美國(guó)總統(tǒng)特朗普說(shuō)，贏得貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)輕而易舉，但如果仔細(xì)回顧歷史，會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)答案截然相反。最著名的貿(mào)易保護(hù)主義落敗案例當(dāng)屬上世紀(jì)30年代美國(guó)的斯姆特-霍利關(guān)稅法（Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act）。法案問(wèn)世時(shí)，全世界其他地區(qū)也出臺(tái)了類似的保護(hù)主義措施。當(dāng)時(shí)，保護(hù)主義重創(chuàng)全球貿(mào)易，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)大蕭條形勢(shì)惡化。自那以后，美國(guó)走上了推動(dòng)貿(mào)易自由化的道路，而且每當(dāng)美國(guó)單邊脫離正軌，往往會(huì)代價(jià)慘重。

尼克松任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)期間，為了穩(wěn)定美國(guó)對(duì)日本等國(guó)家迅速擴(kuò)大的貿(mào)易逆差，他沒(méi)有加息和限制財(cái)政預(yù)算，而是選擇臨時(shí)大范圍征收關(guān)稅和美元與黃金脫鉤，推動(dòng)上世紀(jì)70年代美國(guó)陷入經(jīng)濟(jì)滯脹。2002年，為保護(hù)美國(guó)企業(yè)，時(shí)任美國(guó)總統(tǒng)的小布什對(duì)進(jìn)口鋼鐵征收關(guān)稅，不過(guò)遭到了世界貿(mào)易組織（WTO）其他成員國(guó)的強(qiáng)烈抵制，美國(guó)鋼鐵制造業(yè)的就業(yè)崗位沒(méi)挽回多少，還影響了供應(yīng)鏈下游產(chǎn)業(yè)的就業(yè)增長(zhǎng)。最終，小布什悄然撤除了關(guān)稅。

美國(guó)智庫(kù)彼得森國(guó)際經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所的專家彼得·肖特指出，當(dāng)前特朗普政府的保護(hù)主義姿態(tài)讓美國(guó)貿(mào)易政策進(jìn)入了未知局面。因?yàn)槌鲇趪?guó)家安全理由，這些舉措看似合理。雖然WTO一直允許成員國(guó)為保護(hù)國(guó)家安全征收關(guān)稅，但成員國(guó)很少真正行動(dòng)，主要擔(dān)心WTO沒(méi)法判斷何為成員國(guó)的國(guó)家安全利益。肖特說(shuō)，美國(guó)援引WTO規(guī)則征收關(guān)稅可以看成對(duì)WTO的警告，相當(dāng)于特朗普政府宣布WTO沒(méi)能力公平仲裁貿(mào)易爭(zhēng)端。

隨著特朗普政府質(zhì)疑多年來(lái)全球貿(mào)易政策的根基，美國(guó)的貿(mào)易伙伴將如何回應(yīng)還很難說(shuō)。不過(guò)歐盟已經(jīng)警告稱，將對(duì)美國(guó)肯塔基州產(chǎn)的威士忌和摩托車哈雷·戴維森摩托車等產(chǎn)品征收關(guān)稅作為報(bào)復(fù)。也就是說(shuō)，歐盟不會(huì)善罷甘休。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

譯者：Feb?

President Trump says that winning a trade war is easy, but a closer look at history suggests otherwise. Of course, the most famous example of protectionism gone awry is 1930’s Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act—which along with similar protectionist measures enacted around the globe—helped torpedo world trade and exacerbate the Great Depression. Since that time U.S. has charted a course toward freer world trade, but when it has unilaterally deviated from that direction, it has usually paid a price.

President Nixon helped usher in the era of stagflation in the 1970s by relying on temporary across-the-board tariffs and currency revaluation rather than higher interest rates and budgetary restraint to stabilize rapidly growing trade deficits with countries like Japan. In 2002, President Bush implemented his own across the board tariffs on steel to protect American companies, but those measures hit fierce resistance by other members of the World Trade Organization, and were quietly lifted without doing much to staunch the loss of steel manufacturing jobs, while hurting job growth further down the supply chain.

The current administration’s proposal takes U.S. trade policy into uncharted waters, says Peter Schott of the Peterson Institute for International Economics, because it is being justified on national security grounds. Though the WTO has always allowed members to institute tariffs to protect national security, these provisions have been little used, for fear that the international body is simply not equipped to decide what constitutes a member country’s national security interests. The tariffs’ underlying justification should be read as a shot across the bow to the WTO itself, Schott says, suggesting that the Trump Administration has “written off” the WTO’s ability to fairly arbitrate trade disagreements.

With the administration questioning the very foundations of a generation of global trade policy, it’s tough to know just how U.S. partners will react, but the European Union’s threat to institute retaliatory tariffs against goods like Kentucky bourbon and Harley Davidson motorcycles, suggests they won’t take it lying down.