中國(guó)化工集團(tuán)公司計(jì)劃斥資430億美元現(xiàn)金，收購(gòu)瑞士先正達(dá)公司。在殺蟲劑、除草劑和其他作物保護(hù)產(chǎn)品領(lǐng)域，先正達(dá)處于世界領(lǐng)先地位，同時(shí)還是全球第三大種子生產(chǎn)商。

這的確是一筆大交易，但我們?yōu)槭裁匆P(guān)心一家中國(guó)化工公司收購(gòu)一家瑞士農(nóng)業(yè)公司？首先，這是全球農(nóng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域整合浪潮的一部分，這股浪潮將使得少數(shù)幾家跨國(guó)巨頭控制世界商業(yè)種子市場(chǎng)越來越大的份額（大約50%）。除中國(guó)化工與先正達(dá)的聯(lián)姻之外，陶氏化學(xué)正在收購(gòu)杜邦公司，德國(guó)的拜耳公司正在吞并孟山都，后者也許是最有爭(zhēng)議的轉(zhuǎn)基因種子生產(chǎn)商。這股合計(jì)價(jià)值高達(dá)1700億美元的并購(gòu)狂歡，將對(duì)全球農(nóng)業(yè)的未來產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)的影響。

除此之外，中國(guó)化工收購(gòu)先正達(dá)有助于世人更加深刻地理解中國(guó)對(duì)其未來抱有的愿景。這筆交易表明了全球第二大經(jīng)濟(jì)體在創(chuàng)新、生物科技、知識(shí)產(chǎn)權(quán)和全球化等領(lǐng)域的政策趨勢(shì)。資深中國(guó)問題專家羅伯特?庫恩表示，“這筆交易足以證明中國(guó)正在發(fā)生的事情。它真的確定了前沿陣地?！边@也是一項(xiàng)有可能改變?nèi)蚣Z食供應(yīng)和成本的國(guó)家戰(zhàn)略的最新一步。

ChemChina’s planned takeover, for $43 billion in cash, of Syngenta (syt), the Swiss-based world leader in advanced insecticides, herbicides, and other crop-protection products and the No. 3 producer of seeds.

Why should we care about a Chinese chemical company buying a Swiss agricultural business, however mammoth the deal might be? For starters, it’s part of a wave of global consolidation in agriculture that will put an increasingly large portion of the world’s commercial seed market—roughly 50%—under the control of a few giant multinationals. In addition to the ChemChina/Syngenta union, Dow Chemical (dow) is buying DuPont (dd), and Germany’s Bayer is in the process of swallowing up Monsanto (mon), perhaps the most controversial producer of genetically modified seed species. This combined $170 billion deal binge promises to have a profound impact on the future of global agriculture.

Beyond that, ChemChina’s purchase of Syngenta provides valuable insight about China’s broader view of its future. The deal signals important trends in the country’s policy on innovation, biotechnology, intellectual property, and globalization. “This acquisition is very probative of what’s happening in China,” says Robert Kuhn, a longtime China expert. “It really defines the frontier.” It’s also the latest step in a national strategy that could change food supplies and costs worldwide.

這筆交易需要獲得全球各地所有相關(guān)的政府部門批準(zhǔn)，很可能在5月份或6月份完成。按照中國(guó)的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這是一筆大規(guī)模交易，足以刷新此前的記錄——2013年，中海油斥資150億美元收購(gòu)加拿大能源巨頭尼克森公司。在首席執(zhí)行官任建新的帶領(lǐng)下，中國(guó)化工已經(jīng)成為中國(guó)國(guó)有企業(yè)中最具侵略性的全球并購(gòu)者，比如在2015年收購(gòu)意大利倍耐力輪胎公司和德國(guó)克勞斯瑪菲機(jī)械公司。但先正達(dá)收購(gòu)案的規(guī)模要大得多，如果沒有獲得中國(guó)政府的支持，它是不可能完成的。要了解這筆交易將如何推動(dòng)中國(guó)的諸多利益，以及為什么它將對(duì)其他國(guó)家產(chǎn)生重大影響，你首先必須理解中國(guó)與糧食的獨(dú)特關(guān)系。

