國預(yù)示著一個令人時刻的時刻即將來臨?！八拖裥前涂艘粯樱喝绻憧吹揭淮笈Х鹊暝谝黄瑓^(qū)域出現(xiàn)，你就知道現(xiàn)在就是進(jìn)入這一領(lǐng)域的最佳時機(jī)?！?/p>

對于百威英博來說，中國市場還有另一個有利因素：監(jiān)管法規(guī)不成比例地傾向于最大的市場參與者。在美國，釀酒商不能合法地?fù)碛芯瓢苫驂艛嗑瓢射N售的啤酒；在中國，除控制經(jīng)銷商之外，釀酒商還可以購買酒吧。產(chǎn)品安全法規(guī)給予巨頭們另一個競爭優(yōu)勢。百威英博從美國進(jìn)口鵝島啤酒，然后在中國銷售。也就是說，鵝島的釀造工藝遵循美國的監(jiān)管法規(guī)。然而，中國本土釀酒商不得不服從更加嚴(yán)苛的法規(guī)。監(jiān)管法規(guī)要求，中國境內(nèi)生產(chǎn)的瓶裝啤酒必須獲得質(zhì)量認(rèn)證，而這些認(rèn)證標(biāo)簽只提供給每小時產(chǎn)量至少1.2萬瓶的生產(chǎn)線——這是精釀啤酒坊產(chǎn)量的好多倍。中國的瓶裝啤酒還必須進(jìn)行巴氏消毒和過濾，進(jìn)而消除了精釀啤酒獨特口感所要求的酵母和沉淀物。

在實踐中，這些規(guī)則意味著微型啤酒廠不得不在酒吧銷售桶裝啤酒，而進(jìn)口的“精釀啤酒”則可以輕松地分銷到任何地方。令人意想不到的結(jié)果是：在中國，啤酒罕見地成為一個監(jiān)管法規(guī)有利于外國大公司，而不是本土制造商的市場。百威英博正在竭力利用這一優(yōu)勢。

顛覆性增長

百威英博的歷史，始于三位巴西投資者（即私募公司3G的創(chuàng)始人）在20世紀(jì)80年代后期收購了一家名為博浪的釀酒商。2004年，博浪與比利時巨頭英特布魯公司合并為英博啤酒集團(tuán)，后者隨后在2008年一筆令人瞠目結(jié)舌的交易中，斥資520億美元收購美國最大的啤酒釀造商安海斯-布希公司。去年，新成立的百威英博出資1030億美元吞下其最大的競爭對手南非米勒公司。這家全球性啤酒巨頭現(xiàn)在控制著200個品牌，占據(jù)全球啤酒市場近三分之一的份額。上個季度，百威英博銷售了價值142億美元的啤酒。

但一些弱不禁風(fēng)的“大衛(wèi)”仍然在傷害這個碩大無比的“歌利亞”。百威英博的業(yè)績連續(xù)七個季度未達(dá)到分析師預(yù)期。銷量下挫的，不只是百威啤酒，還包括Bud Light和Busch等主流品牌。于是，像其他跨國公司一樣，百威英博開始在中國不遺余力地尋求增長空間。其戰(zhàn)略核心是：在小型釀酒商有機(jī)會獲得市場份額之前，擠壓其生存空間——或者將其吞并。

百威英博正在通過一個名為“顛覆性增長”的部門協(xié)調(diào)其精釀戰(zhàn)略；競爭對手稱其為“精釀啤酒顛覆部門”。第一步是控制酒吧。 “這是你在美國看不到的東西?！?供職于斗貓酒吧的美籍釀酒師邁克爾·喬丹這樣說道。（斗貓酒吧是一家位于上海的精釀啤酒吧，在去年的世界啤酒節(jié)上為中國贏得了第一枚獎牌。）他聲稱，諸如百威英博這類行業(yè)巨頭在中國提供的那些獎勵措施，將違反西方法律?！爸袊鴽]有這方面的監(jiān)管法規(guī)?！?/p>

