夏日炎炎，商界對(duì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的樂(lè)觀情緒也像烈日一樣火爆。美國(guó)一流企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官協(xié)會(huì)Business Roundtable調(diào)查顯示，今年6月美國(guó)大企業(yè)首席執(zhí)行官信心爆棚，他們預(yù)計(jì)的企業(yè)營(yíng)業(yè)收入和投資規(guī)模都超出3月的預(yù)期，信心值創(chuàng)該調(diào)查十五年來(lái)新高。首席財(cái)務(wù)官同樣信心滿滿。四大會(huì)計(jì)師事務(wù)所之一德勤調(diào)查顯示，首席財(cái)務(wù)官最近對(duì)北美經(jīng)濟(jì)的預(yù)期達(dá)到八年來(lái)最高水平。美國(guó)獨(dú)立企業(yè)聯(lián)盟報(bào)告顯示，小企業(yè)領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者的樂(lè)觀心態(tài)也達(dá)到了過(guò)去三十年來(lái)從未有過(guò)的高位。用一個(gè)比喻評(píng)價(jià)，美國(guó)商界上下一派歌舞升平、擊鐘鼎食的氣象。

這種時(shí)候要讓歡騰的舞步戛然而止似乎有些不盡人情。我們不會(huì)這么潑冷水。今年7月中旬，預(yù)測(cè)機(jī)構(gòu)料將公布二季度GDP增長(zhǎng)預(yù)期，即便他們預(yù)計(jì)美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)至少未來(lái)幾個(gè)季度仍會(huì)保持強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng)也不意外。失業(yè)率正處于歷史低位，就業(yè)前景向好吸引更多美國(guó)人重返勞動(dòng)力大軍。難怪商界領(lǐng)袖們?nèi)绱擞行判摹?

THE OPTIMISM IS BEAMING like the summer sun. America’s big-company CEOs are bursting with confidence, in June expecting to take in even more revenue and make bigger investments than they foresaw in March, when they were more confident than ever before in the 15 years the Business Roundtable has been surveying them. CFOs are just as ebullient. Their perception of the North American economy was recently the highest in the eight years Deloitte had been asking about it. Leaders of small businesses also are brimming with optimism—more than at any time in the past 30 years, reports the National Federation of Independent Business. At least figuratively, confetti is flying, disco balls are spinning, and Champagne corks are popping across the length and breadth of American business.

It seems a shame to pull the plug on the dance music, so we won’t, exactly. As of mid-July, forecasters were expecting the announcement of a knockout GDP growth number for the second quarter, and it wouldn’t be surprising if the U.S. economy continued to grow impressively for at least a few quarters more. Unemployment is near historic lows, and better job prospects are drawing more workers back into the labor force. No wonder business leaders are confident.

然而，經(jīng)濟(jì)走強(qiáng)的跡象掩蓋了一些根本現(xiàn)實(shí)，這些現(xiàn)實(shí)問(wèn)題不會(huì)逐漸消失，也不容忽視。股市上漲停滯等信號(hào)暗示，當(dāng)前美國(guó)的經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張已接近尾聲，而不是剛剛起步。我們稍后會(huì)介紹更多此類信號(hào)。對(duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張的擔(dān)憂已推升長(zhǎng)期利率，不利于資產(chǎn)估值。貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)影響的不確定性導(dǎo)致很多企業(yè)推遲行動(dòng)，收縮潛在投資。事實(shí)上，歌舞升平氛圍背后，經(jīng)濟(jì)的警告信號(hào)無(wú)處不在。美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)遲早會(huì)大幅下滑，甚至衰退，而且可能比我們想象中來(lái)得快。一貫如此。

季節(jié)性變化將至

先從明顯的跡象說(shuō)起：經(jīng)濟(jì)是一個(gè)周期接另一個(gè)周期。不同于自然界的四季更迭、月盈月缺或是潮汐起落，商業(yè)周期的起止向來(lái)難以預(yù)測(cè)。某個(gè)時(shí)候經(jīng)濟(jì)活動(dòng)會(huì)暫時(shí)走上巔峰，然后開(kāi)始收縮，直至最終跌落最低谷，此后又開(kāi)始回升。諷刺的是，判斷我們處在增長(zhǎng)期末尾的熟悉標(biāo)志就是經(jīng)濟(jì)過(guò)熱，有點(diǎn)類似印度的夏天：企業(yè)促使工廠生產(chǎn)，超出其長(zhǎng)期可持續(xù)的水平，員工加班增加。需求非常強(qiáng)勁，通脹開(kāi)始回升，導(dǎo)致央行加息，于是股價(jià)等資產(chǎn)估值趨平或者回落。全球最大對(duì)沖基金橋水基金的首席執(zhí)行官瑞·達(dá)利歐指出：“這就是經(jīng)濟(jì)強(qiáng)勁時(shí)股票和其他資產(chǎn)價(jià)格往往下跌的原因?！?

現(xiàn)狀正是如此。美國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室（CBO）發(fā)現(xiàn)，今年國(guó)內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)開(kāi)始有過(guò)熱跡象，產(chǎn)出超過(guò)了潛在的長(zhǎng)期可持續(xù)水平。今年5月國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì)，隨著薪資上漲，越來(lái)越多勞動(dòng)者將重返工作崗位。6月就是如此。人才市場(chǎng)供應(yīng)繼續(xù)吃緊，勞動(dòng)者對(duì)找工作很有自信，自愿離職率創(chuàng)十七年來(lái)新高。同時(shí)，雇主可能為了吸引并留住優(yōu)秀員工而不得不競(jìng)相加薪，這將直接打擊企業(yè)盈利。

通脹和利率雙雙走高，國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室預(yù)計(jì)漲勢(shì)可能持續(xù)。達(dá)利歐稱，綜合所有因素來(lái)看，“我們都很清楚現(xiàn)在處于商業(yè)周期的‘末期’?！?