永恒的課題

正如政府發(fā)布的一份農(nóng)業(yè)規(guī)劃文件所言，作為世界上人口最多的國(guó)家，中國(guó)的糧食戰(zhàn)略建立在“饑荒頻發(fā)的歷史”之上。習(xí)近平主席在2013年承認(rèn)，糧食安全是“永恒的課題”。二千多年前，皇王就開始儲(chǔ)備糧食，以應(yīng)對(duì)饑荒的威脅。自那時(shí)起，中國(guó)的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人一直在做相同的事情。

政府聲稱，中國(guó)現(xiàn)在常年維持世界上最龐大的玉米、大米和小麥儲(chǔ)備，但它并沒有公布具體數(shù)據(jù)。聯(lián)合國(guó)建議將每年糧食消費(fèi)額的17%作為合理的全球安全儲(chǔ)備。作為世界上最大的糧食出口國(guó)，美國(guó)根本沒有任何政府儲(chǔ)備。咨詢師估計(jì)，中國(guó)的糧食儲(chǔ)備極為龐大，相當(dāng)于年消費(fèi)額的45%到60%。

這項(xiàng)政策不再合乎情理。美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家兼中國(guó)專家弗雷德?蓋爾表示，“這是一種可追溯到幾千年前的短淺觀點(diǎn)。中國(guó)人的日常飲食變化很大。很少有人每天只吃米飯和面條。”決策者開始直面這個(gè)新現(xiàn)實(shí)。他們?nèi)匀话V迷于維護(hù)糧食安全，但其性質(zhì)正在改變。歷史上第一次，中國(guó)人終于能吃飽飯了?！叭绻Z食政策的目標(biāo)是確保沒有人挨餓，這真的不是問題。”一位要求匿名的中國(guó)咨詢師這樣說道?！罢嬲淖h題是提供更多的蛋白質(zhì)?！?/p>

像世界各地的人們一樣，隨著收入超越生存水平，中國(guó)人想要更多的蛋白質(zhì)。他們的首選蛋白質(zhì)是豬肉；他們消費(fèi)了世界上一半豬肉——隨著收入的增長(zhǎng)，這一比例還在上升。相較于直接吃糧食，吃肉需要耗費(fèi)多達(dá)四倍的糧食（即牲畜飼料）。

于是，中國(guó)必須面對(duì)這一新現(xiàn)實(shí)：糧食安全不再意味著只有足夠多的糧食。它還意味著提供足夠多的高蛋白質(zhì)食物，以滿足民眾日益上漲的需求。中國(guó)必須設(shè)法滿足這一新常態(tài)的要求——利用只占全世界7%的耕地養(yǎng)活19%的世界人口，而且要讓他們每天都吃得更好。

這恰好是先正達(dá)的強(qiáng)項(xiàng)。中國(guó)政府最近披露了一項(xiàng)雙管齊下的糧食安全戰(zhàn)略，它遠(yuǎn)比僅僅填充更大的糧倉(cāng)復(fù)雜得多，而這筆收購(gòu)交易正是該戰(zhàn)略的組成部分。先正達(dá)CEO方華德表示，“這筆交易的目的在于保障中國(guó)的食品安全?！彼且晃幻绹?guó)人，曾經(jīng)在2003年到2008年執(zhí)掌杜邦公司的種子和農(nóng)業(yè)化學(xué)品業(yè)務(wù)。中國(guó)可以采用兩種方式來確保糧食安全。第一種顯而易見：“改善技術(shù)和生產(chǎn)率低下的中國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)實(shí)踐，”方華德說。第二種或許令人意想不到：“確保我們正在世界各地開發(fā)尖端的農(nóng)業(yè)技術(shù)。即使中國(guó)發(fā)生嚴(yán)重旱澇災(zāi)害，他們也想確保世界各地有足夠的糧食可供進(jìn)口?！?/p>