目前還不清楚百威英博與本壘美式燒烤這類餐廳達(dá)成了多少交易，但競爭對手表示，這種“收購啤酒龍頭”的現(xiàn)象極為普遍。在北京夜生活區(qū)三里屯，一位酒吧老板向《財富》講述了百威英博最近向他和合伙人提出的一個交易建議。（由于擔(dān)心傷害他的生意，這位老板堅決要求匿名。）去年冬天，百威英博的代表主動聯(lián)系他洽談業(yè)務(wù)，并慷慨地表示，如果他的酒吧同意銷售包括鵝島在內(nèi)的多種精釀啤酒，該公司每月將提供多達(dá)6萬元的獎勵——這筆錢足夠支付這家酒吧近三分之二的租金。百威英博告訴他，他們打算購買這片區(qū)域所有的戶外廣告空間，這將有助于他的酒吧跟當(dāng)?shù)毓賳T談判?！罢賳T通常會說，‘如果我們讓你架起一個大廣告牌，而你隔壁的餐廳沒有，這事就很難辦了?！F(xiàn)在，百威英博打算花錢給隔壁那家也安裝一個廣告牌！”

不過，他和合伙人還是有些惴惴不安。他們是否仍然能夠播放喜力啤酒贊助的橄欖球比賽，并且繼續(xù)提供在售的其他精釀品牌，比如加州的Firestone Walker和堪薩斯城的Boulevard？根據(jù)協(xié)議，他給這些品牌設(shè)定的價位不能低于百威英博旗下品牌。他說，“這是否意味著，當(dāng)鵝島售價20塊的時候，其他品牌就必須賣25塊？”最終，他和合伙人沒有簽字：他們不想失去控制權(quán)。

百威英博的提議或許過于專橫，但在中國，這樣做沒有任何法律問題。如果該公司在美國嘗試類似的收購，它注定將面臨生效時間長達(dá)80年的反壟斷法制裁。禁酒令出臺前，釀酒商有權(quán)擁有酒吧。他們以低廉的價格銷售其酒類產(chǎn)品，設(shè)法從酒館身上擠壓利潤，并誘惑酒吧經(jīng)理通過引入賭博和賣淫等方式提高利潤率。禁酒令被推翻后，三層分銷系統(tǒng)（包括與酒吧談判的中間分銷商）成為酒類監(jiān)管的主要對象，進(jìn)而消解了大型釀酒商對酒吧的影響力。

在世界的另一邊，這個制度并不存在。中國的酒吧很難抗拒百威英博提供的豐厚獎勵。約翰·蓋伊的麥考利愛爾士酒吧公司在華南地區(qū)擁有多家連鎖店，去年的銷售額突破1000萬美元大關(guān)。這位語速極快的澳大利亞人表示，他聽說百威英博為一些酒吧業(yè)主提供高達(dá)100萬元人民幣的獎勵，以鼓勵他們將在售的精釀啤酒全部轉(zhuǎn)換為該公司旗下品牌。他為自己銷售多種海外精釀啤酒而自豪，并一臉不屑地表示，他永遠(yuǎn)不會接受此類交易。但其他酒吧業(yè)主或許別無選擇。他說，“一些酒吧在盈虧平衡線上掙扎，就靠著釀酒商的獎金（一些酒吧每年可獲得1.5萬美元獎勵）掙點錢?！?/strong>對于這些酒吧來說，百威英博看起來就像是一條生命線。

Craft’s share of that total is undoubtedly small, though analysts can only offer guesses. “Right now it might be 0.1%,” says Jonny Forsyth, global drinks analyst at Mintel. But he adds that craft beer tends to take off as a market matures, as China’s is. Gary Brown, owner of beer distributor Top Shelf Asia, says AB InBev’s appearance in China is a sign of heady times to come. “It’s like Starbucks: If you see a bunch of their coffee shops going up in an area, you know it’s a pretty good one to be in.”