美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)走到這一步經(jīng)歷了很長(zhǎng)時(shí)間，從歷史角度看，這種持久性不同尋常。包括上次衰退后的經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇階段在內(nèi)，美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張已經(jīng)持續(xù)110個(gè)月，可以說(shuō)相當(dāng)長(zhǎng)壽，如果在人類世界堪比年逾百歲的老人。根據(jù)美國(guó)國(guó)家經(jīng)濟(jì)研究所分析，這是164年來(lái)美國(guó)第二長(zhǎng)的擴(kuò)張期，期間美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張平均持續(xù)39個(gè)月。唯一一次超過(guò)當(dāng)前擴(kuò)張的時(shí)期是1991年到2001年，當(dāng)時(shí)維持了120個(gè)月。

然而年邁未必意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張將壽終正寢，但步入老年通常會(huì)出現(xiàn)一些狀況。一旦開(kāi)始衰老，就會(huì)整體崩潰。老年學(xué)專家稱之為病變，常常和一些“并發(fā)癥”相互關(guān)聯(lián)。當(dāng)前美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)的繁榮表象之下，已埋伏很多病變。

勞動(dòng)力不足

經(jīng)濟(jì)產(chǎn)出概念非常簡(jiǎn)單：由勞動(dòng)力、資本和生產(chǎn)力組成的函數(shù)。很簡(jiǎn)單的一個(gè)事實(shí)是，如果勞動(dòng)力增長(zhǎng)非常緩慢，就像當(dāng)前美國(guó)勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)一樣，經(jīng)濟(jì)很難快速增長(zhǎng)。20世紀(jì)70年代，勞動(dòng)力增速為每年2.6%，現(xiàn)在約為0.2%。原因之一是，幾十年來(lái)，美國(guó)人生孩子越來(lái)越少（去年美國(guó)生育率降至歷史最低水平）。隨著嬰兒潮一代不斷老去并退出勞動(dòng)力市場(chǎng)，美國(guó)工人數(shù)量將急劇下降。美國(guó)勞工統(tǒng)計(jì)局去年10月預(yù)測(cè)，2016年至2026年間將新增1150萬(wàn)個(gè)就業(yè)崗位，勞動(dòng)力缺口達(dá)100萬(wàn)人。

為了應(yīng)對(duì)人口減少的壓力，美國(guó)公司依賴大量國(guó)外人才。2017年，移民占美國(guó)勞動(dòng)力的17.1%，多年來(lái)該比例一直在上升。事實(shí)上，正如今年早些時(shí)候明尼阿波利斯聯(lián)邦儲(chǔ)備銀行行長(zhǎng)尼爾·卡什卡里在《華爾街日?qǐng)?bào)》撰文提出，對(duì)美國(guó)來(lái)說(shuō)吸引關(guān)鍵勞動(dòng)力“像享受免費(fèi)午餐一樣”。

Yet all these signs of economic strength mask fundamental realities that won’t fade away and mustn’t be ignored. The current economic expansion is much nearer its end than its beginning, as accumulating hints suggest—including the stagnating stock market, about which we’ll say more in a bit. Already the concerns are pushing up long-term interest rates, which is bad for asset values. Uncertainty about the effects of a trade war is causing many companies to postpone action, dampening potential investment. Indeed, look past those disco balls and you’ll see economic warning signs everywhere. A significant slowdown or even recession is coming sooner or later, and it’s probably coming sooner than you think. It always does.

A Seasonal Change is Coming

LET’S START WITH THE OBVIOUS: Economies follow cycles. Unlike with seasons or the moon or the ocean tides, the timing of the business cycle is never easy to predict. But at some point, economic activity reaches a temporal peak, then begins to contract until eventually it bottoms out and starts growing once more. A familiar sign that we’re in the waning stage of the growing season, ironically, is that the economy overheats—think of it as an Indian summer: Companies push factories to produce more than their long-term sustainable output, pushing employees to work more overtime. Demand is so strong that inflation starts to increase, leading central bankers to raise interest rates, which causes asset values, including stock prices, to level off or fall. Ray Dalio, CEO of the world’s largest hedge fund, Bridgewater Associates, writes, “That is why it is not unusual to see strong economies accompanied by falling stock and other asset prices.”

All of that is happening now. The Congressional Budget Office finds that this year, the economy has begun overheating in just this way, producing more than its sustainable longterm potential. The CBO predicted in May that as wages rose, more people who had left the labor force would come back to work, and, yes, that’s just what happened in June. The labor market continues to be tight, with workers so confident that they’re voluntarily quitting their jobs at the highest rate in 17 years. Meanwhile, employers will likely have to bid up wages in order to attract and keep good workers, hitting corporate earnings directly.

Inflation and interest rates are rising and will likely continue to do so, forecasts the CBO. With all those factors combining, says Dalio, “We know that we are in the ‘late-cycle’ part” of the business cycle.

It is somewhat remarkable, historically speaking, that it has taken this long to get here. America’s current expansion is 110 months old (including the recovery period after the last recession), which makes it a marvel of longevity—the economic equivalent of a supercentenarian. The current growth run is the second longest in the 164 years for which the National Bureau of Economic Research has done the analysis; the average expansion has run a mere 39 months. The only one that outlasted this one lived to be 120 months old (1991–2001).

Old age isn’t by necessity a death knell for an expansion—but then, there is something that tends to accompany it: When things start to break down, they break down en masse. Gerontologists call these tandem and often interlinked pathologies “comorbidities.” And in this economy, just under the skin, there seem to be plenty of them.

We Don’t Have Enough Workers

ECONOMIC OUTPUT is pretty straightforward in concept: It’s a function of labor, capital, and productivity. The simple fact is, it’s hard for an economy to grow very fast if the labor force is growing very slowly, as the U.S. labor force is doing. In the 1970s, it increased at a 2.6% annual rate; now the rate is about 0.2%. One reason for this is that for many decades, Americans have been having fewer and fewer babies (the U.S. fertility rate dropped to a new all-time low last year). As the baby-boom generation continues to age and exit the workforce, the number of American-born workers will sharply decline. This past October, the Bureau of Labor Statistics projected that over the period of 2016 to 2026, there will be 11. 5 million jobs created and a million fewer people in the workforce to fill them.

To counter that demographic drag, American companies have relied on an influx of people from outside the country. Immigrants accounted for 17.1% of the U.S. workforce in 2017, a percentage that has been rising for years. This critical labor force infusion, in fact, has been “as close to a free lunch as there is for America,” as Neel Kashkari, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, put it earlier this year in an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal.

