杰夫·伊梅爾特?fù)?dān)任通用電氣（General Electric）CEO的近16年時間，在長期備受煎熬的投資者看來是不成功的，因為如果他們投資一支指數(shù)基金，肯定能獲得更好的回報率。但我們不能如此苛刻地評價伊梅爾特。他離職的消息公布以后，迫使人們不得不關(guān)注通用電氣始終未給出滿意答案的一個重要問題：作為一家業(yè)務(wù)龐雜、定期跑輸大市的綜合大企業(yè)，通用電氣為什么依舊能存在？

伊梅爾特的繼任者約翰·弗蘭納里是通用電氣卓越領(lǐng)導(dǎo)力培養(yǎng)程序的成果，他似乎已經(jīng)為新工作做好了充分準(zhǔn)備。但伊梅爾特和他的所有前任同樣如此。一個殘酷的事實是，投資者沒有理由期望公司就一定能一掃過去的陰霾，未來能帶來更高的回報。

問題在于，通用電氣的業(yè)務(wù)組合在不斷變化，各項業(yè)務(wù)之間并沒有按照任何組織原則聯(lián)系在一起。通用電氣不止是一家公司；它是一家主動式管理的共同基金，CEO相當(dāng)于基金經(jīng)理。在宣布伊梅爾特離職的消息時，通用電氣董事會的首席獨立董事杰克·布倫南贊揚伊梅爾特“進(jìn)行了大規(guī)模的業(yè)務(wù)組合改造?！钡@是每一位通用電氣CEO都會做的事情。伊梅爾特執(zhí)行的策略包括放棄塑料、家電、保險、網(wǎng)絡(luò)電視等業(yè)務(wù)以及通用電氣資本的絕大部分；涉足油田服務(wù)、軟件、3D打印和更多非美國業(yè)務(wù)。他曾嘗試但后來又放棄了安全、水處理和電影業(yè)務(wù)。

很可惜，作為負(fù)責(zé)對業(yè)務(wù)組合進(jìn)行重新洗牌的人，盡管伊梅爾特的表現(xiàn)并不遜色于多數(shù)基金經(jīng)理和他的多數(shù)前輩們，他還是跑輸了大市。而正是因為這個無法避免的事實，投資者們多年來一直要求他下臺。

在通用電氣的CEO中有一個人是最大的例外，他就是伊梅爾特的前任杰克·韋爾奇，他在20年任期內(nèi)多數(shù)時間都跑贏了大盤。但他的成功只是突出了通用電氣的麻煩。通用電氣自二戰(zhàn)結(jié)束以來便一直是一家多元經(jīng)營的大公司，并且在先后經(jīng)歷了六位CEO之后，公司股價才小幅超過標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)。但這些出色的業(yè)績，只能歸功于韋爾奇一個人；假設(shè)在韋爾奇任期內(nèi)通用電氣的股票走勢只是與大盤一致，則公司在二戰(zhàn)之后的業(yè)績依舊將遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于標(biāo)普500指數(shù)。一家公司不能把期待遇到一個百年一遇的管理天才作為戰(zhàn)略。

伊梅爾特的所有策略都是正確的。他從上任之初，便一改韋爾奇的做法，將更多資源投入到技術(shù)研發(fā)與創(chuàng)新。一位前公司高層回憶稱：“他開始在會議上討論能源與醫(yī)療保健行業(yè)未來十年的前景?！痹诮鹑谖C之前放棄保險業(yè)務(wù)非常有先見之明，但他并未因此獲得足夠的贊揚。過去兩年，他將公司的重心轉(zhuǎn)移到工業(yè)業(yè)務(wù)，尤其是基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施業(yè)務(wù)，盡管這些業(yè)務(wù)仍非常多元化；例如，PET掃描儀和海底油井防噴裝置沒有任何相同之處。他投入了大量資源，對這些業(yè)務(wù)進(jìn)行數(shù)字化改造，幫助促進(jìn)不同業(yè)務(wù)之間的知識共享。這些策略聽起來都是非常合理的。

