在德國(guó)中部夏季一個(gè)炎熱的下午，全球最大汽車制造商的新任首席執(zhí)行官坐進(jìn)了一張白色皮革座椅，將鞋伸進(jìn)了腳下厚厚的蓬松地毯，然后露出了微笑。于4月接任大眾首席執(zhí)行官一職的赫伯特·迪斯將自己高大的身影塞進(jìn)了一大塊酷似轎車形狀的櫻桃紅金屬殼中。不過(guò)，這輛車沒(méi)有方向盤、踏板、離合器或任何人們通常能夠在汽車中找到的部件。這個(gè)光鮮亮麗的奇妙裝置是大眾的概念車，名為I.D. Vizzion，在3月的日內(nèi)瓦汽車展上首次與世人見(jiàn)面。

然而，I.D. Vizzion不僅僅是個(gè)試驗(yàn)品，或輪子上的起居室。用迪斯的話來(lái)說(shuō)，它能夠讓人們窺見(jiàn)不久之后公司的無(wú)人駕駛愿景。迪斯正斥巨資押注基于這一愿景的策略，不惜花費(fèi)數(shù)億美元投資電動(dòng)和自動(dòng)駕駛技術(shù)。這位首席執(zhí)行官堅(jiān)信，這一技術(shù)的正確運(yùn)用將成為公司生存的關(guān)鍵。

迪斯坐在大眾沃爾夫斯堡總部巨大的工廠中說(shuō)道：“我們不妨看看當(dāng)馬車向汽車轉(zhuǎn)變，化學(xué)成像照片向數(shù)字成像照片轉(zhuǎn)變的時(shí)候市場(chǎng)都發(fā)生了什么變化?！蔽譅柗蛩贡ぞ嚯x柏林西部約140英里，是一個(gè)暮氣沉沉、因大眾而興起的城市，人口12.5萬(wàn)?！笆袌?chǎng)出現(xiàn)了巨大的顛覆性變化。當(dāng)時(shí)能夠活下來(lái)的知名公司寥寥無(wú)幾?？逻_(dá)倒下了，而且他們很清楚自己倒下的原因?！?

59歲的迪斯上任僅有數(shù)月的時(shí)間，他選擇了在大眾神秘的創(chuàng)新中心（黑色的天鵝絨窗簾遮掩了房間的一部分）與我見(jiàn)面，為的是強(qiáng)調(diào)他的觀點(diǎn)：只有大刀闊斧的轉(zhuǎn)型才能夠挽救這家汽車巨頭，以免被更多靈活的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)者拋在身后。他說(shuō)：“如今，變革對(duì)于公司來(lái)說(shuō)真的很重要?！?

On a hot summer afternoon in central Germany, the new CEO of one of the world’s largest automakers sinks into a white leather armchair, digs his shoes into the thick shag carpet under his feet, and grins. Herbert Diess, who took over as Volkswagen AG’s chief executive in April, has his tall frame folded inside a cherry-red chunk of metal that closely resembles a car—except for the fact that it’s missing a steering wheel, pedals, gears, or anything else you’d normally expect to find in an automobile. The slick contraption is a VW concept car called the I.D. Vizzion. It made its debut at the Geneva Motor Show in March.

The I.D. Vizzion is more than just an experiment, however, or a living room on wheels. Rather, says Diess, it offers a glimpse of our driverless near-future. And Diess is betting heavily on a strategy built on that vision—staking hundreds of millions of dollars on electric and autonomous technology. The CEO insists that getting the technology right will be key to the survival of his company.

“Look what happened when we went from horse-drawn carriages to cars, from chemical-based photography to digital photography,” says Diess, sitting in Volkswagen’s gargantuan factory headquarters in Wolfsburg, a sleepy company town of 125,000 people, some 140 miles west of Berlin. “There was huge disruption. Very few of the successful companies remained. Kodak did not make it, and they knew what was coming.”

Just a couple of months into his job, Diess, 59, has chosen to meet me inside Volkswagen’s secretive innovation center—a black velvet curtain hides one part of the room from view—in order to underscore his point: That only radical transformation can save the auto giant from being left behind by more nimble competitors. “It is now really important for us to change,” he says.

很少有行業(yè)能夠像汽車行業(yè)那樣恰好成為了這場(chǎng)技術(shù)巨變的聚焦點(diǎn)。100多年來(lái)，汽車行業(yè)的存在完全依靠的是一項(xiàng)單一的發(fā)明——內(nèi)燃機(jī)。如今，整個(gè)汽車行業(yè)的年銷量約為8000萬(wàn)輛。去年，有1080萬(wàn)輛來(lái)自于大眾集團(tuán)，1040萬(wàn)輛出自豐田之手，而豐田已經(jīng)逗留在汽車銷量排行榜前列長(zhǎng)達(dá)數(shù)年之久。大眾旗下的12個(gè)品牌包括保時(shí)捷、斯柯達(dá)、奧迪和大眾自身，而大眾也是公司旗下最大的品牌。去年，大眾的總營(yíng)收達(dá)到了創(chuàng)紀(jì)錄的2600億美元，足以讓公司登上今年《財(cái)富》世界500強(qiáng)榜單第7位，僅次于豐田。

然而，盡管數(shù)千萬(wàn)車主可能在今后很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間內(nèi)仍將繼續(xù)使用燃油作為動(dòng)力，但汽車制造商正在面臨一場(chǎng)大清洗，因?yàn)槿蚴袌?chǎng)開(kāi)始緩慢轉(zhuǎn)向電動(dòng)汽車，而且很多國(guó)家的碳排放目標(biāo)也逐漸讓傳統(tǒng)的駕駛方式走向末路。拼車的興起有可能在未來(lái)十年內(nèi)讓城市的面貌和汽車持有量出現(xiàn)巨大的變化。

在這一轉(zhuǎn)型過(guò)程中，美國(guó)親眼見(jiàn)證了自身市場(chǎng)主導(dǎo)地位的衰退，然而美國(guó)民眾對(duì)汽車的激情事實(shí)上左右了行業(yè)策略長(zhǎng)達(dá)數(shù)十年的時(shí)間。如今，更為重要的一個(gè)國(guó)家莫過(guò)于大眾最大的市場(chǎng)——中國(guó)，該國(guó)民眾購(gòu)買了全球四分之一的新車，而且該國(guó)也開(kāi)足了馬力，生產(chǎn)暢銷的電動(dòng)汽車?！白兏锛磳?lái)臨?！钡纤拐f(shuō)道。