也就是說，有史以來第一次，中國(guó)正在重新繪制通往糧食安全的路線圖。中國(guó)政府當(dāng)然希望在國(guó)內(nèi)生產(chǎn)它所需的所有食物，但它承認(rèn)這是辦不到的。于是，中國(guó)不僅嘗試著顯著提高國(guó)內(nèi)產(chǎn)量，同時(shí)也試圖確保世界其他地方總是擁有大量食物，而且中國(guó)能夠隨時(shí)滿足自身的需要——要么徑直購(gòu)買，要么通過收購(gòu)所有權(quán)或其他交易來直接控制外國(guó)的糧食資源。

轉(zhuǎn)基因種子

所有這些目標(biāo)都不容易實(shí)現(xiàn)。首先，作為糧食安全的第一部分，增加國(guó)內(nèi)糧食產(chǎn)量是一個(gè)嚴(yán)峻的挑戰(zhàn)。于中國(guó)而言，增加差強(qiáng)人意的糧食產(chǎn)量有雙重目標(biāo)。其一是滿足日益增長(zhǎng)的需求，其二是增加農(nóng)民收入。迄今為止，中國(guó)主要通過使用農(nóng)用化學(xué)品和化肥來提高產(chǎn)量。過度使用農(nóng)用化學(xué)品和化肥對(duì)土壤和水造成的污染，甚至比工業(yè)活動(dòng)更加嚴(yán)重。現(xiàn)如今，最有效的增產(chǎn)途徑莫過于使用轉(zhuǎn)基因種子。但近30年來頻頻爆發(fā)的食品安全丑聞，給中國(guó)人留下了巨大的創(chuàng)傷，以至于他們極端警惕轉(zhuǎn)基因生物，哪怕123位諾貝爾獎(jiǎng)獲得者聯(lián)名簽署了一份為轉(zhuǎn)基因食品安全背書的公開信。

中國(guó)人傾向于懷疑任何標(biāo)榜為創(chuàng)新的食品開發(fā)項(xiàng)目，認(rèn)為其背后掩藏著不可告人的邪惡目的。許多人認(rèn)為，轉(zhuǎn)基因生物是一種旨在傷害中國(guó)人的西方陰謀。這種理論或許跟中國(guó)缺乏本土開發(fā)的轉(zhuǎn)基因種子有關(guān)，盡管中國(guó)實(shí)際上早在上世紀(jì)90年代就花費(fèi)數(shù)年時(shí)間從事這方面的研究。

自那以后，為安撫公眾的恐懼情緒，中國(guó)政府幾乎禁止了所有的轉(zhuǎn)基因種子。美國(guó)農(nóng)業(yè)部的蓋爾指出，“轉(zhuǎn)基因種子可以幫助中國(guó)解決諸如干旱和蟲害這類令人頭疼的農(nóng)業(yè)難題。但過去十年來，消費(fèi)者的抵觸情緒持續(xù)增長(zhǎng)。在目前這個(gè)時(shí)點(diǎn)，這兩種利益真的發(fā)生了沖突。在長(zhǎng)達(dá)十年的研發(fā)之后，中國(guó)政府從未批準(zhǔn)外國(guó)開發(fā)的轉(zhuǎn)基因大米和玉米進(jìn)入國(guó)內(nèi)市場(chǎng)。”

中國(guó)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人知道這種狀況必須改變。習(xí)近平主席在2013年指出，中國(guó)要“要大膽創(chuàng)新研究，占領(lǐng)轉(zhuǎn)基因技術(shù)制高點(diǎn)，不能把轉(zhuǎn)基因農(nóng)產(chǎn)品市場(chǎng)都讓外國(guó)大公司占領(lǐng)了?！?/font>面對(duì)這種挑戰(zhàn)，最好或許也是唯一的應(yīng)對(duì)方式是，收購(gòu)一家外國(guó)公司——先正達(dá)。