然而很少有人知道，補(bǔ)充勞動(dòng)力實(shí)際上也面臨全球競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。沒(méi)錯(cuò)：其他出生率下降的發(fā)達(dá)國(guó)家同樣需要新工人彌補(bǔ)退休人員留下的崗位。之前美國(guó)一直占據(jù)優(yōu)勢(shì)，不僅能吸引到低薪工人填補(bǔ)美國(guó)人不愿做的工作，還吸引到大批科學(xué)家和企業(yè)家。（硅谷就有座加拿大政府購(gòu)買(mǎi)的廣告牌，建議簽證有問(wèn)題的技術(shù)人員“轉(zhuǎn)向加拿大”。）這就是為什么特朗普總統(tǒng)的移民很可能會(huì)限制美國(guó)公司發(fā)展——移民方面的強(qiáng)硬政策不僅是政治立場(chǎng)，也是經(jīng)濟(jì)政策。

到目前為止，美國(guó)的移民打擊并未顯著減少凈移民人數(shù)，但其中復(fù)雜的風(fēng)險(xiǎn)可能對(duì)美國(guó)企業(yè)產(chǎn)生深遠(yuǎn)影響，不管規(guī)模大小。

貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)令其他問(wèn)題情況更糟

僅看特朗普政府移民政策的話，可能不會(huì)影響經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。但聯(lián)邦政府另一項(xiàng)政策在邊境制造更多麻煩，而且這次是跟長(zhǎng)期貿(mào)易伙伴。即便美國(guó)與中國(guó)、歐洲、加拿大和墨西哥之間新一輪貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)不會(huì)持久，也會(huì)與老齡化一樣成為不良影響。據(jù)FactSet報(bào)道，去年大部分業(yè)務(wù)在海外的美國(guó)公司比其他同行增長(zhǎng)速度更快，盈利能力也更強(qiáng)。因此，發(fā)動(dòng)貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)會(huì)嚴(yán)重影響美國(guó)最強(qiáng)勁的經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)引擎。

從數(shù)據(jù)來(lái)看，目前與貿(mào)易有關(guān)的沖突在美國(guó)每年20萬(wàn)億美元的經(jīng)濟(jì)中無(wú)關(guān)緊要。即使7月初美國(guó)對(duì)340億美元中國(guó)商品征稅引發(fā)報(bào)復(fù)反應(yīng)，也不會(huì)顯著降低GDP。但相關(guān)影響會(huì)以兩種相互交織的方式迅速出現(xiàn)。

首先，戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)規(guī)模再大通常也會(huì)從小型戰(zhàn)斗開(kāi)始，之后引發(fā)不斷升級(jí)循環(huán)。當(dāng)前貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)似乎還在發(fā)展過(guò)程中。美國(guó)針對(duì)中國(guó)的行動(dòng)3月開(kāi)始，當(dāng)時(shí)特朗普對(duì)進(jìn)口鋁和鋼鐵征收關(guān)稅，其中只有約27億美元來(lái)自中國(guó)生產(chǎn)商。中國(guó)隨即對(duì)同等數(shù)量的美國(guó)出口征收新關(guān)稅。第二天，特朗普提出對(duì)500億美元中國(guó)產(chǎn)品征收關(guān)稅；第二天中國(guó)也報(bào)復(fù)性征收關(guān)稅。雙方齟齬一直持續(xù)，現(xiàn)在美國(guó)威脅對(duì)5000億美元的中國(guó)進(jìn)口產(chǎn)品征收關(guān)稅，中國(guó)則發(fā)誓要“不惜一切代價(jià)”實(shí)施報(bào)復(fù)。

隨著賭注越來(lái)越高，言辭也愈發(fā)激烈。6月特朗普表示，中國(guó)“威脅到?jīng)]有做錯(cuò)任何事的美國(guó)公司、工人和農(nóng)民”。中國(guó)商務(wù)部斥責(zé)該言論為“勒索”。最新的關(guān)稅于7月生效時(shí)，中國(guó)一份黨報(bào)警告稱，“美國(guó)顯然低估了全球反對(duì)力量和中國(guó)發(fā)動(dòng)報(bào)復(fù)時(shí)能發(fā)揮多大能量”。

隨著公開(kāi)威脅日漸明確，退一步的可能性越來(lái)越小。推動(dòng)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的兩大經(jīng)濟(jì)體喋喋不休地爭(zhēng)吵，可能發(fā)展為一場(chǎng)歷史性的貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)。

爭(zhēng)端還可能以另一種方式影響美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)，即便雙方對(duì)抗不激化一樣會(huì)實(shí)現(xiàn)。問(wèn)題在于人們會(huì)對(duì)未來(lái)發(fā)展不確定。正如美銀美林經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家米歇爾·梅耶在最近一份報(bào)告中提到，該影響——即“不確定性引發(fā)震蕩”已經(jīng)發(fā)生，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)很擔(dān)心。聯(lián)邦公開(kāi)市場(chǎng)委員會(huì)在6月會(huì)議上報(bào)告稱，“由于貿(mào)易政策存在不確定性，部分地區(qū)資本支出計(jì)劃已縮減或推遲”，并補(bǔ)充稱“大多數(shù)參與者”擔(dān)心不確定性會(huì)影響“商業(yè)情緒”或商業(yè)信心，以及“投資支出”。

別指望局勢(shì)很快會(huì)明確。誰(shuí)也沒(méi)法預(yù)測(cè)大規(guī)模貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)會(huì)怎么發(fā)展。上一次貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)還是20世紀(jì)30年代，當(dāng)時(shí)可沒(méi)有現(xiàn)在這般復(fù)雜快速的全球供應(yīng)鏈。商業(yè)決策者對(duì)最終結(jié)果也只能猜想。

不確定性會(huì)導(dǎo)致一切停擺，這對(duì)增長(zhǎng)沒(méi)有好處。

油價(jià)上漲將阻礙全球發(fā)展

另一個(gè)威脅則是油價(jià)高企，經(jīng)常也差點(diǎn)登上新聞?lì)^條新聞。最近油價(jià)為每桶約73美元，由于美國(guó)也是化石燃料主要生產(chǎn)國(guó)，所以油價(jià)上漲對(duì)美國(guó)有直接好處，但油價(jià)過(guò)高也很可能削弱全球增長(zhǎng)，因?yàn)殡S著美元走強(qiáng)，石油（無(wú)論出自哪國(guó)） 對(duì)其他國(guó)家來(lái)說(shuō)成本更高。

What’s less widely understood is that there has actually been a global competition for this supplementary workforce. That’s right: Other developed nations with declining birthrates likewise need new workers to help offset their armies of retirees—and America has been winning this battle, luring not just low-wage workers to fill jobs that native-born Americans aren’t rushing to do but also scientists and entrepreneurs. (Witness the Silicon Valley billboards, bought by the government of America’s northern neighbor, imploring techies with visa troubles to “Pivot to Canada.”) That’s why President Trump’s immigrant-hostile policy isn’t just a political stance, it’s also an economic one—and one that’s almost sure to limit the ability of U.S. companies to grow.