這個(gè)范圍的動(dòng)蕩對(duì)于任何企業(yè)來(lái)說(shuō)都是令人生畏的。然而對(duì)于大眾來(lái)說(shuō)，在此事發(fā)生之時(shí)，大眾依然還未走出其令人震驚的柴油尾氣作弊丑聞陰影。用一些高管的話來(lái)說(shuō)，這是自希特勒設(shè)立沃爾夫斯堡工廠并將其作為重要的納粹項(xiàng)目以來(lái)，公司遭遇的最大打擊，時(shí)隔正好80年。

這次丑聞?dòng)直环Q為“排放門”事件，于2015年9月爆發(fā)，當(dāng)時(shí)美國(guó)環(huán)境保護(hù)署發(fā)現(xiàn)大眾參與了約60萬(wàn)輛柴油車碳排放測(cè)試的造假，隨后這一數(shù)字增至數(shù)百萬(wàn)輛。在五年多的時(shí)間中，沃爾夫斯堡的工程師在車上安裝了“作弊裝置”，用于掩蓋引擎排放的氮氧化物含量。麻省理工學(xué)院的科學(xué)家發(fā)現(xiàn)，真實(shí)的排放量高達(dá)美國(guó)法律規(guī)定上限的40倍。他們估計(jì)，造假引擎所排放的有毒化合物可能導(dǎo)致歐洲1200人過(guò)早死亡，也致使美國(guó)的過(guò)早死人數(shù)增加了約60名。

約三年前，大眾當(dāng)時(shí)已經(jīng)支付了近300億美元用于法律和解，并召回或改裝了1100多萬(wàn)輛汽車，但塵埃遠(yuǎn)未落定。大眾首席技術(shù)官烏爾瑞奇·艾?；舳髡f(shuō)：“令我感到驚訝的是，我們有時(shí)候仍然會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)一些更老的軟件也擁有這些功能，但我們并不知道車?yán)锩姘惭b了這種軟件?！贝送?，大眾在歐洲和美國(guó)被卷入了數(shù)十個(gè)指控和案件，而這些案件可能會(huì)持續(xù)很長(zhǎng)一段時(shí)間；3月發(fā)布的最新年報(bào)列出了數(shù)十個(gè)正在進(jìn)行的法律行動(dòng)。迪斯說(shuō)：“這些案件將持續(xù)數(shù)年的時(shí)間。”有多少？“我不能說(shuō)?！?

為了展示公司如何向前邁進(jìn)，大眾邀請(qǐng)《財(cái)富》雜志在6月底訪問(wèn)其錯(cuò)綜復(fù)雜的沃爾夫斯堡總部，并逗留數(shù)日，從而在公司成立80周年之際以不同尋常的視角來(lái)深入了解這家處于緊要關(guān)頭的公司。

Few businesses sit so squarely in the crosshairs of a tech upheaval as the auto industry, whose very existence has depended for more than 100 years on a single invention: the combustion engine. Today, the industry overall sells about 80 million cars a year. Last year, a full 10.8 million of those came from the Volkswagen Group, more than the 10.4 million sold by Toyota, which had held the top-selling spot for years. Volkswagen’s 12 brands include Porsche, Skoda, Audi, and VW itself, the biggest brand of all. Last year, Volkswagen’s total revenues were a record $260 billion. That was enough to place the company at No. 7 on this year’s Fortune Global 500 list—one spot behind Toyota.

And yet, while millions of us will probably be filling our tanks with fuel for years to come, carmakers are facing a major shakeout as the world begins a long-term shift to electric vehicles and as carbon-emissions targets in many countries slowly upend old driving habits. A boom in ride-sharing could also drastically reshape cities and car ownership within a decade.

Amid this transformation, the U.S., whose passion for cars virtually dictated the industry’s strategy for decades, is seeing its market dominance fade. More important now is China—Volkswagen’s biggest market—which buys about one-quarter of all the world’s new cars and which is racing full speed into producing mass-market electric vehicles. “Change,” says Diess, “is imminent.”

Turbulence on this scale would be daunting for any business. But at Volks-wagen, it’s happening while the company is still reeling from its mammoth diesel-cheating scandal, which some execs describe as its biggest trauma since Adolf Hitler launched the Wolfsburg factory as a prized Nazi project exactly 80 years ago.

“Dieselgate,” as the scandal is known, exploded in September 2015, when the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency revealed that Volkswagen had engaged in carbon-emissions testing fraud in about 600,000 diesel-powered vehicles; that number has since risen to millions. Over a period of more than five years, engineers in Wolfsburg had installed “defeat devices” in vehicles—software that masked the level of nitrogen oxides the engines were emitting. The real emissions rates were revealed to be up to 40 times above the legal U.S. limit, according to MIT scientists, who estimate that the toxic compound in the tricked-out engines could cause about 1,200 early deaths in Europe and about 60 more in the U.S.

Nearly three years on, Volkswagen has so far paid almost $30 billion in legal settlements and recalled or refitted more than 11 million vehicles—and the fallout is still far from over. “To my dismay we sometimes still find functions in older software that we did not know was there,” says Volkswagen’s chief technology officer Ulrich Eichhorn. In addition, Volkswagen is embroiled in dozens of prosecutions and lawsuits across Europe and the U.S. that are likely to linger for a long while yet; the latest annual report, in March, listed dozens of ongoing legal challenges. “It will take years,” Diess says. How many? “I cannot say.”

To show how the company is moving forward, Volkswagen invited Fortune to spend several days in late June in its sprawling Wolfsburg headquarters, offering a rare, deep look inside the company at a pivotal moment in its 80-year history.

龐大的工廠綜合體面積差不多與摩納哥市或亞特蘭大機(jī)場(chǎng)相當(dāng)，每年生產(chǎn)800萬(wàn)輛車。工廠采用了紅磚結(jié)構(gòu)，看起來(lái)十分簡(jiǎn)樸，其歷史能夠追溯至20世紀(jì)30和40年代，當(dāng)時(shí)由納粹掌管。工廠的二戰(zhàn)防空洞位于機(jī)器人控制的最先進(jìn)組裝線的正下方，已經(jīng)改造為一個(gè)紀(jì)念館，用于紀(jì)念約2萬(wàn)名強(qiáng)迫勞工和曾在工廠工作、被蓋世太保監(jiān)督的集中營(yíng)囚犯。在《財(cái)富》雜志記者到訪沃爾夫斯堡的那一周，整個(gè)城市慶祝了其80歲的生日，紀(jì)念希特勒在1938年啟動(dòng)大眾工廠。如今，作為培訓(xùn)的一部分，大眾都會(huì)安排學(xué)徒參加為期三天的奧斯維辛集中營(yíng)參觀活動(dòng)。