Approved by all relevant government authorities globally, the deal looks likely to close in May or June. It’s a massive transaction by Chinese standards, dwarfing the previous record, set by oil giant CNOOC’s acquisition of a Canadian energy company, Nexen, for $15 billion in 2013. ChemChina CEO Ren Jianxin has made his company the most aggressive global acquirer among China’s state-owned enterprises, buying Italy’s Pirelli tire company and Germany’s Krauss--Maffei machinery manufacturer in 2015, for example. But the Syngenta acquisition is vastly larger, and it wouldn’t have happened without the Chinese government’s blessing. To understand how it advances many of the country’s interests and why it’s so important beyond China, one must begin at China’s unique relationship with food.

The food strategy of the world’s most populous country is built on a “history of innumerable famines,” as a government planning document for China’s agricultural sector put it. President Xi Jinping acknowledged in 2013 that food security is “an eternal issue for us.” Emperors were stockpiling grain against the threat of famine more than 2,000 years ago, and the country’s leaders have been doing the same ever since.

China today maintains massive stockpiles of corn, rice, and wheat—the world’s largest reserves, the government claims, though it doesn’t release figures. The UN has recommended 17% of annual grain consumption as a reasonable global safety reserve. The U.S., which produces so much food that it’s the world’s top food exporter, holds no government stockpiles at all. Consultants believe China keeps reserves equaling a huge 45% to 60% of annual consumption, just in case.

That policy no longer makes sense. “It’s a myopic view going back millennia,” says Fred Gale, an economist and China specialist at the U.S. Department of Agriculture. “The Chinese diet is changing so much. Few people eat just rice and noodles every day.” Policymakers are beginning to face that new reality. Food security is still an obsession, but its nature is changing. For the first time, the country overall is decently fed. “If the issue is that no one goes hungry, there really isn’t an issue,” says a China-based consultant who requested anonymity because he’s critical of government policy. “The real issue is the move to more protein.”

Like people everywhere, the Chinese want more protein as their incomes rise above subsistence levels. Their protein of choice is pork; they consume half of all the world’s pork, a proportion that’s rising along with incomes. Feeding people meat requires three to four times as much grain in the form of livestock feed as does feeding people grain directly.

Thus China’s new reality: Food security no longer means just having enough food. It also means being able to feed people the higher-protein food they increasingly demand. The danger is no longer that millions will starve, but rather that millions may rise up in anger if they can’t get, or can’t afford, the diet to which they’re growing accustomed. China must somehow meet the demands of this new normal by feeding 19% of the world’s people—and feeding them better every day—with just 7% of the world’s arable land.

That’s where Syngenta comes in. The acquisition is part of a recently unveiled, two-pronged strategy for Chinese food security that’s far more sophisticated than just filling bigger granaries. “The reason for this deal was food security for China,” says Syngenta CEO Erik Fyrwald, an American who ran DuPont’s seed and agrochemicals business from 2003 to 2008. That security is to be achieved in two ways. One is obvious: “To improve technology and farm practices in China, where farm productivity is low,” says Fyrwald. The second is unexpected: “To make sure we’re developing leading-edge technology for agriculture around the world. Even if there’s a big drought or a big flood in China, they want to make sure there’s enough food available around the world to import.”

That is, China is remapping the path to food security for the first time in its long history. The government would love to produce all the food it needs within its borders, but it’s acknowledging that it can’t. So while it tries to increase domestic production dramatically, it also aims to ensure that the rest of the world always has plenty of food and that China can get what it needs, either by buying it or by controlling foreign sources directly through ownership or other deals.

None of this will be easy, and the challenges begin at home with the first prong of the strategy: higher domestic production. China’s poor crop yields must be increased not just to meet rising demand, but also so that Chinese farmers, the nation’s poorest people, can make more money. So far China has raised yields mainly by using commodity agricultural chemicals and fertilizers—far too many of them. They’ve polluted the soil and water even worse than industrial activity. The most effective way to raise yields now is to use genetically modified seeds. And the Chinese public, traumatized by 30 years of deadly food-safety scandals, is extremely wary of GMOs.