There’s another reason China is a good market for AB InBev: Regulations disproportionately favor the biggest players. In the U.S., brewers can’t legally own bars or monopolize the beer a bar offers. In China, brewers can and do buy bars, in addition to controlling distributors. Rules around product safety give another edge to the giants. AB InBev imports Goose Island into China from the U.S., where it’s brewed under American regulations. China’s own brewers, however, have to obey more restrictive rules. Regulations require a stamp of quality approval on bottles produced inside China. Those stamps are available only to production lines that generate at least 12,000 bottles an hour—huge multiples of what craft brewers produce. Beer bottled in China also must be pasteurized and filtered, eliminating yeast and sediments that give craft beers character.

In practice, those rules mean microbreweries have to sell their beer in kegs on-site in brewpubs, while “craft” imports can be easily distributed anywhere. The upshot: Beer is the rare market in which China plays favorites with big foreign companies at the expense of local producers. And AB InBev is racing to tap that advantage.

AB InBev began when three Brazilian investors—the founders of the private equity firm now known as 3G Capital—bought a declining brewer called Brahma in the late 1980s. That operation merged with Belgian giant Interbrew in 2004 to create InBev, which then obtained America’s largest brewer, St. Louis’s Anheuser-Busch, in 2008 in a stunning $52 billion deal. The new AB InBev outdid itself last year by paying $103 billion for rival SABMiller. It now controls 200 brands and nearly a third of the global beer market. Last quarter, AB InBev sold $14.2 billion worth of beer.

But diminutive Davids continue to wound this sudsy Goliath. AB InBev has missed analysts’ estimates for seven quarters in a row. Sales have sunk for not just Budweiser but Bud Light, Busch, and other mainstay brands. So, like other multinationals, AB InBev is looking for growth in China, and it’s pulling no punches. The heart of its strategy: Squash—or someday soon acquire—small breweries before they have a chance to capture market share.

AB InBev coordinates its moves through a division called Disruptive Growth; competitors call it the Craft Beer Disruption Unit. The first step: controlling the bars. “This is something that you just don’t see in the U.S.,” says Michael Jordan, the American expat brewmaster at Boxing Cat, a Shanghai brewery that last year won China’s first medal at the World Beer Festival. He argues that the incentives brewers like AB InBev offer in China would run afoul of Western laws. “There’s just no regulation on this side.”

It’s unclear how many deals AB InBev has with bars like Home Plate, but rival brewers say these “tap takeovers” are widespread. One bar owner in Beijing’s Sanlitun nightlife district described a recent deal he says AB InBev proposed to him and his partner. (The owner insisted on anonymity for fear of harming his business prospects.) AB InBev reps approached him last spring and offered to pay 60,000 yuan a month—enough to nearly cover about two-thirds of his bar’s rent—if his bar agreed to host its assortment of beers including Goose Island. He said AB InBev told him it was planning to purchase all the outdoor advertising space in the area, which would put his bar on better negotiating terms with local officials. “Often the government official says, ‘If we let you have a big sign, your neighbor restaurant won’t have one, and that will be bad,’?” he said. “AB InBev will just buy the neighbor a sign!”

Still, he and his partner were uneasy. Would they still be able to show rugby matches sponsored by Heineken? And the craft beers he already offered, from California’s Firestone Walker and Kansas City’s Boulevard? Under the agreement, he couldn’t price those for less than AB InBev’s beers. “So how would that look, those being sold at 25 kuai [yuan] when Goose Island is 20 kuai?” he says. Ultimately, he and his partner didn’t sign: They didn’t want to lose control.

AB InBev’s offer may have been heavy-handed, but in China it’s legally unproblematic. If it tried a similar takeover in the U.S., it would face antitrust action under laws that have been in place for 80 years. Before Prohibition, the brewers owned the bars. They sold their product cheaply, squeezing the profits out of saloons and tempting bar managers to juice margins by introducing gambling and prostitution. After Prohibition was overturned, a three-tier distribution system—including a middleman distributor to negotiate with bars—became a staple of alcohol regulation, keeping big brewers’ influence at a remove from bars.