大眾稱，公司更愿意暢想未來(lái)而不是糾結(jié)于丑聞。然而事實(shí)證明，對(duì)排放門事件視而不見(jiàn)也是不現(xiàn)實(shí)的。在《財(cái)富》雜志記者到訪沃爾夫斯堡的兩天前，德國(guó)檢方因排放門事件向大眾開(kāi)出了10億歐元（約合11.7億美元）的罰單，成為了德國(guó)歷史上最大的工業(yè)罰單之一，而且針對(duì)的是德國(guó)最為知名的企業(yè)之一。數(shù)天后，警察突然出現(xiàn)在奧迪首席執(zhí)行官瑞普特·施泰德的家門口，并逮捕了涉嫌參與丑聞的瑞普特。警察繳獲的文件中包括大眾有關(guān)排放門的內(nèi)部報(bào)告，該報(bào)告由公司委托Jones Day律所位于慕尼黑的律師匯編，并拒絕公開(kāi)發(fā)布。7月初，公司拒絕公開(kāi)報(bào)告的法律行動(dòng)以失敗告終。

The giant factory complex, roughly the area of the principality of Mon-aco or the Atlanta airport, produces 8 million cars a year, from a set of austere-looking redbrick buildings that date back to when the -Nazis ran the operation in the 1930s and 1940s. The factory’s World War II bomb shelter sits directly underneath the state-of-the-art, robot-controlled assembly line and has been turned into a memorial to the 20,000 or so forced laborers and concentration-camp inmates who worked in the factory, watched over by the Gestapo. Coincidentally, the week Fortune visited Wolfsburg, the town celebrated its 80th birthday, marking Hitler’s inauguration of the Volkswagen factory in 1938. Today, Volkswagen apprentices take three-day trips to the Auschwitz concentration camp as part of their training.

Volkswagen says it’s eager to talk about the future rather than rehash the scandal. But ignoring Dieselgate has proved impossible. Two weeks before Fortune’s visit to Wolfsburg, German prosecutors had levied a billion-euro penalty (about $1.17 billion) against Volks-wagen for Dieselgate, one of the country’s biggest-ever industrial fines—and a blow against one of Germany’s most iconic companies. Days later, police stormed Audi CEO Rupert Stadler’s home and arrested him for alleged involvement in the scheme. Among the documents police seized was Volkswagen’s internal report on Dieselgate, which it had commissioned Jones Day lawyers in Munich to compile and which the company has refused to release publicly; in early July, it lost a legal challenge to keep the report confidential.

排放門丑聞幾乎籠罩著我在沃爾夫斯堡的所有對(duì)話，而高管們也在反思其中的細(xì)節(jié)，表達(dá)了他們的震驚和羞愧，同時(shí)還描述了他們走出危機(jī)并改造大眾的計(jì)劃。

希爾楚德·維爾納說(shuō)：“這是自二戰(zhàn)以來(lái)德國(guó)最嚴(yán)重的工業(yè)丑聞，它將成為公司歷史中永遠(yuǎn)抹不去的一個(gè)污點(diǎn)。”希爾楚德于去年加入公司，負(fù)責(zé)誠(chéng)信和法律事務(wù)，是大眾管理委員會(huì)唯一的女性。她還指出，“丑聞的嚴(yán)重程度可謂是前所未有。”

財(cái)務(wù)上付出的代價(jià)一樣很大。目前大眾已經(jīng)賠付300億美元，數(shù)字肯定會(huì)增加，相當(dāng)于“業(yè)績(jī)很好時(shí)三年總收入，但業(yè)績(jī)并不是每年都很好?！奔夹g(shù)總監(jiān)艾?；舳鞅硎??！肮咀龀鲞@樣的事我覺(jué)得很丟臉?！?

雖然沃爾夫斯堡的大眾總部各種反思，有個(gè)問(wèn)題一直存在：雖說(shuō)晚了點(diǎn)，但公司已經(jīng)迅速轉(zhuǎn)向綠色科技，能不能借此重塑自身維持巨大的影響力，還是會(huì)跟傳統(tǒng)汽車工業(yè)的商業(yè)模式一樣穩(wěn)步下滑？

Dieselgate overshadowed almost every conversation I had in Wolfsburg, as executives pored over its details, described their shock and embarrassment, and outlined their plans to exit the crisis and remake Volkswagen.

“This is the worst industrial scandal in Germany since World War II,” says Hiltrud Werner, who joined the company last year to take charge of integrity and legal affairs and is the sole woman on Volkswagen’s board of management. “This will stay with the history of this company forever,” she adds. “It has a magnitude that we have not seen before.”

The financial cost has been mammoth as well: The $30 billion paid out so far—a figure that is sure to rise further—equals “the money we make in three good years, and we don’t always have good years,” says technology chief Eichhorn. “I am ashamed that my company did this.”

For all the soul-searching in Wolfsburg, however, one question remains: Now that the company is rushing—belatedly—to embrace green technology, can it remake itself quickly enough to retain its enormous clout, or will it steadily decline, along with the old-style business models of traditional automakers?

目前復(fù)蘇的跡象看起來(lái)還不錯(cuò)。大眾銷售和收入創(chuàng)下新紀(jì)錄。就在丑聞爆發(fā)一年后的2016年，大眾取代豐田成為全球汽車銷量最高的制造商。但從加州到中國(guó)還有很多更年輕也更靈活的競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手拼命追趕，還不受死板規(guī)矩限制，而且跟大眾一樣，各家公司都希望開(kāi)創(chuàng)新時(shí)代的汽車行業(yè)。

諷刺的是，大眾成功最大的希望也來(lái)自丑聞，因?yàn)槌舐劥碳ご蟊娭泵嫔顚哟蔚娜毕莶⒄J(rèn)清現(xiàn)實(shí)，如果持續(xù)不變將面臨嚴(yán)峻威脅。

2015年7月，迪斯離開(kāi)寶馬加入大眾，就在排放門曝光兩個(gè)月前。大眾招徠他主要是希望獲得新想法和技術(shù)戰(zhàn)略，并借鑒他之前在寶馬削減成本的經(jīng)驗(yàn)。加入之后他的職責(zé)卻變成大力破除舊習(xí)慣并打造新的文化?！拔曳浅４_定，由于行業(yè)里發(fā)生的事情，公司必須改變。”迪斯說(shuō)?！暗裼团欧盼C(jī)加快了變革進(jìn)程?！?