So far, America’s immigration crackdown has not significantly reduced net in-migration, but it’s a compounding risk that could have far-reaching consequences for American businesses large and small.

A Trade War Makes Other Problems Worse

BY ITSELF, the Trump administration’s immigration policies may not be enough to stop growth in its tracks. But another federal policy is making even more trouble at the border—this time with America’s long-standing trading partners. Nascent trade wars with China, Europe, Canada, and Mexico—even if they don’t last—have become yet another comorbidity for our aging expansion. U.S. companies that do most of their business abroad grew faster and were more profitable than the rest last year, just as in previous years, FactSet reports. Waging a trade war thus disproportionately hurts America’s strongest engines of economic growth.

By the numbers, the trade-related skirmishes so far are insignificant in America’s $20 trillion-a-year economy. Even the tit-for-tat imposition of tariffs on $34 billion of trade by the U.S. and China in early July will not, by itself, noticeably reduce GDP. Yet the effects could easily mushroom, in two intertwined ways.

First, even the biggest wars typically start with minor battles that spark an unstoppable cycle of escalation. In the current trade war, that appears to be underway. Hostilities with China began in March when President Trump imposed tariffs on aluminum and steel imports, only about $2.7 billion of which come from Chinese producers. China responded with new tariffs on an equivalent amount of U.S. exports. The next day, Trump proposed tariffs on $50 billion of Chinese imports; China proposed retaliatory tariffs the day after that. On and on this went until the U.S. has now threatened tariffs on nearly all of America’s $500 billion of Chinese imports, and China has vowed to retaliate “at any cost.”

As the stakes get higher, the rhetoric gets more bellicose. China is “threatening United States companies, workers, and farmers who have done nothing wrong,” Trump said in June. China’s Trade Ministry called the speech “blackmail.” When the latest tariffs took effect in July, a Chinese Communist Party newspaper warned that “Washington has obviously underestimated the giant force that the world’s opposition and China’s retaliation can produce.”

As public threats become more explicit, backing down from them appears ever less likely. That’s how a piddling spat between the world’s two largest economies, jointly the foundation of global economic growth, could become a historic trade war.

But the second way the current dispute could damage the U.S. economy doesn’t even require that hostilities get worse. It requires only that people become less certain about where all this is headed. That effect—an “uncertainty shock,” as Bank of AmericaMerrill Lynch economist Michelle Meyer called it in a recent note—is happening already, and it worries the Fed. “Contacts in some Districts indicated that plans for capital spending had been scaled back or postponed as a result of uncertainty over trade policy,” the Federal Open Market Committee reported from its June meeting, adding that “most participants” were concerned such uncertainty could depress “business sentiment”—confidence, that is—“and investment spending.”

Don’t expect much more clarity anytime soon. No one can predict where a large-scale trade war would lead. The last one occurred in the 1930s, when today’s intricate, light-speed global supply chains would have been nearly unfathomable. Which leaves business decisionmakers only to wonder how all this shakes out.

Uncertainty prompts paralysis—and that’s no good for growth.

Rising Oil Prices Will Gum Up Global Gears

ANOTHER THREAT—this one lingering just below the top news headlines—is the high price of oil. Recently around $73 a barrel, it’s on balance a direct benefit to the U.S. now that America is a prodigious producer of the fossil fuel—but expensive oil is also very likely to dent global growth, particularly since the strengthening dollar makes oil (wherever produced) yet more costly for other countries.

經(jīng)濟(jì)合作與發(fā)展組織（OECD）是以促進(jìn)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)為目標(biāo)的政府間機(jī)構(gòu)，該機(jī)構(gòu)指出，高油價(jià)是主要的“重大風(fēng)險(xiǎn)”之一。盡管某些人可能認(rèn)為美國(guó)不必在意全球經(jīng)濟(jì)普遍放緩，但油價(jià)走高終將有損美國(guó)大公司和許多小公司的利益。

刺激政策可能會(huì)短暫推動(dòng)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)...

正如我們指出，經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退和承壓的跡象似乎反映出上一個(gè)商業(yè)周期終結(jié)。但有個(gè)很重要的反證，因?yàn)槲覀兌啻温?tīng)說(shuō)最近聯(lián)邦政府減稅和支出增加。一些經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家表示，令人興奮的刺激計(jì)劃將避免經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，不僅如此，未來(lái)幾年還會(huì)推動(dòng)迅速增長(zhǎng)。

實(shí)際上，從所有傳統(tǒng)標(biāo)準(zhǔn)看，經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)都堪稱亮眼。經(jīng)過(guò)多年低速擴(kuò)張，2018年可能是十年內(nèi)GDP增長(zhǎng)最強(qiáng)勁的一年。但不能指望刺激來(lái)保持刺激。

西北大學(xué)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家羅伯特·J·戈登在最新著作《美國(guó)經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)的興衰》里的觀點(diǎn)相當(dāng)有說(shuō)服力，他指出美國(guó)從1870年到1970年的“特殊世紀(jì)”是“獨(dú)特的高速增長(zhǎng)期，以后無(wú)法重復(fù)?！彼f(shuō)，以前人們認(rèn)為GDP增長(zhǎng)3%很正常，但已不可持續(xù)。然而，減稅和增加支出營(yíng)造的“舊式財(cái)政刺激”將推動(dòng)短暫強(qiáng)勁的增長(zhǎng)，“至少一段時(shí)間內(nèi)增長(zhǎng)3%以上”，而且“未來(lái)四到六個(gè)季度平均增長(zhǎng)3%”。 他表示，“然后刺激政策效應(yīng)逐漸消失?！苯?jīng)濟(jì)回到緩慢增長(zhǎng)的新常態(tài)。

The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an intergovernmental agency aimed at fostering economic growth worldwide, points to high oil prices as one of the main “risks that loom large.” And while a broad global slowdown may seem, to some, removed from U.S. interests, it would hurt America’s biggest companies and many of its smaller ones as well.

The Stimulus May Pad Growth For A While…

THE SIGNS of economic senescence and stress, as we noted, would seem to mirror the end of past business cycles. But there’s one big counterpoint, as we’ve all heard many a time, and that’s the recent federal tax cut and spending increases. That whammy of a stimulus, say some economists, will stave off any recession—and not only that, it will jumpstart growth for years to come.