On the other side of the world, this system doesn’t exist, and Chinese bars have a tough time turning down the kind of money AB InBev offers. John Guy, a quick-talking Australian whose McCawley’s chain of bars in southern China had sales last year topping $10 million, says he has heard of bar owners being offered 1 million yuan (about $150,000) to switch all their draft beer to AB InBev brands. Guy prides himself on his range of overseas craft beers and says he would never accept such a deal. But other bar owners don’t have the same choice. “Some bars run at break-even and make money on tap bonuses—$15,000 a year on some,” he says. For them, AB InBev looks like a lifeline.

百威英博的劍鋒也指向中國啤酒經(jīng)銷商?！敦敻弧房吹搅嗽摴九c一家最大的全國性經(jīng)銷商簽訂的合同。該合同規(guī)定，在這家經(jīng)銷商與另一家釀酒商簽訂分銷合同之前，它必須首先征得百威英博的同意。這份去年簽訂的合同寫道，“在雙方簽署協(xié)議前，經(jīng)銷商和百威英博必須收集關(guān)于高端啤酒品牌和銷量的統(tǒng)計數(shù)據(jù)和書面確認(rèn)。”實際上，百威英博擁有這家經(jīng)銷商能否銷售另一家公司旗下精釀啤酒的否決權(quán)。

中國的經(jīng)銷商過去也簽訂類似的合同，但他們可以通過私下交易來分銷其他啤酒。然而，借助類似這樣的合同，百威英博束縛住了分銷商的手腳。一位分銷商告訴《財富》，百威英博試圖跟他簽訂一份鵝島經(jīng)銷合同，但這份合同將限制他將其他品牌存儲在同一個倉庫，從而有效地阻止他的小公司經(jīng)銷其他競品。（由于他不想對抗這樣一家強(qiáng)大的釀酒商，這位經(jīng)銷商要求匿名。）

在美國，諸如這樣的行為很可能被宣布無效。在百威英博近年來收購北美釀酒商期間，一些釀酒商抱怨說，這家啤酒巨頭試圖與分銷商達(dá)成類似交易以遏制競爭。美國司法部隨后介入調(diào)查，并于去年7月份宣布與百威英博達(dá)成和解。這項庭外和解協(xié)議要求百威英博遏制這種交易，其未來收購事宜必須交由司法部進(jìn)行正式審查。據(jù)了解，中國沒有類似的行動。

百威英博發(fā)言人麗貝卡·郭拒絕置評該公司與中國酒吧的關(guān)系，稱其為“商業(yè)敏感事項”。她補充說，百威英博贈送流量計是為了改善該公司啤酒的普及度，并加強(qiáng)促銷活動。她表示，“批發(fā)商選擇經(jīng)銷哪些啤酒，完全取決于他們自身的決定?！冰Z島總裁肯·斯托特在一份聲明中說，中國和其他非美國市場的啤酒愛好者“對鵝島的反應(yīng)非常好。”

四處撒錢

在這樣一個進(jìn)口啤酒——哪怕是百威這種大眾市場啤酒——帶有奢侈品光澤的國家，百威英博正在穩(wěn)步擴(kuò)張。根據(jù)歐睿國際提供的數(shù)據(jù)，按銷量計算，2015年，這家公司控制著中國市場15.7%的份額，較2011年的11.7%有所上漲，僅次于本土巨頭華潤控股（它釀造世界上最暢銷的雪花啤酒）和青島啤酒。

百威英博并沒有單列精釀啤酒的業(yè)績。但在2016年前9個月，其中國銷售額增長4%，達(dá)到34億美元，稅前和調(diào)整前的收益增長19%至9.73億美元。不難計算，其利潤率高達(dá)30%——在中國這樣一個利潤率穩(wěn)居世界頂級啤酒市場末位的國家，這是一個令人艷羨的數(shù)字。