剛開(kāi)始大眾對(duì)排放門的反應(yīng)不太緊迫，也沒(méi)太在意。2015年9月18日，美國(guó)環(huán)保署官員沒(méi)有通知大眾就在華盛頓召開(kāi)新聞發(fā)布會(huì)，并宣布了近期最大的企業(yè)欺詐行為之一。位于4000英里外沃爾夫斯堡的高管們措手不及。他們派出長(zhǎng)期擔(dān)任首席執(zhí)行官馬丁·溫特科恩用德語(yǔ)在電視上生硬地發(fā)表了一份類似道歉的聲明，他將排放丑聞稱為“少數(shù)人犯下的錯(cuò)誤”，卻對(duì)公司的責(zé)任輕描淡寫。幾天后溫特科恩辭職，今年5月，他在底特律因涉嫌誤導(dǎo)美國(guó)公眾遭到起訴。

丑聞爆發(fā)時(shí)，迪斯正在西班牙度假，當(dāng)時(shí)他已是大眾汽車管理委員會(huì)成員。他等了一整天才飛回家。“當(dāng)時(shí)我并不知道事情會(huì)發(fā)展成什么樣，也不知道會(huì)付出多少代價(jià)?！彼f(shuō)。 “唉，別提了?！?

令人驚訝的是，排放作弊曝光純屬偶然，當(dāng)時(shí)一群西弗吉尼亞大學(xué)的研究生在洛杉磯附近駕駛大眾車輛上下高速公路，記錄車尾排放數(shù)據(jù)。他們本意不是檢測(cè)違規(guī)行為，只是個(gè)簡(jiǎn)單的研究項(xiàng)目。但按照大眾工程師設(shè)計(jì)的方案，排放只在比較測(cè)試期間達(dá)標(biāo)，符合美國(guó)大多數(shù)州要求。所以學(xué)生們偶然揭發(fā)出一樁國(guó)際丑聞。

他們把測(cè)試結(jié)果交給加州和聯(lián)邦官員時(shí)，眾人皆驚。大眾汽車的業(yè)務(wù)嚴(yán)重依賴柴油車，數(shù)年里向美國(guó)人吹噓環(huán)保新型“清潔柴油”。事實(shí)上更像是賣狗皮膏藥。美國(guó)調(diào)查人員透露，沃爾夫斯堡的管理人員曾阻止內(nèi)部提出排放作弊的問(wèn)題，提出質(zhì)疑的工程師都被要求保持沉默繼續(xù)照做。美國(guó)當(dāng)局將數(shù)據(jù)跟大眾對(duì)質(zhì)時(shí)，大眾表示毫不知情。

然而除了沃爾夫斯堡自我封閉的小世界，汽車行業(yè)其他高管心里都很清楚。業(yè)內(nèi)巨頭不僅犯下刑事罪行，還對(duì)后果漠不關(guān)心。

“當(dāng)時(shí)我在想，天吶，這些家伙居然這么天真？”現(xiàn)任大眾集團(tuán)戰(zhàn)略高級(jí)副總裁的托馬斯·塞德蘭回憶起丑聞爆發(fā)時(shí)稱。當(dāng)時(shí)賽德蘭擔(dān)任雪佛蘭歐洲公司的董事總經(jīng)理，2015年年底加入大眾，協(xié)助在排放門之后重塑公司形象。“為什么他們覺(jué)得撒謊沒(méi)什么問(wèn)題，還相信不會(huì)被抓??？”一天下午他坐在沃爾夫斯堡的辦公室里說(shuō)，大眾仍然深陷丑聞困境。 “被抓住之后還是撒謊。真搞不懂。”

問(wèn)題的答案不在于企業(yè)貪婪，也沒(méi)有誤解外國(guó)法律。根據(jù)許多內(nèi)部人士和外界人士的說(shuō)法，問(wèn)題根源在于大眾內(nèi)部異常保守和嚴(yán)格的等級(jí)文化，數(shù)十年間從大眾總部孕育而成。沃爾夫斯堡約有75,000人在大眾工作，超過(guò)該鎮(zhèn)居民人數(shù)一半。

幾十年來(lái)，大眾汽車一直受領(lǐng)導(dǎo)人把控，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)講話不容質(zhì)疑，其專橫風(fēng)格在德國(guó)擁有巨大的政治影響力。德國(guó)總理安吉拉·默克爾就不止一次代表大眾干預(yù)法規(guī)，包括可能控制柴油氮氧化物排放的歐盟法規(guī)，在美國(guó)也一樣。

So far, the signs of a recovery look good. Volkswagen is generating record sales and revenues; it overtook Toyota as the world’s biggest automaker by sales volume in 2016, the year after the scandal broke. Even so, competitors from California to China—younger, more agile, less hidebound by rigid structures—are nipping at its heels and, just like Volkswagen, are racing to build a new-age auto industry.

Ironically, Volkswagen’s best hope for success springs from the scandal itself, which forced the automaker to confront its deep flaws and to conclude that it faces severe threats if it remains unchanged.

Diess arrived at Volkswagen from BMW AG in July 2015, two months before -Dieselgate exploded. He was lured to Volkswagen specifically to inject new ideas and technology strategies, and to cut costs, as he had done at BMW. Now he is charged with taking a wrecking ball to old habits and creating a new culture in its place. “I was already quite sure this company had to change because of what was happening in the industry,” says Diess. “But the diesel crisis has accelerated our change process quite considerably.”

Volkswagen’s initial response to Dieselgate was not so urgent or inspired. On Sept. 18, 2015, EPA officials called a press conference in Washington, without alerting Volkswagen beforehand, and announced one of the biggest corporate frauds of recent times. Executives in Wolfsburg, 4,000 miles away, were caught off guard. They dispatched longtime CEO Martin Winterkorn to deliver a stilted half–apology on television, in German, in which he blamed “the mistakes of only a few” and downplayed the company’s responsibility. Winterkorn resigned days later, and in May of this year, he was indicted in Detroit for having misled the U.S. over the cheating.

Diess, who already sat on Volkswagen’s board of management, was relaxing on vacation in Spain when the scandal broke, and he waited a full day before flying home. “At that time, I did not have any idea of how it was going to end up, or how much it would cost,” he says. “No, no.”

Amazingly, the cheating was uncovered by sheer happenstance, when a group of graduate students from West Virginia University rode Volkswagen vehicles around Los Angeles, hopping on and off freeways, and recorded emissions on gear they had rigged up in the back. They had no expectation of finding wrongdoing; it was a simple study project. But Volkswagen’s engineers had devised the scheme to display good emission levels only during controlled tests, of the kind that most states in the U.S. require. And so the students stumbled on an international scandal.

When they brought their results to California and U.S. officials, there was a stunned response. Volkswagen, whose business depended heavily on diesel cars, had spent years boasting to Americans about its eco-friendly new “clean diesel.” In fact, it was more like selling snake oil. U.S. investigators revealed that managers in Wolfsburg had sought to stifle internal questions about emissions cheating, and that engineers who raised concerns were told to keep quiet and carry on. When U.S. authorities confronted Volkswagen with the data, it denied all knowledge.

To auto executives outside the hermetic world of Wolfsburg, the implications were clear. A global giant of their industry had not only acted criminally but also appeared blithely unconcerned about the consequences.