Indeed, the economy, by all traditional measures, seems to be growing smartly. After years of low-horsepower expansion, 2018 could be the best year for GDP growth in at least a decade. But don’t count on the stimulus to keep stimulating.

Robert J. Gordon, the Northwestern University economist whose latest book is The Rise and Fall of American Growth, argues persuasively that America’s “special century” from 1870 to 1970 represented “a singular interval of rapid growth that will not be repeated.” Regular yearly GDP growth of 3%, once considered normal, is no longer sustainable, he says. Yet “old-fashioned fiscal stimulus” from tax cuts and a spending boost will produce a brief but powerful blast of growth—“3%-plus growth for at least a while” and “an average of 3% growth probably for the next four to six quarters.” Then, he says, “the stimulus fades away.” And it’s back to the slow-growth new normal.

當(dāng)然，一切假設(shè)短期內(nèi)經(jīng)濟(jì)會(huì)出現(xiàn)提升。然而可能不會(huì)。出于多種原因，刺激措施可能無(wú)法像宣傳中一樣發(fā)揮作用。首先，減稅和支出增加等財(cái)政啟動(dòng)通常在商業(yè)周期底部部署，而不是頂部。舊金山聯(lián)儲(chǔ)研究人員在一項(xiàng)新研究中表示，相關(guān)政策對(duì)不斷增長(zhǎng)的經(jīng)濟(jì)體影響不大。有證據(jù)表明，“實(shí)際提升作用可能遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)低于許多人預(yù)計(jì)”，可能“接近零”。

美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)前主席本·伯南克則預(yù)計(jì)，近期將出現(xiàn)巨大變化。他在最近的華盛頓政策討論中表示，刺激計(jì)劃“選了個(gè)非常錯(cuò)誤的時(shí)機(jī)”。（他拒絕了采訪。）“經(jīng)濟(jì)已經(jīng)充分就業(yè)?！贝碳ご胧敖衲旰兔髂陮?duì)經(jīng)濟(jì)造成重大打擊，2020年也是?？傆幸惶齑蟊坷菓褷柪牵▌?dòng)畫(huà)片角色）會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)自己站在懸崖邊雙腳踩空?！?

此外，許多公司將省下來(lái)的稅款用于股票回購(gòu)，而不是投資經(jīng)營(yíng)。股東可能很高興，但從長(zhǎng)遠(yuǎn)來(lái)看不會(huì)刺激經(jīng)濟(jì)增長(zhǎng)。我們認(rèn)為，雖然刺激措施可能會(huì)推進(jìn)經(jīng)濟(jì)擴(kuò)張，但很像把汽車(chē)油門(mén)踩到底。一段時(shí)間里速度非?？?，甚至可能令人興奮，但很快汽油就會(huì)耗盡......或者撞車(chē)。

......然后情況可能更糟

值得注意的是，刺激還會(huì)產(chǎn)生另一種影響：國(guó)會(huì)預(yù)算辦公室宣稱，比起沒(méi)有近期減稅和支出增加的情況，未來(lái)十年累計(jì)的聯(lián)邦赤字將增加1.6萬(wàn)億美元。如果各種稅收和支出條款結(jié)束時(shí)國(guó)會(huì)決定繼續(xù)的話，赤字規(guī)模可能更大，現(xiàn)在看起來(lái)可能性很高。這點(diǎn)很令人擔(dān)心，具體來(lái)說(shuō)有多個(gè)原因（正如《財(cái)富》雜志的記者肖恩·塔利在2018年4月1日發(fā)表的《深陷債務(wù)》里提到）。下一次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退不可避免地到來(lái)時(shí)，華盛頓就無(wú)法采用通常的減稅和增加支出的手段補(bǔ)救。如果債務(wù)不斷膨脹讓外國(guó)投資者感到害怕，購(gòu)買(mǎi)美國(guó)國(guó)債減少，利率只能上升，聯(lián)邦利息支付將會(huì)增加，在惡性循環(huán)中債務(wù)更快擴(kuò)張。

許多公司已過(guò)度杠桿化

雖然人們對(duì)聯(lián)邦債務(wù)日益增長(zhǎng)的威脅已經(jīng)討論很多，但另一項(xiàng)基本被忽視的信用風(fēng)險(xiǎn)中也出現(xiàn)了麻煩：企業(yè)債務(wù)。非金融公司債務(wù)已經(jīng)上升到GDP的73.5%，創(chuàng)歷史新高，卻沒(méi)引起太多關(guān)注。

目前來(lái)看問(wèn)題并不是很?chē)?yán)重，因?yàn)槔室恢焙艿停@也是公司大量借貸的重要原因之一。但隨著利率上升，美國(guó)公司生存環(huán)境日趨惡劣。標(biāo)普國(guó)際信貸分析師安德魯·張表示，如果利率上升而經(jīng)濟(jì)放緩，也就是雙重打擊齊下的話，眼下創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的企業(yè)債務(wù)“將成為大問(wèn)題?！爆F(xiàn)在看起來(lái)發(fā)生的可能性越來(lái)越大。“人們能意識(shí)到風(fēng)險(xiǎn)，但行動(dòng)起來(lái)并不是很規(guī)矩?！彼嬖V《財(cái)富》雜志。公司債的投資者越來(lái)越緊張。投資級(jí)公司債是今年上半年表現(xiàn)最差的債券。

That, of course, assumes we’ll get that short-term boost. We may not. The stimulus may not work as advertised for a number of reasons. First, fiscal fire-starters like tax cuts and spending increases are usually deployed at the bottom of the business cycle, not the top. They just don’t add much oomph to an economy that’s already growing, say researchers at the San Francisco Fed in a new study. The evidence suggests that “the true boost is likely to be well below” what many forecasters predict and could be “as small as zero.”

Former Fed chairman Ben Bernanke foresees a more dramatic near future. The stimulus is arriving “at the very wrong moment,” he said at a recent Washington policy discussion. (He declined an interview request.) “The economy is already at full employment.” The stimulus “is going to hit the economy in a big way this year and next year, and then, in 2020, Wile E. Coyote is going to go off the cliff.”

What’s more, many companies are spending their tax bonus on share buybacks rather than investing it in operations. That may make shareholders happy for a while, but it’s not going to stimulate economic growth over the long haul. Our take is that while the stimulus might extend this expansion, it’s a lot like flooring the accelerator in a car. For a time, you go really fast, and it might even be thrilling—but pretty soon you run out of gas … or crash.