這家公司由此擁有了四處撒錢的雄厚資本。中國啤酒業(yè)資深人士表示，百威英博已經(jīng)為其精釀部門發(fā)動了一場瘋狂的招聘攻勢，向?qū)I(yè)人士提供相當(dāng)于業(yè)內(nèi)平均水平三到四倍的薪酬。尤林考透露說，悠航啤酒坊的兩位銷售人員去年離職，加里·布朗的經(jīng)銷公司也有兩人轉(zhuǎn)投百威英博。百威英博亞洲區(qū)總監(jiān)曾致電深圳TAPS精釀啤酒屋一位員工，并問他“為什么不為我們工作呢？”如此赤裸裸的挖角行為讓這家小型釀酒商的老板丹尼爾·杜姆布里震驚不已。該公司甚至大肆招募那些鼓勵中國人嘗試精釀啤酒的布道者。兩位時尚的“啤酒女孩”曾經(jīng)在長達(dá)兩年的時間里，開著Mini Cooper敞篷車在上海街頭銷售自釀啤酒——其中一位去年加盟百威英博。

百威英博甚至?xí)ㄥX招募客戶。去年九月份，鵝島在中國社交媒體上刊登廣告，尋找年輕人為酒吧增加人氣：“你愛喝鵝島嗎？你是否知道還有比免費更好的事情？想有償參加這些活動嗎？加入鵝島大家庭，這些夢想真的可以實現(xiàn)?！痹诒本┖蜕虾?，該公司向20歲到40歲的飲酒者承諾，除了免費啤酒，縱情搖擺之外，他們還有錢賺。既然百威英博打算不怕麻煩地控制中國酒吧，它當(dāng)然希望這些酒吧人氣爆棚。

這家啤酒大鱷也向酒吧提供折扣價，有時甚至免費的桶裝啤酒，以建立鵝島的人氣——這是競爭對手最害怕的策略。許多釀酒商認(rèn)為，百威英博正在扭曲市場，拉低精釀啤酒的價格，而小型釀酒商根本無力承受這樣做招致的損失。深圳百優(yōu)精釀的老板喬·芬肯賓德爾表示，他聽說鵝島桶裝精釀的售價僅是自家產(chǎn)品成本的三分之一?！八麄冋谝源俗鳛槊^，無限地壓低售價?！彼f。

在中國精釀啤酒市場，并非所有人都對百威英博持批評態(tài)度。深圳TAPS精釀啤酒屋的老板杜姆布里表示，“他們正在做的事情，其實讓我非常興奮。”他在不太富裕的重慶市開設(shè)了一家酒吧，那里的員工不斷地向客戶解釋為什么精釀啤酒比街上賣的其他啤酒更加昂貴。他預(yù)計，這家跨國公司的煽動性營銷活動將有助于中國飲酒者了解印度淡色愛爾(IPA，它是幾乎所有精釀酒吧的標(biāo)配)和貯藏啤酒之間的區(qū)別。

百威英博大力推廣鵝島，也有助于酒吧吸引那些在理論上愿意嘗試其他啤酒的客戶。北平機(jī)器啤酒吧聯(lián)合所有人，35歲的央視主持人李偉（音譯）去年增添了兩個鵝島龍頭。作為回報，百威英博去年為北平機(jī)器啤酒吧免費提供了兩桶鵝島波旁世濤。在美國，這款限量版精釀啤酒每年的短期發(fā)布活動，是精釀鑒賞家們翹首以盼的盛事。在李偉的啤酒吧，一瓶8盎司的鵝島波旁世濤。他把百威英博稱為合作伙伴。