“I thought, Jesus Christ, how naive are these guys?” says Thomas Sedran, now Volkswagen’s senior vice president for group strategy, recalling the moment the scandal broke. Sedran was managing director of Chevrolet Europe at the time and was recruited by Volkswagen in late 2015 to help reshape the company in the wake of Dieselgate. “Why did they think it was okay to cheat and believe they would not get caught?” he says, sitting in his Wolfsburg office late one afternoon, still flummoxed by the scandal. “And even when they were caught, they still lied about it. I don’t get it.”

The answer to Sedran’s question lay not in corporate greed nor in misunderstanding foreign laws. According to many insiders and outsiders, the problem was Volkswagen’s unusually insular and rigidly hierarchical culture, which had been bred over the decades within Wolfsburg, where about 75,000 people—more than half the town’s residents—work for the company.

Volkswagen had for decades been dominated by leaders whose word was unquestioned and whose imperious style held huge political sway in Germany. Chancellor Angela Merkel has more than once intervened on Volkswagen’s behalf to dilute regulations—including EU rules that might have reined in diesel’s nitrogen oxide emissions, as they do in the U.S.

沃爾夫斯堡的存在主要因?yàn)檎?，而大眾又能主?dǎo)政治。當(dāng)年納粹開(kāi)創(chuàng)這個(gè)小鎮(zhèn)當(dāng)成理想工廠原因是地處德國(guó)中部，勞動(dòng)力充足。現(xiàn)在工廠則占據(jù)了整座小鎮(zhèn)，鎮(zhèn)上交通堵塞的時(shí)間都跟組裝線排班保持一致。甲級(jí)聯(lián)隊(duì)大眾足球隊(duì)（德國(guó)叫Fussball）隊(duì)員在公司建的體育場(chǎng)里比賽。Autostadt是大眾于2000年開(kāi)放的汽車展示和主題公園，旋轉(zhuǎn)展示展品，而且全年都有文化活動(dòng)，包括音樂(lè)會(huì)和夏季國(guó)際馬戲節(jié)等。

在采訪中，專家和公司內(nèi)部人士都認(rèn)為丑聞與大眾的僵化文化有關(guān)，中層管理人員和低級(jí)別工人不愿質(zhì)疑上級(jí)的決策，包括排放測(cè)試作弊的決策。

“開(kāi)會(huì)時(shí)，每個(gè)人都在等待老板說(shuō)話?！本S爾納接著說(shuō)，其他德國(guó)公司也有這種傾向。她說(shuō)，大眾汽車內(nèi)部缺乏多樣性，尤其是性別方面，也加強(qiáng)了官僚化趨勢(shì)。我問(wèn)她作為管理委員會(huì)中唯一女性是什么體驗(yàn)時(shí)，她比作在國(guó)外。“出國(guó)時(shí)必須學(xué)習(xí)當(dāng)?shù)厝说恼Z(yǔ)言才能生存。她說(shuō)?！八裕业脤W(xué)習(xí)男人的語(yǔ)言才能生存。”她偶爾也會(huì)主動(dòng)推進(jìn)會(huì)議，好讓其他人認(rèn)真對(duì)待她的意見(jiàn)?！坝袝r(shí)我必須強(qiáng)調(diào)，我在這行已經(jīng)干了27年?！彼f(shuō)。 “我跟他們一樣，汽車的基因流淌在血液里?！?

20世紀(jì)60年代以來(lái)，負(fù)責(zé)監(jiān)督大眾董事會(huì)的車監(jiān)事會(huì)結(jié)構(gòu)從未改變。下薩克森州政府（沃爾夫斯堡所在地）的當(dāng)?shù)馗呒?jí)官員持有20%股份，對(duì)許多戰(zhàn)略決策有否決權(quán)。創(chuàng)立公司的皮耶希和保時(shí)捷兩大家族也有永久代表，還有一半成員來(lái)自工會(huì)；根據(jù)德國(guó)法律，公司董事會(huì)必須有工人代表。

行業(yè)分析師認(rèn)為，正因?yàn)槎聲?huì)結(jié)構(gòu)長(zhǎng)期不變，大眾員工人數(shù)才會(huì)達(dá)到64萬(wàn)之多，跟豐田產(chǎn)能差不多，人卻多出了約三分之一。2016年，大眾勞工代表和當(dāng)?shù)卣缛耸颗c管理層長(zhǎng)期談判后，終于同意允許全球裁員3萬(wàn)人。 “認(rèn)真分析就會(huì)發(fā)現(xiàn)，大眾內(nèi)部效率極低?！眰惗谽vercore ISI全球汽車研究主管阿恩特·埃林霍斯特說(shuō)，本世紀(jì)初他曾在大眾總部當(dāng)管理培訓(xùn)生。 “公司管理有很大提升空間?！卑Ａ只羲固卦诮衲?月給投資者的研究報(bào)告中寫道，“大眾公司結(jié)構(gòu)過(guò)于老舊，非常影響股東的看法?！?

曾研究排放門事件的人們表示，過(guò)時(shí)的公司結(jié)構(gòu)也是大眾汽車出問(wèn)題的關(guān)鍵原因?！案丛谟?，一些不稱職的人受到不良的公司文化縱容?！泵绹?guó)司法部前副部長(zhǎng)拉里·D·湯普森說(shuō)，2017年4月司法部任命他擔(dān)任大眾汽車獨(dú)立監(jiān)察員。作為大眾汽車與美國(guó)政府和解方案的一部分，湯普森帶領(lǐng)約60人的團(tuán)隊(duì)在認(rèn)真監(jiān)督沃爾夫斯堡內(nèi)部改革。他說(shuō)，公司文化“不鼓勵(lì)職業(yè)經(jīng)理人誠(chéng)實(shí)地講出知道的問(wèn)題，也不鼓勵(lì)懷疑現(xiàn)狀?！?/p>

持續(xù)數(shù)十年根深蒂固的習(xí)慣改變起來(lái)是個(gè)漫長(zhǎng)的過(guò)程?！八季S方式要轉(zhuǎn)變?！钡纤拐f(shuō)。“很多人只關(guān)注公司前五號(hào)人物，甚至只關(guān)注首席執(zhí)行官的意見(jiàn)。要讓人們相信所有人都要承擔(dān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和責(zé)任，具備主人翁精神，其實(shí)并不容易?！?

