美國總統(tǒng)特朗普說，贏得貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)輕而易舉，但如果仔細(xì)回顧歷史，會發(fā)現(xiàn)答案截然相反。最著名的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義落敗案例當(dāng)屬上世紀(jì)30年代美國的斯姆特-霍利關(guān)稅法（Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act）。法案問世時，全世界其他地區(qū)也出臺了類似的保護(hù)主義措施。當(dāng)時，保護(hù)主義重創(chuàng)全球貿(mào)易，美國經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條形勢惡化。自那以后，美國走上了推動貿(mào)易自由化的道路，而且每當(dāng)美國單邊脫離正軌，往往會代價慘重。

尼克松任美國總統(tǒng)期間，為了穩(wěn)定美國對日本等國家迅速擴(kuò)大的貿(mào)易逆差，他沒有加息和限制財政預(yù)算，而是選擇臨時大范圍征收關(guān)稅和美元與黃金脫鉤，推動上世紀(jì)70年代美國陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)滯脹。2002年，為保護(hù)美國企業(yè)，時任美國總統(tǒng)的小布什對進(jìn)口鋼鐵征收關(guān)稅，不過遭到了世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）其他成員國的強(qiáng)烈抵制，美國鋼鐵制造業(yè)的就業(yè)崗位沒挽回多少，還影響了供應(yīng)鏈下游產(chǎn)業(yè)的就業(yè)增長。最終，小布什悄然撤除了關(guān)稅。

美國智庫彼得森國際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所的專家彼得·肖特指出，當(dāng)前特朗普政府的保護(hù)主義姿態(tài)讓美國貿(mào)易政策進(jìn)入了未知局面。因為出于國家安全理由，這些舉措看似合理。雖然WTO一直允許成員國為保護(hù)國家安全征收關(guān)稅，但成員國很少真正行動，主要擔(dān)心WTO沒法判斷何為成員國的國家安全利益。肖特說，美國援引WTO規(guī)則征收關(guān)稅可以看成對WTO的警告，相當(dāng)于特朗普政府宣布WTO沒能力公平仲裁貿(mào)易爭端。

隨著特朗普政府質(zhì)疑多年來全球貿(mào)易政策的根基，美國的貿(mào)易伙伴將如何回應(yīng)還很難說。不過歐盟已經(jīng)警告稱，將對美國肯塔基州產(chǎn)的威士忌和摩托車哈雷·戴維森摩托車等產(chǎn)品征收關(guān)稅作為報復(fù)。也就是說，歐盟不會善罷甘休。（財富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Feb?

President Trump says that winning a trade war is easy, but a closer look at history suggests otherwise. Of course, the most famous example of protectionism gone awry is 1930’s Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act—which along with similar protectionist measures enacted around the globe—helped torpedo world trade and exacerbate the Great Depression. Since that time U.S. has charted a course toward freer world trade, but when it has unilaterally deviated from that direction, it has usually paid a price.

President Nixon helped usher in the era of stagflation in the 1970s by relying on temporary across-the-board tariffs and currency revaluation rather than higher interest rates and budgetary restraint to stabilize rapidly growing trade deficits with countries like Japan. In 2002, President Bush implemented his own across the board tariffs on steel to protect American companies, but those measures hit fierce resistance by other members of the World Trade Organization, and were quietly lifted without doing much to staunch the loss of steel manufacturing jobs, while hurting job growth further down the supply chain.

The current administration’s proposal takes U.S. trade policy into uncharted waters, says Peter Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, because it is being justified on national security grounds. Though the WTO has always allowed members to institute tariffs to protect national security, these provisions have been little used, for fear that the international body is simply not equipped to decide what constitutes a member country’s national security interests. The tariffs’ underlying justification should be read as a shot across the bow to the WTO itself, Schott says, suggesting that the Trump Administration has “written off” the WTO’s ability to fairly arbitrate trade disagreements.

With the administration questioning the very foundations of a generation of global trade policy, it’s tough to know just how U.S. partners will react, but the European Union’s threat to institute retaliatory tariffs against goods like Kentucky bourbon and Harley Davidson motorcycles, suggests they won’t take it lying down.