百威英博提供的一些免費贈品反映了精釀啤酒在世界各地的銷售方式。歐睿國際飲品分析師安娜?沃德指出，像百威這樣的大眾市場品牌很適合傳統(tǒng)廣告，但“當(dāng)你給精釀啤酒打廣告時，你也就貶低了它的聲譽。”好萊塢不會像營銷最新大片《變形金剛》那樣營銷一部獨立電影；同樣的邏輯也適用于啤酒。這是一個重要的區(qū)別，因為美國精釀啤酒的大繁榮，正是拜消費者對“大啤酒”的厭惡所賜，而這種厭惡勢必會遷移到中國。自2014年以來，中國啤酒市場一直呈下滑趨勢。百威英博告訴分析師，它計劃通過專注于高端啤酒來提高在華業(yè)務(wù)利潤，這種戰(zhàn)略似乎正在起效——即使銷量下滑，該公司在中國的銷售收入仍然在增長。

盡管百威英博最近不惜成本地推廣鵝島精釀，它仍然在等待收獲回報的時刻。去年夏天，這家公司在中國各大城市舉辦了一系列營銷和折扣活動，但鵝島的銷量據(jù)說并不理想。業(yè)內(nèi)人士表示，有一段時間，鵝島以成本價涌入各大酒吧和餐廳，極其渴望在啤酒陳腐前將其售出。

在這樣一個自身仍然很微小的精釀啤酒市場上，這種短暫頹勢的后果或許同樣微不足道。曾幾何時，美國精釀啤酒市場同樣極其微小，而百威英博錯失了這一趨勢。它不想重蹈覆轍。3月份，這家全球啤酒業(yè)巨頭再次彰顯了它稱霸中國精釀市場的決心：該公司以一筆未公開的金額收購上海斗貓酒吧。美籍釀酒師喬丹不再擔(dān)心跟這個新來的巨人正面競爭。他現(xiàn)在是鵝島團(tuán)隊的一份子。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

原文刊載于2017年3月15日發(fā)布的《財富》雜志。

譯者：Kevin

AB InBev is also targeting China’s distributors. Fortune has seen a contract between AB InBev and one of the country’s nationwide distributors under which the distributor must report to AB InBev before it signs a craft-beer deal with another brewer. “Dealers and AB InBev should gather statistics and written confirmation regarding the super-premium beer products’ brand and sales volume before both sides sign the agreement,” says the contract, issued last year. In essence, AB InBev gets veto power over whether the distributor sells another company’s craft beer.

Previously in China, distributors would sign similar contracts but could carry other beers through side deals. But through contracts like this one, AB InBev has hamstrung distributors. A distributor owner who requested anonymity because he didn’t want to antagonize a powerful player told Fortune he was offered a deal to carry Goose Island, but it would have restricted him from storing competing brands in the same warehouse—effectively keeping his small company from carrying the rivals.

Behavior like this would likely get quashed in the U.S. During AB InBev’s acquisitions of breweries in North America in recent years, craft brewers complained that the beer behemoth was trying to curb competition by striking similar deals with distributors. The Justice Department scrutinized the practice, and in July it announced a settlement with AB InBev curbing such deals and requiring the opportunity for formal DOJ review of future acquisitions. As far as anyone knows, there’s no similar action afoot in China.

Rebecca Kuo, an AB InBev spokesperson, declined to comment on AB InBev’s relationships with China’s bars, calling them “commercially sensitive matters.” She added that InBev had given away flow meters to improve availability and sales promotions of the company’s beers and that “it is ultimately up to the wholesalers as to which beers they choose to carry.” Goose Island president Ken Stout said in a statement that drinkers in China and other non-U.S. markets “have responded really well to our beer.”

In a country where imported beers—even mass-market ones like Budweiser—have a patina of luxury, AB InBev has steadily expanded. The company controlled 15.7% of China’s market by volume in 2015, up from 11.7% in 2011, according to Euromonitor, trailing only domestic giants China Resources Holdings (which brews the world’s top-selling beer, Snow) and Tsingtao.

AB InBev doesn’t break out craft numbers, but its China sales grew 4%, to $3.4 billion, in the first nine months of 2016, and earnings before taxes and adjustments jumped 19%, to $973 million. That’s a 30% profit margin—impressive in a country that ranks dead last among the world’s top beer markets for profitability.