不過(guò)分析師認(rèn)為，迪斯可能是改變大眾汽車的最佳人選，特別是跟很多思維固化的人相比，他想法還算靈活?！八麑?duì)大眾汽車極其重要?！卑Ａ只羲固卣f(shuō)。“這是個(gè)巨大的機(jī)會(huì)。人們相信他可以強(qiáng)力推動(dòng)變革?！眰惗豃.P.摩根汽車股研究員何塞·阿蘇門迪表示贊同，稱迪斯是“德國(guó)汽車業(yè)最佳首席執(zhí)行官”。

各種跡象表明變化正在發(fā)生。有些不太明顯，比如同事之間稱呼對(duì)方時(shí)開(kāi)始用德語(yǔ)里非正式代詞du而不是更正式的Sie。最近大眾汽車還發(fā)布了首個(gè)公司行為準(zhǔn)則，其中包括人權(quán)、性別平等和環(huán)境保護(hù)等規(guī)定。

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Wolfsburg’s very existence is owed to politics, and VW dominates the landscape. The Nazis created the town as an ideal factory site, since it sat in central Germany with plentiful labor. Today, the factory dominates the town, with traffic jams timed to shift changes on the assembly line. A first-division Volkswagen soccer (or Fussball, in German) team plays in the company-built stadium. The Autostadt—a showcase and theme park of cars, with rotating exhibits, which Volks-wagen opened in 2000—runs year-round cultural programs, including concerts and an international circus festival in the summer.

In interviews, experts and company insiders draw a direct connection between the scandal and Volkswagen’s rigid culture, in which mid-level managers and low-level workers were reluctant to question their superiors’ decisions, including the decision to cheat on emissions tests.

“In meetings, everyone is holding back and waiting for the boss to say something,” says Werner, adding that the tendency is found in other German companies too. At Volkswagen, she says, the lack of diversity, including in gender, reinforces that tendency. When I ask her what it is like to be the only woman on the management board, she likens it to being in a foreign country. “When you go abroad, you have to learn the language of the locals to survive,” she says. “So I have to learn the language of the men to survive.” That, she says, includes occasionally pushing in meetings for her views to be taken seriously. “I have to make it clear to them sometimes that I have also worked for 27 years in the industry,” she says. “I have fuel in my blood, just like they do.”

The structure of Volkswagen’s supervisory board, which oversees the board of managers, has remained unchanged since the 1960s. Top local officials from the Lower Saxony government (where Wolfsburg is situated) hold a 20% share, with veto power over many strategic decisions. There is also permanent representation from the Pi?ch and Porsche families, who founded the company, and half the members are from workers’ councils; under German law, company boards must include worker representation.

Industry analysts believe the unchanged board structure is one explanation for Volkswagen’s giant workforce of 640,000 people—about one-third bigger than Toyota’s for almost equal output. After long negotiations with management, in 2016 Volkswagen’s labor representatives and local politicians finally agreed to allow the company to cut 30,000 jobs worldwide. “When you analyze it, it is extremely inefficient,” says Arndt Ellinghorst, head of global automotive research at Evercore ISI in London, who was a management trainee at Volkswagen headquarters in the early 2000s. “It should be far better run.” In a research report to investors in May, Ellinghorst wrote that “VW’s outdated corporate structure remains a major burden to shareholder sentiment.”

That structure is also one key factor in what went wrong at Volks-wagen, say those who have examined the Dieselgate affair. “What occurred was the combination of some bad people and a bad culture,” says Larry D. Thompson, a former deputy U.S. attorney general, whom the Department of Justice appointed in April 2017 as the independent monitor of Volkswagen. As part of the com-pany’s legal settlement with the U.S. government, Thompson’s team of about 60 people now scrutinizes the internal reforms in Wolfsburg. The company culture, he says, “discouraged professional managers from speaking honestly about problems they knew about or suspected were going on.”

Overhauling decades of ingrained habits will be a long process. “We need a change in the mindset,” Diess says. “Many people were focused on what was said by the top five people or probably by the CEO himself. To convince them that they have to take risks, responsibility, ownership—that is not easy.”

Still, analysts think Diess might have the best shot of anyone at changing Volkswagen, especially considering that compared with company lifers, he is an outsider. “He is unbelievably important for Volkswagen,” Ellinghorst says. “It is a huge opportunity. The trust is he will drive change in a very forceful manner.” José Asumendi, auto equity researcher at J.P. Morgan in London, agrees, calling Diess “the best CEO of the auto industry in Germany.”

There are signs everywhere that changes are underway. Some are subtle, like colleagues beginning to address each other with the German informal pronoun du rather than the formal Sie. Recently, Volkswagen issued its first companywide code of conduct, with guidelines that include human rights, gender equality, and environmental protection.

誠(chéng)信主管維爾納發(fā)起了一場(chǎng)宣傳新價(jià)值觀的運(yùn)動(dòng)，即包括公開(kāi)談?wù)搯?wèn)題。6月下旬一個(gè)早晨，我乘上她倡導(dǎo)的“誠(chéng)信公交車”，一輛涂裝鮮艷的大客車，每個(gè)月她都邀請(qǐng)員工乘車在沃爾夫斯堡工廠周圍開(kāi)一小時(shí)。此舉主要為了讓員工相對(duì)客觀地對(duì)高管成員表達(dá)不滿和焦慮，這對(duì)大眾來(lái)說(shuō)就是個(gè)比較新的概念。這天早上，公交車上坐滿了技術(shù)工程師，都因排放門受到同事“責(zé)罵”。“每次去食堂，都讓人感覺(jué)他們就是害公司賠償250億歐元的人?！本S爾納說(shuō)?！斑@種情況并不容易處理?！痹谲嚿?，有名男員工說(shuō)聽(tīng)到外界對(duì)公司嚴(yán)厲指責(zé)之后感到很不安。維爾納告訴他公司正在變化，而且沒(méi)有“回頭路”，不過(guò)她也強(qiáng)調(diào)“可持續(xù)變革需要一個(gè)生命周期?！?

無(wú)論轉(zhuǎn)型最終需要多久，迪斯深信未來(lái)十年動(dòng)蕩中大眾汽車保持增長(zhǎng)至關(guān)重要?！八朗嘏f的公司文化很難生存，以前過(guò)于依靠總部，依靠核心決策?！彼硎尽！叭绻瑯拥膯?wèn)題要問(wèn)很多遍，速度肯定很慢。”

在沃爾夫斯堡小鎮(zhèn)，大眾汽車的等級(jí)文化正在轉(zhuǎn)變，盡管速度緩慢。在瘦長(zhǎng)健談而且精力十足的迪斯帶領(lǐng)下變化，這位首席執(zhí)行官的口頭禪包括“分享”和“合作”，正悄悄加入討論公司變化的談話中。

迪斯主導(dǎo)重大改組計(jì)劃時(shí)，部分工作就是將迷宮式架構(gòu)分為四大產(chǎn)品線：普通、優(yōu)質(zhì)、豪華（大眾旗下高端車型有賓利和布加迪），還有卡車和公共汽車拆分為獨(dú)立公司，最快明年就能上市。12個(gè)品牌都在部門內(nèi)部匯集集中創(chuàng)意，做出各種決策，不用為了老板認(rèn)可相互競(jìng)爭(zhēng)。用迪斯的話來(lái)說(shuō)，公司新架構(gòu)不僅可以改變“思維方式”，而且最終目標(biāo)是削減數(shù)十億美元開(kāi)支。

