小布什執(zhí)政時(shí)期，美國聯(lián)邦通信委員會（FCC）放寬了規(guī)定，允許更多無線通信運(yùn)營商進(jìn)行合并。到了2010年底，美國的全國性無線通信服務(wù)商數(shù)量從七個(gè)減少到了四個(gè)。進(jìn)一步整合直到2011年，在司法部和FCC聯(lián)合出手阻止時(shí)才停下腳步。

從那時(shí)起，盡管谷歌、Dish Network和康卡斯特等公司都大張旗鼓地采取行動，但美國的全國性無線運(yùn)營商數(shù)量一直是四個(gè)。要明白個(gè)中原因，要理解允許T-Mobile收購斯普林特為什么會給消費(fèi)者帶來大麻煩，我們就需要弄清楚進(jìn)入無線通信市場為何如此艱難，就連資金充裕、品牌知名度高的大公司也是如此。

僅參與其中就得花數(shù)十億美元

為防止無線信號相互干擾，F(xiàn)CC針對通信頻段（也就是某個(gè)電磁波頻段）頒發(fā)獨(dú)家使用牌照。要提供無線通信服務(wù)，企業(yè)就必須獲得多個(gè)這樣的牌照。由于政府限制此類牌照的數(shù)量，其價(jià)格高達(dá)數(shù)十億美元。在2016年進(jìn)行的最近一次無線牌照拍賣中，整個(gè)無線通信行業(yè)花費(fèi)了大約200億美元。紐約、洛杉磯等主要城市的牌照成本可接近10億美元。在美國，要在任何一個(gè)市場提供有競爭力的智能手機(jī)通信服務(wù)，都需要多張牌照來滿足帶寬需求。企業(yè)為此要拿出數(shù)十億美元，而此時(shí)通信網(wǎng)絡(luò)建設(shè)甚至還沒有開始。

組建網(wǎng)絡(luò)也需要幾十億美元以及大量時(shí)間，而且所有這些都發(fā)生在企業(yè)可以開始尋找用戶以便開始償還債務(wù)之前，更不用說開始盈利了。只有花上數(shù)十億美元參與其中，企業(yè)才能開始設(shè)法吸引消費(fèi)者。但就算大幅打折并提供優(yōu)質(zhì)服務(wù)，讓一位用戶不辭辛苦地從一家手機(jī)通信運(yùn)營商轉(zhuǎn)向另一家仍需要付出巨大努力，特別是轉(zhuǎn)向質(zhì)量未知而又無歷史記錄可循的新電信服務(wù)商。

以康卡斯特為例，進(jìn)入無線通信行業(yè)前，這家公司已經(jīng)建立了自己的網(wǎng)絡(luò)，而且擁有2300萬有線電視和寬帶用戶。2017年5月，康卡斯特開始提供移動通信服務(wù)。一年后，其手機(jī)用戶只有50萬多一點(diǎn)兒。這聽起來挺多的，但2017年第四季度斯普林特和T-Mobile就發(fā)展了約1百萬（后付費(fèi)）用戶。更糟糕的是，康卡斯特每爭取一位用戶就得花大約1260美元。即便是康卡斯特也無法保持這樣的支出水平，從而真正跟擁有1.26億用戶的T-Mobile和斯普林特抗衡。

如果谷歌和康卡斯特都不能在無線行業(yè)進(jìn)行競爭，又有誰能呢？

這些門檻的出現(xiàn)源于無線行業(yè)的運(yùn)作方式。這些年來，一系列潛在新生力量反復(fù)試圖顛覆這個(gè)行業(yè)的經(jīng)濟(jì)，但都無功而返。無論是小而分散的新生創(chuàng)業(yè)者、打算將業(yè)務(wù)擴(kuò)展至全國的地區(qū)性電信公司、還是資金充足的谷歌等科技巨頭，它們遇到的都是不留情面的無線通信行業(yè)經(jīng)濟(jì)，這實(shí)際上已經(jīng)讓出現(xiàn)真正的全國性競爭者變成了一件不可能的事。