…And Then It May Make Things Worse

THE STIMULUS, it’s important to note, will have another effect as well: The accumulated federal deficit over the next decade will be $1.6 trillion larger than it would have been without the recent tax cuts and spending increases, according to the CBO—and it will be larger still if various tax and spending provisions set to end are renewed by Congress, as seems highly likely. That’s concerning for all kinds of reasons (as Fortune’s Shawn Tully showed in “Deep in Debt,” April 1, 2018). When the next recession inevitably arrives, Washington will be less able to apply the usual remedies of lower taxes and greater spending. If ballooning debt eventually spooks foreign investors into buying fewer Treasuries, rates will have to rise and federal interest payments will grow, expanding the debt even faster in a bad-news feedback loop.

Many Companies Are Already Overleveraged

WHILE MUCH has been said about the growing menace of federal debt, trouble is brewing as well in a different and largely overlooked credit risk: corporate debt. Without many alarm bells sounding, the debt of nonfinancial companies has risen to 73.5% of GDP—an all-time high.

It hasn’t been a problem so far because interest rates have been so low—which is a big reason companies borrowed so heavily in the first place. But as interest rates rise, the Goldilocks environment is darkening. Today’s record corporate debt “would be a problem if rates are rising while the economy slows—a double whammy,” says S&P Global credit analyst Andrew Chang. That’s exactly the scenario that is beginning to seem more likely. “People are aware of the risk but not quite behaving like an aware citizen,” he tells Fortune. Investors in corporate bonds are getting nervous. Investment-grade corporate debt was the worst-performing category of debt investment in this year’s first half.

一些債券持有人指出，美國(guó)公司持有近2萬(wàn)億美元的現(xiàn)金，以此來(lái)自我安慰。但該說(shuō)法有兩大漏洞。首先，24家大公司占據(jù)了龐大現(xiàn)金儲(chǔ)備的一半（領(lǐng)頭的是蘋(píng)果公司，現(xiàn)金達(dá)2670億美元），但這些公司的債務(wù)可占不到總體的一半。

其次，企業(yè)美國(guó)的凈債務(wù)，即債務(wù)減去現(xiàn)金規(guī)模仍然達(dá)息稅折舊及攤銷(xiāo)前利潤(rùn)的1.5倍（即扣除利息、稅收、折舊和攤銷(xiāo)后的利潤(rùn)）。債務(wù)收益率達(dá)到過(guò)去15年來(lái)最高?！艾F(xiàn)金可能處于歷史最高水平，但債務(wù)也一樣，”標(biāo)普國(guó)際的張表示，“人們卻沒(méi)注意到債務(wù)部分?！?

情況已經(jīng)相當(dāng)嚴(yán)重，連美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)都開(kāi)始留意了。今年4月，美聯(lián)儲(chǔ)理事萊爾·布雷納德表示，“我們梳理了金融脆弱性后發(fā)現(xiàn)，兩個(gè)領(lǐng)域風(fēng)險(xiǎn)上升：資產(chǎn)估值和商業(yè)杠桿?！眱煞N風(fēng)險(xiǎn)都與公司債務(wù)有關(guān)。布雷納德指出，公司債券的收益率“比歷史水平低”，意味著當(dāng)前債券價(jià)格非常高。而且與債務(wù)收益率一樣，商業(yè)杠桿“相對(duì)于歷史水平來(lái)看很高”。

明白了么？如果沒(méi)完全理解，看看負(fù)責(zé)評(píng)估美國(guó)金融穩(wěn)定性的財(cái)政部金融研究辦公室的評(píng)論，可能會(huì)清楚一些：“非金融業(yè)務(wù)杠桿率......在潛在漏洞的熱力圖上已變紅色”。

這一不良趨勢(shì)也引發(fā)央行人士擔(dān)心，因?yàn)橛袝r(shí)只要出現(xiàn)小波動(dòng)就能導(dǎo)致一連串公司破產(chǎn)。正如布雷納德觀察，“利潤(rùn)受到意外負(fù)面沖擊加上利率提升”可能會(huì)打擊一系列債券以及出貸方。如果真的發(fā)生，不僅會(huì)對(duì)債券市場(chǎng)造成壓力，還可能影響整體經(jīng)濟(jì)。

可靠的指標(biāo)正在下降

緊盯債務(wù)及其成本很有必要，因?yàn)閭试陬A(yù)測(cè)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退方面向來(lái)很準(zhǔn)，現(xiàn)在也快要預(yù)測(cè)出下一次衰退。如果長(zhǎng)期（10年期）國(guó)債收益率低于短期（三個(gè)月）國(guó)債收益率，也即收益率曲線倒掛，就說(shuō)明衰退不遠(yuǎn)。過(guò)去的50年里，該指標(biāo)從未漏報(bào)也未誤報(bào)過(guò)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退。收益率曲線倒掛就意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，唯一的問(wèn)題距離經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退開(kāi)始還有多少時(shí)間；平均而言是10個(gè)月，不過(guò)2008-09經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退之前有16個(gè)月。

Haver Analytics的數(shù)據(jù)顯示，截至7月中旬，收益率曲線尚未倒掛，但已非常接近，比2008年金融危機(jī)和經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退之前還要接近。

Some debt holders try to comfort themselves by noting that U.S. corporations are sitting on nearly $2 trillion of cash. But that reasoning faces two big holes. First, just 24 companies account for about half of that mammoth cash cache (led by Apple, with $267 billion), yet they account for nowhere near half of America’s corporate debt.

Second, corporate America’s net debt—that is, debt minus cash—is still about 1.5 times Ebitda (earnings stripped away from interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization). That would make it the highest debt-to-earnings ratio in the past 15 years. “Cash may be at an all-time high, but so is debt,” says S&P Global’s Chang, “and people aren’t noticing the second part.”

The situation is serious enough to grab the Fed’s attention. Fed governor Lael Brainard, speaking in April, said, “Our scan of financial vulnerabilities suggests elevated risks in two areas: asset valuations and business leverage.” Both risks involve corporate debt. Brainard noted that yields on corporate bonds are “l(fā)ow by historical comparison,” meaning the bonds look awfully expensive. And business leverage, like that debt-to-earnings ratio, is “high relative to historical trends.”

Got all that? Well, if not, maybe this comment from the Treasury’s Office of Financial Research—the arm of the department that assesses U.S. financial stability—can bring home the message: “Nonfinancial business leverage ratios … are flashing red on the heat map” of potential vulnerabilities.