機(jī)構(gòu)精簡(jiǎn)的推進(jìn)情況對(duì)于大眾汽車能否實(shí)現(xiàn)激進(jìn)轉(zhuǎn)型至關(guān)重要，也決定了大眾能否成為全球電動(dòng)汽車領(lǐng)域的主要參與者。

轉(zhuǎn)型電動(dòng)汽車計(jì)劃非常龐大，令人眼花繚亂，而且花費(fèi)顯然不菲。今年5月迪斯告訴股東，未來(lái)四年內(nèi)投資近400億美元生產(chǎn)電動(dòng)汽車。大眾汽車的目標(biāo)是，到2025年出產(chǎn)汽車中四分之一都是電動(dòng)汽車，每年達(dá)數(shù)百萬(wàn)輛，在全球電動(dòng)汽車市場(chǎng)份額占10%到15%。這意味著未來(lái)四年大眾汽車在全球有16家工廠要轉(zhuǎn)型或擴(kuò)建，其中有一家在美國(guó)，五家在中國(guó)。首席技術(shù)官艾希霍恩表示，十年內(nèi)大眾汽車需要至少六家新電池工廠，每家規(guī)模都與埃隆·馬斯克在內(nèi)華達(dá)州550萬(wàn)平方英尺的Gigafactory工廠相當(dāng)，馬斯克的工廠主要為特斯拉生產(chǎn)電池。“我們希望成為電動(dòng)車技術(shù)領(lǐng)域的領(lǐng)導(dǎo)者，跟之前在內(nèi)燃機(jī)領(lǐng)域一樣?！卑；舳鞅硎?。

Werner, as the integrity chief, has launched a campaign to spread the word about new values—including the ability to speak openly about problems. One morning in late June, I hopped aboard her “integrity bus,” a bright-painted motor coach she fills once a month with invited employees, for an hour-long drive around the Wolfsburg campus. The idea is for them to air grievances and anxieties on neutral ground, with a member of senior management—a relatively new concept at Volks-wagen. On this morning, the bus is filled with technical engineers, whom Werner says have been “stigmatized” among colleagues for being responsible for Dieselgate. “They cannot go into the canteen without people feeling they were the ones who made us pay 25 billion [euros],” she says. “That is not easy to deal with.” On board, one man says he is troubled by the strong criticisms he hears about the company. Werner tells him the company is changing and is at “a point of no return,” but she also tells him “it will take a life cycle to have sustainable change.”

However long the transformation takes, Diess is convinced that it is crucial for Volkswagen to keep growing through the industry’s tumultuous next decade. “It will be very difficult to survive with this kind of company culture, relying very heavily on headquarters, with central decisions,” he says. “You ask many times the same questions. You get slow.”

In small-town Wolfsburg, Volkswagen’s hierarchical culture is shifting, albeit slowly. In the hands of Diess—lanky and chatty, with a kinetic energy—the CEO’s buzzwords like “sharing” and “cooperation” now creep into conversations about how life is changing in the company.

As part of a major reorganization, Diess has grouped the labyrinthine company into four categories: volume, premium, luxury (Volkswagen owns high-end Bentley and Bugatti), and trucks and buses, which will be spun off as a separate entity, with an IPO perhaps as soon as next year. Each of the 12 brands is now expected to pool ideas within its group, making a broad range of decisions rather than competing among themselves for the boss’s approval. Not only will the new organization change “the mindset,” to use Diess’s term, but also it is aimed at cutting billions in expenses.

That leaner operation is critical if Volkswagen has a shot at succeeding in its most radical transformation ever: becoming a major global player in electric cars.

The scale of the electric plan is dizzying—and won’t come cheap. In May, Diess told shareholders that the company intends to invest nearly $40 billion into producing electric cars within the next four years. By 2025, Volkswagen aims to have one–quarter of the vehicles it produces be electric—millions of cars a year—and to have a 10% to 15% share of the electric-car market globally. That will require converting or expanding 16 factories around the world within four years, including one in the U.S. and five in China. Eichhorn, the CTO, says Volkswagen will also need at least six new battery factories within a decade, each of them the size of Elon Musk’s 5.5-million-square-foot Gigafactory facility in Nevada, which produces batteries for Tesla. “We want to be the technology leader in this, just as we were the technology leader in the combustion engine,” Eichhorn says.

事實(shí)上，大眾汽車是在努力彌補(bǔ)失去的時(shí)間。遭受排放門重創(chuàng)后，大眾汽車于2016年推出電動(dòng)車戰(zhàn)略，此時(shí)距馬斯克創(chuàng)立特斯拉已過(guò)去13年。 “如果沒(méi)有柴油危機(jī)，大眾汽車就不會(huì)有電動(dòng)車平臺(tái)。”塞德蘭說(shuō)?！皢螐呢?cái)務(wù)方面看的話，轉(zhuǎn)型電動(dòng)車并不是個(gè)好主意。由于我們?cè)谪?cái)務(wù)上很成功，所以意識(shí)到這點(diǎn)太遲了?！?

思想變化可謂翻天覆地。雖然大眾汽車動(dòng)作很晚，但迪斯認(rèn)為只要投資足夠，大眾可以利用數(shù)十年的傳統(tǒng)汽車制造經(jīng)驗(yàn)超越競(jìng)爭(zhēng)對(duì)手?！拔覀冇薪?jīng)銷商渠道，還有市場(chǎng)?！彼f(shuō)。談到與特斯拉相比時(shí)，他表示“希望為數(shù)百萬(wàn)人制造電動(dòng)汽車，而不僅僅是百萬(wàn)富翁。把某款汽車銷量從一萬(wàn)輛增加到一百萬(wàn)輛？我們?cè)诿總€(gè)國(guó)家都能做到。”

大眾汽車新項(xiàng)目里，有不少曾遭董事會(huì)否決的想法，比如明年大眾將在德國(guó)多個(gè)城市推出共享電動(dòng)車計(jì)劃，2020年將推廣到全球各地。6月下旬我抵達(dá)沃爾夫斯堡時(shí)，大眾的經(jīng)理們興奮不已。因?yàn)榍靶┤兆釉诳屏_拉多落基山舉辦的Broadmoor Pikes Peak拉力賽上，名叫I.D. R Pikes Peak的大眾定制版電動(dòng)車在不到8分鐘的比賽中獲勝?！叭藗儗?duì)電動(dòng)汽車一直抱有巨大懷疑，但我們贏了！”大眾汽車品牌首席戰(zhàn)略官邁克爾·喬斯特激動(dòng)地說(shuō)。

由于起步比較晚，現(xiàn)在大眾汽車也在關(guān)注電動(dòng)汽車之后的新趨勢(shì)：自動(dòng)駕駛汽車。迪斯認(rèn)為，距自動(dòng)駕駛汽車面世可能只有幾年時(shí)間，印度或中國(guó)新崛起的城市可能最先出現(xiàn)。

In reality, Volkswagen is racing to make up for lost time. It only launched its electric strategy in 2016 in the disastrous aftermath of Dieselgate—13 years after Musk founded Tesla. “Without the diesel crisis, Volkswagen would not have an electric platform,” Sedran says. “Just on the financials, it is not a good idea. We would have realized too late, blinded by our financial success.”