Never mind that 123 Nobel Prize winners have signed a letter endorsing the safety of GMO foods. The Chinese tend to suspect evil behind any food development billed as innovation, and they don’t trust the government to keep their food safe. Many in China believe GMOs are a Western plot to harm them. That theory fits well with China’s lack of domestically developed GMO seeds, though the country actually spent years in the 1990s trying to develop them.

Since then the government has banned virtually all GMO seeds in China because of public fear. “China has major agricultural issues that GMO seeds could address—drought, insects. These are big concerns in China,” says the USDA’s Gale. “But resistance among consumers has grown over the past 10 years. Those two interests are really clashing at this point. The authorities have never approved [foreign-developed] GMO rice and corn, after 10 years of study.”

Chinese leaders know that has to change. China must “boldly research and innovate, [and] dominate the high points of GMO techniques,” President Xi said in a 2013 speech. “[We] cannot let foreign companies dominate the GMO market.” The best and perhaps only way to meet that challenge was to buy a foreign company—Syngenta.

只要中國(guó)沒有一家競(jìng)逐轉(zhuǎn)基因領(lǐng)域的公司，這種技術(shù)將大幅提高農(nóng)作物產(chǎn)量的前景就無法實(shí)現(xiàn)。如果中國(guó)種植西方的轉(zhuǎn)基因作物，它就不得不依賴外國(guó)的轉(zhuǎn)基因種子——這恰恰與糧食安全戰(zhàn)略背道而馳。但鑒于一家國(guó)有企業(yè)將擁有一家全球領(lǐng)先的種子公司，政府的動(dòng)機(jī)必將發(fā)生反轉(zhuǎn)。于中國(guó)化工而言，廣泛應(yīng)用轉(zhuǎn)基因種子是一場(chǎng)巨大的商業(yè)勝利；于政府而言，這是一場(chǎng)政策勝利。

這筆交易也有助于滿足其他國(guó)家的優(yōu)先事項(xiàng)。長(zhǎng)期以模仿者形象示人的中國(guó)，希望成為世界頂尖創(chuàng)新者，特別是在科技，尤其是生物科技領(lǐng)域。先正達(dá)于2008年成立的北京研究中心，正在從事生物科技方面的科研工作。這筆交易完成后，該中心將從事更多的類似研究。隨著中國(guó)正在嘗試說服公眾接受轉(zhuǎn)基因生物，通過在中國(guó)研發(fā)更具生產(chǎn)力的非轉(zhuǎn)基因種子，先正達(dá)或許能夠助政府一臂之力。比如，該公司正在借助于傳統(tǒng)雜交的新技術(shù)，讓農(nóng)作物更加抗菌和抗旱。此外，先正達(dá)還在北京研發(fā)基因組編輯的新技術(shù)；不同于轉(zhuǎn)基因生物技術(shù)，它不涉及從另一個(gè)物種提取基因，再將其插入植物中。方華德解釋說，“要想讓玉米更耐旱，你可以修改這種作物的基因，而不必將不同的基因置入其中。這是非常令人興奮的科學(xué)?！彼羞@一切，再加上最前沿的轉(zhuǎn)基因生物研究，正是決策者希望在中國(guó)看到的一幕。

先正達(dá)的另一大吸引力是其遍及全球的運(yùn)營(yíng)版圖。這家公司在北美、拉丁美洲、歐洲、中東和非洲地區(qū)經(jīng)營(yíng)大宗業(yè)務(wù)，在亞洲的存在感相對(duì)較弱，而中國(guó)化工可以幫助它拓展亞洲市場(chǎng)。在全球農(nóng)業(yè)領(lǐng)域，中國(guó)化工自身的業(yè)務(wù)范圍很廣，但極其單?。凰饕N售低利潤(rùn)的農(nóng)用化學(xué)品。在先正達(dá)運(yùn)營(yíng)的所有市場(chǎng)，更加先進(jìn)的產(chǎn)品都讓它成為一家舉足輕重的公司。中國(guó)問題專家?guī)於鞅硎荆跋日_(dá)是一家真正的全球性公司，而作為一項(xiàng)戰(zhàn)略目標(biāo)，中國(guó)正在尋求與世界交往。一種看法認(rèn)為，中國(guó)必須在全球化中發(fā)揮領(lǐng)導(dǎo)作用。它比任何其他主要國(guó)家都更加依賴全球化。”