此外，伊梅爾特堪稱是廣義上的CEO典范。在擔(dān)任CEO大約四年之后，沃倫·巴菲特告訴筆者：“在他的任期內(nèi)，他很有可能是最受尊敬的美國公司代言人。他具備了這個職位要求的所有條件 —— 他既有優(yōu)秀商人的信譽，又有一流的人品?！币晃磺肮靖吖芨嬖V筆者：“他工作非常拼命。他會為了獲得一份訂單，親自坐飛機前往菲律賓?！?/p>

但在他任期內(nèi)，通用電氣的股東整體回報率一直遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)落后于標(biāo)普500指數(shù)的平均回報率。當(dāng)然，在約翰·弗蘭納里的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)下，股東回報率或許會大幅提高。但在當(dāng)前公司滿懷希望進(jìn)行轉(zhuǎn)型的關(guān)鍵時刻，通用電氣的投資者、員工和其他利益相關(guān)者必須面對一個鐵的事實：除非弗蘭納里和董事會決定拆分通用電氣，否則他們沒有理由期望公司有更好的市場表現(xiàn)。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：劉進(jìn)龍/汪皓

Jeff Immelt’s near-16-year tenure as CEO of General Electric (GE, -1.55%) was not successful for the company’s long-suffering investors, who would have done far better in an index fund. But let’s not judge him too harshly. His announced departure forces attention on a large question that the company has never answered satisfactorily: Why does GE—a sprawling conglomerate that chronically underperforms the market—still exist?

Immelt’s successor, John Flannery, is a product of GE’s excellent leadership development process and seems superbly prepared for the job. But the same was true of Immelt and all his CEO predecessors. The harsh reality is that investors have no reason to expect the future will be much better than the miserable past.

The problem is that GE is an ever changing portfolio of businesses unconnected by any organizing principle. It isn’t just a company; it’s an actively managed mutual fund, with the CEO as the manager. In announcing Immelt’s departure, the GE board’s lead independent director, Jack Brennan, praised him for having “executed a massive portfolio transformation.” But that’s what every GE CEO does. Among other moves, Immelt got out of plastics, appliances, insurance, network TV, and nearly all of GE Capital; he got into oilfield services, software, 3D printing, and more non-U.S. operations. He got into and then out of security, water processing, and movies.

Unfortunately, as a portfolio shuffler Immelt performed about as well as most fund managers and most of his predecessors: He underperformed the market. That unavoidable fact has had investors calling for his head for years.

The great exception among GE CEOs is of course Jack Welch, Immelt’s immediate predecessor, who massively beat the market in his 20-year tenure. But his success merely emphasizes the trouble with GE. The company has been a conglomerate since the end of World War II, and through the six CEOs since then it has slightly bested the S&P 500. All of that outperformance and much more, however, is attributable solely to Welch; if we assume that GE simply matched the market during his tenure, then it would have severely lagged behind the S&P 500 since World War II. Hoping for a once-a-century managerial phenomenon is not a corporate strategy.

Immelt did all kinds of things right. From the beginning of his tenure he put greater resources into technological research and innovation than Welch had done. “He started having conferences on the state of energy and healthcare ten years in the future,” notes a former high-level executive. Getting out of insurance before the financial crisis was a prescient move for which he receives insufficient credit. Over the past two years he has focused the company on industrial businesses, especially infrastructure businesses, though they’re still widely diverse; PET scanners and undersea oil well blowout preventers have little in common. He has invested heavily in digitizing those businesses and in helping them share their knowledge among one another. It all sounds impressively reasoned.

In addition, Immelt is in the broad sense a model CEO. When he’d been in the job about four years, Warren Buffett told me, “He’s likely to be the most respected spokesman for American business in his tenure. He has all the ingredients to fill that role—the credentials as a terrific businessperson and a first-class person.” A former top executive told me, “He works his ass off. He’ll jump on a plane to the Philippines to get an order.”

And yet GE’s total return to shareholders has lagged far behind the S&P 500’s over his tenure. Of course it might do significantly better under John Flannery. But at this hopeful moment of transition, GE's investors, employees, and other stakeholders must confront a hard fact: Unless Flannery and the board decide to de-conglomerate GE, there’s no reason to expect better performance.