The thinking has changed drastically. While Volkswagen is late, Diess believes that with enough investment, VW can leverage its decades of producing fuel-burning cars to overtake its competitors. “We have the dealerships, the markets,” he says. In comparison to Tesla, he says, “we want to make e-cars for millions, not just for millionaires. Ramping up a car from 10,000 to a million? We can do that in every country in the world.”

Among Volkswagen’s new projects are ideas the board once rejected, like an electric car–sharing scheme the company is launching next year in German cities before going global in 2020. And when I arrived in Wolfsburg in late June, managers were buzzing with excitement over the Broadmoor Pikes Peak rally that had taken place in the Colorado Rockies days before, where Volkswagen’s custom-made electric car, called I.D. R Pikes Peak, won the race in under eight minutes. “There has been big skepticism about EVs—and we won!” cooed Michael Jost, chief strategy officer for the VW brand.

Having been caught behind the curve, the company is now focusing on what comes after electric vehicles: driverless cars. Diess believes autonomous vehicles are probably only a few years away, perhaps beginning in newly built cities in India or China.

看似空想的概念確實(shí)已進(jìn)入設(shè)計(jì)階段。Autostadt展廳里有個(gè)未來(lái)主義的城市模型，車主在辦公室里忙工作，另一邊移動(dòng)機(jī)器人在停車場(chǎng)四處移動(dòng)給汽車充電。這是大眾汽車與德國(guó)機(jī)器人制造商KUKA合作研究的創(chuàng)意。 “對(duì)我們來(lái)說(shuō)是個(gè)全新的世界，”迪斯說(shuō)?！皢?wèn)題是我們能不能做到迅速應(yīng)用新技術(shù)，變得更像軟件公司？”

各種很棒當(dāng)然也很昂貴的發(fā)明目前還不是大眾汽車的核心業(yè)務(wù)，但經(jīng)歷了焦慮的三年之后給公司注入了不少樂(lè)觀情緒。“我們有很多新想法?！贝蟊娖囇芯坎繄?zhí)行董事阿克塞爾·海因里希興奮地告訴我。有天下午，他帶我穿過(guò)大樓，介紹了大眾600名科學(xué)家和工程師當(dāng)中幾位給我認(rèn)識(shí)。他們的發(fā)明包括用廢棄的香蕉葉和蘑菇根制成汽車座椅，不再使用動(dòng)物原料，此外還有適合儀表板的數(shù)字“貼心助手”。研究人員稱，該助手可在司機(jī)駕駛時(shí)完成復(fù)雜的雙向?qū)υ挕?

在柏林西部的波茨坦，歐洲大眾未來(lái)中心（北京和硅谷還有另外兩家）推出了真實(shí)尺寸的未來(lái)汽車模型，由泡沫塑料制成，還裝配了自動(dòng)駕駛汽車SEDRIC的改裝版?！拔覀冋?wù)摰氖俏磥?lái)，而且不只一種未來(lái)。”運(yùn)營(yíng)該中心的汽車設(shè)計(jì)師彼得·沃達(dá)說(shuō)，他向我展示了搭建的新虛擬現(xiàn)實(shí)平臺(tái)，幾秒內(nèi)就可以調(diào)整設(shè)計(jì)?！霸谶b遠(yuǎn)的未來(lái)”，沃達(dá)表示，“大多數(shù)人都不會(huì)真正擁有汽車?！?

當(dāng)“遙遠(yuǎn)的未來(lái)”到來(lái)時(shí)，迪斯希望大眾汽車除了汽車制造商，還是家科技公司。轉(zhuǎn)型工作才剛剛開(kāi)始，而且隨著排放門之后努力重建信譽(yù)徐徐展開(kāi)。“我們失去了很多客戶的信任，”迪斯說(shuō)?！爸亟ㄐ枰獣r(shí)間?！迸c此同時(shí)，全新形象的大眾正努力加速駛向未來(lái)。（財(cái)富中文網(wǎng)）

本文另一版本刊載于2018年8月1日《財(cái)富》雜志上，標(biāo)題為《大眾汽車大重建背后》。

譯者：Ms

Concepts that seem fanciful are, in fact, already in the design phase. In an exhibition hall in the Autostadt, a scale model of a futuristic city shows mobile robots that zoom around parking lots, recharging cars while their owners are running errands or in the office—an idea that Volkswagen is already working on with German robot manufacturer KUKA. “It is a totally new world for us,” Diess says. “The question is, Can we adopt the new technology fast enough, becoming more of a software company?”

These whiz-bang inventions—costly, and for now not Volkswagen’s core business—have injected optimism after three angst-filled years. “We have a lot to show you,” Axel Heinrich, executive director of Volkswagen’s research department, tells me excitedly, as he leads me through the building one afternoon, introducing me to some of Volks-wagen’s 600 scientists and engineers. Among their inventions are car-seat leather made from discarded banana leaves and mushroom roots rather than from animals, and digital “empathic assistants” that fit onto the dashboard and are, say the researchers, capable of conducting complex two-way conversations while you drive.

In Potsdam, west of Berlin, the Volkswagen Future Center Europe (there are two others, in Beijing and Silicon Valley) turns out full-size Styrofoam models of future cars, including adapted versions of SEDRIC, the company’s self-driving vehicle. “We talk about futures, plural,” says Peter Wouda, a car designer who runs the center, as he shows me the new virtual reality platform they have built, allowing them to tweak new designs within seconds. In the “far future,” Wouda says, “most people will not own a car.”

By the time that “far future” arrives, Diess hopes Volkswagen will be as much a tech company as an automaker. The work of transforming the company has only just begun—and is unfolding as it tries to regain its credibility after Dieselgate. “We have lost a lot of confidence of our customers,” Diess says. “I think it will take time.” In the meantime, the new VW is speeding toward that future as fast as it can.

A version of this article appears in the August 1, 2018 issue of Fortune with the headline “Inside VW’s Big Fix-It Job.”