特別是在食品安全領(lǐng)域。中國(guó)意識(shí)到，單憑自身的力量，它根本無法滿足日益富裕的國(guó)民對(duì)食品的需求。作為其糧食安全戰(zhàn)略的第二部分，中國(guó)正在進(jìn)口越來越多的食物。與此同時(shí)，政府高層認(rèn)為，中國(guó)必須設(shè)法加強(qiáng)安全感。大多數(shù)必須進(jìn)口食物的國(guó)家，比如日本，都依賴于競(jìng)爭(zhēng)激烈的世界市場(chǎng)來滿足他們的需求。但對(duì)中國(guó)來說，這還不夠安全。

因此，中國(guó)糧食安全的新戰(zhàn)略包括全面控制其全球供應(yīng)鏈，這個(gè)供應(yīng)鏈從種子開始。另一個(gè)相對(duì)偏后的環(huán)節(jié)（也是由先正達(dá)提供）是先進(jìn)的農(nóng)作物保護(hù)產(chǎn)品——這些產(chǎn)品旨在幫助農(nóng)作物生產(chǎn)更多的糧食，同時(shí)最大化地減少對(duì)環(huán)境的傷害。此外，中國(guó)正在收購(gòu)貿(mào)易公司，并推動(dòng)本土公司合并，以對(duì)抗西方大公司。

西方合作伙伴

于中國(guó)而言，收購(gòu)先正達(dá)的重要意義還體現(xiàn)在另一個(gè)方面：隨著全球化工和種子產(chǎn)業(yè)在過去18個(gè)月突然加快整合步伐，中國(guó)必須斬獲一個(gè)重量級(jí)的西方合作伙伴。2015年，當(dāng)陶氏化學(xué)與杜邦宣布合并的時(shí)候，孟山都公司正在尋求收購(gòu)先正達(dá)，而后者希望獲得一個(gè)高于收購(gòu)要約的價(jià)格。就是在這個(gè)時(shí)候，中國(guó)化工加入這場(chǎng)競(jìng)購(gòu)戰(zhàn)，并支付了一筆足以滿足先正達(dá)期望值的收購(gòu)款。不久之后，拜耳宣布該公司正在收購(gòu)孟山都。在這些交易塵埃落定之際，全球種子和農(nóng)業(yè)化學(xué)品行業(yè)將涌現(xiàn)三大巨頭：一家是美國(guó)的，一家是歐洲的，還有一家屬于中國(guó)。

The GMO promise of dramatically higher crop yields was unavailable to China so long as the country didn’t have a player in the game. If it grew Western GMO crops, the country would become reliant on foreign sources of necessary seeds—the opposite of food security. But now that a state-owned enterprise will own a leading seed company, the country’s incentives reverse. Wide adoption of GMO seeds becomes a big commercial win for ChemChina and a policy win for the government.

The deal helps meet other national priorities too. Long an imitator, China wants to become the world’s top innovator, especially in technology and even more especially in biotech. Syngenta established a Beijing research center in 2008 and is doing biotech science there now; it will be doing much more after the deal closes. As China moves gradually toward public acceptance of GMOs, Syngenta may help smooth the transition by developing, in China, non-GMO seeds that are nonetheless more productive. For example, it’s making crops more fungus-and drought-resistant through new techniques of traditional hybridizing. It’s also working in Beijing on new technology in genome editing; unlike GMO technology, it doesn’t involve inserting a gene from another species, such as a bacterium, into a plant. “To make a corn plant more drought tolerant, you can modify genes in the plant without having to put a different gene in,” Fyrwald explains. “That’s very exciting science.” All of that, plus leading-edge GMO research, is what policymakers want more of in China.