那么全國性低成本通信服務(wù)商以及預(yù)付費(fèi)通信公司怎么樣呢？比如Boost Mobile或TracPhone？它們或者為四大電信運(yùn)營商所擁有（例如，斯普林特?fù)碛蠦oost Mobile），或者租用四大運(yùn)營商的帶寬，最常見的是租用斯普林特或T-Mobile的帶寬。說這些電信公司和那些全國性運(yùn)營商競爭就像是在說WhatsApp和它的母公司Facebook競爭一樣。

讓T-Mobile收購斯普林特意味著四位競爭者將變成三位。政府一直表示，這樣的集中度對消費(fèi)者來說是件壞事?；跓o線通信行業(yè)的現(xiàn)實(shí)，情況不會發(fā)生改變。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

哈羅德·菲爾德是維權(quán)組織Public Knowledge高級副總裁。

譯者：Charlie

審校：夏林

Back during the George W. Bush administration, the Federal Communications Commission relaxed its rules to allow more wireless companies to merge. By the end of the 2000s, America had gone from seven national providers down to four. The slide to further consolidation only stopped in 2011, when the Justice Department and FCC put their collective regulatory foot down.

Since then, despite high-profile efforts from companies such as Google, Dish Network, and Comcast, we remain at four national providers. To understand why, and why allowing T-Mobile to acquire Sprint would be a big problem for consumers, we need to understand what makes it so hard to for even giant, well-funded companies with recognized brand names to break into the wireless market.

Paying billions just to enter the game

To prevent wireless signals from interfering with each other, the FCC issues exclusive licenses to use the electromagnetic spectrum (usually just called the “spectrum”). To offer wireless services, a business must acquire a fair number of these spectrum licenses. Because the government limits the number of these, they go for billions of dollars. The last wireless auction back in 2016 cost the wireless industry approximately $20 billion dollars collectively. A single license for a major city such as New York or Los Angeles can cost close to $1 billion. To meet the bandwidth demand for a competitive smartphone service takes multiple licenses in every market in the country. That’s a multibillion-dollar price tag before the company even starts to build its network.

Building a network also takes billions of dollars, and a great deal of time. All this is before a business can even begin to find customers to start paying off all its debt, never mind start making a profit. Only after spending billions of dollars to enter the game can a company begin trying to attract customers. But even with steep discounts and quality service, it takes an awful lot to get a customer to go through the hassle of switching from one cell service to another—especially to a new wireless service of unknown quality and no track record.

Consider Comcast, which developed its own network and had a base of 23 million customers for its cable and broadband services before it even entered the wireless industry. Comcast started offering mobile service in May 2017. A year later, it has just over 500,000 subscribers. That sounds impressive, but combined, Sprint and T-Mobile gained approximately 1 million (post-paid) subscribers in the last quarter of 2017. Worse, Comcast spent an estimated $1,260 per customer acquisition. Not even Comcast can keep up that kind of spending to seriously compete with the 126 million subscribersof a joined T-Mobile/Sprint.

If Google and Comcast can’t compete in wireless, who can?

These barriers to entry are built into the way the wireless industry works. Over the years a list of potential new entrants has repeatedly tried to upend the economics of the industry to no avail. Whether scrappy entrepreneurial new entrants, regional providers trying to grow a national footprint, or even well-funded tech giants like Google, each one has run into the unforgiving economics of the wireless industry that make emergence of a serious national competitor virtually impossible.

But what about the low-cost national providers and pre-paid providers, like Boost Mobile or TracPhone? These are either owned by one of the Big Four (Sprint owns Boost, for example), or lease capacity from one of the Big Four, most often Sprint or T-Mobile. Saying that these carriers compete with the national carriers is like saying that WhatsApp competes with its corporate parent, Facebook.

Letting T-Mobile buy Sprint means going from four competitors to three, a level of concentration the government has consistently said is bad for consumers. Based on the realities of the wireless industry, that isn’t going to change.

Harold Feld is the senior vice president at Public Knowledge.