Those trends trouble central bankers because all it takes is a single jolt, in some cases, to create a cascade of corporate havoc. As Brainard observed, “unexpected negative shocks to earnings in combination with increased interest rates” could hammer those bonds and the lenders who own them. If that happens, it won’t just stress the bond market. The effects could ripple through the whole economy.

Reliable Indicators Are Pointing Down

FOCUSING ON DEBT and its cost is wise because bond interest rates boast an excellent record of forecasting recessions—and they’re close to predicting one now. When the yield on long-term (10-year) Treasury securities falls below the yield on short-term (threemonth) Treasuries—an inversion of the yield curve—a recession is on the way. Over the past 50 years, this test has given no false positives or failed to signal a coming downturn. Yield curve inversion has always equaled recession, and the only question is how long it will be before the recession starts; on average, it’s 10 months, though it took 16 months before the 2008–09 recession.

As of mid-July, the yield curve had not inverted, but it was getting close—closer than it has been since just before the 2008 financial crisis and recession, according to Haver Analytics.

另一個(gè)可靠的衰退指標(biāo)則令人驚訝。當(dāng)前失業(yè)率處于低谷，這有點(diǎn)反常，因?yàn)榈褪I(yè)率表明經(jīng)濟(jì)在強(qiáng)勁增長(zhǎng)。但超低失業(yè)率也意味著擴(kuò)張接近極限。過(guò)去65年里該指標(biāo)從未出錯(cuò)，也從未誤報(bào)。

復(fù)雜的是，只有低谷過(guò)去我們才能確定。今年5月失業(yè)率創(chuàng)下了17年來(lái)的最低點(diǎn)3.8%，然后在6月上升至4%，因?yàn)楦喙と酥匦麻_(kāi)始找工作。到底是不是失業(yè)率低谷，至少還得過(guò)幾個(gè)月才能知道。但就目前而言，我們只能說(shuō)我們比較接近。

市場(chǎng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)不可避免地轉(zhuǎn)向時(shí)，會(huì)像所有變化一樣變成機(jī)會(huì)。

除了知道哪些指標(biāo)最能預(yù)測(cè)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退，我們還知道不應(yīng)該問(wèn)誰(shuí)：經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家。至少在這項(xiàng)任務(wù)上，他們很糟糕。多年以來(lái)，全球各地的經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家從未在經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退幾個(gè)月前成功預(yù)測(cè)。奈德·戴維斯研究公司發(fā)現(xiàn)，美國(guó)“1970年以來(lái)的七次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退中，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家預(yù)測(cè)全體失敗”。實(shí)際上，經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家從來(lái)“預(yù)測(cè)”不到衰退，直到衰退到來(lái)才知道。而且即便衰退開(kāi)始他們也會(huì)低估下降趨勢(shì)，只能不斷修改預(yù)測(cè)，一直拖到經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退結(jié)束前不久才能說(shuō)對(duì)。經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家在幫助人們了解經(jīng)濟(jì)運(yùn)作方式方面有些貢獻(xiàn)，但在預(yù)測(cè)經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退上真的很差。

這點(diǎn)很重要，因?yàn)檫@意味著經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退到來(lái)之前專家不會(huì)預(yù)告，也就意味著你得自己做好準(zhǔn)備。

分析師還在幻想

在此背景下，華爾街分析師似乎沉浸在樂(lè)觀情緒里無(wú)法自拔。過(guò)去70年中，美國(guó)企業(yè)利潤(rùn)年復(fù)合增長(zhǎng)率為5.6%。在史上最大牛市，即1982年到2000年間，利潤(rùn)增長(zhǎng)率為6.5%。然而華爾街分析師認(rèn)為標(biāo)準(zhǔn)普爾500指數(shù)公司利潤(rùn)還能以每年15%飆升，不是幾個(gè)季度，而是未來(lái)五年內(nèi)。

有史以來(lái)最偉大的投資者之一，約翰·鄧普頓說(shuō)：“牛市出于悲觀主義，在懷疑中成長(zhǎng)，在樂(lè)觀情緒里成熟，最終在興奮中消亡?！碑?dāng)前的樂(lè)觀情緒像是興奮，不客氣的說(shuō)就是精神錯(cuò)亂。

想預(yù)測(cè)市場(chǎng)拐點(diǎn)很愚蠢，沒(méi)人知道未來(lái)半年或12個(gè)月股票走勢(shì)怎樣。即使當(dāng)前價(jià)格太高，市場(chǎng)也不一定會(huì)暴跌。也可能長(zhǎng)期滯漲，直到利潤(rùn)趕上價(jià)格。

Another highly reliable presage of downturns is surprising. It’s a trough in the unemployment rate—counterintuitive because low unemployment shows that an economy is growing strongly. But super-low unemployment also means the expansion is pressing up against its limits. In the past 65 years, this indicator has never missed and has never called a false positive.

Complicating such a call is the fact that we can’t be sure a trough has occurred until after the fact. Unemployment hit a 17-year low of 3.8% in May, then edged up to 4% in June as more workers rejoined the labor force looking for jobs. Whether that turns out to be a bottom won’t be known for at least a few more months. For now, though, we can only say it’s hard to believe we aren’t at least very near one.

When the markets and the economy inevitably do turn, it will be, like all change, an opportunity.

In addition to knowing which indicators are best at predicting recessions, we also know whom not to ask: economists. At least on this one task, they’re terrible. Around the world, over long periods of time, the consensus of economists has consistently failed to predict recessions even a few months before they begin. Ned Davis Research finds that in the U.S., “economists, as a consensus, called exactly none” of the seven recessions since 1970. In fact, economists typically do not “forecast” a recession until after it has started, and even then they initially understate the decline, revising their estimates until finally getting them right shortly before the recession ends. Economists are highly valuable in helping the rest of us understand how the economy works, but they’re notably reluctant to predict downturns.

This is important to remember because it means the experts won’t tell us a recession is coming until it’s already here. Which means it’s up to you to prepare for it. (For some help, see the sidebar “Where to Invest When the Party Ends” on the next page.)

Analysts Are In Fantasyland

AGAINST THAT BACKDROP, Wall Street analysts seem utterly clueless in their optimism. Consider that over the past 70 years, U.S. corporate profits have grown at a 5.6% compound annual rate. During the greatest bull market in history, from 1982 to 2000, they grew at 6.5%. Yet Wall Street analysts believe the profits of the S&P 500 companies will rage ahead at a searing 15% annual pace—not for a few quarters, but over the next five years.