Another of Syngenta’s attractions is its global reach. The company does significant business in North America, Latin America, and EMEA (Europe, the Middle East, and Africa), with slightly less presence in Asia, where ChemChina can help. ChemChina’s own presence in global agriculture is wide but paper-thin; it mostly sells low-profit commodity agrochemicals. Syngenta’s more advanced products make it more important wherever it operates. “Syngenta is a truly worldwide company, and China has a strategic objective of engaging with the world,” says Kuhn. “There’s a sense that China must take leadership in globalization. It’s more dependent on globalization than any other major country.”

That’s especially true when it comes to food security. Having accepted that it can’t satisfy its prospering population alone, China must find a way to feel secure while importing growing quantities of food—the second prong of its strategy. Most countries that must import food, such as Japan, count on a deep, competitive world market to supply their needs. But that’s not secure enough for China.

Thus China’s new strategy for food security includes controlling its global supply chain from beginning to end, and the chain begins with seeds. A later link, also supplied by Syngenta, is advanced crop protection products to help plants produce more food with minimum damage to the environment. Separately, China is also buying trading companies and combining some of its own to counter big Western firms.

Snagging Syngenta is crucially important for China in one other way: The country had to secure a major Western partner as the global chemical and seed industry suddenly consolidated over the past 18 months. When Dow and DuPont announced their merger in 2015, Monsanto was trying to buy Syngenta, which wanted a higher price than Monsanto was offering. That’s when ChemChina stepped in and paid what Syngenta wanted. Soon thereafter, Bayer announced it was buying Monsanto. When those deals close, the result will be three global giants in seeds and agrochemicals: one American, one European, and one Chinese.

中國(guó)化工和先正達(dá)的合并交易，引發(fā)了一些重要的問題。在這個(gè)全球最大的食品市場(chǎng)，那些剛剛合并的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手將獲得何種待遇？“一個(gè)明明存在，卻被人刻意回避的問題是：中國(guó)是只對(duì)改革感興趣，還是真心致力于改革開放？”一位美國(guó)商界領(lǐng)袖兼中國(guó)問題專家這樣說道?！耙坏┲袊?guó)擁有先正達(dá)，它就有機(jī)會(huì)向銷售競(jìng)品的其他公司開放市場(chǎng)。政府是否會(huì)阻止進(jìn)口，還是會(huì)承認(rèn)競(jìng)爭(zhēng)是件好事？”

答案似乎是，中國(guó)喜歡競(jìng)爭(zhēng)——在一定程度上?！爸袊?guó)政府為先正達(dá)、陶氏化學(xué)、拜耳、杜邦和孟山都等外國(guó)公司提供全面開放的市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入機(jī)會(huì)?！痹谒谋本┺k公室接受電話采訪時(shí)，中國(guó)化工CEO任建新這樣說道?！氨M管如此，我相信，鑒于中國(guó)化工是一家獨(dú)一無二的國(guó)內(nèi)公司，先正達(dá)將享有一種特殊地位?！彼赋觯私佑|中國(guó)政府的機(jī)會(huì)之外，中國(guó)化工還可以為先正達(dá)提供100個(gè)生產(chǎn)設(shè)備，與數(shù)十萬農(nóng)民的合作關(guān)系，以及一個(gè)旨在幫助農(nóng)民購(gòu)買先正達(dá)產(chǎn)品的融資計(jì)劃。

一家主要競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手的CEO似乎接受了中國(guó)的新行業(yè)秩序。他說，“所謂的自由市場(chǎng)其實(shí)是不存在的。我們將密切關(guān)注中國(guó)對(duì)本土公司的偏袒。但我是個(gè)現(xiàn)實(shí)主義者。在一些領(lǐng)域，我們是無法獲得公平的市場(chǎng)準(zhǔn)入機(jī)會(huì)的?！?/p>