That gives the company piles of cash to throw around. China’s beer veterans say AB InBev has launched a frenzied hiring blitz for its craft unit, offering salaries three to four times what the pros could earn elsewhere. Two salespeople from Slow Boat left last year, Jurinka says, and Gary Brown’s distribution business had two defections. Daniel Dumbrill, owner of Shenzhen microbrewery Taps, was stunned when the AB InBev district manager for all of Asia called one of his staff and demanded, “Why are you not working for us?” The company is even poaching the beer proselytizers who helped build China’s craft scene. Two hip women from Shanghai and their Chihuahua—a team known collectively as BrewGirl—sold homebrewed beer out of their Mini Cooper for two years before one joined AB InBev last year.

AB InBev will even hire customers. In September, Goose Island advertised on Chinese social media looking for young people to fill bars: “Do you LOVE drinking Goose Island? Do you think it’s even better when it’s FREE? Or, better yet, getting PAID to attend these events? Join the Goose Family and these dreams really can come true.” The company promised drinkers in Beijing and Shanghai, ages 20 to 40, that they would earn money in addition to “beer and swag.” If AB InBev is going to go to the trouble of controlling China’s bars, they had better be crowded.

The brewer also offers discounted and sometimes free kegs to bars to build Goose Island’s popularity—and that’s the tactic some competitors fear most. Craft brewmasters believe that AB InBev is distorting the market, dragging down prices for craft beer while incurring losses that smaller brewers can’t sustain. Joe Finkenbinder of Bionic Brew in Shenzhen says he has heard of Goose kegs selling for a third of the cost of his kegs. “They’re using that as just the tip of the spear and then driving the prices into the ground,” he says.

Not everyone selling craft beer in China is critical of AB InBev. “I’m actually excited about what they’re doing,” says Dumbrill, the Taps owner. Dumbrill opened a location in Chongqing, in Sichuan province, a less affluent city where his staff is constantly explaining to customers why craft beer is more expensive than what’s being sold down the street. He expects that the multi-national’s splashy marketing campaigns will help teach Chinese drinkers about the differences between, say, an IPA and a lager.

Heavy promotions of Goose Island also help bars attract customers who, in theory, will try other beers. Li Wei, a 35-year-old host on CCTV, co-owns a Beijing brewpub called Pei Ping Machine Brewery. He added two Goose Island taps last year. In return, AB InBev last October delivered two free kegs of Goose Island’s Bourbon County Brand Stout, a special-edition beer whose annual short-term release in the States is celebrated among the craft cognoscenti. Li’s tap house sold it in eight-ounce glasses for $14. He calls AB InBev a partner.

Some of AB InBev’s freebie promotions mirror the way craft beer is sold worldwide. Mass-market brands like Budweiser lend themselves well to conventional advertising, says Anna Ward, drinks analyst at Euromonitor, but “when you advertise craft, you take away from its credentials.” Hollywood doesn’t market an indie film the same way it does the latest Transformers blockbuster; the same logic applies to beer. That’s a key distinction, because the distaste for “big beer” that fueled the craft boom in the U.S. is bound to migrate to China, if it hasn’t already. Total beer volumes sold in China have declined since 2014. AB InBev has told analysts it plans to boost profits in the country by focusing on premium beers, and it may be working—its China revenue is growing even as sales by volume decline.

For all its recent spending on Goose Island, AB InBev is still waiting for a payoff. After the company blanketed Chinese cities with events and discounts last summer, there were reports of tepid sales. Insiders say at one point Goose Island flooded bars and restaurants with kegs priced at cost, eager to move the beer before it went stale.

The consequences of such hiccups may be tiny in a craft-beer market that’s still tiny itself. Once upon a time, the U.S. craft market was equally microscopic, and AB InBev missed the trend. That’s a misstep it doesn’t want to repeat. And in early March it showed it was serious, acquiring the Boxing Cat brewery for an undisclosed sum. Jordan, the brewmaster, no longer has to worry about competing against the new giant in town. He’s now on the team.

A version of this article appears in the March 15, 2017 issue of Fortune.