One of the all-time great investors, John Templeton, said, “Bull markets are born on pessimism, grow on skepticism, mature on optimism, and die on euphoria.” This sounds like euphoria, or what we might less politely term insanity.

Trying to call turns in the market is folly, and there’s no telling how stocks might perform in the next six or 12 months. Even if today’s prices are in fact far too high, the market need not plunge. It could just stagnate until profits eventually catch up with prices.

兩位頂尖投資者認(rèn)為，市場(chǎng)回歸理性之前甚至可能短期再漲一波。瑞·達(dá)利歐就在觀察“股價(jià)最后沖刺”，他認(rèn)為這是構(gòu)成“經(jīng)典頂部”的關(guān)鍵元素。基金經(jīng)理杰里米·格蘭瑟姆曾提前發(fā)現(xiàn)網(wǎng)絡(luò)泡沫和房地產(chǎn)泡沫，他稱之為“崩盤(pán)”，最后全場(chǎng)瘋狂買(mǎi)入，標(biāo)志著牛市終結(jié)。1999年最后三個(gè)月就是個(gè)戲劇性的例子。

牛市如何結(jié)束以及何時(shí)結(jié)束基本無(wú)法預(yù)計(jì)，但種種跡象表明，步入第10年的牛市已臨近終點(diǎn)。達(dá)利歐和其他經(jīng)驗(yàn)豐富的投資者都表示，找不到值得買(mǎi)入的股票。CNBC最近一期百萬(wàn)富翁調(diào)查顯示，富裕的投資者正撤出股市，轉(zhuǎn)向現(xiàn)金或準(zhǔn)現(xiàn)金投資。耶魯大學(xué)諾貝爾經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)獎(jiǎng)獲得者羅伯特·希勒定期調(diào)研投資者，詢問(wèn)其對(duì)股票估值沒(méi)有過(guò)高有多少信心；最新數(shù)據(jù)是自1999年以來(lái)最低水平。

然而，華爾街分析師毫無(wú)撤退的意思。“有點(diǎn)像1928年的情形，”席勒說(shuō)?！皹?lè)觀情緒太濃厚，感覺(jué)要去破壞氣氛都有點(diǎn)不愛(ài)國(guó)?！?

所以不光要小心，還要準(zhǔn)備

股市泡沫、經(jīng)濟(jì)指標(biāo)下行、金融穩(wěn)定性亮起紅燈，還有貿(mào)易戰(zhàn)等等……要擔(dān)心的事情太多。這并不一定意味著災(zāi)難即將來(lái)臨。從現(xiàn)狀來(lái)看，股市可能像格蘭瑟姆說(shuō)的一樣恢復(fù)上漲甚至“崩盤(pán)”。今年經(jīng)濟(jì)可能會(huì)明顯增長(zhǎng)，但不用多想也該感覺(jué)緊張了。除經(jīng)濟(jì)顧問(wèn)委員會(huì)，似乎沒(méi)人相信長(zhǎng)期來(lái)看GDP可以增長(zhǎng)3%，即便最近的刺激措施能推動(dòng)增長(zhǎng)，以后也會(huì)付出代價(jià)。經(jīng)濟(jì)周期尚未消失，證據(jù)顯示我們處于一個(gè)周期的后期。我們最好為下一次經(jīng)濟(jì)衰退做好準(zhǔn)備，因?yàn)樗ネ苏嬲齺?lái)臨時(shí)經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)家還是預(yù)測(cè)不出來(lái)。

當(dāng)市場(chǎng)和經(jīng)濟(jì)不可避免地轉(zhuǎn)向時(shí)，會(huì)像所有變化一樣變成機(jī)會(huì)。不光股票會(huì)恐慌拋售，公司經(jīng)理也要記住，經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況不好時(shí)各行業(yè)的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)狀況比經(jīng)濟(jì)好時(shí)變化更大。

頭腦清醒的投資者和領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者很早就面對(duì)現(xiàn)實(shí)，所以能安然度過(guò)低迷期。而且在經(jīng)濟(jì)狀況好的時(shí)候，他們就已未雨綢繆。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文的另一版本刊載于2018年8月1日《財(cái)富》雜志，標(biāo)題為《終結(jié)即將來(lái)臨》。

譯者：Pessy

審校：夏林

Two of the best investors alive think there’s even a chance of a brief market leap before sanity returns. Ray Dalio is watching for “one last spurt in equities prices,” which he considers a key element of “the classic top.” Fund manager Jeremy Grantham, who spotted the dotcom and housing bubbles well in advance, calls it a “melt-up,” a final, rapturous delirium of buying that signals a bull market’s decisive end. See the last three months of 1999 for a dramatic example.

Exactly how and when a bull market will expire is unknowable, but signs are piling up that this bull market, now in its 10th year, has about run its course. Dalio and other sophisticated investors say they can’t find stocks worth buying. CNBC’s latest Millionaires Survey reveals that rich investors are moving out of stocks and into cash or near-cash investments. Nobel Prize–winning economist Robert Shiller of Yale regularly surveys investors on their confidence that stocks are not overvalued; the latest reading is the lowest since 1999.

Yet those Wall Street analysts are having none of it. “It’s kind of like we’re in 1928 at the moment,” says Shiller. “There’s still all this optimism and a sense that it would be unpatriotic to disturb it.”

So Don’t Just Beware, Prepare

FROTHY STOCKS, economic indicators pointing down, financial stability flashing red, trade war, and more—it’s a lot to worry about. It doesn’t necessarily mean calamity is just ahead. For all we know, stocks could resume rising or even “melt up,” as Grantham says. The economy may well grow impressively this year. But we don’t have to look much further out to get more nervous. No one except the Council of Economic Advisers seems to think GDP can grow at 3% over the long term, and if the recent stimulus turbocharges growth, it does so at a price that will have to be paid afterward. The economic cycle hasn’t been abolished; all evidence says we’re in the latter stages of one. And we had better be ready for the next recession, because when it arrives, economists will not have predicted it.

When the markets and the economy inevitably do turn, it will be, like all change, an opportunity. Stocks will be on sale, and corporate managers should remember that the competitive order in any industry always changes more in adversity than in smooth sailing.

Clearheaded investors and leaders come through downturns fine because they confront reality early—and in the best of times, they prepare for the worst.

A version of this article appears in the August 1, 2018 issue of Fortune with the headline “The End is Near.”