另一個(gè)大問題是，中國(guó)不斷增長(zhǎng)的胃口是否會(huì)危及世界其他地區(qū)的糧食安全？多年來，農(nóng)業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家一直擔(dān)心中國(guó)的旺盛需求可能會(huì)淹沒世界糧食市場(chǎng)——自2008年以來，中國(guó)的食品進(jìn)口一直在持續(xù)飆漲。然而，全球的糧食價(jià)格不僅沒有上漲，反而下降了。如果這筆收購(gòu)交易最終提升了中國(guó)或其他地區(qū)的糧食產(chǎn)量，它就將大大緩解全球糧食市場(chǎng)的價(jià)格上漲壓力。廣大農(nóng)民可能不喜歡這樣的結(jié)果，但這種前景將降低全球爆發(fā)糧食危機(jī)或地緣政治沖突的幾率。

至少短期內(nèi)如此。另一個(gè)與先正達(dá)交易相關(guān)的大問題是：接下來會(huì)發(fā)生什么？中國(guó)幾乎肯定會(huì)增加國(guó)內(nèi)糧食產(chǎn)量，但隨著中產(chǎn)階級(jí)群體對(duì)肉類的需求不斷增長(zhǎng)，它將需要更多的糧食和大豆。即使產(chǎn)量增長(zhǎng)，中國(guó)也無法依靠自身力量生產(chǎn)足夠多的糧食。歷經(jīng)饑荒頻發(fā)的數(shù)千年歷史之后，中國(guó)人終于解決了吃飽飯這一永恒的挑戰(zhàn)。它將在多大程度上解決下一個(gè)挑戰(zhàn)，讓廣大民眾的飲食結(jié)構(gòu)達(dá)到富裕國(guó)家的水準(zhǔn)，是先正達(dá)交易尋求解決，但還沒有給出答案的大問題。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Kevin

The ChemChina/Syngenta deal raises important questions. How will its newly merged competitors be treated in China, the world’s largest food market? “That’s the elephant in the room: Is China interested in reform only, or interested in reform and opening up?” wonders a U.S. business luminary and China expert. “Once China owns Syngenta, there will be an opportunity to open to other companies with competing products. Will the authorities block imports or recognize that competition is good?”

The answer seems to be that China likes competition up to a point. “The Chinese government is fully open in providing access to foreign players, including Syngenta, Dow, Bayer, DuPont, and Monsanto,” says ChemChina’s Ren in a phone interview from his Beijing office. “But in spite of this fact, I believe that with ChemChina as a domestic player in a unique and good position, Syngenta enjoys a special position.” He notes that besides access to its owner, the government, ChemChina can offer Syngenta 100 production facilities, relationships with hundreds of thousands of farmers, and a financing operation to help farmers buy Syngenta products.

The CEO of a major competitor is resigned to the new industry order in China. “There’s no such thing as free markets,” he says. “We’ll be very watchful of bias to the local. But I’m a realist. We don’t have fair market access to some things.”

Another big question: Will China’s growing appetite imperil food security for the rest of the world? Agricultural economists have worried for years that Chinese demand could overwhelm world food markets, and the country’s food imports have increased sharply since 2008. Yet global prices haven’t spiked. On the contrary, they’ve declined. If the Syngenta deal raises yields in China and maybe elsewhere too, it will ease upward pricing pressure globally. Farmers may not like that result, but it will reduce chances of food-based crises or geopolitical conflicts.

At least it will for a while. One more big question about the Syngenta deal is: What comes next? China will almost certainly increase domestic food production, but the more that its swelling middle class demands meat, the more grain and soybeans it will need. And even with higher yields, the country can’t produce enough on its own. The eternal challenge of fending off starvation has been met. After thousands of years, China has likely suffered its last famine. How well it can meet its next challenge, feeding its people a rich-country diet, is a big question the Syngenta deal addresses but doesn’t answer.?